William Whitford v. Gerald Nichol Adam R. Foltz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

WILLIAM WHITFORD, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 15-CV-421-bbc
GERALD NICHOL, et al.,
Defendants.

## VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF

ADAM R. FOLTZ
Madison, Wisconsin
March 31, 2016
9:27 a.m. to 1:28 p.m.

Laura L. Kolnik, RPR/RMR/CRR


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The court reporter, Laura | 1 | Have you seen a copy of the exhibit -- of |
| 2 | Kolnik, will now swear in the witness. | 2 | Exhibit 73 before, Mr. Foltz? |
| 3 | ADAM R. FOLTZ, called as a witness herein, | 3 | A. I have. |
| 4 | after having been first duly sworn, was examined and | 4 | Q. All right. When did you receive a copy of Exhibit |
| 5 | testified as follows: | 5 | 73, the subpoena? |
| 6 | MR. ST. JOHN: Doug, before we begin, I'd just | 6 | A. Last week at some point. |
| 7 | like to put on the record that in the Baldus | 7 | Q. And you are represented by counsel here today, |
| 8 | litigation there were a variety of motions that were | 8 | correct? |
| 9 | raised that related to legislative privilege. The | 9 | A. That's correct. |
| 10 | Baldus court ruled that with respect to the | 10 | Q. What did you do to prepare for your deposition |
| 11 | testimony, the deposition testimony of Mr. Foltz, | 11 | today? |
| 12 | that the legislative privilege did not apply, | 12 | A. I met with counsel and read my prior depositions |
| 13 | allowed the plaintiffs to seek information that went | 13 | from the Baldus action. |
| 14 | into the deliberative process as well as documents | 14 | Q. And when you say "counsel," who did you meet with |
| 15 | that went into that. | 15 | specifically? |
| 16 | We are here to produce information for the | 16 | A. Gabe Johnson-Karp and Kevin St. John. |
| 17 | plaintiffs and will testify to those matters that -- | 17 | Q. Did you meet with any counsel other than |
| 18 | that relate to what was asserted as a legislative | 18 | Mr. St. John and -- and Mr. Karp? |
| 19 | privilege. I note that some courts dealing with | 19 | MR. JOHNSON-KARP: Johnson-Karp. |
| 20 | legislative privilege have looked at it as a | 20 | Q. Johnson-Karp. |
| 21 | testimonial privilege, and other courts have looked | 21 | A. No, I did not. |
| 22 | at the question of what would be submitted into | 22 | Q. Was anyone present at the meetings that you had with |
| 23 | evidence as a different question as what would be | 23 | Mr. Johnson-Karp and Mr. St. John? |
| 24 | discoverable. |  | A. There was a brief overlap with Tad Ottman, but the |
| 25 | So without waiving those rights that may be | 25 | meetings were not concurrent. |
|  | Page 7 |  | Page 9 |
|  | asserted at a later time by either the defendants or | 1 | Q. Did you talk with anyone other than Mr. Johnson-Karp |
| 2 | the deponents, we make Mr. Foltz available for your | 2 | and Mr. St. John about your deposition today? |
| 3 | deposition. | 3 | A. Yes. |
| 4 | MR. POLAND: I understand, Kevin. I understand | 4 | Q. Who else did you speak with? |
| 5 | the preservation. | 5 | A. Senator Fitzgerald, chief of staff to Senator |
| 6 | EXAMINATION | 6 | Fitzgerald, mentioned it to my girlfriend, but |
| 7 | BY MR. POLAND: | 7 | that's about it. Oh, also the Speaker's office. |
| 8 | Q. Good morning, Mr. Foltz | 8 | Zach Bemis from the Speaker's office I also made |
| 9 | A. Good morning. | 9 | aware that I was being deposed. |
| 10 | Q. Will you please state your name for the record? | 10 | Q. What did you talk about with Mr. Fitzgerald? |
| 11 | A. Adam Foltz. | 11 | A. Just generally made him aware that I would be |
| 12 | Q. And can you spell your last name, please? | 12 | required to give a deposition in the ongoing |
| 13 | A. F-O-L-T-Z. | 13 | litigation. |
| 14 | Q. And Mr. Foltz, do you reside within the State of | 14 | Q. Did you talk about the substance of your testimony |
| 15 | Wisconsin? | 15 | at all at the deposition? |
| 16 | A. I do. | 16 | A. No. |
| 17 | Q. You're appearing here this morning pursuant to a | 17 | Q. Did you talk about any of the issues that were -- |
| 18 | subpoena that was issued to you, correct? | 18 | that you thought might come up during the |
| 19 | A. That's correct. | 19 | deposition? |
| 20 | Q. All right. And the court reporter has marked as | 20 | A. No. |
| 21 | Exhibit No. 73 a subpoena. I'm giving a copy to you | 21 | Q. What about the chief of staff of Senator Fitzgerald, |
| 22 | and I'll give a copy to your -- your counsel as | 22 | did you talk about the substance at all of the -- |
| 23 | well. I'm also will hand you a check for \$45 in | 23 | your testimony of the deposition? |
| 24 | payment of the witness fee. I'll tender that to you | 24 | A. No, again just generally made him aware that I would |
| 25 | now for -- for the appearance this morning. | 25 | be required to come in for a deposition. |


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| :---: | :---: |
| 1 Q. All right. And I think in addition to your | 1 MR. POLAND: An extra copy? |
| 2 girlfriend there was one other person that you said | 2 MR. ST. JOHN: That would be for the court |
| 3 that you had talked to about the deposition or about | 3 reporter. |
| 4 the subpoena? | 4 MR. POLAND: For the court reporter. Got it. |
| 5 A. Yeah. Zach Bemis. | 5 (Exhibit No. 74 marked for identification.) |
| 6 Q. Zach Bemis. Did you talk with Zach Bemis at all | 6 BY MR. POLAND: |
| 7 about the substance of the deposition or your | 7 Q. Mr. Foltz, you've produced today and been handed a |
| 8 testimony? | 8 CD-ROM and then a flash drive as well. Are the |
| 9 A. No. | 9 are there identical documents on both the CD-ROM and |
| 10 Q. Did you -- and you mentioned that you did review | 10 the flash drive or are they two different |
| 11 documents to prepare for your testimony today? | 11 collections of documents? |
| 12 A. Yes. | 12 A. I produced the flash drive. |
| 13 Q. What documents did you review? | 13 Q. You produced the flash drive, okay. So the CD-ROM |
| 14 A. I read prior depositions and the exhibits that were | 14 is an exact copy of what's on the flash drive? |
| 15 part of those depositions as well. | 15 A. That's my understanding. |
| 16 Q. All right. And those were the -- the depositions | 16 Q. All right. Okay. Let me ask you about where you |
| 17 from the Baldus litigation, correct? | 17 searched for documents to respond to the subpoena. |
| 18 A. That's correct, and the 30(b)(6) that followed. I | 18 A. Uh-huh. |
| 19 believe that was still considered part of the | 19 Q. Where did you search for documents in response to |
| 20 Baldus, but I'm not $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ percent on that. | 20 the subpoena? |
| 21 Q. I'd like you to take a look at Exhibit A to the | 21 A. So there were some remaining emails from the prior |
| 22 subpoena. That's the very last page of Exhibit No. | 22 litigation so my process was to sort those emails by |
| 23 73. | 23 attachment, whether or not there was a presence of |
| $24 \text { A. Uh-huh. }$ | 24 an attachment, and then to secondarily sort that by |
| 25 Q. Did you read Exhibit A when you receive | 25 the date range listed in Exhibit A. |
| Page 11 | Page 13 |
| 1 the subpoena? | 1 Then I proceeded to work through just in |
| 2 A. I did. | 2 sequence, I can't remember if I worked from April 1 |
| 3 Q. All right. And so you see that there's a request to | 3 down or August 9 up, and then initially just checked |
| 4 produce documents, and it requests all MS Excel | 4 to see if the attachment was, in fact, a Word or an |
| 5 spreadsheets. Do you understand that MS stands for | 5 Excel document. If it was, I would then more |
| 6 Microsoft? | 6 closely examine it to see if it was something that |
| 7 A. I do. | $7 \quad$ was enumerated here in Exhibit A that dealt with |
| 8 Q. All right. "All Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and | 8 partisan performance actual or projected. |
| 9 Microsoft Word documents in native format generated | 9 Q. Okay. So the emails that you -- those were emails |
| 10 during the redistricting process and formation of | 10 that you searched through; is that correct? |
| 11 the state assembly boundaries set out in Act 43 of | 11 A. That's correct. |
| 122011 that mention or evaluate potential or actual | 12 Q. Where were the emails located? |
| 13 partisan performance between the dates of April 1, | 13 A. There was a folder on my Microsoft Outlook and then |
| 142011 and August 9, 2011." Do you see that? | 14 also a Gmail folder that contained the emails that |
| 15 A. I do. | 15 were searched. |
| 16 Q. And did you search for those documents? | 16 Q. All right. Was the -- is the Gmail folder, was that |
| 17 A. I did. | 17 actually on the computer that you were using? |
| 18 Q. And did you find any documents? | 18 A. I mean in the sense that any Gmail folder is |
| 19 A. I did. | 19 available whenever you log into it at whatever |
| 20 Q. All right. Do you have those documents with you | 20 computer. Yes. I guess. |
| 21 today? | 21 Q. Okay. Let me back up a second. When you say that |
| 22 A. Yes. | 22 you searched -- you searched email, was that email |
| 23 MR. POLAND: I'm going to have the court | 23 that was actually residing on a computer that you |
| 24 reporter mark these as Exhibit -- | 24 have access to now? |
| 25 MR. ST. JOHN: A copy for you. | 25 A. The -- the Outlook would be resident on the computer |


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| 1 | that I work on. The -- the Google would be, you | 1 | files, and then I see two -- two zip files. Do I |
| 2 | know, Gmail would be saved on the server but | 2 | understand your testimony correctly that those |
| 3 | accessible with my login and password. | 3 | separate Excel files are actually contained in the |
|  | Q. So essentially web mail; is that correct? | 4 | zip files -- |
| 5 | A. Yeah. | 5 | A. Yeah. |
| 6 | Q. Do you -- you don't still have the computer that you | 6 | Q. -- too? |
| 7 | used for legislative redistricting in 2011; is that | 7 | A. They would be duplicative. |
| 8 | correct? | 8 | Q. They're duplicative? |
| 9 | A. No, I do not. | 9 | A. Yes. |
| 10 | Q. And that was -- that was given to the LTSB some time | 10 | Q. Okay. Okay. So what we have -- essentially what |
| 11 | ago, correct? | 11 | you've produced are one, two, three, four, five |
| 12 | A. Correct. | 12 | separate Excel spreadsheets; is that correct? |
| 13 | Q. How did the -- how did files that relate to the 2011 | 13 | A. Uh-huh. I believe so. |
| 14 | legislative redistricting make their way onto your | 14 | Q. All right. And we'll go into them a little bit more |
| 15 | computer that you're using now in your work? | 15 | detail. I just want to try to get the general |
| 16 | A. I want to be very clear about the distinction | 16 | contours of what we have. |
| 17 | between files and emails. The emails were available | 17 | A. Okay. |
| 18 | because you log in to your state -- your state login | 18 | Q. Mr. Foltz, do you know whether these particular |
| 19 | with whatever server LTSB has, and the emails are | 19 | Excel files that you've produced today were also |
| 20 | available across multiple machines. | 20 | produced in the Baldus litigation? |
| 21 | Q. I understand. So there's a server that LTSB retains | 21 | A. I believe they were. Yes. |
| 22 | that has emails on it even if those emails might | 22 | Q. Okay. Do you know why these particular spreadsheet |
| 23 | have been from a few years ago? | 23 | would have been saved on the email server that LTSB |
| 24 | A. That's correct. | 24 | has? |
| 25 | Q. All right. So even if you get a new computer, sort | 25 | A. The emails that they were attached to were from |
|  | Page 15 |  | Page 17 |
| 1 | of like with web mail, you can go back and you can | 1 | technical support staff that are employed by LTSB, |
| 2 | get those emails that were on the LTSB email server? | 2 | the GIS team specifically within LTSB. |
| 3 | A. Yes, that's my understanding. | 3 | Q. I understand. Did you look any -- well, strike that |
| 4 | Q. Understood. Okay. Did you do anything physically | 4 | question. |
| 5 | to transfer any files from your -- from the computer | 5 | In addition to emails stored on the LTSB |
| 6 | that you used for legislative redistricting in 2011 | 6 | server, where did you look for documents to respond |
| 7 | to the computer that you have now? | 7 | to Exhibit A on -- on the subpoena? |
|  | A. No, the emails just are there once you log in. | 8 | A. The -- the Gmail account that I mentioned |
| 9 | Q. Understood. The -- the email -- so what you have | 9 | previously. |
| 10 | produced then on the flash drive and the CD-ROM, | 10 | Q. Did you look anywhere else for documents that would |
| 11 | these were all attachments to emails, you said? | 11 | respond to the subpoena? |
| 12 | A. That's correct. | 12 | A. No. |
| 13 | Q. All right. | 13 | Q. Did you look at any paper files you might have had? |
| 14 | A. One point on that, too. Two of the files were | 14 | A. No. No. |
| 15 | zipped files that in that zip file contained Excels | 15 | Q. Do you know what -- did you retain any paper files? |
| 16 | so I produced both the zip and took the liberty of | 16 | A. I do have one copy of one of the summary sheets that |
| 17 | also unzipping so you have the Excel files that | 17 | was produced during Baldus that I have kept that I |
| 18 | would be contained within. | 18 | did not bring with me today. |
| 19 | Q. All right. So as I look at this, and I've just | 19 | Q. But that was something that was produced in Baldus? |
| 20 | opened this up, and I'd be happy to pop -- pop the | 20 | A. That's correct. |
| 21 | drive in or the CD-ROM into the computer if you want | 21 | Q. And when you say "summary sheets," was that a |
| 22 | to look at it as well, but I've got the flash drive | 22 | summary spreadsheet or -- |
| 23 | at least in my directory. I'm looking at it now. | 23 | A. Yes. |
| 24 | A. Uh-huh. | 24 | Q. All right. Does it fall within the time period that |
| 25 | Q. And I see one, two, three, four, five separate Excel | 25 | was requested in the subpoena? |



|  | Page 22 |  | Page 24 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | organized. | 1 | transcript. |
| 2 | BY MR. POLAND: | 2 | Q. When did you do that? |
| 3 | Q. Mr. Foltz, have you seen Exhibit No. 75 before? | 3 | A. About the same time, late last week. |
|  | A. I have. | 4 | Q. All right. And is your testimony that you gave in |
| 5 | Q. Okay. And you recognize that as a copy of the | 5 | Exhibit 76 true and correct? |
| 6 | transcript of your deposition taken in the Baldus | 6 | A. It is. |
| 7 | case on December 21, 2011? | 7 | Q. Is there anything in your testimony reflected in |
| 8 | A. Yes. | 8 | Exhibit 76 that you believe needs to be changed to |
| 9 | Q. And do you recall being deposed in -- roughly on | 9 | make it true and correct? |
| 10 | that date in 2011? | 10 | A. No, it's all true and correct first time around. |
| 1 | A. Sounds right. | 11 | Q. You can set that to the side. |
| 12 | Q. Now, I'm not going to go through all the questions | 12 | MR. POLAND: Just for the record, these copies |
| 13 | that you were asked in this deposition, but I do | 13 | of these transcripts, they don't have the exhibits |
| 14 | have a few questions about it for you. | 14 | attached, these are just the transcripts themselves. |
| 15 | A. Yes. | 15 | Q. And you testified as well that you do recall being |
| 16 | Q. You testified a few minutes ago that you have rerea | 16 | deposed a third time in connection with the Baldus |
| 17 | the transcripts of your depositions in the Baldus | 17 | case? |
| 18 | case? |  | A. That's correct. |
| 19 | A. Yes. | 19 | (Exhibit No. 77 marked for identification.) |
| 20 | Q. When was the last time that you read the Exhibit 75? | 20 | Q. Mr. Foltz, I'm handing you a copy of a document that |
| 21 | A. Late last week. | 21 | the court reporter has marked as Exhibit No. 77, ask |
| 22 | Q. And is your testimony that you gave in Exhibit 75 | 22 | you to take a look at that, please. |
| 23 | true and correct? | 23 | A. Okay. |
| 24 | A. It is. | 24 | Q. Can you identify Exhibit 77? |
| 25 | Q. Is there anything in your testimony that you believe | 25 | A. It appears to be a transcript of my third round of |
|  | Page 23 |  | Page 25 |
| 1 | needs to be changed to make it true and correct? | 1 | depositions related to the Baldus litigation. |
| 2 | A. It's all true and correct. | 2 | Q. All right. And we've been referring to it as the |
| 3 | Q. You can set that to the side for the moment. We | 3 | Baldus litigation. If you look at the caption, the |
| 4 | might come back to it | 4 | caption actually does say Baldus versus members of |
| 5 | A. Okay. | 5 | the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, and |
| 6 | (Exhibit No. 76 marked for identification.) | 6 | en it lists the members of the board there, |
| 7 | Q. Mr. Foltz, handing you a copy of a document the | 7 | correct? |
| 8 | court reporter has marked as Exhibit No. 76, and ask | 8 | A. That's correct. |
| 9 | you to take a look at that. | 9 | Q. All right. But if we refer to this as the Baldus |
| 10 | A. Okay. | 10 | litigation, you'll know what I'm referring to? |
| 11 | Q. Can you identify Exhibit 76? | 11 | A. I will. |
|  | A. It appears to be the continuation or second | 12 | Q. And you recently reviewed Exhibit 77 as well? |
| 13 | deposition, I'm not sure how exactly it's | 13 | A. I did. |
| 14 | classified, of my depositions. | 14 | Q. When was the last time that you reviewed Exhibit 77 |
| 15 | Q. Fair enough. And do you see that there is a date of | 15 | A. Late last week, beginning of this week. |
| 16 | February 1st, 2012. It's in very tiny print in the | 16 | Q. Is your testimony in Exhibit 77 true and correct? |
| 17 | upper left-hand corner. | 17 | A. It is. |
| 18 | A. I do see that -- I do see the date of February 1st. | 18 | Q. Is there anything in your testimony in Exhibit 77 |
| 19 | Q. All right. Do you recall being deposed on | 19 | that you need -- that you believe needs to be |
| 20 | February -- on or about February 1st, 2012 in | 20 | changed to make it true and correct? |
| 21 | connection with the Baldus case? | 21 | A. No. |
| 22 | A. Yes. | 22 | Q. You can set that to the side as well. |
| 23 | Q. Have you reviewed this particular transcript that's | 23 | Now, do you understand that you've been named |
| 24 | Exhibit 76? | 24 | as a witness in a new redistricting case that's |
|  | A. Slightly different format, but the same -- but the | 25 | scheduled to go to trial in less than two months? |


| $\text { Page } 26$ | Page 28 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 A. I do understand that. | 1 A. I don't remember exactly how I found out. I |
| 2 Q. And that's the case that we're -- that you are | 2 probably saw something in the Journal Sentinel or |
| 3 appearing in today, correct? | 3 WisPolitics or something along those lines. |
| 4 A. That's correct. | 4 Q. Did anybody tell you that it had been filed? |
| 5 Q. For this deposition? You understand that there is a | 5 A. Not that I can recall. |
| 6 different group of plaintiffs and the lead plaintiff | 6 Q. Have you discussed the Whitford case with anyone |
| 7 is a man with the last name Whitford? | 7 other than your counsel and the people that you |
| 8 A. Uh-huh. | 8 mentioned earlier today that you had told about this |
| 9 Q. Do you understand that? | 9 deposition? |
| 10 A. Yes. | 10 A. Not that I can directly recall. I'm sure it's come |
| 11 Q. So if I refer to this case as the Whitford | 11 up in conversation, but not that I can specifically |
| 12 litigation, will you know that I'm talking about | 12 recall. |
| 13 this case that's been scheduled for trial in the | 13 Q. Have you discussed the Whitford case with |
| 14 Western District of Wisconsin this year? | 14 Mr. Keenan? |
| 15 A. Yes. | 15 A. Yes. |
| 16 (Exhibit No. 78 marked for identification.) | 16 Q. When did you discuss the Whitford case with |
| 17 Q. Mr. Foltz, I'm handing you a copy of a document the | 17 Mr. Keenan? |
| 18 court reporter has marked as Exhibit 78. I'm going | 18 A. I don't know off the top of my head. |
| 19 to ask you to take a look at that. | 19 Q. Do you remember whether it was before or after the |
| 20 A. (Witness reading.) | 20 time of the Rule 26 initial disclosures where you |
| 21 Q. Have you seen Exhibit 78 before? | 21 were identified as a potential witness? |
| 22 A. I believe I have. | 22 A. I'm assuming it was before, but I don't know that |
| 23 Q. Were you aware on or about this -- this date October | 23 for a fact. |
| 247 of 2015 that's on the document that you were | 24 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr. Keenan abou |
| 25 identified as an individual potentially having | 25 the substance of the allegations in the -- in the |
| Page 27 | Page 29 |
| 1 knowledge regarding the matter and as a potential | 1 Whitford complaint? |
| 2 witness to provide testimony? | 2 A. I'm sure I did. Yes. |
| 3 A. I believe so. Yeah. | 3 Q. Do you recall the substance of any of those |
| 4 Q. When was the first time that you heard about the | 4 discussions? |
| 5 Whitford case? | 5 MR. ST. JOHN: I'm going to assert a |
| 6 A. Probably when the initial action was filed. I'm not | 6 attorney-client privilege objection to that. The |
| 7 recalling the specific date, but when the initial | 7 legislature had notified the attorney general's |
| 8 action was filed. | 8 office and requested representation from the |
| 9 Q. Did you see -- if I represent to you on or about in | 9 attorneys general's office at or about or before the |
| 10 July of 2015, does that sound about right? | 10 time to cover -- which would cover the time period |
| 11 A. Yeah, that sounds about right. | 11 in question. Mr. Foltz continues to be represented |
| 12 Q. Did you see a copy of the complaint in the Whitford | 12 by the attorney general's office, and all |
| 13 case when it was filed? | 13 communications with subordinate attorneys within th |
| 14 A. I did. | 14 attorney general's office would fall under the scope |
| 15 Q. Have you seen copies of any other documents that | 15 of the privilege. I'm going to instruct you not to |
| 16 have actually been filed with the court in the | 16 answer the question as to substance. |
| 17 Whitford case? | 17 BY MR. POLAND: |
| 18 A. Yes. | 18 Q. Are you going to follow your counsel's instruction |
| 19 Q. Were you asked to review them by someone? | 19 not to answer the question? |
| 20 A. No. | 20 A. I will. |
| 21 Q. Why did you review the documents that have been | 21 MR. KEENAN: And I would just like to interpose |
| 22 filed in the Whitford case? | 22 and join the objection, but then also state an |
| 23 A. General curiosity. | 23 attorney work product objection to the extent it's |
| 24 Q. How did you find out that the Whitford case had been | 24 not covered by the attorney-client privilege if it |
| 25 filed? | 25 will get into the thought processes of an attorney. |



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|  | A. I don't know if defense theories is the right label | 1 | MR. POLAND: And does that -- does your |
| 2 | for it. I mean I've talked to, you know, Mr. Keenan | 2 | objection include an instruction not to answer as |
| 3 | in general about everything involved with this, so I | 3 | well? |
| 4 | don't know if defense theories is a proper way of | 4 | MR. ST. JOHN: My -- the assertion of the |
| 5 | phrasing it. | 5 | privilege includes an instruction not to answer |
| 6 | Q. Okay. How would you phrase it, what you spoke with | 6 | questions relating to the substance of the |
| 7 | him about? | 7 | conversations between Mr. Foltz and Mr. Keenan. |
| 8 | A. I would say general discussions, general discussions | 8 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 9 | on the process, things like that. | 9 | Q. All right. And will you follow your counsel's |
| 10 | Q. And when you say "the process," do you mean the | 10 | instruction not to answer the question? |
| 11 | process of redistricting? | 11 | A. I will. |
| 12 | A. The process that led to Act 43. | 12 | Q. All right. You said you had conversations as well |
| 13 | Q. Okay. Was anyone else present when you had those | 13 | with Zach Bemis about the Whitford case? |
| 14 | discussions with Mr. Keenan? | 14 | A. Yes. |
| 15 | A. Yeah, one time I believe Tad was -- Tad was | 15 | Q. And again who's Mr. Bemis? |
| 16 | involved. | 16 | A. He is a policy advisor and legal counsel I believe |
| 17 | Q. Anyone else present at those discussions you had? | 17 | is his title, generally legislative aide to Speaker |
| 18 | A. No. No. | 18 | Vos. |
| 19 | Q. What was the substance of the discussions that you | 19 | Q. Did you talk with Mr. Bemis about the substance of |
| 20 | had with Mr. Keenan about the process that led to | 20 | the allegations in the Whitford complaint? |
| 21 | Act 43? | 21 | A. I'm sure we did at some point. |
| 22 | MR. ST. JOHN: I'm going to interpose an | 22 | Q. Do you recall those -- the substance of those |
| 23 | assertion of attorney-client privilege with respect | 23 | conversations? |
| 24 | to discussions that Mr. Foltz had with Mr. Keenan | 24 | A. Not specifically. Again probably just a broad |
| 25 | during a date range that you haven't -- that isn't | 25 | overview of what -- what the complaint was. |
|  | Page 35 |  | Page 37 |
| 1 | clear to me from your question. But it's to repeat | 1 | Q. And then you mentioned you also spoke with Lauren |
| 2 | the same objection -- or I'm sorry, the same | 2 | Clark? |
| 3 | assertion of privilege as repeated -- I'm sorry, as | 3 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 4 | I stated previously on the same basis. | 4 | Q. And Lauren Clark is a legislative aide, too? |
| 5 | MR. POLAND: Just to clarify the date range, it | 5 | A. Yes. |
| 6 | would be since the filing of the Whitford complaint. | 6 | Q. Who is Lauren Clark a legislative aide to? |
| 7 | THE WITNESS: Okay. | 7 | A. She's chief of staff to Senator Luther Olsen. |
| 8 | MR. KEENAN: And I would just like to join in | 8 | Q. Did you speak with Ms. Clark about the substance of |
| 9 | the objections and my work product objections, but I | 9 | the allegations in the Whitford case? |
| 10 | don't have an objection to him answering something | 10 | A. No. |
| 11 | that would be the equivalent of the privilege log | 11 | Q. Did you talk with Ms. Clark about any of the |
| 12 | descriptor of what a conversation was, but then | 12 | defenses in the Whitford case? |
| 13 | getting into the substance I would have an | 13 | A. Defense, no. |
| 14 | objection. | 14 | Q. What was the nature of the conversations you've had |
| 15 | MR. POLAND: Yeah. | 15 | with Ms. Clark about the Whitford case? |
| 16 | MR. KEENAN: If that makes sense. | 16 | A. Just made her aware that there was another case out |
| 17 | MR. POLAND: I think so. | 17 | there. |
| 18 | MR. KEENAN: I think maybe your question was | 18 | Q. When were you first approached to be a witness in |
| 19 | aimed more at that. | 19 | the Whitford case? |
| 20 | MR. POLAND: It was aimed at the substance. I | 20 | A. The date -- whatever the date of the subpoena is. |
| 21 | think I had the description. I think the witness | 21 | Q. All right. Well, let me back -- let me back up |
| 22 | testified it was a general discussion about the | 22 | then. In Exhibit No. 78, you were identified as |
| 23 | process that led to Act 43 so I think I know the | 23 | potentially testifying as a witness. |
| 24 | topic. | 24 | MR. ST. JOHN: I object to the question. It's |
| 25 | MR. KEENAN: Right. | 25 | not -- it's a mischaracterization of what the |


|  | Page 38 |  | Page 40 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | document says. | 1 | that? |
| 2 | BY MR. POLAND: | 2 | A. I've had conversations with Mr. Keenan about the |
| 3 | Q. All right. Let's just read it then. Okay. Exhibit | 3 | litigation in general, yes. |
| 4 | 78 , do you see that this is a document -- if you | 4 | Q. But and so I want to make sure I'm clear here. In |
| 5 | turn to the third page, you'll see it was a document | 5 | terms of what you might testify to at trial, have |
| 6 | that was filed by -- by Mr. Keenan and | 6 | you had any conversations with Mr. Keenan about |
| 7 | Mr. Russomanno on behalf of the Wisconsin Departmen | 7 | that? |
| 8 | of Justice. Do you see that? This is on the third | 8 | MR. KEENAN: I'm going to object as vague. I |
| 9 | page. | 9 | don't understand that. |
| 10 | A. Yes. Yes. | 10 | MR. ST. JOHN: The -- |
| 11 | Q. And you see it was filed October 7, 2015, correct? | 11 | MR. KEENAN: And attorney-client privilege. |
| 12 | A. I do see that, yes. | 12 | MR. ST. JOHN: I'm going to -- can I have the |
| 13 | Q. All right. Now, if you turn to the first page | 13 | question read back for the purpose of determining |
| 14 | under -- on the very first page it states, | 14 | whether I should assert the attorney-client |
| 15 | "Defendants, by their attorneys, make the following | 15 | privilege? |
| 16 | initial disclosures," then there's a letter A. It | 16 | (Question read.) |
| 17 | says, "Individuals potentially having knowledge | 17 | MR. ST. JOHN: I'm going to assert the |
| 18 | regarding this matter," and you were identified | 18 | attorney-client privilege with respect to that |
| 19 | there, correct? | 19 | question. It seeks substantive communications |
| 20 | A. It reads that way, yes. | 20 | between Mr. Foltz and Mr. Keenan. |
| 21 | Q. Then if you look at the paragraph just below it it | 21 | MR. POLAND: And does that include an |
| 22 | states, "To the extent it may become relevant if the | 22 | instruction not to answer? |
| 23 | case survives the motion to dismiss, Adam Foltz, who | 23 | MR. ST. JOHN: It includes an instruction not |
|  | was involved in the 2012 districting process, may | 24 | to answer. |
| 25 | provide testimony regarding that process and the | 25 | BY MR. POLAND: |
|  | Page 39 |  | Page 41 |
| 1 | basis for districting." Do you see that? | 1 | Q. Are you going to follow your counsel's advice and |
| 2 | A. I do. | 2 | not answer the question? |
| 3 | Q. Now, do you understand that the case did survive a | 3 | A. Yes. |
| 4 | motion to dismiss? | 4 | Q. As you sit here today, do you know whether you will |
| 5 | A. I do understand that, yes. | 5 | be called as a witness to testify in the trial in |
| 6 | Q. So now this document does state that you may provide | 6 | the Baldus case? |
| 7 | testimony regarding that -- the process actually | 7 | A. I don't. |
| 8 | from the 2011 districting, correct? | 8 | Q. If you are called to testify as a witness -- I'm |
| 9 | A. That's fair. | 9 | sorry, strike that last question. I said Baldus. |
| 10 | Q. And the bases for that, correct? | 10 | As you sit here today, do you know whether you |
| 11 | A. Yes. | 11 | will be called to testify as a witness in the trial |
| 12 | Q. When were you first approached about providing | 12 | of the Whitford case? |
| 13 | testimony? | 13 | A. I do not know that. |
| 14 | A. I don't know if approached is a proper term. I | 14 | Q. If you are called to testify, do you know what you |
| 15 | don't recall any specific conversation before the | 15 | would testify about? |
| 16 | filing of this document. | 16 | A. I have a general idea that I would be testifying |
| 17 | Q. So did anybody ever call you up or talk to you and | 17 | about the redistricting process and, you know, |
| 18 | say, "Adam, would you be willing to testify for the | 18 | what's enumerated here on page 1 of the document. |
| 19 | defendants at the trial of the Whitford case?" | 19 | Beyond that, no. |
| 20 | A. Not that I recall, no. | 20 | Q. So as you sit here today, you don't know of any |
| 21 | Q. All right. Have you had any conversations with | 21 | specific testimony that you might be asked to give |
| 22 | anyone about what you might testify to at trial of | 22 | during the trial of the Whitford case; is that |
| 23 | the Whitford case? | 23 | correct? |
| 24 | A. No. | 24 | A. I think that's fair. |
| 25 | Q. Have you had any conversations with Mr. Keenan about | 25 | Q. Go back to your testimony that you gave in the -- in |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | regard to population, over/under population and then | 1 | sensitivity to minority concerns in the districts |
| 2 | where the new district landed, analysis might be | 2 | that were drawn? |
| 3 | strong because I believe it was just a sentence in | 3 | A. That's again a lot going on in that question. So |
| 4 | that memorandum. | 4 | could you narrow it down a little bit? |
| 5 | Q. And was that produced in the Baldus litigation? | 5 | Q. Sure. So -- well, for the purpose of analyzing |
| 6 | A. It was. | 6 | minority concerns or concerns to minority interests |
| 7 | Q. Any of the work that you performed in drawing | 7 | in the various districts that were drawn as part of |
| 8 | districts for Act 43 that analyzed or took into | 8 | Act 43 -- strike that question. |
| 9 | account population -- population differences among | 9 | Were there -- are there -- were there any |
| 10 | districts, would that have been reflected in the | 10 | cuments or materials that you considered when you |
| 11 | materials that were produced in the Baldus | 11 | were assessing sensitivity to minority concerns as |
| 12 | litigation? | 12 | part of drawing Act 43 that to your knowledge were |
| 13 | A. That sounds right. | 13 | not produced as part of the Baldus litigation? |
| 1 | Q. Now, you also took into account sensitivity to | 14 | A. No. You would have all of those documents from the |
| 15 | minority concerns in drawing the districts -- | 15 | prior litigation. |
| 16 | A. Uh-huh. | 16 | Q. There was -- there was nothing that you recall as |
| 17 | Q. -- for Act 43? | 17 | you sit here today that you withheld from production |
| 18 | A. Yes. | 18 | or at least didn't give to counsel as part of the |
| 19 | Q. And did you personally do any analysis of some | 19 | Baldus litigation that impacted your analysis of |
| 20 | aspect of the sensitivity to minority concerns in | 20 | minority concerns? |
| 21 | the districts that you drew? | 21 | A. No. |
| 22 | A. There's a lot in that question. Could you be a | 22 | MR. ST. JOHN: Can I have that last question |
| 23 | little bit more specific? | 23 | and answer read back because I think there might |
| 24 | Q. What did you do to take into account sensitivity | 24 | have been a negative in there, and I'm not sure that |
| 25 | minority concerns in the districts that you were | 25 | the transcript is clear on that last answer. |
|  | Page 47 |  | Page 49 |
| 1 | drawing for Act 43? | 1 | (Question and answer read.) |
| 2 | A. Yeah. And that's where a lot of the expert help | 2 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 3 | comes in on this is them working with you to try to | 3 | Q. One of the other factors that you testified you took |
|  | make sure that those concerns are addressed. | 4 | into account in drawing districts in Act 43 was |
| 5 | Q. And Dr. Gaddie, Keith Gaddie would have been one of | 5 | compactness, correct? |
| 6 | the people who was assisting with that analysis; is | 6 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 7 | that correct? | 7 | Q. And did you personally conduct any analyses of |
| 8 | A. Yes. | 8 | compactness of the districts that you were drawing |
| 9 | Q. There were some other people who assisted as well? | 9 | as part of Act 43? |
| 10 | A. Not from an analysis standpoint, but, you know, as | 10 | A. I would take a little issue with again analysis. It |
| 11 | was discussed in the Baldus litigation, there were | 11 | was something that is produced by the autoBound |
| 12 | other -- there were other factors, the counsel | 12 | software, various compactness scores and various |
| 13 | working with MALDEF, various other exchanges and | 13 | measures that geographers or demographers or your |
| 14 | inputs that maybe don't rise to the level of | 14 | Dr. Gaddies of the world would use. |
| 15 | analysis, but definitely were part of the process. | 15 | I would say again taking a little bit of an |
| 16 | Q. And in terms of other people who were involved, did | 16 | issue with the word analysis that it's more of just |
| 17 | your testimony in the Baldus litigation identify any | 17 | a report that is produced to be reviewed by others |
| 18 | of those people who would have been involved? | 18 | that have a greater degree of familiarity with those |
| 19 | A. Not -- maybe not my testimony, but I was asked | 19 | metrics. |
| 20 | questions related to various documents that were | 20 | Q. Who would have reviewed any reports produced by |
| 21 | produced that reflected others that may have been | 21 | autoBound with respect to compactness? |
| 22 | involved in that process. | 22 | A. Primarily Dr. Gaddie. |
| 23 | Q. Do you believe that -- that you produced in the Bal | 23 | Q. Do you recall discussing with Dr. Gaddie compactness |
| 24 | -- as part of the Baldus litigation any documents | 24 | of districts that you were drawing with Act 43? |
| 25 | that you would have relied on in analyzing |  | A. Not specifically, no. |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | So let's go back to the Racine airport example where | 1 |
| 2 | I could click on that, you know, a group of census | 2 |
| 3 | blocks or, you know, ward, or whatever level of | 3 |
| 4 | geography I'm playing around with at that point and | 4 |
| 5 | make sure that that is in fact a city of Racine | 5 |
| 6 | census block or city of Racine ward, and that will | 6 |
| 7 | be my check to see that that is in fact what I was | 7 |
| 8 | intending to do. | 8 |
| 9 | Q. So it is -- it is changes that are made are made | 9 |
| 10 | through the software as opposed to having some kind | 10 |
| 11 | of -- of separate analysis that you would do and | 1 |
| 12 | then go back and perhaps change districts for | 12 |
| 13 | contiguity? | 13 |
| 14 | A. I think that's fair -- I think that's a fair | 14 |
| 15 | classification. | 15 |
| 16 | Q. In terms of any changes that were made then for | 16 |
| 17 | contiguity purposes to the draft districts that you | 17 |
| 18 | were drawing for Act 43, those would have been | 18 |
| 19 | reflected in the autoBound files themselves? | 19 |
| 20 | A. I don't know if that's an accurate way of | 20 |
| 21 | classifying it. | 2 |
| 22 | Q. Okay. You don't know if they would have been | 22 |
| 23 | reflected in -- in the autoBound files? | 23 |
| 24 | A. Well, if I'm understanding your question, you're | 24 |
| 25 | saying is that if a contiguity error was flagged or | 25 |
|  | Page 55 |  |
| 1 | any movement of a line for that matter, if that -- | 1 |
| 2 | once that change is made, is it reflected going | 2 |
| 3 | back? I don't know. | 3 |
| 4 | Q. Okay. So you don't know if the change is actually | 4 |
| 5 | recorded or the basis for the change is actually | 5 |
| 6 | recorded? | 6 |
| 7 | A. Yeah. That's -- I think that's a fair -- I think | 7 |
| 8 | that's a fair characterization. | 8 |
| 9 | Q. As you sit here today, do you know whether there | 9 |
| 10 | were -- whether there were any kinds of analyses of | 10 |
| 11 | contiguity that were produced, whether by autoBound | 11 |
| 12 | or that you would have produced as you went through | 12 |
| 13 | and drafted the maps for Act 43? | 13 |
| 14 | MR. ST. JOHN: Let me just object to form. | 14 |
| 15 | It's compound. You can answer the question if you'd | 15 |
| 16 | like. | 16 |
| 17 | THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think it goes back to the | 17 |
| 18 | larger talk about contiguity being a little | 18 |
| 19 | different. I don't even remember if autoBound had a | 19 |
| 20 | contiguity report or if it was more just an error | 20 |
| 21 | message. | 21 |
| 22 | BY MR. POLAND: | 22 |
| 23 | Q. Just a flag that popped up that you testified to? | 23 |
| 24 | A. Yeah, I don't remember the mechanics of the software | 24 |
| 25 | with regard to that specifically. | 25 |

Q. Would any of the work that you performed with 56
respect to these traditional redistricting criteria
that we just went over have been reflected on the
computer that you used for the districting purposes
in 2011 ?
A. I don't -- I don't understand the question, I guess.
If you wouldn't mind reading it back or restating
it.
MR. POLAND: Sure. We can have the court
reporter read it back.
(Question read.)
THE WITNESS: I guess I'm not totally following
the question. I mean these scores are embodied in
the map itself, and the map then has a certain
backhand analysis that can be done like contig --
compactness reports and things like that.
So the work with regard to traditional
redistricting criteria is reflected in so much as
that once you produce a map, you can use vari --
various analytics to help you have a better
understanding of the work you were doing while you
were making assignments.
BY MR. POLAND:
Q. And all that work was performed on the districting
computer that you had in 2011 , correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't do that on other computers or other machines, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And there was a lot of testimony about that obviously in your previous three depositions. That was the computer that you had in the Michael Best \& Friedrich offices, correct?
A. That's correct, and it was subsequently moved over to the Capitol after the conclusion of at least that portion of the litigation and everything.
Q. Right. Yep, and I think we have quite a bit of testimony on the whole chain of custody of the computer.
A. Yes.
Q. And those files were files that you would have turned over to -- well, strike that.

The files that were on the -- the computer that you used for redistricting in 2011, those you had turned over to counsel during the Baldus litigation, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you no longer have that computer, correct?
A. I do not.
Q. When did you last use that computer?



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | column of 851. | 1 | purpose of the motions? |
| 2 | A. Uh-huh. | 2 | A. Not knowing what a Daubert motion is, I generally |
| 3 | Q. And your -- the court here is talking about | 3 | understood it to be a motion for summary judgment. |
| 4 | population deviations and so this is in the context | 4 | Q. Fair enough. Did you attend that hearing? |
| 5 | of that discussion. I'd like you to -- to look at | 5 | A. I did not. |
| 6 | the sentence that's one, two, three, four, five | 6 | Q. Did you speak with anybody about that hearing? |
| 7 | lines down, starts out, "Numbers like these..." Do | 7 | A. Yes. |
| 8 | you see that? | 8 | Q. All right. Who did you speak with about that |
| 9 | A. Okay. | 9 | hearing? |
| 10 | Q. All right. "Numbers like these place a very heavy | 10 | A. Zach Bemis, Brian Keenan. |
| 1 | burden on the plaintiffs to show a constitutional | 11 | Q. What -- what discussions did you have with |
| 12 | violation. In the final analysis, they have failed | 12 | Mr. Keenan about that hearing? |
| 13 | to surmount that burden. We come to that conclusion | 13 | MR. KEENAN: I'm going to assert the same |
| 14 | not because we credit the testimony of Foltz, Ottman | 14 | objections we've been asserting before. |
| 15 | and the other drafters to the effect that they were | 15 | MR. ST. JOHN: I'll join the assertion that the |
| 16 | not influenced by partisan factors; indeed, we find | 16 | substance of the communication with Mr. Keenan would |
| 17 | those statements to be almost laughable. But the | 17 | be covered by the attorney-client privilege. I |
| 18 | partisan motivation that in our view clearly lay | 18 | reiterate that the basis for it is the fact that the |
| 19 | behind Act 43 is not enough to overcome the de | 19 | attorney general represents Mr. Foltz today, that |
| 20 | minimis population deviations that the drafters | 20 | Brian Keenan is a subordinate employee of the |
| 21 | achieved at least under that theory." | 21 | attorney general's office; that there is no conflict |
| 22 | Do you see that? | 22 | of interest which prevents Mr. Keenan in his |
| 23 | A. I do. | 23 | representation of his state clients from also |
| 24 | Q. Do you | 24 | providing representation. |
| 25 | Judges Stadtmueller and Dow that partisan motivation | 25 | I am here specifically also representing -- I'm |
|  | Page 67 |  | Page 69 |
| 1 | clearly lay behind Act 43? | 1 | here specifically representing Mr. Foltz with |
| 2 | A. I would go back to my prior -- my prior testimony | 2 | respect to his deposition, but an attorney-client |
| 3 | that my job is to accommodate the requests of the | 3 | relationship continues to exist between Mr. Foltz as |
| 4 | members of the Wisconsin State Assembly, | 4 | an employee of the legislature and the attorney |
| 5 | particularly the republican caucus given that $I$ was | 5 | general, and that the privilege would apply to all |
| 6 | employed by the Speaker. My job is to accommodate | 6 | of the subordinate attorneys within the attorney |
| 7 | their requests to the best of my ability and to make | 7 | general's office. |
| 8 | sure those requests are juxtaposed, working with | 8 | MR. POLAND: And Kevin, does you -- your |
| 9 | experts and legal counsel, aren't running afoul of | 9 | objection includes an instruction not to answer? |
| 10 | various statutory and constitutional requirements. | 10 | MR. ST. JOHN: As to the substance of the |
| 11 | Now, I'm not going to tell you that when a | 11 | communication, not to the fact of the communication |
| 12 | member of the state assembly sat me down and asked | 12 | or the general subject matter of the communication. |
| 13 | for $X, Y$, and $Z$ that their motivations might have | 13 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 14 | been partisan. But like I said earlier, it's not my | 14 | Q. And are you going to follow your client -- your |
| 15 | job to place a value judgment on that and say you | 15 | counsel's instruction not to answer the question? |
| 16 | don't get to make those requests because of the | 16 | A. Yes. |
| 17 | partisan motivation, or if the motivation is that | 17 | Q. What was the general topic of the conversation that |
| 18 | they want to represent their old high school. | 18 | you had with Mr. Keenan about the hearing in the |
| 19 | Q. Did you -- were you aware that there was a hearing | 19 | Whitford case last week? |
| 20 | last week in the Whitford case in the federal | 20 | A. Just generally the hearing itself. |
| 21 | district court here? | 21 | Q. All right. Did you discuss at all with -- with |
| 22 | A. Yeah, vaguely aware; generally aware, yes. | 22 | Mr. Keenan how anything that was said in that |
| 23 | Q. Summary -- a hearing on summary judgment motions | 23 | hearing might affect your testimony today? |
| 24 | that the defendants had brought and a Daubert motion |  | A. No. |
| 25 | that the plaintiffs had brought. Did you know the |  | Q. Have you -- have you reviewed a transcript of the |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | hearing of -- from last week? | 1 | disputing that they districted with partisan |
| 2 | A. I have not. | 2 | advantage." |
| 3 | MR. POLAND: Would you mark this as Exhibit -- | 3 | Do you see that testimony? |
| 4 | THE COURT REPORTER: 80. | 4 | A. I do. |
| 5 | MR. POLAND: -- 80. | 5 | Q. You wouldn't dispute those statements by Mr. Keenan, |
| 6 | (Exhibit No. 80 marked for identification.) | 6 | would you? |
| 7 | Q. Mr. Foltz, I'm handing you a copy of a document that | 7 | MR. ST. JOHN: Objection. Form. You wouldn't |
| 8 | the court reporter has marked as Exhibit No. 80, and | 8 | dispute that Mr. Keenan made them or the content? I |
| 9 | I'll ask you to take a look at that. | 9 | don't understand the question. |
| 10 | A. Okay. (Witness reading.) | 10 | MR. POLAND: The substance of the statements |
| 11 | Q. Have you seen Exhibit 80 before? | 11 | that Mr. Keenan made. |
| 12 | A. No. | 12 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 13 | Q. All right. Since you haven't, then I'll just | 13 | Q. You don't disagree with those statements that |
| 14 | identify it for the record that it's a transcript of | 14 | Mr. Keenan made, do you? |
| 15 | a hearing held in the Whitford case on March 23rd, | 15 | A. I take a little issue with just the broader context |
| 16 | 2016 beginning at 9:30 a.m. I'd like you to turn to | 16 | of the legislature and a broader legislative intent |
| 17 | page 9 of the transcript. | 17 | where it's again me as a legislative staffer trying |
| 18 | A. Okay. | 18 | to amalgamate the individual requests of many many |
| 1 | Q. And I'd like you to look at beginning at line 13 of | 19 | different legislators, I believe we were at 60 at |
| 20 | the transcript, you'll see there's a question by | 20 | the time, and balancing all those var -- various |
| 21 | Judge Crabb. | 21 | interests. |
| 22 | A. Uh-huh. | 22 | So I think -- and again going back to the prior |
| 23 | Q. She -- Judge Crabb says, "I have one question. For | 23 | testimony, if an individual legislator asked me for |
| 24 | the purpose of summary judgment, are you denying | 24 | a certain thing, it's my job to try to accommodate |
| 25 | that the legislature had any partisan intent when | 25 | that, and that legislator obviously has a very |
|  | Page 71 |  | Page 73 |
| 1 | it" -- and she says, "You're not." | 1 | rochial interest in their own district. So my job |
| 2 | Mr. Keenan says, "No, we're not." | 2 | to accommodate those. |
| 3 | Judge Crabb says, "That's good." | 3 | So I take a little bit of issue with the |
| 4 | Mr. Keenan goes on to say, "Our argument is | 4 | broader -- a broader implication of the legislature |
| 5 | that even assuming there's partisan intent and that | 5 | as a whole. |
| 6 | there was some partisan intent, the standard still | 6 | Q. In performing your work in Act 43, and indeed as the |
| 7 | doesn't work." | 7 | Baldus court identified in its opinion, there |
| 8 | Do you see that colloquy? | 8 | were -- there were other elected representatives who |
| 9 | A. I do. | 9 | participated in the drafting process, correct? |
| 10 | Q. All right. I'd like you also now to turn to page | 10 | A. That's correct. |
| 11 | 24. And I'd like you to look at page number 13 -- | 11 | Q. And that included your -- your boss at that time, |
| 12 | or I'm sorry, line 13. | 12 | Speaker Jeff Fitzgerald, correct? |
| 13 | A. Uh-huh. | 13 | A. Correct. |
| 14 | Q. See again Judge Crabb states, "You're not really | 14 | Q. And that also included Senate Majority Leader Scott |
| 15 | disputing that the republicans drew this plan with | 15 | Fitzgerald who you work for now, correct? |
| 16 | the desire to create the best possible election | 16 | A. Correct. |
| 17 | process for the republicans, are you?" | 17 | Q. And that also included, I believe, Robin Vos, |
| 18 | Mr. Keenan says, "I would say I would dispute | 18 | Senator Zipperer were two of the others that were |
| 1 | whether it's the best possible." | 19 | mentioned, correct? |
| 20 | Judge Crabb then says, "I'm not saying it | 20 | A. That's correct. |
| 21 | turned out to be the best, but that their intent was | 21 | Q. And certainly you had the -- you had the assembly |
| 22 | to do the best job they could to safeguard the | 22 | speaker, and you had the senate majority leader who |
| 23 | common seats and to increase the number of seats | 23 | were part of that process, correct? |
| 24 | that would be available to republicans." |  | A. That's correct. |
| 25 | Mr. Keenan then says, "I think -- I'm not | 25 | Q. You met with both Speaker Fitzgerald and Senate |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Majority Leader Fitzgerald as part of the process of | 1 | forward that wasn't part of the process. The -- the |
| 2 | drawing the districts in 2011, correct? | 2 | pro -- I mean the number available was a history of |
| 3 | A. Yeah, they were part of that broader group that you | 3 | past performance and how a new district's lines, if |
| 4 | had enumerated. | 4 | you were to go back in time and put that new |
| 5 | Q. And so your -- you may have met individually with | 5 | district in place for a prior election, what that |
| 6 | different representatives, but you also met with | 6 | performance would have been, assuming -- I think |
| 7 | the -- the senate majority leader and the assembly | 7 | it's also I should point out assuming that that seat |
| 8 | speaker with respect to drawing the districts, too, | 8 | would be open at the time as well. |
| 9 | rrect? | 9 | Q. You -- as part of your work on Act 43, you worked |
| 10 | A. Along with Senator Zipperer, Representative Vos, | 10 | with Keith Gaddie, correct? |
| 11 | Representative Suder. | 11 | A. Yes. |
| 12 | Q. So the legislative leadership was a part of that | 12 | Q. And you worked with Keith Gaddie on partisanship |
| 13 | process, too, correct? | 13 | analyses, correct? |
| 14 | A. Which part of the process? Because there was a lot | 14 | A. I don't specifically recall working with Dr . Gaddie |
| 15 | of different steps to this process. | 15 | on partisanship specifically. |
| 16 | Q. Part of the drafting process. | 16 | Q. All right. You met with Dr. Gaddie several times |
| 17 | A. It was part of the determination of regional | 17 | when he was in Madison, correct? |
| 18 | alternatives. I want to be specific just because | 18 | A. Correct. |
| 19 | process and drafting, there's a lot of different | 19 | Q. And in the -- and this is in the spring of 2011. So |
| 20 | ways it could go. | 20 | unless I tell you otherwise, I'd like you to assume |
| 21 | Their involvement was specifically the | 21 | a time frame between April 1st, 2011 and June 30, |
| 22 | determination of multiple regional alternatives, | 22 | 2011, okay? |
| 23 | which direction they would prefer to go. | 23 | And you met with Dr. Gaddie in approximately |
| 24 | Q. And they did review those with you, correct? | 24 | mid-April of 2011 in Madison? |
| 25 | A. That's correct. | 25 | A. I don't specifically recall that time frame, but |
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| 1 | Q. You do not intend to testify at trial that you | 1 | I'll take your word for it. |
| 2 | didn't intend to advantage republicans in creating | 2 | Q. All right. And you met with Dr. Gaddie in Madison |
| 3 | districts that make up Act 43, do you? | 3 | in late May of 2011? |
| 4 | MR. ST. JOHN: Objection to form. | 4 | A. Again not specifically recalling, but I would |
| 5 | THE WITNESS: I -- yeah, repeat the question or | 5 | imagine. |
| 6 | restate the question. | 6 | Q. All right. Do you recall meeting with Dr. Gaddie in |
| 7 | BY MR. POLAND: | 7 | Madison a third time in June of 2011? |
| 8 | Q. Sure. If asked -- if asked at trial, you don't | 8 | A. Again not specifically recalling that it was in June |
| 9 | intend to testify that you -- that in drawing Act | 9 | how many times we met, but I know that Dr. Gaddie |
| 10 | 43 , you didn't intend to advantage republicans, | 10 | me in a few times. |
| 11 | correct? | 11 | Q. Do you know that Dr. Gaddie was deposed in the |
| 12 | A. My testimony will be consistent with the testimony | 12 | Whitford litigation? |
| 13 | I'm giving today that my job was to balance the | 13 | A. I do know that. |
| 14 | requests of individual legislators to the best of my | 14 | Q. All right. And do you know it was earlier this |
| 15 | ability. | 15 | month that he was deposed? |
| 16 | Q. And the only legislators that you met with were | 16 | A. I take your word for it. |
| 17 | members of the republican caucus, correct? | 17 | Q. Did you read a transcript of Dr. Gaddie's |
| 18 | A. That's correct. | 18 | deposition? |
| 19 | Q. In drafting Act 43, you took into account the | 19 | A. No, I did not. |
| 20 | potential partisan performance of the districts you | 20 | Q. Did you talk to anyone about Dr. Gaddie's |
| 21 | were drawing by taking previous election data and | 21 | deposition? |
| 22 | calculating how the districts would perform on a | 22 | A. Yes. |
| 23 | partisan basis, correct? | 23 | Q. Who did you talk with about Dr. Gaddie's deposition? |
|  | A. I take issue with a few things in that question. |  | A. Mr. Keenan. |
| 25 | Your question builds in an idea of projection going | 25 | Q. All right. When did you talk with Mr. Keenan about |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Dr. Gaddie's deposition? | 1 | districts that you were drawing based on election |
| 2 | A. I don't specifically recall. Sometime after his | 2 | results from past elections, correct? |
| 3 | deposition. | 3 | MR. ST. JOHN: Can you read the question back, |
| 4 | Q. Did you talk about the substance of Dr. Gaddie's | 4 | please? |
| 5 | testimony with Mr. Keenan? | 5 | (Question read.) |
| 6 | MR. ST. JOHN: You can answer that question. | 6 | MR. ST. JOHN: I'll just object to that that it |
| 7 | THE WITNESS: I don't -- | 7 | calls for speculation and asks for the witness's |
| 8 | MR. ST. JOHN: It's a yes or no question. Did | 8 | opinion on non-fact testimony. |
| 9 | you talk about the substance? | 9 | THE WITNESS: I don't know if that's a proper |
| 10 | THE WITNESS: Yeah. I'd say that's fair. | 10 | way of determining what Dr. Gaddie's work was. I |
| 1 | BY MR. POLAND: | 11 | know that there was a regression model. I don't |
| 12 | Q. All right. Did you talk with Mr. Keenan about | 12 | know what the probative value is to that model going |
| 13 | specific testimony that Dr. Gaddie gave on | 13 | forward as opposed to a summary of past performance |
| 14 | partisanship analyses? | 14 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 15 | A. Not that I can specifically recall, no. | 15 | Q. Did you ever -- did you ever use Dr. Gaddie's |
| 16 | Q. What was the substance of the discussion that you | 16 | regression analysis or regression model to predict |
| 17 | had with Mr. Keenan about Dr. Gaddie's deposition | 17 | the partisan outcome of districts that you were |
| 18 | testimony? | 18 | drawing? |
| 19 | MR. ST. JOHN: I'll assert the attorney-client | 19 | A. To be clear on this, Dr. Gaddie's regression model |
| 20 | privilege with respect to that conversation about | 20 | was not some -- was not information that was |
| 21 | the substance for the reasons previously stated, | 21 | available to us during the drawing process. |
| 22 | instruct the witness not to answer the question. | 22 | Q. Did you ever give Dr. Gaddie draft district |
| 23 | BY MR. POLAND: | 23 | boundaries and ask him to run those through his |
| 24 | Q. And | 24 | regression model for the purpose of determining what |
| 25 | answer that question? | 25 | the partisan makeup of that district would be? |
|  | Page 79 |  | Page 81 |
|  | A. I will. |  | A. Not that I can recall. Like I said, it's not -- |
| 2 | MR. KEENAN: And I'd just interpose the | 2 | it's not a data point we had available to us during |
| 3 | additional work product objection I've been making | 3 | the drawing, but that doesn't mean that there wasn't |
| 4 | in this deposition. | 4 | a point where Dr. Gaddie used his regression model |
| 5 | Q. Turning your attention back to the spring of 2011 | 5 | after, you know, more of a -- I don't want to say |
| 6 | so again between April and the end of June, each | 6 | completion of the process, but once the process had |
| 7 | time you met with Dr. Gaddie in Madison, that was at | 7 | gotten to a certain point. |
| 8 | the offices of Michael Best \& Friedrich, correct? | 8 | Q. Is it your understanding that Dr. Gaddie's |
| 9 | A. Yes. | 9 | regression model could be used to forecast partisan |
| 10 | Q. And each time you met with him, you discussed with | 10 | performance in the newly configured districts that |
| 11 | him the draft districts that were -- that had been | 11 | you were drawing? |
| 12 | created at the time and various aspects of those | 12 | A. I don't -- again I don't think that's an -- I don't |
| 13 | districts, correct? | 13 | know if academics would say that that's a |
| 14 | A. I think that's fair. | 14 | forward-looking projection. I don't know enough |
| 15 | Q. Now, one of the tasks that Dr. Gaddie had in working | 15 | about the nuts and bolts of the regression. So my |
| 16 | as a consultant in the spring of 2011 was to develop | 16 | understanding was it was a regression based off of |
| 17 | a regression model that would take data from | 17 | prior elections. So I don't know if that inherently |
| 18 | previous elections and calculate how the draft | 18 | or if you need to do more to a regression to make it |
| 19 | districts that you were drawing would perform on a | 19 | something that's not just backward looking but also |
| 20 | partisan basis, correct? | 20 | forward looking. I don't understand enough about |
| 21 | A. Yeah, I think that's fair, but there's some | 21 | that. |
| 22 | ambiguity in there which I'm sure we'll get to | 22 | But again it was not, you know, it wasn't -- it |
| 23 | shortly here. | 23 | wasn't something I had available to me as I clicked |
| 24 | Q. Now, Dr. Gaddie's regression model could be used to | 24 | through and made assignments on the map. So it |
| 25 | attempt to forecast the partisan performance of | 25 | wasn't -- it just wasn't something I dealt with on a |


|  | Page 82 |  | Page 84 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | day-in/day-out basis. |  | A. Somebody from DOJ. As I said, it was something that |
| 2 | Q. But did you -- did you take any of the draft | 2 | was attached when your clients were exploring the |
| 3 | districts that you were drawing and review them with | 3 | idea of a 30(b)(6) deposition. This was attached to |
| 4 | Dr. Gaddie and get Dr. Gaddie's feedback from how he | 4 | that 30(b)(6). |
| 5 | believed that those districts would perform on a | 5 | Q. Understand. Did you -- you never saw Exhibit 81 |
| 6 | partisan basis in elections going forward? | 6 | between April and June of 2011? |
| 7 | A. Not that I specifically recall. Again, not | 7 | A. No. |
| 8 | really -- not really understanding if his regression | 8 | Q. All right. I'd like you to take a look -- well, |
| 9 | has a forward-looking component to it. That's what | 9 | strike that question. |
| 10 | I keep on getting hung up on. I don't know if you | 10 | Do you know who drafted Exhibit 81? |
| 11 | were to sit down with Dr. Gaddie, which you have, if | 11 | A. My understanding it was Dr. Gaddie. |
| 12 | he would say that it's a forward projection or | 12 | Q. All right. And I'll represent to you that |
| 13 | simply something that looks backward, so I don't -- | 13 | Dr. Gaddie did testify at his deposition that he did |
| 14 | $I$ take issue with forward projection because I | 14 | draft this document. |
| 15 | really don't understand enough of the political -- | 15 | A. Okay. |
| 16 | the social science behind it and how that would lead | 16 | Q. I'd like you to look at the first paragraph. |
| 17 | to implications or projections for future elections. | 17 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 18 | Q. Did you -- did you -- your understanding of it | 18 | Q. Do you see that Dr. Gaddie says in this document the |
| 19 | notwithstanding, did -- did Dr. Gaddie ever give you | 19 | measure -- "The measure of partisanship should exist |
| 20 | any feedback on the potential partisan performance | 20 | to establish the change in the partisan balance of |
| 21 | of any districts that then caused you to go back and | 21 | the district. We are not in court at this time; we |
| 22 | adjust the district boundaries that you were | 22 | do not need to show that we have created a fair, |
| 23 | drawing? | 23 | balanced, or even a reactive map. But we do need to |
| 24 | A. No. | 24 | show to lawmakers the political potential of the |
| 25 | MR. POLAND: Would you mark this, please. | 25 | district." |
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| 1 | (Exhibit No. 81 marked for identification.) | 1 | Do you see that? |
| 2 | Q. Mr. Foltz, I'm handing you a copy of a document that | 2 | A. I do. |
| 3 | the court reporter has marked as Exhibit 81. I'd | 3 | Q. Did you ever discuss with Dr. Gaddie the need to |
| 4 | like you to take a look at this document, then I'll | 4 | show to lawmakers the political potential of a |
| 5 | have some questions for you about it. | 5 | district? |
| 6 | A. (Witness reading.) Okay. | 6 | A. No, not that I can recall. |
| 7 | Q. Have you ever seen Exhibit 81 before? | 7 | Q. Did you ever discuss the -- the potential |
| 8 | A. I have. | 8 | political -- I'm sorry, the political potential of |
| 9 | Q. When did you first see Exhibit 81? | 9 | the district with Mr. Ottman or Mr. Handrick? |
| 10 | A. I first saw this exhibit when plaintiffs were | 10 | A. Political potential of the district. Are we |
| 11 | exploring a 30(b)(6), a second -- not to be confused | 11 | referring to Dr. Gaddie's regression or are we |
| 12 | with my prior 30(b)(6) deposition, but a new | 12 | saying in a broader context? |
| 13 | 30(b)(6) deposition earlier in the month of March, I | 13 | Q. Let's -- let's talk about first with respect to |
| 14 | believe, maybe late February. This was attached as | 14 | Dr. Gaddie's regression model. |
| 15 | an exhibit to that. | 15 | A. Yeah. And going back to that, the regression model |
| 16 | Q. All right. And when you say March, you're talking | 16 | was not something that we had as a data point |
| 17 | about 2013 now, correct? | 17 | available to us when we were assigning various units |
| 18 | A. ${ }^{16}$. | 18 | of geography to a given district. |
| 19 | Q. Oh, just of this year? | 19 | Q. And when you say "we," are you speaking for |
| 20 | A. Just of this year. | 20 | yourself and Mr. Ottman and Mr. Handrick? |
| 21 | Q. So this is not -- Exhibit 81 is not a document that | 21 | A. I'm speaking for myself. |
| 22 | you saw during the Baldus litigation? | 22 | Q. Just for yourself. |
| 23 | A. That's correct. | 23 | A. But the data point of the regression output was not |
| 24 | Q. All right. So you just saw this as of March 2016. | 24 | available to us as the map drawers/legislative staff |
| 25 | Who -- who gave you a copy of Exhibit 81? | 25 | tasked with this. |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | as a visual aid, but again I'm not sure how he | 1 | identifying a proxy for partisan outcome; is that |
| 2 | defines visual aid. | 2 | correct? |
| 3 | Q. Did you see, is there any way that you define visual | 3 | A. I'm not sure what you mean by that. I think your -- |
| 4 | aid that would characterize output that Dr. Gaddie | 4 | not to assume too much in your question, but are you |
| 5 | gave to you? | 5 | referring to the email exchange with Handrick and |
| 6 | A. I think I go back to that curve, although normally | 6 | Gaddie on the correlation between the two? |
| 7 | when I think of Microsoft Excel I don't think of | 7 | MR. POLAND: Let's just mark that. |
| 8 | visual aid, I think of a spreadsheet, but Dr. Gaddie | 8 | (Exhibit No. 82 marked for identification.) |
| 9 | did create some series of curves that he used in his | 9 | Q. Mr. Foltz, I'm handing you a copy of a document that |
| 10 | evaluation late in the process. | 10 | has been marked at depositions before, but we're |
| 11 | Q. Do you recall looking at any of those curves that | 11 | going to mark it as Exhibit No. 82 here for your |
| 12 | Dr. Gaddie created? | 12 | deposition. |
| 13 | A. I'm sure I did. | 13 | A. Okay. Many times before. |
| 14 | Q. Do you remember where you had looked at those? | 14 | Q. Yes. |
| 15 | A. Physically where I was? | 15 | A. (Witness reading.) |
| 16 | Q. Correct. | 16 | Q. Mr. Foltz, have you seen Exhibit No. 82 before? |
|  | A. It would have been at Michael Best. | 17 | A. Yes. |
| 18 | Q. Was Dr. Gaddie there with you at the time? | 18 | Q. And I want you to look at the lower right-hand |
|  | A. He would have to have been. | 19 | corner of Exhibit 82. Do you see there is what we |
| 20 | Q. And you would have discussed those curves with him? | 20 | refer to as a Bates stamp there that says Foltz |
| 21 | A. Again not recalling a specific conversation on the | 21 | 001059? |
| 22 | curves, I'm sure we talked about them when he | 22 | A. I do. |
| 23 | produced them. | 23 | Q. On the first page. Do you understand that indicates |
| $\begin{aligned} & 24 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | Q. Was anyone else present with you when you talked about the curves with Dr. Gaddie? | $\begin{aligned} & 24 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | that this is a document that came from your files or files that you produced? |
|  |  |  |  |
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|  | A. I don't specifically recall anyone being there, but | 1 | A. Yes, that's my understanding of the Bates numbering. |
| 2 | there was a good chance that it was Tad Ottman, | 2 | Q. And I will represent that this was produced as part |
| 3 | possibly even Joe Handrick. | 3 | of the Baldus litigation. |
| 4 | Q. Was there a room at Michael Best that you referred | 4 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 5 | to or that was generally referred to as the map | 5 | Q. The -- is this the -- the email exchange that you |
| 6 | om? | 6 | were referring to in your testimony a minute ago? |
|  | A. Yeah, I think that's a safe way of describing our | 7 | A. Yeah. I'm just reviewing it. |
| 8 | office. | 8 | Q. Yep, no, take a minute to review it. |
| 9 | Q. Was there -- was a discussion of these curves -- |  | A. (Witness reading.) Okay. |
| 10 | strike that question | 10 | Q. And you've seen Exhibit 82 before, correct? |
| 11 | Did the discussion of curves that you had with | 11 | A. I have. |
| 12 | Dr. Gaddie occur in the map room? | 12 | Q. When was the last time that you saw Exhibit 82? |
| 13 | A. Yeah. | 13 | A. I would have seen it in my preparation for this |
| 14 | Q. Were you looking at -- at potential -- well, strike | 14 | deposition as I reviewed prior exhibits that have |
| 15 | that. | 15 | been produced during the Baldus depositions. |
| 16 | Were you -- were you looking at -- at maps at | 16 | Q. All right. Now, turning your attention to the top |
| 17 | the same time you were discussing the curves with | 17 | of Exhibit 82, you'll see there is a -- a Gmail |
| 18 | Dr. Gaddie? | 18 | header, and it has your Gmail address there, |
| 19 | A. I don't know if we were or not. | 19 | correct? |
| 20 | Q. Do you recall the discussions that you had, the | 20 | A. That's correct. |
| 21 | substance of the discussions you had with Dr. Gaddie | 21 | Q. And so Exhibit 82 came from your Gmail files, |
| 22 | about the curves? | 22 | correct? |
| 23 | A. No. | 23 | A. Yes. |
| 24 | Q. Now, another -- another task of Dr. Gaddie's was to |  | Q. And the -- just below that there is a header that |
| 25 | assist you and Tad Ottman and Joe Handrick in | 25 | says -- it's got Joseph Handrick's name and it says |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q. And that's why you needed to have -- you needed to | 1 | proxy could be used for the purpose of determining |
| 2 | have a partisanship proxy so that those numbers | 2 | the potential partisan outcome of a future election |
| 3 | didn't have to be generated by Dr. Gaddie's | 3 | based on the past election data? |
|  | regression model every time you wanted to get that | 4 | Yeah. And again, I take -- I take issue with that. |
| 5 | information, correct? | 5 | I mean obviously taking Dr. Gaddie's mention here of |
| 6 | A. I don't -- I don't know if that's the motivation for | 6 | the -- or, you know, from the prior exhibit on |
| 7 | it. I mean you're looking for a statistic to | 7 | forward looking at face value, the averages were |
| 8 | describe the world around you. And it's more just | 8 | averages. And so I don't know if the difference |
| 9 | that there are certain limitations not only of, you | 9 | between the regression model is something built into |
| 10 | know, just the mathematical limitations of, you | 10 | that, some coefficient or something in the math that |
| 11 | know, me not being a social scientist or, you know, | 11 | creates a forward-looking aspect to it and just how |
| 1 | Tad or Joe not being a social scientist, but the | 12 | it's structured, what the math is, where what I know |
| 13 | autoBound software itself, things like that where | 13 | of the composites is that they are just simply |
| 1 | Dr. Gaddie may use something much more sophisticated | 14 | averages of prior races. |
| 1 | to develop this type of regression analysis. We | 15 | So I'll leave it to the social scientists to |
| 16 | don't have that. We just have a fairly simple way | 16 | debate whether past performance is indicative of |
| 1 | of looking at the world around us with, you know, | 17 | future results, but this -- this metric, this |
| 18 | averages basically. | 18 | composite is just nothing more than prior election |
|  | Q. Right. And that's what the proxy was designed to | 19 | results. And any time you get into that, the |
| 20 | do, correct? | 20 | individual nuances of races are going to factor in |
| 21 | A. To give us a statistic to describe a district | 21 | because, you know, you can have very competitive |
| 2 | Q. And one of the descriptions is the partisan makeup | 22 | races that come out to be 50/50. We've seen a |
| 23 | of that district, correct, or the partisan outcome | 23 | series of wave elections in Wisconsin. |
| 2 | of that district? | 24 | I mean, you know, certainly lower ticket races |
| 25 | MR. ST. JOHN: Object to form. It's compound. | 25 | are much more subjective -- or much more subject to |
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| 1 | MR. POLAND: It is compound. Could you read | 1 | these nuances than maybe top of the ticket where |
| 2 | the question back, please? | 2 | things maybe average out a little bit more across |
| 3 | (Question read.) | 3 | the state. So I take issue with that because I |
| 4 | MR. POLAND: You can answer if you understand | 4 | think the individual races can sometimes throw this |
| 5 | the question. | 5 | off, and I think the individual races are obviously |
| 6 | THE WITNESS: I would take -- I'm sorry, not to | 6 | backward-looking occurrences. |
| 7 | have you do this again, what was the question? | 7 | So I take a little bit of issue with that, and |
| 8 | (Question read.) | 8 | $I$ think that individual races have unique |
|  | THE WITNESS: I would have -- I would take | 9 | characterization -- or characteristics to them that |
| 10 | issue with outcome. I would take issue with | 10 | don't necessarily make it something you can look |
| 11 | anything that purports to be forward looking. I | 11 | forward in the future because I don't know what the |
| 12 | think makeup is accurate. I think it's more -- more | 12 | future holds. You know, I mean obviously we're |
| 13 | accurate to describe it because it is -- any | 13 | going to have a much more competitive U.S. Senate |
| 14 | composite is an average of prior races with regard | 14 | race this time around than when Robert Gerald Lorge |
| 15 | to, you know, a composite, just a sum total of prior | 15 | ran against Herb Kohl, you know, things like that. |
| 16 | races. So I think makeup is probably a little bit | 16 | Q. Did you -- did you use the partisanship proxy that |
| 17 | more accurate. | 17 | Dr. Gaddie identified in assessing the partisan |
| 18 | BY MR. POLAND: | 18 | makeup of the draft districts that you were creating |
| 19 | Q. What if I used the word potential partisan outcome | 19 | for Act 43? |
| 20 | of that district based on past election data? | 20 | A. It was an available data point to us. |
| 21 | A. Again I would take issue with that. I would take | 21 | Q. And I understand that it was available, but did you |
| 22 | issue with the forward looking on taking prior races | 22 | actually refer to it as you were drawing districts |
| 23 | and just simply coming up with an average. | 23 | for Act 43? |
|  | Q. Is it your understanding, though, that both |  | A. You could have. You could have made an assignment |
| 25 | Dr. Gaddie's regression model and the partisanship | 25 | and then gone over to whatever portion of the matrix |


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|  | to look at that. That is something that was | 1 | that maybe was 50/50, that's their right to request |
| 2 | available to you as a map drawer. | 2 | that. |
| 3 | Q. And I understand it was available, but I'm just | 3 | Q. Did you ever adjust the boundaries of a district |
|  | asking a different question. So I'm asking whether | 4 | based on a partisan proxy score for a specific |
| 5 | you actually did that as part of the drawing | 5 | district? |
| 6 | process. | 6 | A. Not that I can specifically recall. |
| 7 | A. Yeah, I'm sure -- I mean I think it's safe to say | 7 | Q. What about for -- what about for the map overall, |
| 8 | that when assignments were made I could reference | 8 | for the assembly districts overall in the state? |
| 9 | that and look at it, yes. | 9 | A. Well, again, not wanting to cross streams here. So |
| 10 | Q. But the question is a little different. I know you | 10 | what are you saying, that if there was an individual |
| 11 | could, there's a potential there. But it's not a | 11 | partisan proxy score? |
| 12 | conditional question. The question is did you | 12 | Q. Well, let me ask the question. Was there -- was |
| 13 | actually do that? | 13 | there a partisan proxy score that was generated for |
| 14 | A. Yeah, it was there. It was on the screen. | 14 | the act -- for the map as a whole, all the assembly |
| 15 | Q. Did you ever modify a district that you drew after | 15 | districts together? |
| 16 | reviewing either results of an application of | 16 | A. There was at one point a summary of the partisan |
| 17 | Dr. Gaddie's regression model or applying a partisan | 17 | proxy scores for all the districts. That summary |
| 18 | proxy -- partisanship proxy to that district? | 18 | did not exist until after the map had been basically |
| 19 | A. There's a couple of different things in that | 19 | finalized. |
| 20 | question that's kind of required to be split out. | 20 | Q. Do you recall when that was, the time frame? |
| 21 | As I testified to, if you make assignments, the |  | A. No, I don't. It would have been -- it would have |
| 22 | partisan proxy score is there. The regression | 22 | been sometime around the drafting request, you know. |
| 23 | analysis is not something that was available to us | 23 | $I$ don't know if $I$ ran it before that or after we put |
| 24 | as we were drawing so that's -- I think it's an | 24 | in the drafting request just because we were trying |
| 25 | important distinction to make. | 25 | to get the drafting process going. So somewhere in |
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| 1 | Q. That's fair. So let's just limit the question to | 1 | there after all the decisions had been made I could |
| 2 | the partisan proxy score | 2 | ake that partisan score and dump it into a |
| 3 | A. Right. | 3 | spreadsheet, which, you know, we've talked about |
| 4 | Q. Did you ever -- after -- after generating a partisan | 4 | before, and I'm sure we'll talk about again. |
| 5 | proxy score, looking at partisan proxy score for a | 5 | Q. All right. Just to make sure that I'm clear on this |
| 6 | draft district that you drew, did you ever | 6 | then, is it your testimony that after reviewing a |
| 7 | reconfigure the district in a way that increased the | 7 | partisan proxy score for a specific district, you |
| 8 | partisan proxy score for republicans? | 8 | did not change that district in a way that increased |
|  | A. Well, and again I've got to take a little issue with | 9 | the partisan proxy score for the republicans? |
| 10 | the phrasing of that question. Because partisan | 10 | A. And again, this is the crossing of districts between |
| 11 | proxy score for the republicans has certain | 11 | individual and the broader context of the map. So |
| 12 | implications for the broader map. Partisan proxy | 12 | the process, the leadership team did have various |
| 13 | score to an individual district is a different | 13 | regional alternatives available to them. They would |
| 14 | thing. So again I want to make sure we're not | 14 | make a decision based on the various factors. If |
| 15 | crossing streams here. | 15 | they asked me what the partisan score was of that, I |
| 16 | So if you draw a district and you finalize the | 16 | could tell them at the time that option $A$ is, you |
| 17 | assignments for it, again finalize being kind of a | 17 | know, a certain partisan proxy score of $X$ percent |
| 18 | nebulous term, I can look at that partisan proxy. I | 18 | and another option is $Y$, and that option $X$ gives the |
| 19 | do not recall any specific instance where I looked | 19 | member everything they're asking for, but option $Y$ |
| 20 | at that and said the member's requests are wrong, | 20 | defers to the member next door who wants the same |
| 21 | I'm going to go a different direction and overrule | 21 | piece of territory they do. |
| 22 | them. Again my job was to accommodate the member's | 22 | And so, you know, they know that there is a |
| 23 | requests for that district to the best of my | 23 | competition between two members for a same township. |
| 24 | ability. | 24 | And then they would also have available to them the |
| 25 | So if that member wanted a certain township | 25 | scores if they asked for them, whether it be prior |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | election races, you know, whether it be, you know, | 1 | sure it came up in the weighing of the alternatives. |
| 2 | J.B. Van Hollen in 2010, or if they wanted to, they | 2 | Q. Did -- did you ever have discussions with |
| 3 | could also have access to that composite score, that | 3 | Mr. Handrick in the context of where to draw |
| 4 | amalgamation. | 4 | boundaries for different assembly districts with |
| 5 | Q. Did it ever occur as part of the drafting process | 5 | respect to the partisan proxy score for that |
| 6 | that the legislative leadership asked you for those | 6 | district? |
| 7 | partisan proxy scores on a regional basis? | 7 | A. State that again or -- |
| 8 | A. On a regional basis? | 8 | Q. I can rephrase it. In other words, did you ever |
| 9 | Q. Correct. | 9 | discuss with Mr. Handrick the partisan proxy outcome |
| 10 | A. So yeah, again going back to the testimony, if we | 10 | of a draft district and how those district lines |
| 1 | put up a map -- or I don't remember exactly how we | 11 | could be changed to increase the republican partisan |
| 12 | structured that process, but if they asked me, I | 12 | proxy score for that district? |
| 13 | would have that data available to me. I don't | 13 | A. Not that I can specifically recall. I think it's |
| 14 | recall specific instances of them asking me that, | 14 | more in the context of $I$ have an alternative, Joe |
| 15 | but I'm sure at some point it was brought up or | 15 | has an alternative, and I don't want to say that in |
| 16 | asked of me what the various performances were for | 16 | such a way that it limits us to one alternative |
| 17 | the various options. | 17 | each, but everybody has alternative or alternatives, |
| 18 | Q. All right. And did you ever have any conversations | 18 | and in that context I'm sure that that metric came |
| 19 | with either Tad Ottman or Joe Handrick about the | 19 | up, but I don't recall specific instances of where |
| 20 | partisan proxy scores of either individual districts | 20 | there were regional alternatives and their specific |
| 21 | or of regions? | 21 | scores. |
| 22 | MR. ST. JOHN: Object to form. | 22 | MR. POLAND: So at this point in time we're |
| 23 | THE WITNESS: I mean in so much as if Tad | 23 | going to -- let's take a break because we have to |
| 24 | offered an alternative that had a certain percent | 24 | change the tape, and then we're going to look at |
| 25 | and I had another percent, I'm sure that's -- I'm | 25 | some files on the computer. |
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|  | sure that was discussed or it was data that was | 1 | THE WITNESS: Sounds good. |
| 2 | available. But, you know, that's reflecting where | 2 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This ends disk numb |
| 3 | he has senators that may be asking for certain | 3 | the video deposition of Adam R. Foltz on March 31, |
| 4 | different boundaries than my representatives, then | 4 | 2006; the time 11:26 a.m. |
| 5 | it's like well, here's where we hit -- here's where | 5 | (Exhibit No. 83 marked for identification.) |
| 6 | we hit the disagreement is that the senator would | 6 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the beginning of |
| 7 | like the outside boundary of their district to look | 7 | disk number two of the video deposition of Adam R. |
| 8 | different than the assembly rep. Here are the | 8 | Foltz on March 31, 2016; the time 11:41 a.m. |
| 9 | various options. And, you know, with assembly | 9 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 10 | districts it's a little different because you could | 10 | Q. Mr. Foltz, you had testified earlier today that you |
| 11 | be buried within the senate district and not affect | 11 | used a specific computer in your redistricting work |
| 12 | the outer boundary potentially. | 12 | in 2011, correct? |
| 13 | So, you know, there's -- for every, you know, | 13 | A. That's correct. |
| 14 | one that Tad -- every one member that Tad has to | 14 | Q. And do you recall from the Baldus case that the |
| 15 | deal with, I have potentially three times the input | 15 | aintiffs in that case obtained the internal and |
| 16 | so I'm balancing more concerns than Tad might be at | 16 | one external hard drive from the computer that you |
| 17 | a given -- for a given region. | 17 | used for redistricting purposes? |
| 18 | Q. Did you ever have any discussions with Joe Handrick | 18 | A. Yes. I would say internal hard drives probably more |
| 19 | about the partisan proxy scores that were generated | 19 | accurately. |
| 20 | for individual districts? | 20 | Q. And that's correct because there were two mirrored |
|  | A. I'm sure we discussed it. | 21 | internal hard drives, each one was 500 gigabytes, |
| 22 | Q. Do you recall what you discussed with -- with | 22 | correct? |
| 23 | Mr. Handrick about -- about those scores for |  | A. That's my understanding. |
| 24 | districts? | 24 | Q. And do you recall that in the Baldus case, the |
| 25 | A. No, not -- not specifically. But like I said, I'm | 25 | plaintiffs, they retained a computer forensic expert |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A. Okay. | 1 | attached to the Lanterman affidavit or declaration |
| 2 | Q. Mr. Lanterman then goes down in paragraph 16 and | 2 | that was Exhibit 83, and we've put it into a laptop |
| 3 | says, "I also identified relevant spreadsheets from | 3 | computer that Mr. Foltz now has access to. |
| 4 | the external hard drive associated with the WRK32580 | 4 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 5 | system." | 5 | Q. And if there's any need, Mr. Foltz, during the time |
| 6 | Do you see that? | 6 | that we're going through this exercise that you need |
| 7 | A. I do. | 7 | to refer back to Mr. Lanterman's declaration, please |
| 8 | Q. And it is your recollection that there was a hard | 8 | let me know, feel free to do that. |
| 9 | drive that was associated with your redistricting | 9 | So I'd like you to open up, please, the |
| 10 | computer, correct? | 10 | spreadsheet that is WRK32586 Responsive Spreadsheets |
| 11 | A. An external hard drive, yes. | 11 | File Detail Report. |
| 12 | Q. External. Mr. Lanterman states in paragraph 16, | 12 | A. 32586. |
| 13 | "This external hard drive was used in conjunction | 13 | Q. Correct. |
| 14 | with a backup program that packaged files within | 14 | A. Okay. |
| 15 | compressed zip volumes that first needed to be | 15 | Q. And file detail report. There's a separate one for |
| 16 | decompressed. After that, CFS identified a total of | 16 | the external hard drive, but I'd like to just stay |
| 17 | 57 spreadsheets that had been created or modified | 17 | on the 32586 for now. |
| 18 | between April and June 2001. Of those 57, 11 files | 18 | A. Okay. |
| 19 | were duplicates, leaving a total of 46 unique | 19 | Q. All right. And are you there? |
| 20 | files." | 20 | A. I am. |
| 21 | He then continues on, "I created an Excel | 21 | Q. All right. Now, can you identify these -- from the |
| 22 | spreadsheet detailing the locations, dates, and | 22 | file names, these spreadsheets as spreadsheets |
| 23 | other information of all responsive spreadsheets | 23 | that -- that you created? |
| 24 | that were identified on the external hard drive | 24 | A. Me or the autoBound software seems to be a generally |
| 25 | associated with the WRK32586 system," and then in | 25 | fair way of characterizing them. |
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| 1 | open parens he says -- or in parens he says, open | 1 | Q. All right. Now, I just asked you about file names. |
| 2 | quote, WRK32586 External HD Responsive Spreadsheet | 2 | If you scroll over to the right -- this is a pretty |
| 3 | File Detail Report.xlsx, close quote, close paren. | 3 | big spreadsheet, and if you scroll over to the |
| 4 | And then finally he concludes, "I provided a | 4 | right, you'll see in column F it should be there is |
| 5 | copy of the spreadsheet I created as well as the 46 | 5 | a file path. |
| 6 | unique identified spreadsheets to counsel for the | 6 | A. Okay. |
| 7 | plaintiffs. Copies of the spreadsheet that I | 7 | Q. And you'll see a file path that says from -- I'm |
| 8 | created as well as the 46 unique identified | 8 | looking at the first about, oh, I don't know, 30 or |
| 9 | spreadsheets are contained on the DVD-ROM provided | 9 | so rows on the spreadsheet, Users $\backslash$ afoltz. Do you |
| 10 | contemporaneously with this declaration." | 10 | see that -- |
| 11 | Do you see that? | 11 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 12 | A. I do. | 12 | Q. -- in column F? |
| 13 | Q. I wanted to make sure that you saw that for the | 13 | A. Yeah. Yes, I do. |
| 14 | context of looking at the spreadsheets we're going | 14 | Q. All right. And then if you scroll a little further |
| 15 | to look at. | 15 | over to the right, in columns H and I, you'll see H |
| 16 | A. I understand. | 16 | is an Author column? |
| 17 | Q. Let's go ahead then and put the DVD in the computer. | 17 | A. Okay. |
| 18 | We can go off the record here while we set that up. | 18 | Q. Do you see that? And then I is a Last Saved by |
| 19 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record | 19 | column? |
| 20 | then at 11:50 a.m. | 20 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 21 | (Discussion held off the record.) | 21 | Q. And you'll see in the Author column -- and we'll get |
| 22 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record at | 22 | into detail with specific spreadsheets, but you'll |
| 23 | 11:55 a.m. | 23 | see that your name appears in some of those afoltz, |
| 24 | MR. POLAND: For the record, I just want to | 24 | correct? |
| 25 | note that during the break we took the DVD that was |  | A. Uh-huh. |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | MR. POLAND: Or just read back. | 1 | 8 and 9, Composite_Current_Curve, do you know wha |
| 2 | THE WITNESS: Yeah, 8 and 9 is our point of | 2 | the term "composite" refers to? |
| 3 | reference? | 3 | A. No, no, I don't. |
| 4 | MR. POLAND: 8 and 9 is what we're looking at. | 4 | Q. All right. What about the -- what about the term |
| 5 | THE WITNESS: And the question? I'm sorry. | 5 | "current" as used in those file names? |
| 6 | MR. POLAND: Can you read back the question? | 6 | A. I don't recall specifically, but $I$ would assume that |
| 7 | (Question read.) | 7 | it has something to do with the map that was in |
| 8 | THE WITNESS: It appears from the data | 8 | place at this time, so this would have been the |
| 9 | associated with the file that yes, this was | 9 | prior -- the redistricting plan prior to Act 43, but |
| 10 | Dr. Gaddie's product. | 10 | I don't know that with $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ percent certainty. |
| 11 | BY MR. POLAND: | 11 | Q. All right. Just below that -- those two rows in |
| 12 | Q. All right. And the spreadsheet also indicates that | 12 | rows 10 and 11 , do you see there are file names that |
| 13 | they were last saved by you, correct? | 13 | both say Composite_Joe_Assertive_Curve? |
| 14 | A. That appears to be the case, yes. | 14 | A. I do. |
| 15 | Q. And they were last saved on May 28, 2011 -- I'm | 15 | Q. Do you know what "composite" refers to in that file |
| 16 | sorry, strike that question. | 16 | name? |
| 17 | Column J indicates that they were created on | 17 | A. No. |
| 18 | May 28th, 2011, correct? | 18 | Q. Do you know what Joe refers to? |
| 19 | A. Yes. | 19 | A. Joe Handrick. |
| 20 | Q. All right. Do you know is that a time whe | 20 | Q. All right. And then the term "assertive," do you |
| 21 | Dr. Gaddie was visiting in Madison? | 21 | know what that refers to? |
| 22 | A. I don't recall that specifically, but it seems to | 22 | A. No. |
| 23 | fit that that would be the case. | 23 | Q. Then below those two rows, and now we're in rows 12 |
| 24 | Q. Do you recall working with Dr. Gaddie on any curv | 24 | and 13 , you'll see a file name |
| 25 | or any Excel spreadsheets that had the title curve | 25 | Composite_Joe_Base_Curve. Do you see that? |
|  | Page 123 |  | Page 125 |
| 1 | or name curve in the file name while Dr. Gaddie was | 1 | A. I do. |
| 2 | visiting in Madison? | 2 | Q. And again do you know what "composite" refers to |
| 3 | A. I think worked with. I didn't do anything with or | 3 | there? |
|  | to any curves. That was just Dr. Gaddie's | 4 | A. No. |
| 5 | production, so I want to be careful about the word | 5 | Q. And Joe refers to Mr. Handrick? |
|  | "work." I didn't do anything on them or to them. | 6 | A. Correct. |
|  | Q. Is it your testimony that Dr. Gaddie created these | 7 | Q. And then do you know what "base curve" refers to? |
| 8 | spreadsheets and then provided you with an | 8 | A. No. |
| 9 | electronic copy of them? | 9 | Q. If you turn down to row 20 or scroll down to row 20, |
| 10 | A. I think it's a fair summary of it. | 10 | you'll see a spreadsheet that's labeled Plan |
| 11 | Q. How did Dr. Gaddie provide you with the electronic | 11 | Comparisons. That's the file name. |
| 12 | copies of the spreadsheets? | 12 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 13 | A. I don't recall. | 13 | Q. All right. And then if you scroll across over to |
| 14 | Q. All right. Do you recall whether there was a flash | 14 | column H and column I, you'll see that you are |
| 15 | drive used or whether they were emailed or whether | 15 | identified as the author and the person who last |
| 16 | there was a Dropbox account that was used? | 16 | saved that, correct? |
| 17 | A. Wouldn't have been Dropbox. Probably wasn't email. | 17 | A. Correct on both accounts. |
| 18 | Maybe a flash drive, maybe some type of burnable | 18 | Q. All right. And that was created on, at least |
| 19 | disk, but I don't recall. | 19 | according to the metadata, May 9th of 2011? |
| 20 | Q. Do you recall what you did with these curves once | 20 | A. May 2nd of 2011? |
| 21 | you had saved them to your computer? | 21 | Q. Okay. So we're on row 20, correct? |
| 22 | A. No, maybe printed them, but I really don't -- I |  | A. Yep. Office created date 5/2/11. |
| 23 | really don't remember doing anything specific with | 23 | Q. Okay. All right. Fair enough. It does -- it does |
| 24 | these. | 24 | say that there. I was looking I guess in -- in |
|  | Q. All right. Looking again at the file name for -- on | 25 | column C where it says May 9th, 2011. If you look |

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | at column C. |  | a -- a printout of the Plan Comparisons.xlsm file |
| 2 | A. Yeah. | 2 | that appears in row 20 in the spreadsheet we were |
| 3 | Q. Any idea why there is a difference between those | 3 | just looking at. We can -- we can certainly open it |
| 4 | two? |  | up as well on the DVD if you'd like. |
| 5 | A. I have no idea. |  | A. I don't see a need to at this point. |
| 6 | Q. All right. We might have to have Mr. Lanterman |  | Q. Okay. All right. Make sure I've got the right one |
| 7 | explain that. | 7 | here. |
| 8 | It also identifies that -- that the file was -- | 8 | MR. POLAND: Are you guys okay? |
| 9 | was modified it appears on April 27th of 2012, and | 9 | MR. ST. JOHN: Uh-huh. Yep. |
| 10 | I'm looking in column E. Do you see that? | 10 | BY MR. POLAND: |
| 11 | A. Column E line 20 4/27 of 2012. | 11 | Q. All right. Sorry if I already asked you this. Have |
| 12 | Q. Right. So that was the year after it was created. | 12 | you seen Exhibit 39 before? |
| 13 | Do you see that? | 13 | A. Yes. |
| 14 | A. Yeah. Yeah. | 14 | Q. All right. Is Exhibit 39 a document that you |
| 15 | Q. Do you know why it might have been modified in Apr | 15 | created? |
| 16 | of 2012? | 16 | A. Yes. |
| 17 | A. No. | 17 | Q. All right. What is Exhibit 39? |
| 18 | Q. All right. Do you recall the Plan Comparisons | 18 | A. It appears to be a summary of partisan scores for |
| 19 | spreadsheet as you sit here today? | 19 | districts. |
| 20 | A. Not by name, but I believe that's the red and blue | 20 | Q. And is -- was this created using the proxy that we |
| 21 | summary statistics. | 21 | had talked about earlier in your deposition? |
| 22 | Q. Yeah, let's just -- there are a couple that I've got | 22 | A. I believe so. Yes. |
| 23 | hard copies of and so some of these it might be | 23 | Q. Why was Exhibit 39 created? |
| 24 | easier to take a look at them in hard copies so |  | A. To create a summary as to the various changes in the |
| 25 | everyone can look at them. |  | districts. |
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|  | A. Uh-huh. | 1 | Q. Now, up at the top of Exhibit 39 there's a label |
| 2 | MR. POLAND: I guess the question, Brian, a | 2 | that says Milwaukee Gaddie 4_16_11_V1_B. Do you see |
| 3 | question for you on management, do we want -- if | 3 | hat? |
| 4 | we've got documents that have been marked as | 4 | A. I do. |
| 5 | exhibits already in this deposition, I've remarked a | 5 | Q. What is the significance of that title? |
| 6 | couple, should we remark them or just keep them as | 6 | A. That would probably be reflective of the autoBound |
| 7 | they are? | 7 | file that would have been associated with a map that |
| 8 | MR. KEENAN: I haven't necessarily been doing | 8 | led to this summary. |
| 9 | that since it's already been marked with Gaddie. | 9 | Q. Okay. And so when you were -- when we were talking |
| 10 | MR. POLAND: Okay. | 10 | fore about naming conventions for autoBound files, |
| 11 | MR. KEENAN: I don't -- if you want to, feel | 11 | that's a naming convention that you would have used? |
| 12 | free. I don't see the need to. | 12 | A. Yes. |
| 13 | MR. POLAND: Yeah, I don't see the need to | 13 | Q. Okay. So if we look -- if we look over on Exhibit |
| 14 | either then. Let's just -- let's not do it. It's | 14 | 39, this identifies districts 1 through 99, correct? |
| 15 | more question for management for us at trial. | 15 | A. Yes. |
| 16 | I'd like the record to reflect that I'm handing | 16 | Q. And those are the assembly districts in Wisconsin? |
| 17 | the witness a copy of a document that's been | 17 | A. For this given version of a map, yes. |
| 18 | previously marked as Exhibit 39 Gaddie. | 18 | Q. All right. And by the way, was this -- was this the |
| 19 | BY MR. POLAND: | 19 | final version of the -- of the assembly district |
| 20 | Q. And I'll give you a minute to take a look at that, | 20 | maps that was included in Act 43? |
| 21 | Mr. Foltz. |  | A. No, this wouldn't have been. |
| 22 | A. (Witness reading.) Okay. | 22 | Q. All right. So looking -- |
| 23 | Q. Is Exhibit 39 a document that you've seen before? |  | A. To the best of my recollection this would not be. |
| 24 | A. Yes. |  | Q. I understand. I understand. Is it -- is it your |
| 25 | Q. All right. And I'll represent to you that this is | 25 | belief that there was a -- a subsequent |

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | configuration of the assembly districts that | 1 | attempt at drawing the first assembly district is -- |
| 2 | superseded this? | 2 | again assuming it's the composite, which I'm fairly |
| 3 | A. Yes. | 3 | sure of, that that new district in this possible |
|  | Q. If we look at the -- at the column right next to the | 4 | proposed map or map that I drew of 51.22 is the new |
| 5 | District column, there's a column that's labeled | 5 | composite for that given district. |
| 6 | Assembly. Do you see that? | 6 | Q. All right. And that's the republican score again, |
| 7 | A. Yes. | 7 | correct? |
| 8 | Q. All right. At the top. And then across the header | 8 | A. I believe so. Yes. |
| 9 | rows it says Current, New, Delta. Do you see that? | 9 | Q. And then next to that there is a column that says |
| 10 | A. Yes. | 10 | Delta. Do you see that? |
| 11 | Q. All right. Now, if we look down the column that | 11 | A. I do. |
| 12 | says Current, there are a number of -- there's | 12 | Q. And that's simply the difference, the change from |
| 13 | some -- some red -- there's a red bar that fills in | 13 | the current to the new? |
| 14 | part of that cell, and then there are percentages | 14 | A. Yes. |
| 15 | next to that. Do you see that? | 15 | Q. And by "the change," I mean the change in composite |
| 16 | A. I do. | 16 | scores from the current to the new, correct? |
| 17 | Q. All right. What does that indicate? | 17 | A. Yes. That appears to be correct. |
| 18 | A. I believe that is the composite score. | 18 | Q. And so if we look down the column that's headed |
| 19 | Q. What's it a composite score of? | 19 | Delta, we can see that some of the -- some of the |
| 20 | A. We talked earlier about the composite. I don't | 20 | scores go up and some of the scores go down, |
| 21 | remember what the individual components -- this goes | 21 | correct? |
| 22 | back to the testimony on regression versus a less | 22 | A. Uh-huh. Yes. |
| 23 | sophisticated summary. I believe it to be that | 23 | Q. Now, if we move directly next to that, there is a -- |
| 24 | number. | 24 | a column that has an overall heading of Senate, |
| 25 | Q. All right. And so that would be -- so, for example, | 25 | correct? |
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| 1 | when we look at district 1 it says Current, and it |  | A. Yes. |
| 2 | says 51.15 percent, correct? | 2 | Q. And that's essentially the same process that we go |
| 3 | A. Yes. | 3 | through there. We're looking at the senate |
| 4 | Q. And so what is the 51.15 percent? What does that | 4 | istricts, and there's a current score, a new score, |
| 5 | number mean? | 5 | and then a Delta, correct? |
| 6 | A. That would be that if you applied the composite -- | 6 | A. Yes. |
| 7 | again I believe it's the composite -- to the first | 7 | Q. All right. And those are all -- those are |
| 8 | assembly district as it existed prior to Act 43, | 8 | republican scores; is that correct? |
| 9 | that would have been the composite of those races | 9 | A. Yes. |
| 10 | looking back backwards in time. | 10 | Q. Now, if we look all the way down at the bottom of |
| 11 | Q. All right. And so that would have been -- that | 11 | the first page of Exhibit 39, there are two other |
| 12 | would have been the republican share in that | 12 | boxes that are on the bottom. Do you see that? |
| 13 | district, correct? | 13 | A. I do. |
| 14 | A. I believe the composite is to republican score. I | 14 | Q. All right. There's one box on the left that says |
| 15 | think that's an accurate classification. | 15 | Current Map. Do you see that? |
| 16 | Q. All right. So now if we go -- if we go directly | 16 | A. I do. |
| 17 | over to the right, there is a column that's labeled | 17 | Q. All right. Now, under Current Map there is a line |
| 18 | New. Do you see that? | 18 | that says Safe GOP, and then in parens 55 percent |
| 19 | A. I do. | 19 | plus, and then there's a close paren. Do you see |
| 20 | Q. And so in the New column sticking with the first row | 20 | that? |
| 21 | it says 51.22 percent. Do you see that? | 21 | A. I do. |
| 22 | A. I do. | 22 | Q. What does that indicate? |
| 23 | Q. And so what does the column that's -- that's headed | 23 | A. Generally that a district that achieves that |
| 24 | New, what does that indicate? | 24 | percentage or greater is classified as being safe. |
|  | A. That for this given version of the map, that that | 25 | Q. All right. And what does it mean by -- what does |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | "safe" mean? | 1 | Q. That's all right. And there's no -- there's no |
|  | A. Generally that it's not a district that is going to | 2 | lower number there, correct? |
| 3 | be a targeted district in an electoral process $I$ | 3 | A. No, the total lines are next. |
| 4 | think is a fair way of classifying it. | 4 | Q. Okay. And so the Total DEM seats (safe plus lean), |
| 5 | Q. Now, if we -- and there are numbers in the assembly | 5 | and then there are total numbers of 40 and 13, |
| 6 | and senate that are associated with a safe GOP, | 6 | rrect? |
| 7 | right? There's 27 under assembly and seven under | 7 | A. Correct. |
| 8 | senate, correct? | 8 | Q. So if we move to the next box over, New Map, that |
| 9 | A. Correct. | 9 | contains the same general rows. In other words, |
| 10 | Q. If we look just below that line, we'll see it says | 10 | Safe GOP, New Lean GOP, Total GOP Seats, as the |
| 1 | Lean GOP. What does the lean GOP mean? | 11 | previous box, correct? |
| 12 | A. Again fairly self-explanatory that that district, | 12 | A. Correct. |
| 13 | looking at prior elections, has a tendency to be | 13 | Q. So if we compare the two, if we look at the current |
| 14 | leaning in the direction of GOP. | 14 | map and the new map, this would indicate that with |
| 15 | Q. All right. And so for assembly we see that's a 13 | 15 | the district configuration on page 1 , the new map |
| 16 | and 8 for senate, correct? | 16 | would yield 52 total GOP seats in the assembly |
| 17 | A. Yes. | 17 | versus 40 under the current map, correct? |
| 18 | Q. All right. And those -- those numbers there refer | 18 | A. Correct. |
| 19 | to districts, correct? | 19 | Q. And it would yield 18 total GOP seats under the new |
| 20 | A. The total number, the count of districts. | 20 | map versus 15 under the current map, correct? |
| 21 | Q. As opposed to -- correct. Yes. I think we | 21 | MR. ST. JOHN: Object to -- object to form |
| 22 | understand one another. | 22 | or -- I'm sorry, the question is would yield -- or |
| 23 | So then there is a -- a tally that says Total | 23 | maybe I'll object to foundation. The testimony was |
| 24 | GOP Seats (safe plus lean), and that simply is a | 24 | not what would yield from that. |
| 25 | tally of the previous two lines, correct? | 25 | MR. POLAND: Well, you can object to the form, |
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|  | A. Yes. | 1 | Kevin. |
| 2 | Q. Moving down from there, it says Swing, 48 to 52 | 2 | MR. ST. JOHN: Object -- object to form. Go |
| 3 | percent. Do you see that? | 3 | ahead, restate the -- may the court reporter please |
| 4 | A. I do. | 4 | restate the question for the witness? |
| 5 | Q. What -- what does that indicate? | 5 | (Question read.) |
| 6 | A. Districts that, again using kind of | 6 | THE WITNESS: So for this version of a map that |
| 7 | back-of-the-napkin common ways of referring to them, | 7 | would be reflected in these scores and how they are |
| 8 | are a little bit more susceptible to swinging back | 8 | categorized, in yield to the attorney's objection, |
| 9 | and forth between the parties using this average of | 9 | maybe has a little bit more built into it, but |
| 10 | races. | 10 | that's the summary statistics. |
|  | Q. All right. And so we see 19 assembly districts and | 11 | BY MR. POLAND: |
|  | five senate districts that fall under that swing | 12 | Q. Under the partisan proxy score that was -- that came |
| 13 | row, correct? | 13 | out of autoBound? |
| 14 | A. Correct. | 14 | A. Yes. |
| 15 | Q. So if we look just below that then, there is a line | 15 | Q. All right. Under the -- under the New Swing line of |
| 16 | that says Lean DEM, 45.1 percent to 47.9 percent. | 16 | the New Map, that indicates 9 assembly seats versus |
| 17 | Do you see that? | 17 | 19 assembly seats under the swing for the current |
| 18 | A. I do. | 18 | map, correct? |
| 19 | Q. All right. And there are numbers that are | 19 | A. Correct. |
| 20 | associated with that, 7 and 3, correct? | 20 | Q. And then in the senate it's 2 for new swing under |
|  | A. Yes. | 21 | the new map versus 5 under the swing line for the |
| 22 | Q. And then safe DEM is 45 percent? | 22 | current map, correct? |
| 23 | A. Uh-huh. Yes. | 23 | A. Yes. |
|  | Q. And then -- | 24 | Q. And then if we look down, just to finish this off, |
|  | A. Sorry. | 25 | with the DEM seats, there would be -- total DEM |


|  |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| seats under the new map, there would be 13 indicated in the senate, which is the same as under the current map, correct? <br> A. I'm sorry, where are you again? <br> Q. Sure. Under the New Map box, I'm under the Total DEM Seats. <br> A. Okay. <br> Q. And there would be 13 under -- for the senate under the new map, correct? <br> A. Uh-huh. Yes. <br> Q. Versus -- which is the same as under the current map, correct? <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. And then if you look at the assembly under the new map, it indicates 38 total DEM seats versus 40 under the current map, correct? <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. Now, this is -- this particular spreadsheet has several tabs to it, correct? <br> A. I believe so. Yes. <br> Q. So if we look at, for example, the next page, you'll see there's a header at the top that says Statewide Milwaukee Gaddie 4_16_11_V1_B? <br> A. Okay. <br> Q. And we can also look at the spreadsheet on Excel if | Q. Okay. All right. Would you turn to the -- to the next page or the next tab then. You'll see there's a header that says Final Map. Do you see that? <br> A. I do. <br> Q. All right. What does that indicate to you? <br> A. That if -- that it was probably the final map, but it may not be. I don't know if this reflects the Baldus court's decision. I don't know if there were any subsequent changes. So it may not be the final map, but I think it's a safe assumption that very near the completion of the process. <br> Q. All right. And I note, and again you can look at the spreadsheet on Excel if you want, I note that there's a second tab that is also -- has a header that says Final Map. <br> A. Okay. <br> Q. Do you know whether there's any difference between those two? <br> A. No, not without sitting down with it more I -- <br> Q. Oh, the only difference that I have noted, and I'm not trying to testify, the only difference I've noted is that in the first of the two final maps, the districts are -- are numbered one through 99, and in the second tab they appear to be sorted in some way. |
| you'd prefer to do that. <br> A. No, I'm good. <br> Q. Either way is fine. And so this is -- well, what does that -- the title Statewide 2 Milwaukee Gaddie 4_16_11_V1_B indicate to you? <br> A. Just the -- the name of the autoBound file that would have fed into this summary sheet. <br> Q. And this is -- again this is a file that you -- that you created using autoBound? <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. And was the general description of the layout of -that you had described for the first page that we looked at tabbed, does that apply to this second tab as well? <br> A. It appears to, yes. <br> Q. Now, this -- do you know why Statewide 2 -- or strike that question. Does the Statewide 2 have any specific meaning to you versus the name Milwaukee that's used in the -- on the first tab? <br> A. No. If memory serves, I normally labeled my statewide plans with statewide in them, so I don't know if there's any difference between the first page and the second page other than the file name, but I don't -- there's really no significance to me other than that. | A. Okay. <br> Q. But not by district number. <br> A. Okay. Yep. <br> Q. And then the -- but the general description again that you had given for the -- the first page of Exhibit 39 applies to the final map -- <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. -- page as well? <br> Is it -- if we look again at the bottom then, current map versus the new map, is it fair to say that this printout indicates that under the current map there would be 40 total GOP seats in the assembly and 15 in the senate; is that correct? <br> A. It appears that way, yes. <br> Q. All right. And then under the new map total GOP seats there would be 52 in the assembly and 17 in the senate, correct? <br> A. Correct. <br> Q. And if we look at the swing under the current map, 19 assembly, five in senate, correct? <br> A. Correct. <br> Q. And then in -- under the new map, the new swing, 10 in assembly and three in senate, correct? <br> A. Correct. <br> Q. And if we look at under the total DEM seats there |


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| :---: | :---: |
| 1 are 40 total DEM seats in the -- under the current | 1 Q. I'd like you to take a look, Mr. Foltz, on -- we're |
| 2 map, 40 in the assembly and 13 in the senate, | 2 sticking on the Responsive Spreadsheets File Detail |
| 3 correct? | 3 Report right now. |
| 4 A. Yes. | 4 A. Okay. |
| 5 Q. And then under new map, 37 total DEM seats in the | 5 Q. There is a -- a row 33, Team Map Curve.xlsx. Do you |
| 6 assembly and 13 in the senate, correct? | 6 see that? |
| 7 A. Correct. | 7 A. I do. |
| 8 Q. Would you turn to the final page then, and there is | 8 Q. And if you look -- if you scroll over to the right, |
| 9 a header that says Kessler Map. Do you see that? | 9 you'll see that -- that Dr. Gaddie is listed as the |
| 10 A. I do. | 10 author, and it's identified as being created on June |
| 11 Q. What does that indicate? | 11 14th. Do you see that? |
| 12 A. That it's a summary of -- I'm assuming this is a | 12 A. I do. |
| 13 summary of the map that -- I can't remember the name | 13 Q. Okay. Scroll -- yeah, you've got to scroll over to |
| 14 of the organization, but I believe Representative | 14 the Office Created Date is row -- or column J. |
| 15 Kessler was part of a group that tried to come in | 15 A. Yep, 6/14 of '11. |
| 16 during the Baldus litigation as an amicus party. I | 16 Q. Yep. Right. Do you recall what the Team Map Curve |
| 17 believe this is a summary of the partisan composite | 17 was or what it represented? |
| 18 from the autoBound plan that would have been | 18 A. Not specifically. It seems like it could be a curve |
| 19 associated with that map. | 19 that resulted from the -- the final -- or the map |
| 20 Q. Okay. If we -- and I am going to draw you back to | 20 that was subsequent -- or following the regional -- |
| 21 the -- back to the spreadsheet now. This is the | 21 the meetings with leadership where the regional |
| 22 Responsive Spreadsheets File Detail Report that you | 22 alternatives were discussed, but I don't know that |
| 23 had been looking at. | 23 for a fact. |
| 24 A. Okay. | 24 Q. All right. I'm going to ask you to do this then on |
| 25 Q. And ask you to take a look at line 20 that says Plan | 25 your computer. Can you open up -- can you find the |
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| 1 Comparisons. | 1 Team Map Curve within the folder, that's the WRK? |
| 2 A. Okay. | 2 A. Okay. So I'm at the directory. So which folder am |
| 3 Q. If you look, we had talked before about the -- about | 3 I looking at? |
| 4 the access and the modified and that it was a 2012 | 4 Q. You're looking for Team Map Curve. |
| 5 date? | 5 A. So 32586 Responsive Spreadsheets Duplicated? |
| 6 A. Okay. What columns are we looking at here? | 6 Q. Right. Exactly. |
| 7 Q. So we're looking at columns D and E. | 7 A. And Team Map Curve. |
| 8 A. Okay. | 8 Q. Dot xlsx. |
| 9 Q. All right. | 9 A. I believe I'm there. |
| 10 A. Yes. | 10 Q. Okay. |
| 11 Q. You're there? | 11 A. I think we're -- |
| 12 A. Yes. | 12 Q. You've got it open? |
| 13 Q. So you see that there is a -- an access and a | 13 A. Yes, sir. |
| 14 modified date in April of 2012. Do you see that? | 14 Q. I'm just going to turn my screen so you can see it |
| 15 April 27, 2012? | 15 to make sure at least it looks like we're looking at |
| 16 A. Yes. | 16 the same thing. |
| 17 Q. All right. Do you know when Representative Kessler | 17 A. Yep. |
| 18 came up with his -- with his map that he had | 18 Q. All right. What is Team Map Curve? |
| 19 submitted? | 19 A. I -- again not specifically recalling when in the |
| 20 A. I don't remember. | 20 process this is. I believe this is an analysis |
| 21 Q. Do you know whether the -- whether the revisions | 21 Dr. Gaddie ran on what was the map that resulted |
| 22 or -- revisions that you had made to your Plan | 22 from the regional meetings, but again I don't know |
| 23 Comparisons.xlsm in April of 2012 related to | 23 if it's the final map or something close to it in |
| 24 Representative Kessler's map? | 24 the -- close to the final map in kind of the |
| 25 A. I don't know if that's why it was flagged. | 25 process. |


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| :---: | :---: |
| 1 Q. All right. Just generally speaking, is -- you had | 1 followed once leadership had made their decisions, |
| 2 testified previously about the curves that | 2 and then as I testified to before, they made their |
| 3 Dr. Gaddie created? | 3 decisions on various regional alternatives, but they |
| 4 A. Yeah. | 4 didn't necessarily fit together because you may have |
| 5 Q. And what's -- what's -- this is an example of one of | 5 taken an alternative that I proposed in one area and |
| 6 the curves that he had created? | 6 an alternative that Joe Handrick had proposed in |
| 7 A. Right. | 7 another, and those two areas may crash, the puzzle |
| 8 Q. What's your understanding of what Dr. Gaddie was | 8 pieces might not fit together. |
| 9 why he created th | 9 So after those decisions were made, there was |
| 10 A. I really don't know what question he was trying to | 10 another process where you tried to have -- you had |
| 11 answer with this. I don't really know what he was | 11 to iron out those wrinkles or portions where they |
| 12 attempting to -- attempting to evaluate with this. | 12 didn't -- they didn't meet together well, they |
| 13 Q. Dr. Gaddie had created these curves as a visual | 13 didn't join together well. |
| 14 representation or a visual aid, | 14 So I think this curve would probably be that |
| 15 A. It appears that way, yes. | 15 map after the regional decisions were made. But |
| 16 Q. And you looked at printouts of these -- of at least | 16 like I said, it might not be the final final product |
| 17 some curves with Dr. Gaddie? | 17 that ultimately became Act 43. |
| 18 A. I don't know if we looked at printouts. I don't -- | 18 Q. If you look on the -- on the Responsive Spreadsheets |
| 19 I don't really recall how we looked at these or | 19 File Detail Report, so back out to that sort of |
| 20 really even looking at them. | 20 overall spreadsheet. |
| 21 Q. All right. Did you look at any of these curves with | 21 A. Okay. |
| 22 Dr. Gaddie? | 22 Q. We had talked before about the -- on line number 6 |
| 23 A. I'm sure we did at some point | 23 or row number 6 Composite_Adam_Assertive_Curve.xlsx |
| 24 Q. Do you have a specific recollection of -- of viewing | 24 A. Okay. |
| 25 them with Dr. Gaddie? | 25 Q. Do you see that? |
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| 1 A. No. | 1 A. I do. |
| 2 Q. Do you remember whether they would have been printed | 2 Q. All right. Can you open that file for me? |
| 3 out or would have been pulled up on a computer | 3 A. Okay. I should be there. |
| 4 screen? | 4 Q. All right. So that's the composite Adam assertive |
| 5 A. I don't remember. It could have been either. It | 5 curve? |
| 6 could have been both. | 6 A. Yes. |
| $7 \quad$ Q. Did -- what was the nature of the discussio | 7 Q. All right. And you have that one open? |
| 8 you had with Dr. Gaddie about the -- the curves that | 8 A. I do. |
| 9 he created? | 9 Q. All right. Have -- do you recall seeing this |
| 10 A. I don't really recall any conversations that | 10 particular curve before? |
| 11 happened related to these curves | 11 A. Again same as with the other ones, not a specific |
| 12 Q. All right. Do you remember -- do you know what | 12 recollection of this curve, but I'm sure we looked |
| 13 the -- what the file name Team Map m | 13 at it at some point. |
| 14 A. Going back to prior testimony, I believe if -- I | 14 Q. All right. Does -- does looking at this particular |
| 15 believe it was maybe not the final map, but | 15 spreadsheet now that you have it open, does that |
| 16 something that was close to it and probably a map | 16 give you any -- any further indication of what |
| 17 that was following the process in which leadership | 17 the -- what the file name, the "composite Adam |
| 18 got together and made their decisions on the various | 18 assertive" means? |
| 19 regional alternatives. | 19 A. No. |
| 20 Q. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut y | 20 Q. All right. Okay. I'd like you to go now to the -- |
| 21 A. No. I was done. | 21 to the folder that has the -- has the WRK32586, the |
| 22 Q. Do you know whether -- whether the word "team" has | 22 external. Do you see that? And I'd like you to |
| 23 any particular significance in -- in the file name? | 23 look at the -- |
| 24 A. I think the significance is going back to the prior | 24 A. I'm sorry, am I looking at a sheet or a folder here? |
| 25 testimony of $I$ believe this was something that | 25 Q. Looking at a sheet. This is WRK32586 External HD |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Responsive Spreadsheets File Data Report -- File | 1 | it. It seems like this would be something that |
| 2 | Detail Report. | 2 | could have been associated with that when we |
| 3 | A. Okay. WRK3258 External HD Responsive Spreadsheets | 3 | received a copy of the Kessler map. |
| 4 | File Detail Report. | 4 | Q. Okay. Would you -- would you take a look -- and I'm |
| 5 | Q. Right. | 5 | sorry, I'm just asking you to jump back and forth |
| 6 | A. Yes, I'm there. | 6 | here between two different things. I'm going to ask |
| 7 | Q. It's not a short name. | 7 | you to go back out to the WRK32586 External HD |
| 8 | A. Yes, but I am there. | 8 | Responsive Spreadsheets File Detail Report. |
| 9 | Q. You got it. Okay. Terrific. There is a -- there | 9 | A. And I am there. |
| 10 | are a number of files in here that -- file names | 10 | Q. Okay. You're there? |
| 11 | that refer to Kessler map. | 11 | A. Yes. |
| 12 | A. Okay. | 12 | Q. So if we look at row 5 again. |
| 13 | Q. Okay? And so, for example, there is -- if we look | 13 | A. Yep. |
| 4 | on row 5, you'll see a file name that says -- it's | 14 | Q. And that's the entry for the spreadsheet we were |
| 15 | users \afoltz \desktop \workspace $\backslash$ Kessler $\backslash$ Kessler | 15 | just looking at. |
| 16 | Map \Data. Do you see that? | 16 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 17 | A. I do. | 17 | Q. It says it was created on May 2nd, 2011. |
| 18 | Q. And then if you go down to line -- or to row 16, | 18 | A. Okay. |
| 19 | there's another one that says Work | 19 | Q. Okay. Now, if you scroll over further, if you look |
| 20 | Space $\backslash$ Kessler $\backslash$ Pass1_Key. Do you see that? | 20 | under the -- if you look under the author, the line |
| 21 | A. I do. | 21 | is blank and it says last saved by TVAENDRW. Do you |
| 22 | Q. All right. And there are a couple of others as | 22 | see that? |
| 23 | well. Do you know what these particular | 23 | A. I do. |
| 24 | spreadsheets are? And we can open them up and take | 24 | Q. And it -- it says -- and then it says an office |
| 25 | a look at them if you want. | 25 | created date of $5 / 24 / 2005$. Do you see that? |
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|  | A. I don't know what these particular spreadsheets are. | 1 | A. Yeah, I do. |
| 2 | Q. Okay. Let's do that. Let's open the first one at | 2 | Q. Does that give you any further indication of when |
| 3 | least, the one that says Kessler Map Data asm.xls. | 3 | that spreadsheet was created? |
| 4 | A. External, 32586. They're labeled a little | 4 | A. The date's very odd. I mean an '05 date showing up |
| 5 | differently here. There's a $C$ in front of | 5 | nywhere in here is very strange so I can't explain |
| 6 | everything. | 6 | hat. |
| 7 | Q. Yeah, that's right. There's a C in front of mine, | 7 | Q. All right. Do you know who -- who the TVANDERW is |
| 8 | too. Sorry. I was shortcutting that. | 8 | A. Without knowing exactly, I would assume it's Tony |
|  | A. And which one are you looking at specifically now? | 9 | Van Der Wielen. |
| 10 | Q. This is User -- | 10 | Q. Okay. And if we -- if we go down to line or row 16, |
| 11 | C\user \afoltz \desktop\workspace $\backslash$ Kessler \Kessler Map | 11 | that is also a file name that has a reference to |
| 12 | Data.asm? | 12 | Kessler in there? |
| 13 | A. Data.asm. Okay. I'm there. | 13 | A. Okay. |
| 14 | Q. All right. You have that spreadsheet open? | 14 | Q. And you'll see that that has a created date of May |
| 15 | A. I do. | 15 | 2nd, 2011 as well? |
| 16 | Q. All right. What -- what is this spreadsheet? | 16 | A. Okay. |
| 17 | A. I don't know. | 17 | Q. And if we go down to line 31, there is another entry |
| 18 | Q. As you sit here today, do you recall where you got | 18 | that says -- has Kessler in the title, in the file |
| 19 | this spreadsheet from? | 19 | name? |
| 20 | A. My guess is that when Representative Kessler and his | 20 | A. 31? |
| 21 | group introduced their map, I reached out to a | 21 | Q. Yep. 31. |
| 22 | service agency, probably LTSB, maybe LRB, and got | 22 | A. Okay. |
| 23 | the map. And, you know, autoBound files, assuming | 23 | Q. And that also was created on May 2nd, 2011? |
| 24 | it's an autoBound file, which I don't remember, have |  | A. Okay. |
| 25 | a lot of associated folders and files that come with | 25 | Q. And then there are -- there are two more in row 35 |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | about the changes coming from -- or generated by | 1 | Q. All right. I'd like you to open up the Summary.xlsx |
| 2 | looking at a comparison between the current map and | 2 | spreadsheet. |
| 3 | the new map? | 3 | A. Summary singular? |
| 4 | A. I'm sure $I$ did at some point, but I don't | 4 | Q. Yeah, summary singular. You'll see there are two |
| 5 | specifically recall any conversation with regard to | 5 | and it's the summary singular. |
| 6 | the team map. | 6 | A. Okay. Okay. Summary singular xls sheet. |
| 7 | Q. Were the -- were those changes from current map | 7 | Q. Right. |
| 8 | new map in different districts, was that information | 8 | A. Okay. |
| 9 | that you used as part of the decision of how to draw | 9 | Q. All right. Are you there? |
| 10 | district lines? | 10 | A. I am. |
| 11 | A. No. | 11 | Q. All right. And -- I'll just take a glance over your |
| 12 | Q. Did there ever come a time when you looked at the -- | 12 | shoulder to make sure we're looking at the same |
| 13 | the differences in either total GOP seats as they're | 13 | thing. Yes. I'll give you a minute to take a look |
| 14 | identified, for example, on Exhibit 43 from a | 14 | it. |
| 15 | current map to a new map and decided that you were | 15 | A. (Witness reading.) |
| 16 | going to adjust district lines to either increase or | 16 | Q. Let me know when you've had a chance to look at it. |
| 17 | decrease the total GOP seat count? | 17 | A. Okay. |
| 18 | MR. ST. JOHN: Can I have that question read? | 18 | Q. All right. Have you had a chance to look at that? |
| 19 | Before you answer it. | 19 | A. Yeah. |
| 20 | (Question read.) | 20 | Q. Is this a -- a spreadsheet that you've ever seen |
| 21 | THE WITNESS: No. The -- this point in the | 21 | before? |
| 22 | process would have been after the regional | 22 | A. I'm sure I saw it at some point in the process, but |
| 23 | alternatives were decided and then there was that | 23 | I don't specifically recall seeing it. |
| 24 | smoothing-out process. So the changes would be mor | 24 | Q. All right. Did -- did you create this spreadsheet? |
| 25 | in the context of the different regions not | 25 | A. I don't believe so. |
|  | Page 159 |  | Page 161 |
| 1 | necessarily merging together and then having to try | 1 | Q. Do you know who did? |
| 2 | to accommodate the fact that these didn't -- these | 2 | A. I don't know. |
| 3 | two different regional choices didn't merge, they | 3 | Q. Looking at the -- looking at the rows 2 and 3, |
| 4 | didn't mesh, and then, you know, trying to | 4 | you'll see it says "Statistical pickup. Currently |
| 5 | accommodate leadership's decision and the wishes of | 5 | held DEM seats that moved to 55 percent or better"? |
| 6 | the members as we went through that smoothing-out | 6 | A. Uh-huh. |
| 7 | process. | 7 | Q. Do you see that? Do you know what that indicates? |
| 8 | BY MR. POLAND: | 8 | A. That the seat in question's composite score moved |
| 9 | Q. You can set that document to the side | 9 | from something sub 55 to something greater than 55. |
| 10 | There are two other spreadsheets I wanted to | 10 | Q. Okay. And this would have been an analysis of a |
| 11 | ask you about. These are going to be in a different | 11 | specific plan or a specific map? |
| 12 | folder. | 12 | A. Yeah, it would have been. I don't know which one, |
| 13 | A. Okay. | 13 | though, and there's nothing to -- |
| 14 | Q. So you can get back to the -- to the DVD directory. | 14 | Q. That's what I was about to ask you, if there was a |
| 15 | A. Okay. | 15 | way of telling based on this spreadsheet which one |
| 16 | Q. And for this I'd like you to look at the -- I think | 16 | it might have been. |
| 17 | it's on this one. Let me just make sure. Make sure | 17 | A. No, there isn't. |
| 18 | I've got the right one here. So this would be the | 18 | Q. If you look just below that or just down a few rows |
| 19 | file that's the WRK32864. | 19 | to row 13 and 14, you see it says, "GOP Seats |
| 20 | A. 32864. The folder or -- | 20 | strengthened a lot. Currently held GOP seats that |
| 21 | Q. Yep. If you look under the Responsive Spreadsheets | 21 | start at 55 percent or below that improve by at |
| 22 | Duplicated. | 22 | least one percent"? |
| 23 | A. Okay. | 23 | A. I do. |
| 24 | Q. All right. |  | Q. All right. What does -- do you know what that |
| 25 | A. Okay. I believe I'm there. | 25 | means? |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A. It's fairly self -- I mean it seems to me that the | 1 | context of this spreadsheet that donate to the team? |
| 2 | composite increased by at least one percent on | 2 | A. I wouldn't think so. It may just be a broader |
| 3 | whatever map this is. And start below 55. So below | 3 | ference to the caucus, not necessarily |
| 4 | 55 , and an improvement on whatever score is used | 4 | attributable to the map. So I don't know which one |
| 5 | here, I'm assuming the composite, by at least one | 5 | that could refer to. |
| 6 | percent. | 6 | Q. All right. And then below in rows 89 and 90 you'll |
| 7 | Q. All right. And then if we go down below that, we | 7 | see it says, "DEMS weakened. Currently held DEM |
| 8 | see it says -- and this is rows 35 and 36 it says, | 8 | seats 45 percent or better that become more GOP." |
| 9 | "GOP seats strengthened a little. Currently held | 9 | Do you see those? Do you see those rows? |
| 10 | GOP seats that start at 55 percent or below that | 10 | A. I do. |
| 11 | improve less than one percent." | 11 | Q. All right. And is there any specific meaning that |
| 12 | Do you see that? | 12 | you attribute to that heading? |
| 13 | A. I do. | 13 | A. No, I mean the heading, or the subheading I should |
| 14 | Q. And again is that something you'd say that's fairly | 14 | say, is fairly self-explanatory to what the -- what |
| 15 | self-explanatory? | 15 | the numbers below seem to indicate. |
| 16 | A. Yeah. Fairly. | 16 | Q. Okay. Does having looked at this spreadsheet at all |
| 17 | Q. All right. And then rows 53 and 54, "GOP seats | 17 | reflect your recollection about who might have |
| 18 | weakened a little. Currently held GOP seats that | 18 | prepared this? |
| 19 | start at 55 percent or below that decline." | 19 | A. No. |
| 20 | Do you see that? | 20 | Q. Do you know why it was prepared? |
| 21 | A. I do. | 21 | A. No. |
| 22 | Q. Does that have any meaning beyond the explanation | 22 | Q. All right. I'd like you to take a look then at the |
| 23 | that's given there? | 23 | other spreadsheet, the one that you had identified |
| 24 | A. Yeah. Yeah, currently held seats that start at | 24 | as Summar |
| 25 | or below that decline. Yeah. I think it's fairly | 25 | A. Okay. Okay. Summaries plural within the same |
|  |  | Page 165 |  |
|  | self-explanatory in that sentence. | 1 | folder? |
| 2 | Q. All right. Below that then we see "GOP seats likely | 2 | Q. Right. Yeah. |
| 3 | lost. Currently held GOP seats that drop below 45 | 3 | A. Yes. |
| 4 | percent"? | 4 | Q. Should be just right there. |
| 5 | A. Okay. | 5 | A. Okay. |
| 6 | Q. All right. And any specific meaning to that beyond | 6 | Q. All right. Are you there? |
| 7 | what's written there? | 7 | A. I am. |
| 8 | A. No. Seems again to be fairly self-explanatory. | 8 | Q. I'll give you a minute to take a look at it if you'd |
|  | Q. All right. Below that there is a -- a 74 -- line 74 | 9 | like. |
| 10 | d 75. It says, "GOP donors to the team. | 10 | A. (Witness reading.) A lot of columns here. |
| 11 | Incumbents with numbers above 55 percent that donat | 11 | Q. Yeah. There are a lot of columns. |
| 12 | to the team." | 12 | A. Okay. I think I've got -- I'm sure you'll point me |
| 13 | Do you see that? | 13 | to the columns and rows that you're specifically |
| 14 | A. I do. | 14 | asking about. |
| 15 | Q. What does that indicate? | 15 | Q. Yeah, I will. |
| 16 | A. I don't know. | 16 | A. There's a lot going on here. |
| 17 | Q. Did you ever hear that term used before, donors to | 17 | Q. And this is the last spreadsheet I'm going to ask |
| 18 | the team? | 18 | you about. Is this -- is this a spreadsheet that |
| 19 | A. No. Maybe. Nothing that I recall. | 19 | you've seen before? |
| 20 | Q. All right. We had -- we had looked at an Exhibit | 20 | A. Not that I can recall. |
| 21 | 39, for example, a spreadsheet that was labeled Team | 21 | Q. Not one that you prepared then? |
| 22 | Map, and we'd seen a Team Curve before. | 22 | A. I don't believe so. This just doesn't feel like |
| 23 | A. Uh-huh. | 23 | something I would prepare. |
| 24 | Q. Does that -- the captions in those documents about team have anything -- any meaning in -- in the | 24 | Q. Do you know who did prepare it? |
|  |  |  | A. No. |


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| :---: | :---: |
| 1 Q. If you look at the sheet one and if you're scrolled | 1 referring to a summary of the overall map. |
| 2 all the way over to the left, so we're in columns A | 2 Q. All right. And we see there and I'm looking here |
| 3 through L, do you see that there is a -- on cell A1 | 3 now at rows 3 through 16, so just staying within the |
| 4 it says Racine/Kenosha? | 4 assembly. |
| 5 A. I do see that. | 5 A. Uh-huh. |
| 6 Q. All right. What does that refer to? | 6 Q. This looks to me at least like we have the same |
| 7 A. I am assuming Racine and Kenosha. | 7 Strong GOP, Lean GOP, Total GOP, then Swing numbers, |
| 8 Q. All right. And then if you look in column A, there | 8 and then Lean DEM, Strong DEM, and Total DEM as we |
| 9 are a number of numbers, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66. Do | 9 saw at the bottom of some of the xl file printouts |
| 10 you see those? | 10 we looked at before, correct? |
| 11 A. I do. | 11 A. Correct. |
| 12 Q. Do those refer to the assembly district numbers that | 12 Q. All right. Then if we -- if we look over at columns |
| 13 are in Racine and Kenosha? | 13 AL through AR, you see AL has Joe Assertive, column |
| 14 A. Yes. | 14 AN has Tad assertive -- or Tad Aggressive. Column |
| 15 Q. And then just below that SD 21, SD 22, those are the | 15 AP says Adam Aggressive. Do you see those? |
| 16 two senate districts? | 16 A. I do. |
| 17 A. That's correct. | 17 Q. All right. Do those -- and then there are some |
| 18 Q. Now, if we look over in the next row, I'm sorry, the | 18 partisan scores below those as well, right? |
| 19 next column it says Current Law, and there are some | 19 A. Yes. Or I'm sorry, no, there are counts below |
| 20 numbers down that column, correct? | 20 those, not scores. |
| 21 A. Uh-huh. | 21 Q. Those are counts? |
| 22 Q. Then in row -- in column D it says Base Map, there's | 22 A. I believe so. |
| 23 some numbers below that; if you look at column F it | 23 Q. Okay. Well, yes. Okay. Understand. Right. |
| 24 says Assertive Map, some numbers below that? | 24 District counts in other words? |
| 25 A. Uh-huh. | 25 A. Yes. For those various categories. This thing is |
| Page 167 | Page 169 |
| 1 Q. And then over in column I it says Aggressive Map and | 1 horribly formatted. |
| 2 there are some numbers below that. Do you see that? | 2 Q. And then over on the -- in column AR it says Team |
| 3 A. Uh-huh. | 3 Map. Do you see that? |
| 4 Q. Do you know what the number | 4 A. Yes. |
| 5 A. Yes. | 5 Q. And those have zero below all of those, correct? |
| 6 Q. -- that appear in those columns? | 6 A. They do. |
| 7 A. I don't know. I would assume it's some type of | 7 Q. All right. Looking at -- looking at those columns, |
| 8 composite score but not knowing if it's the same | 8 Joe Assertive, Tad Aggressive, Adam Aggressive, does |
| 9 composite score you see in the summary sheets that I | 9 that refresh any recollection about any meaning that |
| 10 put together with the red and the blue formatting. | 10 those -- we saw some of those file names before -- |
| 11 Q. Are those partisan scores? | 11 that those might have? |
| 12 A. They would be partisan composite scores. | 12 A. Those are not my file names. |
| 13 Q. Are those partisan composite scores for the GOP do | 13 Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that those represent |
| 14 you know? | 14 different district configurations? |
| 15 A. I believe so. Yes. | 15 A. It appears to be that way, yes. |
| 16 Q. If you scroll over then, I'd like to look at it's | 16 Q. All right. Now, in the -- in the center of -- of |
| 17 columns AG through AR. | 17 that collection of rows and columns we were looking |
| 18 A. AG through AR? | 18 at, there's -- and this is column AK. It says |
| 19 Q. Yeah. | 19 "Current map: 49 seats are 50 percent or better." |
| 20 A. Oh, too far. Okay. | 20 Do you see that? |
| 21 Q. So you'll see that beginning in -- it's column AG, | 21 A. Uh-huh. |
| 22 row 1, it says Tale of the Tape. Do you see that? | 22 Q. Do you know what that means? |
| 23 A. I do. | 23 A. Again fairly self-explanatory. I think it's a |
| 24 Q. Do you know what that refers to? | 24 reflection that under the current -- or pre Act 43 |
| 25 A. I think it's just a back-of-the-napkin way of | 25 redistricting plan, that using whatever composite, |



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| :---: | :---: |
| 1 Q. All right. Below that it says, "GOP incumbent | 1 spreadsheet and then give your impression of them. |
| 2 weakened equals those 55 percent and below who have | 2 Do you recall those questions? |
| 3 negative movement on composite." Again that's a -- | 3 A. Yes. |
| 4 that's going to be a loss in the partisan score? | 4 Q. Okay. Was that -- were your answers based on any |
| 5 A. Uh-huh. Yes. | 5 preexisting knowledge of what this document |
| 6 Q. And then "Statistical loss equals seat that is | 6 contained? |
| 7 currently held by GOP that goes to 45 percent or | 7 A. No, just trying to interpret it on the -- on the |
| 8 below," then in parens, "Example: If number 47 goes | 8 fly. |
| 9 all Dane County" -- or CTY. I assume that means | 9 Q. Okay. And then we also looked at a similar document |
| 10 county? | 10 called Summary singular? |
| 11 A. Right. | 11 A. Yes. |
| 12 Q. -- "we lose the number, but not the incumbent. | 12 Q. Mr. Poland also asked you a series of questions |
| 13 Do you see that? | 13 about that document. Were your answers about it |
| 14 A. I do. | 14 based on any knowledge you had coming into this |
| 15 Q. Right. And what does that indicate? | 15 deposition about the contents of the document? |
| 16 A. It seems to -- well, I mean the first part is fairly | 16 A. No. I -- like I said, I may have seen this at some |
| 17 self-explanatory of there's a belief that if a seat | 17 point, but my summaries were the -- the red and blue |
| 18 dips below 45, it's statistically lost. 47 goes we | 18 sheets as we've talked about. |
| 19 lose the number, but not the incumbent. I think | 19 Q. And so your answers where he asked you to read some |
| 20 this is just alluding to a remuneration where -- | 20 words on the spreadsheet and then tell what they |
| 21 where an incumbent may not keep the same number, but | 21 meant, that was just based on you reading them here |
| 22 yet this metric is based off of the seat number. | 22 at the deposition and giving your opinion? |
| 23 That's how I read it. | 23 A. Uh-huh. |
| 24 Q. All right. And then finally just below that it | 24 MR. POLAND: Object to the form of the |
| 25 says, "GOP non-donors equals those over 55 percent | 25 question. Leading. |
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| 1 who do not donate points." | THE WITNESS: Yes, I was reading them on the |
| 2 Do you see that? | 2 fly and trying to extrapolate based on the heading, |
| 3 A. I do. | 3 the plain language reading, plus if there were any |
| 4 Q. What does that mean? | 4 data below that what was implicated. |
| 5 A. It seems to imply that an incumbent is over 55 | 5 BY MR. KEENAN: |
| 6 percent and does not take a negative hit on the | 6 Q. And both the summary and the summary documents, did |
| 7 composite. | $7 \quad$ you create those documents? |
| 8 Q. Do you know what the -- the reference to non-donors | 8 A. I don't -- no, I didn't. |
| 9 means? | 9 Q. And so you don't actually know what -- do you know |
| 10 A. I think it's -- again I think it's a little bit more | 10 what the author of the document intended by the |
| 11 self-explanatory that it's that they maintain or | 11 terms and titles that he used in them? |
| 12 increase on their composite. | 12 A. No. Everybody in the process had their own way of |
| 13 Q. All right. | 13 summarizing the decisions that were made. My |
| 14 MR. POLAND: Just a minute here. Okay. I | 14 process was the red and blue spreadsheets with -- |
| 15 think that's all I have. | 15 with the summary data at the bottom and the formulas |
| 16 MR. KEENAN: I have some questions. | 16 and the conditional formatting, so that's the way I |
| 17 EXAMINATION | 17 chose to summarize the decisions that were |
| 18 BY MR. KEENAN: | 18 ultimately made by the legislative leaders and |
| 19 Q. We'll just start off on the document that we're on | 19 eventually the caucus as a whole, the body as a |
| 20 now, the Summaries spreadsheet. I believe you | 20 whole. |
| 21 testified before this deposition you had never seen | 21 Q. Okay. And just some factual questions. Coming out |
| 22 this spreadsheet? | 22 of the 2010 elections, how many assembly seats had |
| 23 A. I may have. I don't specifically recall it, though. | 23 the republicans won? |
| 24 Q. Okay. And so Mr. Poland asked you a series of | 24 A. Sixty in the assembly I believe was where we were |
| 25 questions asking you to read words in the | 25 at. |


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| :---: | :---: |
| Q. Okay. And then in the 2012 election, how many seat did the republicans win? <br> A. 2012, 63? <br> Q. I believe that's correct, but so there was -- in 2010 there were 60 republicans who won assembly seats; is that correct? <br> A. I believe so. Yes. <br> Q. And if we look at, for example, Exhibit -- Gaddie Exhibit 43 which you were shown as a Team Map summary sheet. <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. Okay. If we look at the Current Map, that refers to the -- the plan that was in place for the 2010 election? <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. Okay. And that shows that there's 40 total GOP seats, safe plus lean. Do you see that? <br> A. I do. <br> Q. And then there's swing seats 19,48 to 52 . Do you see that? <br> A. I do. <br> Q. Okay. So am I correct in reading this sheet that in the 2010 elections the republicans won more seats than that were characterized as total GOP seats and all the swing seats in the current map? | testimony about the goals of the -- the process and the maps. So I'm going to point you to page 156 of the deposition. <br> A. Okay. <br> Q. And if you look at line 16 to 18 , there's a question and answer, and it's -- question is, "Was it a part of the goal to increase the republican membership in the legislature?" <br> The answer is, "No." <br> Do you see that? <br> A. I do. <br> Q. Okay. And you've testified today that the tes -this testimony remains correct? <br> A. Yes. I have testified that -- to that. <br> Q. What was the republican membership in the legislature at the time you were drawing the Act 43 map? <br> A. Sixty members in the assembly. <br> Q. Okay. And then how many senators? <br> A. Eighteen at that point? <br> Q. Okay. So was it a part of your goal to increase the republican membership in the legislature from 60 to above 60? <br> A. No. <br> Q. Okay. We can move on to page 195. |
| A. Yeah, the sum of those two would have been 59 seats, and we came out of the -- we, the republican assembly caucus, came out of that election with 60 seats. <br> Q. Okay. And then looking at the New Map, this Team Map sheet shows there's total GOP seats, safe plus lean 52 , and then swing 48 to 52 of 10 . That's correct? <br> A. Yes, it is. <br> Q. And how many republican assembly people are there right now? <br> A. Sixty-three. <br> Q. Okay. So republicans have won even more seats than are listed here as total GOP seats safe and lean and all the swing districts; is that correct? <br> A. The sum of those two numbers 52 and 10 would lead you with 62, and the current membership is 62 , so yes. <br> Q. Okay. So I just want to go back to your deposition testimony. I'm looking at Exhibit 75. This is the deposition from December 21, 2011. This was the first deposition from the Baldus case. <br> A. Okay. <br> Q. And Mr. Poland had previously shown you also some -an opinion in the Baldus case that referenced some | A. Okay. <br> Q. And there's a question starting on line 3 that says, "What about maximizing republican representation in the assembly?" <br> And the answer is, "No." <br> Was it a goal of yours in drafting the maps that became Act 43 to maximize republican representation in the assembly? <br> A. No. <br> Q. And why do you say that? <br> A. My goal is to get -- well, it's the competing goals of redistricting. Not only the -- you know, the criteria of compactness, contiguity, sensitivity to minority concerns, but there was also the other end of this which is that it is a bill like any other bill that requires a certain number of votes that gets over the finish line in the state assembly. <br> Q. Okay. So and by testifying that you -- your goal was not to maximize republican representation in the assembly, did you mean that you did not consider republican partisanship at all in drawing the Act 43 districts? <br> MR. POLAND: Object to the form of the question. Leading. <br> THE WITNESS: The -- again going back to the |


|  | Page 182 |  | Page 184 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | prior testimony that when I sat down with a member | 1 | engaging in the process of assigning geographic |
| 2 | of the legislature and they asked me for a certain | 2 | areas to a particular district? |
| 3 | thing, my job is to try to accommodate that. If I | 3 | A. Partisan data including the history of prior |
| 4 | can't accommodate that, or at least partially | 4 | elections under what would be if you took those |
| 5 | accommodate that, we run the risk of losing votes of | 5 | prior elections and applied it to the new lines, |
| 6 | members to ultimately pass this | 6 | those would be available. So you could look at a |
| 7 | So I need to be cognizant of what their | 7 | prior, you know, J.B. Van Hollen from 2010 race |
| 8 | requests are regardless of the motivation of that. | 8 | under a new configuration or an evolving and draw a |
| 9 | And like I said, whether it be that they want to | 9 | configuration. And then also the partisan composite |
| 10 | represent their old high school that they don't | 10 | was available to look at for that individual |
| 11 | currently represent or if there are more friendly | 11 | district as the geographic assignments were made. |
| 12 | republicans in that area, I have to try to | 12 | Q. And you used the example of drawing District 1. |
| 13 | accommodate that to the best of my ability. | 13 | When you were drawing District 1, what type of |
| 14 | BY MR. KEENAN: | 14 | partisanship information was available on the screen |
| 15 | Q. In this deposition -- in this deposition today and | 15 | in autoBound? Was it just District 1 or was it the |
| 1 | then in the other depositions there's been questions | 16 | entire state? |
| 17 | asked about things you consider when drawing |  | A. If other districts were assigned, it is possible |
| 18 | districts. | 18 | that I could see that. If District 2 had already |
| 19 | A. Uh-huh. | 19 | been -- let's say I assigned District 1 because it's |
| 20 | Q. What do you understand that to mean when someon¢ | 20 | the Peninsula and it's easy to assign. I could see |
| 2 | asks you what you were considering when you were | 21 | the partisan numbers, whether it be the history or |
| 22 | drawing districts? | 22 | the composite for that district, and then I could |
| 23 | A. Well, and again it goes back to traditional | 23 | see District 2, that individual districts, because |
| 24 | redistricting criteria: compactness, contiguity, | 24 | the matrix has more lines -- every district is a |
| 25 | population equality, sensitivity to minority | 25 | line, so I could see multiple districts, and by that |
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| 1 | concerns, and then also consideration of what that | 1 | I mean multiple lines, but only so much as the |
| 2 | specific member is asking for with regard to | 2 | screen would show me at a given time. |
| 3 | their -- with regard to their district. | 3 | Q. And could you see the impact a change you're making |
| 4 | Q. And I guess I kind of meant something more along the | 4 | to a particular district would have on the entire |
| 5 | lines of what -- what did you understan | 5 | state's political balance? |
| 6 | someone refers to drawing a district? What actually | 6 | A. No. |
| 7 | were you doing when you're drawing a district? | 7 | MR. KEENAN: I think I might want to take a |
| 8 | A. The mechanical | 8 | break to make sure there's no other questions in my |
| 9 | Q. Yeah | 9 | notes. I may just have a couple more, but I may be |
| 10 | A. -- of drawing the district? It's a matter of | 10 | done. So -- |
| 11 | assigning geography to a district, to a number, so | 11 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record |
| 12 | that that geography at its smallest can be a census | 12 | at $1: 27$ p.m. |
| 13 | block and at its largest could be multiple counties. | 13 | (Discussion held off the record.) |
| 14 | And so you select that level of geography and an | 14 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record |
| 15 | associated district number, and then you basically | 15 | 1:28 p.m. |
| 16 | click something in the software that assigns Door | 16 | MR. KEENAN: We're back on the record and I |
| 17 | County to District 1 in that case. You know, | 17 | have no further questions. |
| 18 | obviously Peninsula, that's always kind of been the | 18 | MR. ST. JOHN: I have no further questions. |
| 19 | first assembly district. So in that case you can | 19 | MR. POLAND: I don't have any questions either. |
| 20 | very easily just assign the entirety of the county | 20 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This ends the video |
| 21 | as opposed to assigning census block by census block | 21 | deposition of Adam R. Foltz on March 31, 2016; the |
| 22 | or municipality by municipality. | 22 | time 1:28 p.m. |
| 23 | Q. And when you were working in the autoBound program | 23 | (Deposition ended at 1:28 p.m.) |
| 24 | actually drawing a district, what kind of | 24 |  |
| 25 | partisanship information was available to you while | 25 |  |

## William Whitford v. Gerald Nichol

Adam R. Foltz

```
STATE OF WISCONSIN }
    } SS:
COUNTY OF WALWORTH }
    I, LAURA L. KOLNIK, Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Wisconsin, do hereby certify that the foregoing
proceedings were taken before me on the 31st day of
March, 2016.
    That the appearances were as noted initially.
    That before said witness testified, he was first
duly sworn by me to testify the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth relative to said cause.
    I further certify that I am neither counsel for,
related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the
action in which this proceeding was taken; and, further,
that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or
counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially
interested, or otherwise, in the outcome of this action.
    That the foregoing proceedings are true and correct
as reflected by my original machine shorthand notes taken
at said time and place.
    Dated this
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$\qquad$

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$\overline{\text { LAURA L. KOLNIK, RPR/RMR/CRR }}$ Notary Public
State of Wisconsin
My commission expires
February 23, 2018

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\hline 109:4 & 28 122:15 & 67:1 73:6 75:3 & 175:5 & 84:5,10 87:17 \\
\hline 2008 88:3 94:25 & 28th 122:18 & 75:10,19 76:9 & 57 114:17,18 & 89:8 \\
\hline 2010 88:3 94:25 & & 101:19,23 & 58 172:9 & 82 4:9 92:8,11 \\
\hline 106:2 177:22 & 3 & 124:9 129:20 & 59 170:4,10 & 92:16,19 93:10 \\
\hline 178:5,13,23 & 3 135:20 161:3 & 131:8 148:17 & 179:1 & 93:12,17,21 \\
\hline 184:7 & 168:3 181:2 & 155:23,24 & & 83 4:8,9 109:5 \\
\hline 2011 11:12,14 & 3/22/12 4:7 & 156:11,15 & 6 & 110:5,16 116:2 \\
\hline 11:14 14:7,13 & 3/23/16 4:8 & 157:7,20 & \(6118: 25119: 12\) & 845 63:24,25 \\
\hline 15:6 18:23 & 30 76:21 117:8 & 158:14 169:24 & 120:7 148:22 & 851 65:22 66:1 \\
\hline 19:25 20:8,21 & 30(b)(6) 10:18 & 178:9 180:16 & 148:23 170:16 & 86 113:6 \\
\hline 21:5 22:7,10 & 19:18 83:11,12 & 181:7,21 & 6/14 144:15 & 89 164:6 \\
\hline 39:8 42:23 & 83:13 84:3,4 & 441-5104 2:8 & \(6072: 19\) 178:5 & \\
\hline 56:5,25 57:19 & 31 1:16 5:7 & \(45135: 22163: 3\) & 179:3 180:22 & 9 \\
\hline 65:9 74:2 & 109:3,8 153:17 & 164:8 170:21 & 180:23 & 9 11:14 13:3 \\
\hline 76:19,21,22,24 & 153:20,21 & 171:12 172:9 & 608 2:8,16,24 & 70:17 121:6 \\
\hline 77:3,7 79:5,16 & 185:21 & 173:18 174:7 & 3:7 & 122:2,4 124:1 \\
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William Whitford v. Gerald Nichol
Adam R. Foltz
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
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\begin{aligned}
& \quad 137: 16 \\
& \mathbf{9 t h} 125: 19,25 \\
& \mathbf{9 : 2 7} 1: 175: 7 \\
& \mathbf{9 : 3 0} 70: 16 \\
& \mathbf{9 0} 164: 6 \\
& \mathbf{9 2} 4: 9 \\
& \mathbf{9 9} 129: 14 \\
& \quad 140: 23
\end{aligned}
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\section*{United States District Court \\ for the}

WILLIAM WHITFORD et. al
\begin{tabular}{cc} 
Plaintiff & \()^{\text {) }}\) \\
v. & \\
GERALD NICHOLS et al & \\
Defendant & Civil Action No. 15-cv-421-bbc
\end{tabular}

\section*{SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY AT A DEPOSITION IN A CIVIL ACTION}

Adam Foltz
To:
Office of Senator Scott L. Fitzgerald
Room 211 South, State Capitol, Madison WI 53707
(Nanve of person to whom this subpoena is directed)
Testimony: YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the time, date, and place set forth below to testify at a deposition to be taken in this civil action. If you are an organization, you must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on your behalf about the following matters, or those set forth in an attachment:
\begin{tabular}{l} 
Rathje \& Woodward, LLC \\
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline Place: & 10 E Doty St, Suite 800 \\
Madison WI 53703
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The deposition will be recorded by this method:
Stenographic and videographic means
Production: You, or your representatives, must also bring with you to the deposition the following documents, electronically stored information, or objects, and must permit inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of the material:

Please see attached Exhibit A

The following provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 are attached - Rule 45(c), relating to the place of compliance; Rule 45 (d), relating to your protection as a person subject to a subpoena; and Rule \(45(\mathrm{e})\) and (g), relating to your duty to respond to this subpoena and the potential consequences of not doing so.


The name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of the attorney representing (name of party) Plaintiffs
\(\qquad\) , who issues or requests this subpoena, are:
Ruth Greenwood, Attorney, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, rgreenwood@clccrul.org (202) 560.0590

\section*{Notice to the person who issues or requests this subpoena}

If this subpoena commands the production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things before trial, a notice and a copy of the subpoena must be served on each party in this case before it is served on the person to whom it is directed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4).

AO 88A (Rev. 02/14) Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No, \({ }^{15-c v-421-b b c ~}\)

\section*{PROOF OF SERVICE}

\section*{(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.)}

I received this subpoena for (name of individual and title, if any) \(\qquad\)
on (date) \(\qquad\) .
\(\square\) I served the subpoena by delivering a copy to the named individual as follows:
\(\qquad\)
\(\qquad\) on (date) \(\qquad\) ; orI returned the subpoena unexecuted because:

Unless the subpoena was issued on behalf of the United States, or one of its officers or agents, I have also tendered to the witness the fees for one day's attendance, and the mileage allowed by law, in the amount of \$ \(\qquad\) .

My fees are \$ \(\qquad\) for travel and \$ \(\qquad\) for services, for a total of \$ 0

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: \(\qquad\)

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc.:

\section*{Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 (c), (d), (e), and (g) (Effective 12/1/13)}

\section*{(c) Place of Compliance.}
(1) For a Trial, Hearing, or Deposition. A subpoena may command a person to attend a trial, hearing, or deposition only as follows:
(A) within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person; or
(B) within the state where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person, if the person
(i) is a party or a party's officer; or
(ii) is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial expense.
(2) For Other Discovery. A subpoena may command:
(A) production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things at a place within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person; and
(B) inspection of premises at the premises to be inspected.
(d) Protecting a Person Subject to a Subpoena; Enforcement.
(1) Avoiding Undue Burden or Expense; Sanctions. A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. The court for the district where compliance is required must enforce this duty and impose an appropriate sanction-which may include lost earnings and reasonable attorney's fees-on a party or attomey who fails to comply.

\section*{(2) Command to Produce Materials or Permit Inspection.}
(A) Appearance Not Required. A person commanded to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things, or to permit the inspection of premises, need not appear in person at the place of production or inspection unless also commanded to appear for a deposition, hearing, or trial.
(B) Objections. A person commanded to produce documents or tangible things or to permit inspection may serve on the party or attorney designated in the subpoena a written objection to inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling any or all of the materials or to inspecting the premises-or to producing electronically stored information in the form or forms requested. The objection must be served before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served. If an objection is made, the following rules apply:
(i) At any time, on notice to the commanded person, the serving party may move the court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling production or inspection.
(ii) These acts may be required only as directed in the order, and the order must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party's officer from significant expense resulting from compliance.

\section*{(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoenf.}
(A) When Required. On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that:
(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply;
(ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c);
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.
(B) When Perniitted. To protect a person subject to or affected by a subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may, on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires:
(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information; or
(ii) disclosing an unretained expert's opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert's study that was not requested by a party.
(C) Specifying Conditions as an Alternative In the circumstances described in Rule \(45(\mathrm{~d})(3)(\mathrm{B})\), the court may, instead of quashing or modifying a subpoena, order appearance or production under specified conditions if the serving party:
(i) shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship; and
(ii) ensures that the subpoenaed person will be reasonably compensated,
(c) Duties in Responding to a Subpoena.
(1) Producing Documents or Electronically Stored Information. These procedures apply to producing documents or electronically stored information:
(A) Documents, A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents must produce them as they are kept in the ordinary course of business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the demand.
(B) Form for Producing Electronically Stored Information Not Specified. If a subpoena does not specify a form for producing electronically stored information, the person responding must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms.
(C) Electronicallys Stored Information Produced in Only One Form. The person responding need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form,
(D) Inaccessible Electronically Stored Information. The person responding need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the person responding must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule \(26(b)(2)(C)\). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.

\section*{(2) Chaiming Privilege or Protection.}
(A) Information Witheld. A person withholding subpoenaed information under a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material must:
(i) expressly make the claim; and
(ii) describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.
(B) Information Produced. If information produced in response to a subpoena is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the person making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the information under seal to the court for the district where compliance is required for a determination of the claim. The person who produced the information must preserve the information until the clam is resolved.
(g) Contempt.

The court for the district where compliance is required - and also, after a motion is transferred, the issuing court-may hold in contempt a person who, having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena or an order related to it.

\section*{Exhibit A}

Documents to be produced by Adam Foltz:
All MS Excel spreadsheets and MS Word documents in native format generated during the redistricting process and formation of the state assembly boundaries set out in Act 43 of 2011 that mention or evaluate potential or actual partisan performance, between the dates of April 1, 2011 and August 9, 2011

**A hard copy of this flash drive will be hand-delivered to the clerk.

\title{
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \\ FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
}

WILLIAM WHITFORD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 15-CV-421
v.

GERALD NICHOL, et al.,
Defendants.

\section*{DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(a)(1) INITIAL DISCLOSURES}

Defendants, by their attorneys, make the following initial disclosures:

\section*{A. Individuals potentially having knowledge regarding this matter.}

Adam Foltz
Aide, Wisconsin State Legislature
c/o Attorneys Brian Keenan and Anthony Russomanno
Wisconsin Department of Justice
17 West Main Street
Madison, WI 53707
(608) 266-0020 (AAG Keenan)
(608) 267-2238 (AAG Russomanno)

To the extent it may become relevant if the case survives the motion to dismiss, Adam Foltz, who was involved in the 2012 districting process, may provide testimony regarding that process and the bases for districting.

\author{
Tad Ottman \\ Aide, Wisconsin State Legislature \\ c/o Attorneys Brian Keenan and Anthony Russomanno \\ Wisconsin Department of Justice \\ 17 West Main Street \\ Madison, WI 53707 \\ (608) 266-0020 (AAG Keenan) \\ (608) 267-2238 (AAG Russomanno)
}

To the extent it may become relevant if the case survives the motion to dismiss, Tad Ottman, who was involved in the 2012 districting process, may provide testimony regarding that process and the bases for districting.

Defendants also anticipate naming one or more experts at a future time, in rebuttal or otherwise, pursuant to the schedule to be set by the court.

\section*{B. Potentially relevant documents}

To the extent it may become relevant if the case survives the motion to dismiss, Defendants reserve the right to rely on documents or information previously exchanged, filed, produced, or otherwise made publically available in the previous federal litigation regarding the 2011 districting, Baldus v. Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Case Nos. 11-CV-562, 11-CV-1011, which, among other things, may provide background information and data about the districting process and criteria used. Those documents are available in the files of counsel for the Baldus case, including attorney Peter Earle who is also counsel in the present case, and via the federal courts' PACER website.

The defendants reserve the right to supplement their disclosures with documents or individuals that become known through further discovery, or based on legal standards that the court might announce if the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

\section*{C. Calculation of damages.}

Not applicable to the defendant.

\section*{D. Insurance agreements.}

Not applicable.
Dated this \(7^{\text {th }}\) day of October, 2015.


BRIAN P. KEENAN
Assistant Attorney General State Bar \#1056525

ANTHONY D. RUSSOMANNO
Assistant Attorney General
State Bar \#1076050

Attorneys for Defendants

Wisconsin Department of Justice
Post Office Box 7857
Madison, Wisconsin 53707-7857
(608) 266-0020 (AAG Keenan)
(608) 267-2238 (AAG Russomanno)
(608) 267-2223 (fax)
keenanbp@doj.state.wi.us
russomannoad@doj.state.wi.us
should be prepared to discuss how they wish to proceed.

NOW, THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. CAC's motion for summary judgment [D. 133] is GRANTED-IN PART and DENIED-IN-PART;
2. The JM Defendants' motion for summary judgment and for dissolution of the stipulated temporary injunction [D. 126] is DENIED;
3. CAC's motion to strike or disregard most of the JM Defendants' responses to CAC's proposed findings of fact [D. 182] is DENIED as moot;
4. CAC's motion for waiver of argument, disregard of facts, and limited waiver of attorney-client privilege [D. 184] is DENIED as moot;
5. CAC's motion to strike and/or disregard most portions of the affidavit of James Borneman [D. 186] is DENIED as moot;
6. CAC's motion to strike and/or disregard paragraph 4 of the declaration of attorneys Joseph Seifert and Evan Knupp and Exhibit I [D. 188] is DENIED as moot;
7. The JM Defendants' motion to withdraw its motion to dissolve the stipulated preliminary injunction [D. 191] is DENIED as moot;

\section*{8. The JM Defendants' motion to quash [D. 194] is DENIED;}
9. CAC's motion to supplement the evidentiary record [D. 203] is GRANTED; and
10. The Court will conduct a telephonic status conference on March 1, 2012 at

11:30 am (CST). The Court will initiate the call.

\section*{IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT}

Defendants Jeffrey Moon, JM Casting, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and any entity controlled by or in which they have an interest in, and all persons who are in active concert or participation with such persons, are RESTRAINED from directly or indirectly: (1) operating a business competitive to that of CAC; (2) further using and/or disclosing the Proprietary Process and/or confidential Business Information; (3) assisting, aiding, abetting or conspiring with any other Defendant from breaching the Non-Competition Agreement; (4) contacting any customer of CAC , including but not limited to U.S. Battery, with respect to any product manufactured or that could be manufactured by CAC using the Proprietary Process and/or the Confidential Business Information; and (5) interfering or doing business with any of CAC's suppliers, customers and/or prospective customers as it relates to the manufacture and/or sale of battery terminals using the Proprietary Process.


Alvin BALDUS, Carlene Bechen, Elvira Bumpus, Ronald Biendseil, Leslie W. Davis, III, Brett Eckstein, Gloria Rogers, Richard Kresbach, Rochelle Moore, Amy Risseeuw, Judy Robson, Jeanne Sanchez-Bell, Cecelia


BALDUS v. MEMBERS OF WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT
Cite as 849 F.Supp.2d 840 (E.D.Wis. 2012)

Schliepp, Travis Thyssen, Cindy Barbera, Ron Boone, Vera Boone, Evanjelina Cleerman, Sheila Cochran, Maxine Hough, Clarence Johnson, Richard Lange, and Gladys Manzanet, Plaintiffs,

Tammy Baldwin, Gwendolynne Moore and Ronald Kind, Intervenor-

Plaintiffs,
\(v\).
MEMBERS OF the WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD, each only in his official capacity: Michael Brennan, David Deininger, Gerald Nichol, Thomas Cane, Thomas Barland, and Timothy Vocke, and Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel for the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Defendants,
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Thomas E. Petri, Paul D. Ryan, Jr., Reid J. Ribble, and Sean P. Duffy, IntervenorDefendants.

Voces De La Frontera, Inc., Ramiro Vara, Olga Vara, Jose Perez, and Erica Ramirez, Plaintiffs, v.

Members of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, each only in his official capacity: Michael Brennan, David Deininger, Gerald Nichol, Thomas Cane, Thomas Barland, and Timothy Vocke, and Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel for the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Defendants.
Case Nos. 11-CV-562 JPS-DPW-RMD, 11-CV-1011 JPS-DPW-RMD.
United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

Decided March 22, 2012.
Background: After two actions were brought to challenge newly-enacted Wis-
consin statutes establishing new legislative and congressional districts, State's Democratic members of Congress were permitted to intervene as plaintiffs, and State's Republican members of Congress were permitted to intervene as defendants, 2011 WL 5834275. The actions were consolidated, and defendants and intervenor-defendants moved to dismiss.
Holdings: The District Court held that:
(1) new legislative districts did not violate "one-person, one-vote" principle;
(2) voters who were moved did not thereby have their right to vote diluted;
(3) new congressional districts did not violate "one-person, one-vote" principle; but
(4) legislative redistricting plan violated Voting Rights Act (VRA), by "cracking" Latino community into two Latino influence districts.
Ordered accordingly.
See also 849 F.Supp.2d 862, 2012 WL 1004871.
1. Constitutional Law \(\bigodot 3658\) (6)

States © 27 (5)
New legislative districts created by Wisconsin legislature did not violate "oneperson, one-vote" principle despite the partisan motivation for the districts' deviations from census precise ideal population; total population deviations of 438 persons for newly adopted assembly districts, a maximum deviation of \(0.76 \%\), and 1,076 persons for newly adopted senate districts, a maximum deviation of \(0.62 \%\), were de minimis. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

\section*{2. States \(\curvearrowleft 27(5)\)}

United States
Plaintiffs had initial burden, in their action challenging newly-enacted Wiscon\(\sin\) statutes establishing new legislative
and congressional districts, to show (1) the existence of a population disparity that (2) could have been reduced or eliminated by (3) a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal proportion; if plaintiffs succeeded in making that showing, burden shifted to defendants to show that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.

\section*{3. States \(\curvearrowleft 27(5)\)}

Acceptable justifications for significant variance between voting districts include core retention, avoidance of split municipalities, contiguity, compactness, and maintenance of communities of interest.
4. Constitutional Law \(\Longleftrightarrow 3658\) (3)

Wisconsin voters who were moved, during redistricting, from certain evennumbered state senate districts to oddnumbered senate districts, did not thereby have their right to vote diluted, in violation of their equal protection rights, even though they had to wait an additional two years before they could vote for a state senator; there was no evidence that any particular group would suffer more disenfranchisement than the remainder of the population. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
5. Constitutional Law \(\curvearrowleft 3658\) (6) United States \(\cong 10\)
Absent any evidence of population deviation, new congressional districts created by Wisconsin legislature did not violate "one-person, one-vote" principle under the Equal Protection Clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

\section*{6. United States \(\cong 10\)}

Absent any specific proposal offering a workable standard against which to measure new congressional districts created by Wisconsin legislature, allegation that districts were created through partisan gerrymandering failed to state a judiciable complaint.

\section*{7. States \(\curvearrowleft 27(6)\)}

To succeed in a claim that a legislative redistricting plan violates the Voting Rights Act (VRA), plaintiffs must show that(1) the minority groups are sufficiently large and geographically compact to create a majority-minority district, (2) the minority groups are politically cohesive in terms of voting patterns, and (3) voting is racially polarized, such that the majority group can block a minority's candidate from winning. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq.

\section*{8. States \(\Longleftrightarrow 27(4.1)\)}

If plaintiffs make threshold showing that a legislative redistricting plan violates the Voting Rights Act (VRA), district court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the minority groups have been denied an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b).

\section*{9. States 6 27(6)}

Wisconsin legislative redistricting plan denied Latinos an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice, in violation of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), by "cracking" the Latino community into two Latino influence districts; community was sufficiently large and geographically compact to create one majority-minority district and voting in the area was racially polarized and cohesive. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b).

\section*{10. Injunction \(\Leftrightarrow 1066,1348,1504\)}

District Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct of any special or recall elections using district lines created by newly-enacted Wisconsin statutes establishing new legislative districts; although there was pending litigation in state courts which sought to conduct upcoming recall

\section*{BALDUS v. MEMBERS OF WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT}
elections using the newly-created districts, there was no question ripe for determination by the District Court. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.

Douglas M. Poland, Rebecca K. Mason, Godfrey \& Kahn SC, Jacqueline E. Boynton, Law Offices of Jacqueline Boynton, Peter G. Earle, Law Offices of Peter Earle LLC, Milwaukee, WI, Dustin B. Brown, Brady C. Williamson, Godfrey \& Kahn SC, Madison, WI, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel S. Lenz, P. Scott Hassett, Lawton \& Cates SC, Madison, WI, for Interve-nor-Plaintiffs.

Colleen E. Fielkow, Patrick J. Hodan, Daniel Kelly, Joseph W. Voiland, Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren SC, Milwaukee, WI, Maria S. Lazar, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, for Defendants.

Kellen C. Kasper, Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Foley \& Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Intervenor-Defendants.

Before WOOD, Circuit Judge, STADTMUELLER District Judge, and DOW, District Judge.

\section*{MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER}

\section*{PER CURIAM.}

There was once a time when Wisconsin was famous for its courtesy and its tradition of good government. In 2006, James J. Conant was able to write that:

The most important feature of Wisconsin's society, government, and politics during the twentieth century was its progressive nature. Wisconsin had a highly developed civil society, its elected and administrative officials continuously attempted to improve the state's political
1. James J. Conant, Wisconsin Politics and Gov. ernment: America's Laboratory of Democracy at
institutions, and they attempted to enhance the economic and social circumstances of the state's citizens. Throughout the century Wisconsin's politics were issue-oriented, state government institutions operated free of scandal, and the administration of state policies and programs was conducted efficiently and effectively. \({ }^{1}\)
Students of American history still read about Robert M. La Follette, Sr., an independent thinker who came to prominence at the end of the 19th century and whose views defied the partisan pigeonholes of his day. More recently, Wisconsin has been called a "purple" state-that is, a state whose people regularly elect comparable numbers of Democrats and Republicans. Over roughly the last half-century, six Republicans and six Democrats have served as governor. Over the same time, one of its two seats in the U.S. Senate has been held continuously by a Democrat, while the other one has been occupied by three Republicans and two Democrats.

This bipartisan tradition has not, unfortunately, exempted Wisconsin from the contentious side of the redistricting process that takes place every ten years in the wake of the United States Census. Before the events leading to this lawsuit, the last time the Wisconsin legislature successfully passed a redistricting plan was in 1972, following the 1970 census. See Wis. Stat. § 4.001(1); Wisconsin State AFL-CIO v. Elections Board, 543 F.Supp. 630, 631 (E.D.Wis.1982). After the 1980 census, however, the state was not so fortunate. Beginning with that round, decennial litigation was just as much a feature of the political scene as was decennial redistricting. See Wisconsin State AFL-CIO, 543 F.Supp. 630 ( 1980 census); Prosser \(v\).

XV (2006).

Elections Board, 793 F.Supp. 859 (W.D.Wis.1992) (1990 census); Arrington v. Elections Board, 173 F.Supp. 2 d 856 (E.D.Wis.2001) (2000 census) and then Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Nos. 01-121 and 02-366, 2002 WL 34127471 (E.D.Wis. May 30, 2002) (per•curiam), amended by 2002 WL 34127473 (E.D.Wis. July 11, 2002) (also 2000 census). In 1982, 1992, and 2002, Wisconsin's legislative districts were drawn by a three-judge court. It is notable that in each of these earlier cases, the only contested matter related to the state's legislative districts; until now, no one has called on the federal court to intervene with respect to the state's congressional districts.

Now it is our turn. The U.S. Constitution, see Art. I, sec. 2, cl. \(3,{ }^{2}\) requires the federal government to conduct an actual enumeration of the U.S. population once every ten years; that enumeration provides the basis for representation in the House of Representatives. Article IV, section 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution independently requires the state legislature to update its senate and assembly districts following each federal census. In 2010, the Bureau of the Census complied with its constitutional duty, and on December 21, 2010, it announced and certified that Wisconsin's population was \(5,686,986\) as of April 1, 2010. This represented a slight increase over the 2000 population of 5,363 ,675. These new numbers required Wisconsin to take a fresh look at both its state assembly and senate districts, and its eight congressional districts (the overall number of districts remained the same) to ensure compliance with the one-person, one-vote principle announced by the Supreme Court
2. The Enumeration Clause is actually the fourth to appear in the original Constitution, but the original Clause 3, which established the infamous three-fifths rule for counting population, was abrogated by section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore skip over the now-repudiated clause and count the
in Reynolds v. Sime, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed. \(2 d 506\) (1964). Wisconsin has attempted to do so. Regrettably, like many other states, Wisconsin chose a sharply partisan methodology that has cost the state in dollars, time, and civility. Nevertheless, our task is to assess the legality of the outcome, not whether it lived up to any particular ideal.

\section*{1. The Redistricting Process}

The mid-term election in November 2010 resulted in a shift in political control in the State of Wisconsin. Scott Walker, the Republican candidate for governor, defeated Tom Barrett, the Democratic candidate, in the race to replace Governor Jim Doyle, a Democrat. Control of both Wisconsin's State Assembly (its lower house) and State Senate shifted from the Democratic to the Republican party. Thus, as of the time the Census results were certified and the state was ready to begin drawing whatever new legislative and congressional district lines were necessary, all three critical players were in the hands of a single party for the first time in many years. (Throughout this opinion, when we refer to "legislative" redistricting, we mean the two state houses; we use the term "congressional" redistricting for the lines drawn for seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.) The new governor and legislators were sworn in on January 3, 2011, and the very next day the Republican legislative leadership announced to members of the Democratic minority that the Republicans would be provided unlimited funds to hire counsel and consultants for the purposes of legislative redistricting.

\footnotetext{
Enumeration Clause as the third. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 457, 122 S.Ct. 2191,153 L.Ed.2d 453 (2002); Dep't of Commerce \(v\). U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 362, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
}

They informed the Democrats that they would not receive any funding for this process.
True to their word, the Republicans immediately began work in earnest, retaining the law firm of Michael Best \& Friedrich LLP ("Michael Best") to advise their caucus. Every effort was made to keep this work out of the public eye and, most particularly, out of the eye of the Democrats. Indeed, it was widely assumed that redistricting work would not begin until Wisconsin's units of local government had a chance to review their ward lines. Wards in Wisconsin are the smallest unit of govermment. In the past, redistricting has always proceeded on a "bottom up" basis: ward lines would be redrawn based on the new census figures, villages and towns would recompute their populations, and the counties would build on those figures. The Census does not use these units of government; instead, it proceeds on the basis of "census blocks" that do not always correspond to local government boundaries. Some care must be taken, therefore, to translate the census data into information that is compatible with actual governing units.
As we noted, the venue of the redistricting work was the offices of Michael Best. The actual drafters included: Adam Foltz, a staff member to Assembly Speaker Jeff Fitzgerald; Tad Ottman, a staff member to Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald; and Joseph Handrick, a consultant with the law firm of Reinhart Boerner Van Duren s.c. Others involved in the process were James Troupis, Eric McLeod, Ray Taffora, Speaker Fitzgerald, Majority Leader Fitzgerald, Sarah Troupis, Robin Vos, Senator Rich Zipperer, and Dr. Keith Gaddie. The drafters relied on a computer program called autoBound to work with various district lines. They testified that the partisan makeup of the potential new districts played no part at all in their
decisions. Handrick, for instance, testified that he did not know if partisan makeup was considered, that he had no access to voting data from past elections, and that only "population equality, municipal splits, compactness, contiguity, [and] communities of interest" were considered. Foltz testified that he worked with legal counsel and experts, and that Speaker Fitzgerald, Senator Fitzgerald, Robin Vos, and Senator Zipperer advised him where to draw the boundaries.
In June and July 2011, Foltz had meetings about redistricting with every single Republican member of the State Assembly. He did not meet with any Democrats. Nevertheless, he testified that it was not "a part of the goal to increase the Republican membership in the legislature." Before his meetings with the Republicans, each person was required to sign a confidentiality agreement promising not to discuss anything that was said. Ottman had similar meetings, conducted under the same cloak of secrecy. The drafters did not limit their outreach to public officials; they also held meetings behind closed doors with selected outsiders. In January 2011, they met with certain private business interests, including representatives from realtor and banking associations, and a hybrid state chamber of commerce called Wisconsin Manufacturers \& Commerce.

In addition, the drafters reached out to certain members of the Latino community. They contacted Jesus Rodriguez, a cofounder and member of Hispanics for Leadership, a political organization comprised of local business people, educators, and community advocates who work toward "getting the most representation possible for the Latino community on all levels." Rodriguez is also the President of Hispanics for School Choice, a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing school choice for Hispanic children, notably
through school vouchers. Hispanics for School Choice, available online at http:// www.hispanicsforschoolchoice.com/ (last visited March 14, 2012). Through Hispanics for School Choice, Rodriguez developed a professional and personal relationship with former Assembly Speaker Scott Jensen (a Republican), who presently serves as a senior advisor for another school choice advocacy organization, American Federation for Children. American Federal for Children, available online at: http://www.federationforchildren.org/ (last visited March 15, 2012). Troupis also contacted the Mexican American Legal Defense Education Fund (MALDEF), a national Latino civil rights organization, in an attempt to secure its support for the Republicans' plan. He hoped to "take the largest legal fund for the Latino community off the table in any later court battle," by courting their approval.
The process followed for the congressional districts was somewhat different. Like the state legislature, the Wisconsin congressional delegation ended up with a majority of Republicans after the 2010 mid-term elections (specifically, five Republicans and three Democrats, as we can see from the intervening parties to this case). In keeping with long-standing practice, the legislature in 2011 permitted the incumbent Wisconsin members of the House of Representatives to draft a map delineating the new congressional districts. Andrew D. Speth, chief of staff to Republican Congressman Paul D. Ryan, Jr., took primary responsibility for that task. Speth had some communications with Erik Olson, chief of staff to Democratic Congressman Ronald Kind, and later on, Congressman Ryan consulted with the three Democratic members of Wisconsin's delegation. In meetings that Speth held with the Republican members, they expressed their desire to draw districts that would maximize the chances for Republicans to be elected. (Note the contrast with the
disclaimers of partisanship offered by those who were working on the legislative redistricting process.) Speth's first complete draft was ready by May 13, 2011. That draft was shared exclusively with the Republicans. A second draft of June 1, 2011, was circulated to all members of Wisconsin's House delegation. The Democrats offered an alternative map two days later, but it was quickly rejected for failing to reflect minimal deviation from the ideal population for each district. Speth finalized a draft on June 8, 2011.
On July 8, 2011, the bills that would become Act 43 (legislative redistricting) and Act 44 (congressional redistricting) were introduced by the Republican leadership in the Wisconsin legislature. Simultaneously, the bill that became Act 39 was introduced. This was crucial, because it was Act 39 that permitted the legislature to draw new districts before Wisconsin's municipalities drew or re-drew their ward lines based on the new Census. Instead, upending more than a century of practice in Wisconsin, Act 39 required the municipalities to adjust their ward lines to the new state legislative districts. The legislature held a single public hearing on Acts 43 and 44 on July 13, 2011. On July 19, 2011, the legislature passed Act 43, and on July 20, 2011, it passed Act 44; both bills were then transmitted to the Governor. Act 39 was passed on July 25, 2011.

\section*{2. Procedural History}

On August 9, 2011, Governor Scott Walker signed into law each of the three critical bills discussed here: Act 39, which enabled redistricting based only on census blocks; Act 43, establishing the new legislative districts for both the State Assembly and the State Senate; and Act 44, establishing the new lines for Wisconsin's eight congressional districts. In the meantime, correctly suspecting that something like
the process we have described was afoot, on June 10, 2011, a group of voters filed suit against the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board (GAB) and its members in their official capacity, alleging that Acts 43 and 44 both violate federal and state law. The GAB is the state body charged with administering and enforcing all of Wisconsin's laws related to campaign finance, elections, ethics, lobbying, and contract disclosures. We refer to these voters as the Baldus plaintiffs, using the name of the lead party. On October 31, 2011, Voces de la Frontera, Inc. ("Voces"), an organization that describes itself as a grassroots group organized under the laws of Wisconsin, filed its own complaint against GAB and its members. Voces charged that Act 43 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; it did not challenge Act 44.
Because these two lawsuits qualified as actions "challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body," 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered an order assigning this litigation to a three-judge court and appointing this panel to serve as the members of the court. In an order entered on November 21, 2011, the court permitted the three Democratic members of Wisconsin's delegation to the United States House of Representatives to intervene as plaintiffs, and it permitted the five Republican members of that delegation to intervene as defendants. The next day, the court consolidated the Baldus and the Voces cases. Pretrial discovery took place on an expedited basis, with the expectation that trial would begin on February 21, 2012. That morning, however, the court urged the parties to make one last good-faith effort to settle, in the interest of all citizens of the State of Wisconsin and out of respect for the role of the state legislature in redistricting
matters. See Perry v. Perez, - U.S. ——, 132 S.Ct. 934, 940, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012). Those efforts, unfortunately, were unsuccessful, and so the trial continued on February 23 and 24, 2012.

With the benefit of the full record, the panel now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law for the case. For ease of reading, these are not presented separately. Our analysis of each of the plaintiffs' claims leads us to the conclusion that Act 43 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), by improperly diluting the citizen voting age population of Latinos across Assembly Districts 8 and 9. Otherwise, we find no judicially redressable injury in any of the plaintiffs' and intervenor-plaintiffs' remaining claims.

\section*{3. Analysis of Claims}

\subsection*{3.1 Overview}

Before turning to our detailed analysis of each claim, we must review what is still properly before us. For ease of reference, we begin by summarizing the claims of the Second Amended Complaint, noting the statute to which each one pertains, the current status of the claim, and, where pertinent, which parties are pursuing it:
- Claim One (Act 43): Legislative boundaries unconstitutionally sacrifice redistricting principles required by the U.S. Constitution. This claim went to trial on behalf of the Baldus plaintiffs.
- Claim Two (Act 43): The new legislative districts violate federal standards because they impermissibly disrupt local governmental boundaries. The Baldus plaintiffs were the only ones raising this, and they abandoned it at trial. Trial Trans. Vol. VI, 398-99.
- Claim Three (Act 43): The statute violates federal law because it disenfranchises 299,704 voters whose state senate districts have been moved. It does so by shifting them from an odd-numbered district to an evennumbered district; this shift means that voters in the affected districts will have to wait six years, not just four, until they have an opportunity to vote again for their state senator. This claim went to trial for the Baldus plaintiffs only.
- Claim Four (Act 44): Congressional districts are not compact and fail to preserve communities of interest, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Baldus plaintiffs abandoned this claim at trial, but the congressional plaintiff-intervenors continued to maintain it.
- Claim Five (Acts 43 and 44): The legislative (Act 43) and congressional (Act 44) districts reflect partisan gerrymandering forbidden by both the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment. The Baldus plaintiffs abandoned this claim at trial; the congressional plaintiff-intervenors continued to maintain it.
- Claim Six: (Act 43): The new legislative districts violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6, in two ways: first, because Act 43 "packs" Afri-can-American voters in Milwaukee into six districts and thus foregoes the opportunity to create a seventh "influence" district; and, second, because the statute "cracks" the Latino community into two districts, neither one of which is a majority-minority district of citizen voting age Latinos. The Baldus plaintiffs abandoned at trial their challenge to the AfricanAmerican districts, but they, along with the Voces de la Frontera plain-
tiffs in the consolidated case, pursued the second claim at trial. (Indeed, this claim consumed nearly all of the trial time.)
- Claim Seven (Act 43): Act 43 is unconstitutional because the legislative drafters used race or ethnicity as the predominant reason for drawing certain districts, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause as explained in cases such as Shavo v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630[, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511] (1993). The Baldus plaintiffs abandoned this claim at trial.
- Claim Eight (Act 43): The legislative redistricting accomplished in Act 43 violates the Equal Protection Clause because the new districts break up communities of interest. This claim went to trial.
- Claim Nine (Act 43): This claim seeks a declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring the GAB not to use the new 2012 district lines for any recall elections that may take place in Wisconsin between the present time and the date of the general election in November. This claim, too, went to trial.
In summary, therefore, most of this case remains before us in one way or another. Only Claim Two, part of Claim Six (dealing with the African-American districts), and Claim Seven are entirely out of the case.
As we noted earlier, the total "official" population of Wisconsin for purposes of redistricting is \(5,686,986\). Using that number and applying the "one person, one vote" command, the ideal population for each of Wisconsin's 33 senate districts is 172,333, and for its 99 assembly districts 57,444 . As for the congressional districts, the ideal population is either 710,873 or 710,874 . (Two of the eight congressional districts must have an additional person
because the total population does not divide evenly by eight.) As we discuss below, there is some deviation from these ideals for the legislative districts, but, reflecting the capabilities of modern computer programs, the congressional districts from a headcount standpoint could not be improved.

The Baldus plaintiffs are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Wisconsin's Government Accountability Board and its members. They ask the court to bar the implementation of both redistricting plans for the reasons we have just outlined and discuss in more detail below. The intervenor-plaintiffs are still pursuing a claim against the new congressional districts drawn in Act 44. The Voces de la Frontera plaintiffs, joined by the Baldus plaintiffs, charge that Act 43 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it dilutes the Latino community's voting strength in the 8th Assembly District. Both the GAB defendants and the congressional intervenor-defendants filed motions to dismiss both complaints on the pleadings; they have also denied that there is any cognizable federal violation in either Act.

We now turn to the merits of the case. In doing so, we say nothing about any arguments that could be understood to be based on allegations that the state officials have failed to follow state law. As defendants rightly point out, such claims are beyond our authority under the principles announced in Penmhurst State School \& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900,79 L.Ed. \(2 d 67\) (1984). We note, however, that the facts underlying some points that touch on state law may still be relevant for the federal issues that are properly before us. Thus, for example, we may examine plaintiffs' allegation that Act 43 fails to honor traditional redistricting criteria or to maintain local government boundaries, even if we refrain
from expressing any opinion on the question whether this may also state a claim for violating the Wisconsin Constitution.

\subsection*{3.2 Claims One and Eight: The New Legislative Districts Fail To} Comply with Constitutional Standards and Are Not Justified by any Legitimate State Interest.

Claim One addresses redistricting principles in general, while Claim Eight focuses on the specific principle against breaking up communities of interest. Since the latter is subsumed within the former, we have grouped these two claims together for purposes of discussion.

Only 323,026 people needed to be moved from one assembly district to another in order to equalize the populations numerically, but instead Act 43 moves more than seven times that number- \(2,357,592\) peo-ple-for a net change that results in districts that are roughly equal in size. Similarly, only 231,341 people needed to move in order to create equal senate districts, but Act 43 moves \(1,205,216\)-more than five times as many. Even accepting the argument urged by the GAB that one cannot change one district without affecting another, these are striking numbers. (Physicists would remind us that the amplitude of waves, whether in water or in air, diminishes unless one is in a vacuum because energy is absorbed; so too, a "wave" of population shifts in one corner of Wiscon\(\sin\) is likely to dissipate long before the other corners are reached.)
[1-3] When Act 43 is compared to the 2010 census precise ideal population, the total population deviation (from the most populous to the least populous district) is 438 persons for the newly adopted assembly districts, and 1,076 persons for the newly adopted senate districts. Plaintiffs, therefore, allege that the Act violates the "one-person, one-vote" principle. Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed. \(2 d 506\) (1964). And indeed, it is an interesting question whether deviations that might have been acceptable in an earlier time ought to be tolerated now that-as Wisconsin proved in Act 44-it is possible for a computer to draw not one, but an unlimited number of districts with the perfect number of voting inhabitants. But putting that thought to one side, it was the plaintiffs who had the initial burden to show (1) the existence of a population disparity that (2) could have been reduced or eliminated by (3) a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal proportion. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983). If the plaintiffs accomplish this, the burden shifts to the GAB to show that "each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal." Karcher, 462 U.S. at 731, 103 S.Ct. 2653. Accepted justifications include: core retention; avoidance of split municipalities; contiguity; compactness; and maintenance of communities of interest. \(I d\). at 740,103 S.Ct. 2653; Wisconsin State AFL-CIO, 543 F.Supp. at 636.

The defendants do not defend the state's new legislative districts on the ground that they are the best that could be managed. What the three-judge court said in 1992 remains just as true today: "representative democracy cannot be achieved merely by assuring population equality across districts," Prosser, 793 F.Supp. at 863 ; factors like homogeneity of needs and interests, compactness, contiguity, and avoidance of breaking up counties, towns, villages, wards, and neighborhoods are all necessary to achieve this end. Id. Nor do the defendants appear to argue that it is impossible to draw a plan that serves these democratic and neutral purposes. That is plainly not the case, since the court-drawn plans have consistently and scrupulously striven to be politically neutral. Id. at 867 ; see generally

Abrans v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997). Instead, defendants begin by observing that the Supreme Court has said that "state reapportionment statutes are not subject to the same strict standards applicable to reapportionment of congressional seats." White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed. 2 d 314 (1973). As Abranss pointed out, the Court has also held state legislatures to a lower standard of population equality than it imposes on courts. 521 U.S. at 98,117 S.Ct. 1925. Although times may be changing, in the past the Court has opined that "an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under \(10 \%\) falls within this category of minor deviations" that are insufficient to make out a prima facie case. Brount v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed. 2 d 214 (1983).

This does not mean, of course, that deviations under the \(10 \%\) point are beyond challenge. It does, however, indicate that plaintiffs bear a greater burden to show a violation of their voting rights for deviations of \(10 \%\) or lower. Several courts have expressed this thought by concluding that legislative population disparities under \(10 \%\) are subject to a rebuttable presumption of validity, but that they may nevertheless be unconstitutional if the drafting process was arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise unsupported by traditional redistricting criteria. Daly v. Hunt, 93 F. 3 d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir.1996); Cecere v. County of Nassau, 274 F.Supp.2d 308, 311-12 (E.D.N.Y.2003); Montiel v. Davis, 215 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1285-86 (S.D.Ala.2002) (three-judge court); Hulme v. Madison County, 188 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1047 (S.D.Ill. 2001); Abate v. Rockland County Legislature, 964 F.Supp. 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Marylanders for Fair Representation v. Schaefer, 849 F.Supp. 1022, 1032 (D.Md. 1994) (three-judge court). Notably, the Northern District of Georgia concluded in
a case quite similar to ours that it "need not decide [] whether the mere use of a \(10 \%\) population window renders Georgia's state legislative plans unconstitutional, because the policies the population window was used to promote in this case were not free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination." Larios v. Cox, 300 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1341-42 (N.D.Ga.2004). The Georgia court was appalled by the "baldly unconstitutional scheme" to protect the legislative influence of traditional communities at the expense of growing populations elsewhere and to protect incumbents in a discriminatory and arbitrary fashion. Id. With this case law in mind, we address the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.
The plaintiffs' redistricting expert, Dr. Kenneth Mayer, testified that Act 43 fails to comply with traditional redistricting principles. He was particularly concerned with the excessive shifts in population, disregard for core district populations, arbitrary and partisan motivations related to compactness, and unnecessary disenfranchisement. The defendants' experts, in particular Professor Bernard Grofman, had little to say about these points beyond the generic comment that when an underpopulated district must seize population from a neighboring district in order to reach its optimal size, the neighboring district may need to do the same, until such time as an overpopulated district is encountered and matters balance out. Conspicuously missing from Professor Grofman's testimony was anything precise about the magnitude of the population shifts here; Dr. Mayer, in contrast, offered testimony about many districts that could have been balanced out by moving vastly fewer numbers of people.

While we share Dr. Mayer's concerns in many respects and find ourselves largely unpersuaded by Professor Grofman's incomplete testimony to the contrary, we return to the degree of the deviations,
which were nowhere close to the \(10 \%\) number that the Supreme Court mentioned in 1983. The maximum deviation for assembly districts is \(0.76 \%\) and \(0.62 \%\) for senate districts. Numbers like these place a very heavy burden on the plaintiffs to show a constitutional violation. In the final analysis, they have failed to surmount that burden. We come to that conclusion not because we credit the testimony of Foltz, Ottman, and the other drafters to the effect that they were not influenced by partisan factors; indeed, we find those statements to be almost laughable. But the partisan motivation that, in our view, clearly lay behind Act 43 is not enough to overcome the de minimis population deviations that the drafters achieved, at least under this theory. We therefore find no merit in Claims One or Eight and conclude that they must be dismissed.

Before leaving this point, we add a few words about communities of interest. It is important not to assume that the mere ability to elect a representative of one's preferred political party is a perfect substitute for the ability to elect a representative who will more broadly identify with and serve his or her constituents' needs. The two major political parties are both big tents that contain within them people of significantly different viewpoints. That is precisely why, especially when the court must also take into account the rights of minority groups as we must with Assembly Districts 8 and 9 , careful attention is necessary. As we discuss in greater detail in section 3.5 below, the concept of community of interest is one that sweeps in much more than party label. Thus, for example, even if the reconfigured Assembly District 8 were seen as a reliably Democratic district, as Professor Grofman testified, that does not necessarily mean that the successful candidate would be the candidate of choice for the Latino community there. The whole point of the analysis under sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act is to ensure that qualifying minorities have an opportunity to elect representatives who will have strong voices on the topics that matter to them. Thus, the concept of community of interest will have an important role to play when we come to Claim Six. Untethered from section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, however, we do not have enough evidence before us to conclude that the remaining new districts created by Act 43 can be disturbed on that basis alone.
3.3 Claim Three: Disenfranchisement of Voters For State Senators
[4] In Claim Three, the Baldus plaintiffs assert that the movement of 299,704 voters ( \(5.26 \%\) of all persons in Wisconsin, according to the 2010 Census) from certain even-numbered senate districts to oddnumbered senate districts deprives those voters of their constitutional right to vote for a state senator in a regular election for two years. (Obviously, as the defendants point out, those voters have the right to vote for any other office on the ballot, but we do not understand defendants to be arguing that a voter can constitutionally be deprived of the right to vote in a particular race-maybe for the House of Representa-tives-as long as he/she may vote for dogcatcher or the library board. The right to vote is a fundamental right for every elective office in a democracy.) Pursuant to Wisconsin Constitution Article IV, section 5 , state senators serve four-year, staggered terms with half of the senators elected in presidential years and the other half during midterm years. The redistricting plan shifts voters among senate districts in a manner that causes certain voters who previously resided in an evennumber district (which votes in presidential years) to be moved to an odd-numbered district (which votes in mid-term years); this shift means that instead of voting for a state senator in 2012, as they
would have done, they must wait until 2014 to have a voice in the composition of the State Senate. The number of persons experiencing this type of disenfranchisement per district ranges from 133 to 72,431 , with an average of 17,630 for the 17 districts involved.
The Baldus plaintiffs argue that this disenfranchisement violates the Equal Protection Clause's requirement that "a State make an honest and good faith effort" to avoid vote dilution. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577,84 S.Ct. 1362. Some degree of temporary disenfranchisement in the wake of redistricting is seen as inevitable, and thus as presumptively constitutional, so long as no particular group is uniquely burdened. Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 515-16 (3d Cir.1993); Republican Party of Oregon. v. Keisling, 959 F.2d 144, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has never articulated a hard-and-fast standard for how much of this type of disenfranchisement is too much, nor did the Baldus plaintiffs offer any concrete standard to which we might turn. Although the GAB suggested that earlier maps drawn by courts for Wisconsin have established a floor of 500,000 , or even 750,000 , for permissible moves, we reject that proposition. These numbers cannot be assessed in a vacuum, and we have no indication of any other factors that might have compelled these significant numbers. Each case, and each decade, should be assessed on its own record, and factors like the number of people moved, the overall population shifts in the state (both internally and from out-of-state), the impact on particular demographic groups, and comparable points, will all enter into the assessment. It is important to us here that the evidence presented at trial did not indicate that any particular group will suffer more disenfranchisement than the remainder of the population. While we are sympathetic to the nearly 300,000 voters who have lost their opportunity to vote for
a state senator for two years, we find that Act 43 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause on this basis.
3.4 Claims Four and Five: Congressional Districts Fail Constitutional Standards for Compactness, Communities of Interest, and Partisan Gerrymandering
[5] The intervenor-plaintiffs (the three Democratic members of Congress from Wisconsin) assert that Act 44 violates Reynolds by focusing on population equality to the detriment of other principles, especially that of effective representation. They had no other choice, given the fact (as the parties stipulated) that Act 44 apportions the 2010 census population of the state of Wisconsin perfectly. Lacking any evidence of population deviation whatsoever, the intervenor-plaintiffs have no traction on this aspect of their Equal Protection Clause claim. Whatever else may have happened in Wisconsin, it has without a doubt preserved the one person, one vote principle for its citizens.
Second, the intervenor-plaintiffs argue that the Republican majority's legislative leadership in the Wisconsin legislature systematically created congressional districts to give their party an unfair electoral advantage in an attempt to preserve political majorities. The intervenor-defendants demur to that point, asserting frankly that there is nothing wrong with political considerations motivating redistricting. They further argue that the intervenor-plaintiffs did not offer a workable standard for the court to use in evaluating the political gerrymandering claim.
Justice Kennedy made a similar comment in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed. 2 d 546 (2004). Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia had argued that Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986),
which had recognized the possibility of a constitutional claim based exclusively on the existence of partisan political gerrymandering, should be overruled. But five members of the Court did not agree with him, even though it was also the case that they could not agree on exactly what legal standard ought to apply in these cases. Interestingly, however, Justice Kennedy's pivotal opinion on this point appeared to throw the ball to the litigating parties to come up with a manageable legal standard.
Whether the parties bear full responsibility for the development of the law, or if the Court shares that duty, is a topic beyond the scope of this case. We do note that the right to vote is an individual right, not a group right, see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (strict scrutiny is required for election laws that impose a severe restriction on an individual's right to vote). And few acts in a democracy are more expressive than the individual's marking a ballot (in whatever way it is done these days) to indicate which candidates he or she would like to see win the race. If, as the Supreme Court has held, the First Amendment protects persons from politicallybased hiring decisions, see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), O'Hare Truck Semice, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 135 L.Ed. \(2 d 874\) (1996), Board of County Coni's, Wabaunsee County \(v\). Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 116 S.Ct. 2361, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996), Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990), then perhaps the Court will find some day that the First Amendment also protects persons against state action that intentionally uses their partisan affiliation to affect the weight of their vote. Legislative districts drawn behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would arguably give each voter the best chance to express his or her views without anyone
putting a thumb on the scale in advance. But those developments, we concede, lie in the future, and so we return to the case at hand.
[6] For now, we find that the interve-nor-defendants have the better of the argument, because we are unable to discern what standard the intervenor-plaintiffs propose. Their failure to offer a workable standard means that no one has had a chance to test a suggested rule through the adversarial process. Without a specific proposal on the table, we are unable to evaluate the merits of this partisan gerrymandering claim. To the extent that the point is about process rather than results, we add that our review of the drafting of Act 44 leads us to believe that it was a significantly more bipartisan process than that associated with the drafting of Act 43. As discussed above, Speth did begin by meeting with the Republican members of Congress to discuss their priorities and concerns about redistricting. But well before the process was over, Congressman Ryan consulted his three Democratic colleagues to discuss their preferences. Speth testified that he attempted to incorporate all of the feedback (not just the Republican comments) into the draft. He avoided putting incumbents together in the same district, and he did not flip districts from majority-Democrat to majority-Republican or vice versa. Accordingly, we hold that the intervenor-plaintiffs cannot succeed on their partisan gerrymandering claim.

\subsection*{3.5. Claim Six: Voting Rights Act Claim of Latinos}
[7, 8] This claim, which concerns only Act 43, is the most troubling. As matters now stand, both the Baldus and the Voces plaintiffs charge only that the legislative redistricting plan, as it applies to one particular area of Milwaukee County, violates the rights of Latino voters under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act. To succeed, plaintiffs are required to meet the threshold requirements for such a case spelled out in Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986): (1) the minority groups are sufficiently large and geographically compact to create a majority-minority district; (2) the minority groups are politically cohesive in terms of voting patterns; and (3) voting is racially polarized, such that the majority group can block a minority's candidate from winning. If plaintiffs can meet this threshold, the court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the minority groups have been denied an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45, 106 S.Ct. 2752.

The defendants argue that the districts drawn in Act 43 give Latinos \(60.52 \%\) of the voting age population in New Assembly District 8 and \(54.03 \%\) of the voting age population in New Assembly District 9. As the trial unfolded, however, it appeared that they conceded that the relevant measure is citizen voting age population, at least for an ethnic group with as high a proportion of lawful non-citizen residents as the Latinos. This is correct. For the obvious reason that non-citizens are not entitled to vote, we cannot ignore citizenship status, particularly given the Supreme Court's express endorsement of the centrality of this point. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 429, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (concluding that citizen voting age population "fits the language of \(\S 2\) because only eligible voters affect a group's opportunity to elect candidates").

The defendants' expert, Dr. Gaddie, chose not to testify on this claim. He was, however, involved in the drafting process for Assembly Districts 8 and 9. Foltz testi-
fied that Dr. Gaddie instructed the drafters on how to draw the Latino districts in the way he believed was appropriate, but that the drafters did not follow his instructions for the final version. Rather, Foltz said, changes from Dr. Gaddie's recommendations were made in response to MALDEF's input. Ottman testified that Dr. Gaddie "looked at some of the minority district configurations that we had prepared and kind of evaluated them."
[9] Turning to the Gingles factors, the parties have stipulated that the Latino community in the area of Milwaukee covered by both former and New Assembly Districts 8 and 9 satisfies the first criterion (i.e., the Latino group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to create a majority-minority district). Professor Grofman, the defendants' lead Section 2 expert, testified at trial that he agrees with the plaintiffs that they have also satisfied the second requirement (i.e., that the Latinos in Milwaukee are politically cohesive in their voting behavior). Finally, Dr. Grofman agreed that we may accept Dr. Mayer's racial polarization analysis for the third inquiry (i.e., that voting is racially polarized, such that the majority group can block the Latino candidate from winning). In fact, when asked whether "the issue in this case is more about the totality of the circumstances" than the Gingles factors, Dr. Grofman agreed. We see no reason to disagree with this assessment, which as far as it goes is shared by Dr. Mayer.

Inquiry into the totality of the circumstances inevitably requires us to get into the weeds and decide, based on all of the facts in the record, whether Latinos in the vicinity of New Assembly Districts 8 and 9
3. 'In majority-minority districts, a minority group composes a numerical, working majority of the voting-age population.... At the other end of the spectrum are influence districts, in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even if its
have been denied an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The parties do not dispute that Milwaukee's Latino community bears the socioeconomic effects of historic discrimination in employment, education, health, and other areas, and that its depressed socioeconomic status hinders its ability to participate in the electoral process on an equal basis with other members of the electorate.

The dispute surprisingly centers on whether two Latino influence districts are superior to one majority-minority district. \({ }^{3}\) The defendants assert that "[t]he Latino community itself is divided on this point.... [S]ome members want the chance to have a second seat, they want 8 and 9 as they were prepared." There is a preliminary legal question to be answered, however, which will dictate whether this argument can prevail. It is whether, in a Section 2 claim, a state is entitled to deprive a minority group of one majorityminority district and substitute for that two influence districts. We have searched both Supreme Court decisions and those of other courts around the country, and we cannot find anything holding that this is an acceptable trade-off. In fact, the Supreme Court specified in Bartlett v. Strickland that "[u]nder present doctrine, § 2 can require the creation of [majority-minority] districts" but that "[t]his Court has held that § 2 does not require the creation of influence districts." Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009). We interpret the Court's language to mean that if we find a Section 2 violation, the creation of influence districts in lieu of a majority-

\footnotetext{
preferred candidate cannot be elected." Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009). In light of LULAC, supra, we understand the Court to be referring to citizen voters, where that qualification is pertinent.
}
minority district is not on the menu of options for relief.
The defendants argue that "[o]thers, such as Voces, appear to want to make a 100 -percent guarantee in 8 sacrificing the influence that was given to them in 9. ." But this argument flies in the face of Section 2's protection against cracking minority populations-in a sense, its assurance that a bird in the hand really is better than two in the bush, even though everyone realizes that a good hunter might actually snare both of the latter. The fundamental question for a Section 2 claim is whether the redistricting plan in Act 43 provides Latino voters with an opportunity to elect a candidate of choice. LULAC, 548 U.S. at \(430-\) 31, 126 S.Ct. 2594.

Dr. Mayer estimates that eligible Latinos constitute \(47.07 \%\) of New Assembly District 8's and \(40.52 \%\) of New Assembly District 9's citizen voting age population. Taking into account not only that number, but also actual voting experience in the races for the 2011 primary for Milwaukee County Circuit Judge, the 2008 State Superintendent of Public Instruction general election, the 2008 12th Aldermanic race, the 2008 Milwaukee City Attorney race, and the 2004 State Senate election, he concludes that this number is not enough to create the opportunity that Section 2 mandates. He also identified 36 elections since 1989 in which one or more Latino candidates ran against one or more Caucasian, non-Latino candidates, and showed that only four Latino candidates won over this time period, which represents only \(11.1 \%\) success by Latino candidates. He proposes an alternative Assembly District 8 with a Latino voting age population of \(70.07 \%\), which he estimates amounts to \(60.06 \%\) citizen voting age population.
One of the defendants' other experts, Peter Morrison, largely agreed with Dr. Mayer's conclusions. Mr. Morrison, a demographer, estimates that by November

2012 Latinos will constitute at least \(44.9 \%\) of the citizen voting age population in New Assembly District 8; that number coincides with Dr. Mayer's estimate. Morrison estimates that the Latino share of the citizen voting age population is increasing at a rate of at least \(1.1 \%\) annually, which means Latinos will continue to lack an effective majority in New Assembly District 8 through 2018. The parties' experts also agree that Latinos do not have an effective majority in New Assembly Districts 8 and 9 , but that if the lines were drawn differently, they could immediately achieve a majority-minority district in a reconfigured Assembly District 8 .
In light of this evidence, coupled with the fact that voting is racially polarized and cohesive in this area, it is apparent that Latino voters have a distinctly better prospect of electing a candidate of choice with one majority-minority district than with two influence districts. Notably, the 25,590 individuals who were added to New Assembly District 8 include a high percentage of Caucasian voters who come from neighborhoods where the effects of past discrimination are less burdensome than those experienced by the Latinos from the predecessor Assembly District 8. The newly added voters-who represent \(45 \%\) of the New Assembly District 8-are approximately \(41 \%\) non-Latino and are expected to continue to engage in racially polarized voting. Moreover, given the lower degree of historic discrimination, they are more likely to register and cast a ballot on election day. Dr. Mayer testified that the voter turnout rates among the newly-added Caucasian voters in New Assembly District 8 are higher by a factor of 10 when compared to Latino voters in that new district.

This is where our earlier observations about community of interest come back into play. The evidence shows that the
new lines for Districts 8 and 9 will be disruptive to the Latino community of interest. This is so despite Professor Grofman's prediction that the voters of New District 8 are likely to support candidates from the Democratic party. But the Democratic candidate favored by the Latino community will not necessarily be the same as the Democratic candidate favored by the new non-Latino voters in the district. The latter are people who, as the record shows, have a vastly higher turnout rate than do the Latinos. In other words, we may simply have a situation in which the real race is at the primary level, not during the general election, but all of the same problems will simply be pushed back one stage. As the Supreme Court pointed out in O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 15-16, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972), quoting from United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 308, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), "where the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the choice, the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary, is likewise included in the right protected by Article I, § 2."

Dr. Grofman argues that Latinos in New Assembly District 8 can elect their candidate of choice because the district is more properly understood as a coalition district. In a coalition district, "two minority groups form a coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition's choice." Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13, 129 S.Ct. 1231. Dr. Grofman believes that non-Latino minorities in New Assembly District 8-specifically Afri-can-American voters-will support the Latinos' candidate of choice. This argument is more commonly presented by plaintiffs seeking to protect the minority coalition's Section 2 rights. Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.1996) (en banc). That said, the Supreme Court has suggested that a proven coalition district may dodge Section 2 intervention. Johnson v.

De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed. \(2 d 775\) (1994) ("If the lesson of Gingles is that society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity, that should not obscure the fact that there are communities in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect candidates of their choice.").

Certainly, if the GAB had offered concrete evidence demonstrating that New Assembly District 8 is a coalition district, such a showing would have supported a finding of no Section 2 violation. But Dr. Grofman did not conduct a racial polarization analysis, for Latinos or any other minority community. The only racial polarization analysis in the record is Dr. Mayer's, where he independently examined the Latino and African-American communities. While the plaintiffs have abandoned their Section 2 claim on behalf of African-American voters, we note that Dr. Mayer showed that African-Americans tend to vote nearly unanimously for African-American candidates, whereas Caucasian voters were "uniformly less likely to support the African-American candidate, often by huge margins." Dr. Mayer also testified at trial that there is no evidence of coalition building in New Assembly District 8 among Latino, African American, or Asian voters. He concluded, in fact, that "there's quite a bit of tension" among the distinct racial groups. Testimony by Christine Neumann-Ortiz, the founder of Voces de la Frontera, and Pedro Colon, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge, support Dr. Mayer's conclusion. Presented with this record, we cannot make the leap that African-American
voters would prefer a Latino candidate to a Caucasian candidate merely because they tend to prefer African-American candidates to a Caucasian candidate. Dr. Grofman would have us rely on his hunch that African-Americans would vote for Latino candidates, but that is plainly inadequate. Section 2 rights are too valuable to be evaluated on an expert's unsubstantiated prediction.

Dr. Grofman also argues that there is no Section 2 violation because the current Assemblywoman, Jocasta Zamarripa, from the former Assembly District 8 is Latina. He did not estimate the extent of such an incumbency advantage and whether it sufficiently counteracts Dr. Mayer's concerns with low registration and low voter turnout among Latino voters. It is no matter, however, because Dr. Grofman's supposition utterly ignores the radical reconfiguration that the New Assembly District 8 imposes. Assemblywoman Zamarripa is not an incumbent with respect to fully \(45 \%\) of the population of New Assembly District 8. It seems to this court that the alleged incumbency advantage tracks the racial divide, thus rendering its significance minimal.

Finally, the defendants assert that New Assembly District 8 should pass muster under the Voting Rights Act because Act 43 is, in certain ways, consistent with this court's 2002 map. The former Assembly District 8 had a Latino voting age population in 2002 of \(58.3 \%\), which is less than the New Assembly District 8's \(60.52 \%\) Latino voting age population. We first point out that the Supreme Court did not highlight the importance of focusing on citizenship status until 2006. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 429,126 S.Ct. 2594 . Since 2006 , we have been required to take real voting majorities into consideration; just as we
do not include children in those numbers, we cannot include non-citizens who do not enjoy the franchise. Second, the record shows that the Latino community's success under the 2002 map is mixed at best. We are not tied down by history when better evidence of the present and likely future is before us, and when the last decade has produced demographic changes that now make it possible to draw an effective ma-jority-minority district. We find persuasive, in this context, the experience of the 2008 Milwaukee City Attorney race between Grant Langley (Caucasian) and Pedro Colon, in which Langley won the position. When Colon ran, he had been the Assemblyman from the former Assembly District 8 for 10 years. He was on the joint finance committee during his tenure, and had previously run for mayor, and thus was hardly an unknown to Milwaukee's voters. Colon won nearly every ward in the former Assembly District 8. He lost every ward in those areas that represent the former Assembly District 9areas that would be added to New Assembly District 8 by Act 43. Whether or not this election result was, as Dr. Mayer put it, "a dry run of what the future holds under Act 43 ," we cannot turn a blind eye to this evidence, which supports the need for a functioning majority-minority district for Milwaukee's Latino community, not just one or two influence districts.

\subsection*{3.6 Claim Nine: Use of the New Districts in Any Future Recall Election Before November 6, 2012}
[10] Plaintiffs ask the court to declare as unconstitutional and enjoin the conduct of any special or recall elections under Act 43 prior to November 6, 2012. The defendants counter that no case or controversy exists because the GAB Board does not intend to conduct recall elections in accord
with the legislative districts created by Act 43. At first we had trouble understanding why this claim reflected any kind of controversy between the parties, because the GAB has insisted that it intends to conduct the recall elections under the 2002 district lines, just as plaintiffs want. But the plot thickens when we realize that there is pending litigation in the state courts of Wisconsin in which some Republican plaintiffs have sued the GAB to compel it to conduct the recall elections using the 2012 districts.

This puts us in a difficult position. On the one hand, there is no authoritative statement from the state (either its legislature, or a court proceeding, or an administrative order from the GAB ) with which any decree of this court would conflict. But there's the rub: there is also nothing concrete on which any such decree could operate. We have concluded, based on the GAB's formal representations to us in the present proceeding, that there is no question ripe for determination before us at this time. We take the GAB at its word that it will use the 2002 districts. This is sensible, especially in light of the command in the Wisconsin Constitution not to redistrict more than once each 10 years. State ex rel. Smith v. Zinmerman, 266 Wis. 307, 63 N.W.2d 52 (1954). \({ }^{4}\) District lines may be close to perfect from a population standpoint when they are initially drawn, but they slip away from perfection as time goes on, people are born, die, move, and become naturalized citizens. Both the state and the federal Constitu-
4. Indeed, the GAB claimed before trial that it is barred by the Wisconsin Constitution from making any amendments to the redistricting plan for the next ten years. We saw nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution or in Zimmerman that stood in the way of further revision by the General Assembly in the context of reaching a settlement with the plaintiffs, but
tions recognize that line-drawing is essential, and they have both chosen a 10 -year period for that line. Taking that into account, it becomes clear that there is nothing unconstitutional at all about the 2002 districts for the period of time between the adoption of the map based on the 2000 census and the adoption of the map based on the 2010 census. We note as well that we have no authority to enjoin on-going state court proceedings, see the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and so our hands are tied with respect to the state court case. If, however, a time comes when the \(G A B\) proposes to take a different action, either on its own or by virtue of a state court ruling, and there is a live controversy, plaintiffs may return to this court and present whatever arguments they may have on this question.

\section*{4. Conclusion}

In conclusion, we find that the Baldus and Voces plaintiffs are entitled to relief on their Section 2 claim concerning New Assembly Districts 8 and 9 , because Act 43 fails to create a majority-minority district for Milwaukee's Latino community. Two influence districts have never been held to be an adequate substitute for such a district under the factual circumstances that we have before us. This holding is not intended to affect any other district drawn by Act 43. Indeed, to avoid disrupting other lines, the court emphasizes that the re-drawing of the lines for Districts 8 and 9 must occur within the combined outer
for present purposes we will take the \(G A B\) at its word that it finds its hands tied to make any changes to the plan whatsoever until 10 years has elapsed, and assume that this position will also require it to argue to a competent court that any effort on the part of the legislature to advance the effective date of Act 43 is blocked by the state constitution.
boundaries of those two districts. Recognizing as we have throughout this litigation the primary role that the state has in this area, we are giving the legislature the first opportunity to address this point, but it must act quickly given the impending elections. This should not be an impossible task, given that Dr. Mayer has prepared at least one alternative configuration that should be a useful starting point.

As for the other claims, we find that although the drafting of Act 43 was needlessly secret, regrettably excluding input from the overwhelming majority of Wisconsin citizens, and although the final product needlessly moved more than a million Wisconsinites and disrupted their long-standing political relationships, the resulting population deviations are not large enough to permit judicial intervention under the Supreme Court's precedents. Act 44 has zero population deviation, which is why we find that the intervenor-plaintiffs have no meritorious "one person, one vote" claim. The in-tervenor-plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claim never made it out of the gate because no workable standard was offered to the court.

Tempers can flare when people are excluded from the political process, whether they are shut out because of their party affiliation, because of their race, because of their economic status, or because of any other trait. Such a contentious atmosphere is neither necessary nor desirable. We know that it is not necessary, because courts hold themselves to a higher standard and have succeeded in drawing successful maps time and again. We should have learned that it is not desirable because of the rancor that it fosters. Some states, like Iowa and California, have adopted nonpartisan systems that seem
successfully to have overcome this. New York is seriously thinking right now of taking a similar step, and there has been some talk of it in Wisconsin in the wake of this litigation. But we must deal with the here-and-now, and we therefore must acquiesce in the approach that Wisconsin (not alone among the states in this circuit, we hasten to add-see Committee for a Fair and Balanced Map v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 835 F.Supp.2d 563, 2011 WL 6318960 (N.D.IIl. Dec. 15, 2011); Radogno v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 2011 WL 5025251 (N.D.IIl. Oct. 21, 2011))-has chosen.

Before concluding, the court must finally address a number of motions that the parties have submitted and that remain outstanding, all of which may now be dispatched.

The first, the intervenor-defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket \# 75), has effectively been granted by the Court's determination that all of the plaintiffs' and consolidated plaintiffs' Act 44 claims fail. Thus, the motion requires no further ruling beyond dismissing it as moot. Similarly, the Court is also obliged to deny the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket \# 128) as moot, given that, through this order, the Court has addressed the substance of all of the outstanding claims in this matter.

Further, the plaintiffs' and intervenorplaintiffs' motions to defer a judicial decision (Docket \# 117, \# 119), in which they invited the Court to delay ruling on the intervenor-defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket \# 75), have also become moot. Through the passage of time, allowing trial to proceed before rendering a decision on the intervenordefendants' motion, the Court effectively deferred its decision. Therefore, the

\section*{BALDUS v. MEMBERS OF WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT \\ Cite as 849 F.Supp.2d 840 (E.D.Wis. 2012)}

Court will also deny the motions to defer as moot.

A number of other motions may be taken care of administratively. At trial, the Court clarified the scope of its prior order relating to the subpoena issued to James Troupis, essentially granting Mr. Troupis's motion for clarification. (Tr. 58:14-60:4 (clarifying scope of Court's prior order, as requested by Mr . Troupis in Docket \# 179)). Thus, that motion (Docket \# 179) can be administratively terminated as having been granted at trial. Additionally, the defendants' motion in limine (Docket \# 160) is hereby administratively terminated. The Court never specifically addressed the motion at trial, and the parties did not go to great lengths to elicit testimony regarding anomalies in redistricting boundaries (the subject of the motion in limine ); further, in this order, the Court does not discuss those anomalies. Therefore, the Court has no reason to grant or deny that motion (Docket \# 160), and will thus terminate it without making a decision on its merits.

Finally, the Court must also deny a request from members of the group Citizens for Fair and Competitive Redistricting to appear as anicus curiae. (Docket \# 126). Through counsel, that group submitted a proposed brief and several maps which, taken together, urge the Court to adopt an entirely different redistricting plan than the plan adopted by the legislature. (Docket \# 126). Heeding the instruction of the United States Supreme Court that "[r]edistricting is 'primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,' " the Court will not tread into the black water of re-drawing the redistricting boundaries itself. Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 940 (citing Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed. \(2 d 766\) (1975)). Instead, as discussed above, the Court will allow the Legislature to sort out the redistricting maps' infirmi-
ties on its own. The Court will thus deny the amicus' request to appear without consideration of the group's submissions.

Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs' and intervenor-plaintiffs' Sixth Claim for relief be and the same is hereby GRANTED, the Court having found that New Assembly Districts 8 and 9 violate the Voting Rights Act, and, accordingly, the Government Accountability Board is hereby ENJOINED from implementing Act 43 in its current form;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' and intervenor-plaintiffs' remaining claims be and the same are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the intervenor-defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket \# 75) be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket \# 128) be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to defer a judicial decision (Docket \# 117) be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the intervenor-plaintiffs' motion to defer a judicial decision (Docket \# 119) be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James Troupis' motion for clarification (Docket \#179), having been granted at trial, be and the same is hereby TERMINATED administratively;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants' motion in limine, as related to
the presentation of evidence related to redistricting anomalies (Docket \# 160), having not been addressed at trial or in this Order, be and the same is hereby TERMINATED administratively;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the intervenor-defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing (Docket \# 198) be and the same is hereby DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of Citizens for Fair and Public Redistricting to appear as amicus curiae, (Docket \# 126) be and the same is hereby DENIED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party is to bear its own costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Alvin BALDUS, Carlene Bechen, Elvira Bumpus, Ronald Biendseil, Leslie W. Davis, III, Brett Eckstein, Gloria Rogers, Richard Kresbach, Rochelle Moore, Amy Risseeuw, Judy Robson, Jeanne Sanchez-Bell, Cecelia Schliepp, Travis Thyssen, Cindy Barbera, Ron Boone, Vera Boone, Evanjelina Cleerman, Sheila Cochran, Maxine Hough, Clarence Johnson, Richard

Lange, and Gladys Manzanet, Plaintiffs,

Tammy Baldwin, Gwendolynne Moore and Ronald Kind, IntervenorPlaintiffs,
v.

MEMBERS OF THE WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD, each only in his official capacity: Michael Brennan, David Deininger, Gerald Nichol, Thomas Cane, Thomas Barland, and Timothy Vocke, and Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel for the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Defendants,
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Thomas E. Petri, Paul D. Ryan, Jr., Reid J. Ribble, and Sean P. Duffy, IntervenorDefendants.

Voces De La Frontera, Inc., Ramiro
Vara, Olga Vara, Jose Perez, and Erica Ramirez, Plaintiffs,
v.

Members of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, each only in his official capacity: Michael Brennan, David Deininger, Gerald Nichol, Thomas Cane, Thomas Barland, and Timothy Vocke, and Kevin Kennedy, Director and General Counsel for the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, Defendants.

Case Nos. 11-CV-562 JPS-DPW-RMD, 11-CV-1011 JPS-DPW-RMD.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

March 27, 2012.
Background: After Wisconsin state legislative redistricting plan was declared to

\section*{UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT}

\section*{FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN}

WILLIAM WHITFORD, ROGER ALCLAM, EMILY BUNTING, MARY LYNNE DONOHUE, HELEN HARRIS, WAYNE JENSEN, WENDY SUE JOHNSON, JANET MITCHELL, ALLISON SEATON, JAMES SEATON, JEROME WALLACE, and DONALD WINTER,

Plaintiffs,
- Vs -

GERALD NICHOL, THOMAS BARLAND JOHN FRANKE, HAROLD EROEHLICH, KEVIN KENNEDY, ELSA LAMELAS, and TIMOTHY VOCKE,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-421-BBC

Madison, Wisconsin
March 23, 2016
9:30 a.m.

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING HELD BEFORE the HONORABLE JUDGE KENNETH RIPPLE, HONORABLE JUDGE BARBARA B. CRABB, and HONORABLE JUDGE WILLIAM GRIESBACH

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs:
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BY: MICHELE ODORIZZI
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U.S. District Court Federal Reporter

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120 North Henry Street, Rm. 520 Madison, Wisconsin 53703
(608)255-3821


For the Defendants:
Department of Justice BY: BRIAN KEENAN ANTHONY RUSSOMANNO
Assistant Attorneys General
17 East Main Street Madison, Wisconsin 53703

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(Proceedings called to order.)
THE CLERK: Case Number 15-CV-421. William Whitford, et al. v. Gerald C. Nichols, et al. Court is called for oral argument hearing. May we have the appearances, please.

MS. ODORIZZI: Michele Odorizzi for plaintiffs.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Nicholas Stephanopoulos for the plaintiffs.

MR. KEENAN: For the defendants, Brian Keenan, and with me is Anthony Russomanno.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Good morning to everyone. We're here today to hear the arguments on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and as we have indicated, we have allotted an hour to each side for their primary arguments and a half hour for rebuttal for the movants.

You don't need to use all the time; you're masters of your own time. But we thought that would be the best way to handle things. We will take a break at some point in
the morning as well. Okay?
So with that, we'll ask the movants to please begin.
MR. KEENAN: May it please the Court. The court should grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment because there's no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs' proposed standard is not a legal standard by which an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander can be judged. There's no issue of material fact because the defendants' motion is based on the plaintiffs' own expert reports and undisputed results of wisconsin elections in -- historical elections.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Before you get to that point, and of course it's a very important one, maybe you could spend a little bit of time on the first element of the test that has been tendered by the plaintiffs in the case, the matter of intent. There is disagreement between both of you on that. Could you please describe to us your position and why you think the position taken by the plaintiffs is infirm.

MR. KEENAN: Yes, I will. The plaintiffs have a standard that has three stages and the first is the intent element. The plaintiffs feel that an unconstitutional gerrymander, the intent element, would be established by any sort of partisan intent to favor the party that's districting and disadvantage the party
that's out of control. The defendants see that as an inappropriate and infirm intent element because that type of intent is not actually unconstitutional in and of itself and that's been well established through Supreme Court case law dating back many years to the Gaffney decision, \(I\) believe in the \(70^{\prime} \mathrm{s}\), and into the Vieth decision, recently in the LULAC decision; that the use of partisan classifications, the use of a partisan motive isn't constitutional in and of itself. And the problem with partisan gerrymandering claims is determining the level of partisan intent that would move something from being a normal and ordinary consideration, I believe was the language used in Vieth, into something that now has turned into unconstitutional.

The defendants don't believe that the plaintiffs'
intent element works because it takes just that
constitutional motive of partisan intent and finds that's
enough to meet the test, then moves it to an effects
element that looks at the partisan asymmetry in
converting statewide vote shares into seats and counts
that entire asymmetry as a discriminatory effect such
that you can have a test -- a plan becomes
unconstitutional with a bare partisan motive and then a large effect.

JUDGE RIPPLE: So an intent to distinguish one
party from another in gerrymandering is constitutionaly permissible and therefore wouldn't be an intent to create an invidious classification? Is that your point?

MR. KEENAN: Correct. And the plaintiffs'
standard hasn't attempted to delineate where
invidiousness would jump into the --
JUDGE RIPPLE: And then the next point, I
suppose, would be well then what is an invidious classification and what would be -- how do we measure the intent to create such an invidious classification.

MR. KEENAN: Well, as counsel for the defendant, it's hard for me to come up with what a plaintiff's standard should be. But \(I\) think invidiousness should have to be measured by, as Justice Kennedy has outlined in his Vieth concurrence, some sort of departure from normal districting principles and criteria.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Let me see if I could help you on that. Suppose the plaintiffs were able to prove that the defendants had the intent to create a plan that would simply not be subject to change for the entire decennial period; in other words, that would be frozen in place with no possibility of a flip for the entire decennial period. Would that be a sufficient unconstitutional -invidious -- would that be a sufficient intent to create
        an invidious classification?
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MR. KEENAN: No, it would not.
JUDGE RIPPLE: Why not?
MR. KEENAN: And I assume you're referring to a flip of the efficiency gap and not a flip of control of the legislature?
THE COURT: Flip of the control of the
legislature is what \(I\) was --
MR. KEENAN: Oh, control of the legislature. I
still think that would not necessarily show
invidiousness. That invidiousness would have to be shown
-- how does that result differ from a plan that's enacted using solely traditional districting principles.
JUDGE RIPPLE: Well, that would be the third
element and one where we'd have to deal with allocation
of burden of proof later on. But just in terms of the first element, the intent, would it be enough if we could -- if the plaintiffs could prove that the intent was to create a plan that would be in concrete for the ten years; no possibility this thing was going to create a legislature with another party in leadership.
MR. KEENAN: I don't think that would
necessarily be enough and I think it would depend on the state and it would depend on the electoral circumstances.
I can imagine there are states where it's practically impossible for one of the parties to win control of the
legislature if there's so much support for one of the other parties in that --

JUDGE RIPPLE: That's the key. What would be enough then in your view?

MR. KEENAN: I'm not sure that this is something
that can be solved. The Vieth plurality examined a
predominant intent test that looked at the Vieth plaintiffs' offer that the partisan advantage outweighed all the other concerns of districting like equal population and Voting Rights Act and compactness, contiguity, things like that, and the Vieth plurality found that to be just completely unworkable because on a statewide basis, it was just impossible to determine the relative weight of all these different factors. To me it's hard to see how, and this has been the problem that's plagued these cases since Bandemer, is what -- how do you establish some sort of intent where it goes beyond the normal to something abnormal that's unconstitutional. No one else has been able to figure it out. I don't know that \(I\) can. And \(I\) think it would be challenging to delineate a line anywhere that would show that.

And I think one of the concerns is that embedded in the question was that there's an assumption that things would never change and I don't know that that's even a valid assumption to make about the future. For example,
the Vieth case itself, the plaintiffs allege that the Democrats would never be able to win a majority of the congressional districts in that case. It went up to the Supreme court. In 2004 they lost. Well, in 2006 the Democrats won a majority of the congressional seats in Pennsylvania, and again in 2008, they were able to secure through the political process what they claimed in court was going to be impossible. So I don't know that it's possible to even make a prediction about the future as to what the likely consequences are of a plan over a ten-year period, at least with a certainty enough to say something is unconstitutional.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Thank you for your views on
intent. I interrupted you. You may want to go on and talk about the efficiency gap.

MR. KEENAN: Sure. Well, the intent was one of my elements, so it just kind of leads me into my argument about the plaintiffs' intent element seems to focus more as a way to avoid the consequences of the efficiency gap rather than actually showing how much partisanship is too much. The plaintiffs, as I'll show, the efficiency gap ends up capturing a large number of plans as presumptively unconstitutional. The number of plans that have large efficiency gaps that trip the various thresholds the plaintiffs would want to establish is
quite large and the plaintiffs use the intent element mainly as a way to try to prevent the -- to avoid the consequences of this, which would be to show that a large number of plans that have no partisan intent at all are showing this asymmetry and thus aren't partisan gerrymanders and this asymmetry is present when there's no partisan intent. And the intent element mainly serves as a way for them to say well hey, our test doesn't actually capture the Wisconsin 2000's plan. That doesn't have intent. But I mean the defendants' argument is that that just shows that the efficiency gap is a poor metric for measuring partisan gerrymandering.

JUDGE CRABB: I have one question. For the purpose of summary judgment, are you denying that the legislature had any partisan intent when it -- you're not.

MR. KEENAN: No, we're not.
JUDGE CRABB: That's good.
MR. KEENAN: Our argument is that even assuming there's partisan intent and that there was some partisan intent, that the standard still doesn't work.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: For purposes of trial would you even deny the court is partisan?

MR. KEENAN: No, we would not plan to dispute that at trial either.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Would you dispute the fact that they had the partisan intent to attempt to create a plan that would stay in place throughout the decennial period that would be not capable of producing a legislature in control of the other party?

MR. KEENAN: Yes, I think we would dispute that. JUDGE RIPPLE: You would dispute that.

MR. KEENAN: Yeah. I mean that's not in the summary judgment record, but \(I\) think at trial to the extent - -

JUDGE CRABB: You would dispute it as to whether that was the intent or whether that was what actually happened?

MR. KEENAN: I think whether it was the intent and then whether it actually does happen is in the future and so \(I\) wouldn't really be able to say what will happen. JUDGE GRIESBACH: Is your rejection -- and this may be jumping ahead and I'm sorry if I am. But is your rejection of the efficiency gap -- I take it it's not just the level that the plaintiffs argue. Is there no efficiency gap that you think would be unconstitutional if it's the result of redistricting?

MR. KEENAN: Yeah, I think it's a two-fold thing. One is just that the efficiency gap has no tie to a constitutional violation so that a high efficiency gap
just doesn't show a constitutional violation in and of
itself. But then secondarily, that even the levels that
the plaintiffs have suggested end up presenting
themselves in cases where there's no partisan intent. So
it's not even showing any sort of gerrymandering at all.
    But I think one of the important things is that the
efficiency gap, and hopefully the brief has made clear
the different versions of the efficiency gap that are
used by the plaintiffs, that the historical analysis that
they've used by Professor Jackman to set their thresholds
is based on a seats-to-votes line that expects a party to
win a certain proportion of seats in a legislature based
on their percentage of the vote share. That's based on a
two-to-one slope.
So I mean the way to kind of understand that, I
think, is in simple terms that a 51 percent vote share is
implied that they should win 52 percent of the seats.
And then a 52 percent vote share is implied to win 54
percent of the seats. You kind of get a bump in seats
for each vote share. And we agree that's not saying that
proportional representation is required, but we think
it's actually worse in that it's judging plans based on
how they deliver hyperproportional representation. For
example, you could have perfectly proportional
representation in an efficiency gap if -- and this is
what happened in Wisconsin, I believe, in 2008 is the Democrats won 54 percent of the vote and win 53 percent of the seats roughly proportional. But the efficiency gap implies that they should win 58 percent of the seats. And so therefore you still get a negative 5 percent efficiency gap when you're delivering roughly proportional representation probably as close as you can in a situation like this.

And so we do think that there's no tie to the constitution such that the efficiency gap just has a fundamental problem being used as a test irrespective of the particular level that ends up being reached

JUDGE RIPPLE: Isn't it a test though that at
least is helpful in measuring the degree to which the plan might be susceptible to producing a legislature that would be dominated by the other party?

MR. KEENAN: I would say not necessarily. It's more concerned about how the vote share matches up with the seat share. So for example, our expert, Sean Trende, went through, and there's a list of 17 plans that were unambiguously one side or the other that Professor Jackman found through time. That means that they were always either negative or positive every single election in them. And what Sean Trende found is that in a number 25 of those plans, the control of the legislature actually
flipped even though the efficiency gap sign stayed the same.

And I think some of this is illustrated by the New York example which keeps appearing as an efficiency gap, negative efficiency gap favorable to Republicans even though the Democrats actually control the New York legislature quite a bit of the time. And the reason the efficiency gap presents itself is that maybe the Democrats have 55 percent of the seats, but they actually won 60 percent of the vote which implies that they should win, you know, 70 percent of the seats. So you end up with a large efficiency gap.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Mr. Keenan, on that point I'm
beginning to have a little bit of trouble keeping the
summary judgment matrix in place. Is that argument -- I
can see how that argument might be very helpful to you at
trial in impeaching the position taken by the plaintiffs
and their experts, but how is it helpful to you in
prevailing in this motion for summary judgment?
    MR. KEENAN: Well, because all that information
    is just taken straight from the plaintiffs' reports.
    That's undisputed that this is what is happening.
    JUDGE RIPPLE: You're talking about Professor
Trende and Professor Trende's views on things.
    MR. KEENAN: Well, Professor Trende looked at
what Jackman had done and just looked at -- and the plaintiffs haven't disputed that that's, in fact, what happened in these cases. So that's an undisputed fact.

And so I think the efficiency gap is -- what it shows is that -- is how a party can convert statewide vote share into how they compare to, like, the two-to-one vote curve, two-to-one seat-to-vote curve. So that's what it tells you. And then it actually doesn't tell you much about who's going to win control of the legislature. I mean some of the examples here are 1994 is the last year Wisconsin had a positive efficiency gap, which is a gap that favors Democrats. Well, 1994 was the first year that Republicans won control of the legislature in Wisconsin -- or the Assembly in Wisconsin in a number of years. So it's like in a sense, it's the worst year for Democrats electorally, but it looks like under the efficiency gap a good year for them. And the most favorable, so to speak, year for Democrats on the efficiency gap in the last plan was 2010, it was negative 4, and that was also a year where the Republicans did very well and won 60 seats and a large vote share, like 54 percent, I think.

So the efficiency gap does not correlate necessarily
with who's winning control of the legislative seats.
It's measuring who is getting more or less seats compared
to what you would expect under this vote line. JUDGE CRABB: I wanted to ask you about
clustering because \(I\) understand that you're arguing that the maps are pro-Republican because Democrats naturally cluster more. Is that a recent trend?

MR. KEENAN: We believe that it's a fairly
recent trend, and it shows up in the Jackman report starting in the mid \(90^{\prime} \mathrm{s}\), and that's when the efficiency gaps naturally start changing in favor of the Republicans and it's continued through the 2010's and -- or 2000 's and 2010's.

JUDGE CRABB: Do you have evidence that the
Democrats have been more clustered in recent years?
MR. KEENAN: Our evidence would be -- yeah, would be the Sean Trende analysis that we performed. JUDGE CRABB: That's your only evidence?

MR. KEENAN: Yes. And then just the inferences from what's happened through Jackman's own report which shows the trend. And \(I\) would say that \(I\) think -- it's important to note that we aren't asking the court to make a finding on that basis. We don't think we need to make a finding -- the Court needs to find that. The fact that the high efficiency gaps present themselves in plans with no partisan intent shows that it's not a discriminatory effect and it shows that it's not something that's
necessarily inconsistent with traditional districting principles. We have provided the analysis to provide some context so that the court could understand, like, was this just -- is it an accident that

Republican-favored efficiency gaps are more durable; that they're more common; that even in neutral plans that we see pro-Republican efficiency gaps more commonly than Democratic efficiency gaps.

JUDGE CRABB: But isn't it the case that there's quite a bit of clustering of Republicans?

MR. KEENAN: There is. I mean that's true. I mean there's clustering of all groups. And so the question is how does that clustering then affect the ability to win states on a sea wide -- seats on a statewide basis. And then, for example, the clustering of Republicans isn't quite at the level of the Democrats. If you look at -- for example, waukesha county is used as the, you know, Republican equivalent. And if you look at the City of Milwaukee, they're both fairly strong for each party, but Milwaukee votes more strongly Democrat than Waukesha votes Republican.

So when you're tallying up wasted votes district by district, Republicans will win all seats in Waukesha, Democrats will win all seats in Milwaukee. But Democrats will just have more wasted votes because if you win the
district 90 to 10 , you'll have more wasted votes than winning at 80 to 20 or 75 to 25 . And so when you do a wasted vote analysis, it ends up going one way or the other.

JUDGE CRABB: But if you have a lot of clustering for both parties, you have all these counties in southeastern Wisconsin that are heavily Republican and you have clustering of Democrats in three cities, why are the Democrats always hurt by the clustering and the Republicans are not hurt by the clustering?

MR. KEENAN: Well, I think in some ways it's -I think the answer isn't always knowable why certain districts vote certain ways. But I think one of the problems is that just drawing those districts in the outer areas that aren't really strongly one or the other, you're going to end up with fairly close districts and then you end up drawing them. If you're looking at statewide vote share and a big chunk of that is taken up by safe seats, which is true in the case of Democrats, then there just aren't as many of them in the outlying areas. And the Republican vote share, if it's 75 percent in waukesha, there's still more vote share out in the outlying areas where it's available to win legislative seats.

I do want to be clear that we don't think on summary
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    judgment it is necessary to make any sort of finding like
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    this. It's something that's occurred in many different
    neutral plans. Our main argument is that the presence of
    a high efficiency gap doesn't show -- departure from
    districting principles doesn't show discrimination and
    doesn't show -- on a more fundamental level is just not
    based on the constitution.
    JUDGE CRABB: It could show discrimination, but
    not \(a\) kind that has been recognized.
    MR. KEENAN: Yes, perhaps.
    JUDGE RIPPLE: If we were to assume for the sake
    of argument that whoever we decide has the burden of
    proof but nobody can show that these neutral factors of
    political geography really impact or justify the plan,
    impacted the plan, does the efficiency gap then take on a
    new meaning if that's really -- if we were to determine
    that?
        MR. KEENAN: I don't believe so.
        JUDGE RIPPLE: Why not?
        MR. KEENAN: Well, the efficiency gap still is
    just measuring how you conform to the two-to-one vote
    share. It's still not based on the constitution. It is
    showing how you convert a statewide vote share into
    seats, but that's not based on the constitution. As
    well, it is affected by a host of other factors in the
sense that really the legislature -- legislative races come down to -- I think we've shown that in 2012 five seats were decided by . 1 percent of the vote, which can swing the efficiency gap a lot one way or the other. That in a sense, it's more important where you get your votes rather than, like, what your statewide vote share is when it comes to winning legislative seats. So I still would think the efficiency gap doesn't provide much, and even so -- I mean the last plan was enacted with no partisan intent. It had certain effects that were seen. Those were caused by something. We don't know -- I think it's many different things: You know, concentration; it's the candidates; the amount of money spent; the issues that were salient at a certain point in time, things like that that I'm not sure how you can distinguish how much of a efficiency gap is really made up of discrimination or partisanship versus other things.

JUDGE CRABB: So your position is that
efficiency gaps are not particularly helpful in deciding
whether there's been overly partisan redistricting.

MR. KEENAN: Correct. Basically, yes. Good summary. Thank you. And I think a key point here is that the plaintiffs style their test as partisan intent and partisan effect, but it's not a partisan effect that's unconstitutional; that the language used in
Bandemer and that was used by this court in its ruling on the motion to dismiss is the discriminatory effect. And so we don't think that an efficiency gap can really show a discriminatory effect when, for example, there was a 12 percent efficiency gap under a plan with no
discrimination at all and then now there's a 12 percent efficiency gap in a plan that has partisan intent, that that actually shows any sort of discriminatory effect. I mean it shows an electoral effect, but it doesn't show a discriminatory effect. And I'm trying to use the word partisan effect as sort of like muddying the waters and not actually tieing this to the constitution, which is a discriminatory effect.
And then \(I\) think a further problem is then -- we talked about the intent and the fact is then this burden shifting. Third step that the plaintiffs have proposed, which they say is based off of the one-person, one-vote cases, but the burden-shifting analysis that the plaintiffs have provided is actually not at all like what's done in one-person, one-vote cases. In one-person, one-vote cases the court examines not whether something is a necessary consequence or an unavoidable consequence, which is the language the plaintiffs use, it's whether the plan may reasonably be said to advance the rational state policy of, for example, preserving
subdivision lines or county lines or whatever the rationale is for the departure from the equal population. And I got that from the Voinovich v. Quilter case.

And the plaintiffs, it seems that the burden shifting is all that's required is then to produce an alternative plan that meets a few benchmarks and then you've met this, where -- I mean there's no discussion of whether things advance state policy, whether the justifications -- and \(I\) believe that's because once you get into that realm, now we're in the judicially manageable -- a problem of judicial manageability and weighing who districts better, who's more complying with districting principles, and that there's really no way to judge that once, if you're going to do a true burden shifting where there's some sort of like weighing of the interests and determining whose \(\rightarrow\) like whether the plan meets certain criteria, the plaintiffs basically have said well, we put forward a plan that is equivalent to your plan, therefore, you know, sorry, your plan is unconstitutional.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Wouldn't you have somewhat of a better idea of exactly what of the so-called politically neutral elements in drawing up a plan might have been used and why they were used on the other side? Isn't that a good reason to put a burden on you to at least
make some showing with respect to -- with respect to how this whole thing is explainable by these so-called neutral factors?

MR. KEENAN: Well, I don't know that we would necessarily -- the plaintiffs would be free to take discovery and they can analyze the plan on all the various -- whatever various factors they can analyze on: compactness and equal population, things like that. There was a large amount of discovery in the prior litigation, the Baldus case, about what the process that went into the districting and things like that. So I mean in a sense \(I\) would say no, and then also that the burden is on plaintiffs to prove a violation of the constitution and \(I\) would say especially in this case where there's -- it's hard for courts to find a manageable standard. This process is entrusted to legislative branches who have exercised that process who were elected fairly under a neutral plan, even in a statewide governor's race, and so \(I\) would say that no, the burden should still remain on the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Mr. Keenan, you touched on an
ancillary problem that \(I\) know concerns at least me and
that is to what degree can we take judicial notice of the
proceedings in the earlier case?
    MR. KEENAN: By earlier case you mean the Baldus
case?

JUDGE RIPPLE: Yes.

MR. KEENAN: I would think what's in the -- what is in the record in that case would be available for judicial notice and then the decision itself. I would also say the same would be true for the Baumgart and the Prosser cases, which were the districting cases that enacted the 90's plan and the 2000's plan. I mean I would say, like, perhaps to the extent there's issues with -- I would say, like, testimony that was given in those cases might have to be regiven here in the sense that there was different issues and so \(I\) don't know that, and we didn't have a chance to ask witnesses followup questions or things like that. So I might have a problem with that kind of thing.

But in terms of the -- you know, things that
happened, I would say like the opinion in the Baldus case or generally \(I\) don't necessarily have a problem. There may be some things where we would have a problem with the testimony if it wouldn't meet the criteria under the rules.

JUDGE RIPPLE: There's an intermediate position we could take on this last element of the plaintiffs' case as well. Rather than saying you have the burden of proof, we could say you at least have the burden of going
forward, of suggesting what the neutral factors that might justify the plan are, keeping the ultimate burden of proof on the plaintiffs. How does that sound to you?

MR. KEENAN: Well, it's better. I would still say it's a little bit -. I'm not sure how it would work given that I think we'd still need a standard by which that would then be judged. I think that's where the problem comes in is that we could have witnesses testify about the reasons that went into the districting, but then -- and the plaintiffs would have the right obviously to present evidence on their opinions on that and facts and then ultimately what's -- how is the decision made.

JUDGE CRABB: You're not really disputing that the Republicans drew this plan with the desire to create the best possible election process for the Republicans, are you?

MR. KEENAN: I would say I would dispute whether it's the best possible.

JUDGE CRABB: I'm not saying it turned out to be the best, but that their intent was to do the best job they could to safeguard the common seats and to increase the number of seats that would be available to Republicans.

MR. KEENAN: I think -- I'm not disputing that they districted with partisan advantage. I think there's
a problem with saying they would -- for example, the language the plaintiffs use of maximizing Republican advantage or making this the best map possible in the sense that -- and I guess we're going away from the summary judgment record here -- but this would be at trial that

JUDGE CRABB: Right.

MR. KEENAN: -- there's competing factors here that go into the districting plan which would be to have a plan that passes the House and the individuals who vote on that are most interested in what their individual district looks like, whereas perhaps the Republican Party as a whole is interested in what the overall map looks like and that the best map for Republicans might be the most districts at 52 percent Republican, but that the individual legislators may not really want to be running in a district that's only 52 percent Republican but would rather be 55 percent Republican or 60 or, you know. And then there's balancing of all sorts of different concerns.

So I think after the fact you probably could reverse engineer a map that's even more favorable to Republicans, but -- so I would say in a sense, yes, we're not

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disputing that there's partisan advantage being looked at. But the level of it and maximizing the Republican
advantage or making the most favorable plan, I don't know that that's really what is the case.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Well, you wouldn't dispute
though, as going to the third prong, you wouldn't argue that you were compelled by traditional factors or other considerations such as population and voting rights considerations to adopt the plan you did.

MR. KEENAN: The specific plan, no.
JUDGE GRIESBACH: And that's the third prong.

So really there is no issue on the third prong, is there? If we adopt the plaintiffs' test and accept -- I don't think there's a dispute on intent. And if we say 7 is a sufficient efficiency gap to presume unconstitutionality, they win, don't they?

MR. KEENAN: I mean I think they way they've
phrased their test, they do, because I think any
plaintiff that gets to make up their own test would make one that they would win. But \(I\) guess our point would be that --

JUDGE GRIESBACH: I mean at trial there's nothing to try on the third prong, is there?

MR. KEENAN: The way they phrased it there isn't and that's why we think it's --

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Well, is there another way of

I mean once -- if we adopt 1 and 2, 3 follows necessarily, doesn't it?

MR. KEENAN: That's been our argument. Then it seems like it's not even really a burden shifting because I don't know that there's any plan that's required to be adopted.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Right.
MR. KEENAN: I mean there's any number of plans.
JUDGE GRIESBACH: For considerations, they give
you a whole range of plans you can adopt and obviously the intent was to adopt one that was electorally advantageous to the Republican Party that was in control.

MR. KEENAN: Correct. And our position is that there's nothing unconstitutional about that; that basically there's nothing unconstitutional about the Republicans winning control in 2010, deciding to enact a plan that is favorable to themselves, even more favorable than the prior plan had been. Conversely there would have been nothing unconstitutional had Democrats won in 2010, unified control, and actually a plan that was more favorable to themselves than what a neutral plan conceivably would have been. That partisan motive just isn't unconstitutional. And then moving to the efficiency gap, that's not showing discriminatory effect.

In a sense I think you're also showing -- the
asymmetry here is that working off of the baseline of the 2000's plan, which was favorable to Republicans, the Democrats could have engaged in conceivably what's traditionally understood as gerrymandering, drawing strange districts, kind of ignoring some districting principles, and maybe end up with even still a negative efficiency gap, maybe a slightly positive one. And that kind of escapes review under this plan because perhaps there's a limit to what -- you know, how positive an efficiency gap can even be in Wisconsin if we've only seen a plus two as the most favorable to the Democrats in the last 20 years or 24 years. I think that's our example that we showed with Illinois which, using Jackman's numbers, was alleged to be a Democrat gerrymander. Jackman finds that even at one year, it actually was a pro-Republican bias map even though it was a Democratic gerrymander. I mean Democrats would seem to be -- might be able to be free to gerrymander under this standard because they would just, like, escape review because the efficiency gap wouldn't get to such a level. Jackman finds that it's rare to have Democratic efficiency gaps that exceed the 7 or 10 percent threshold in the first election, or as is relatively common for Republican plans, seems to be an asymmetry, which a standard is going to be applied differently depending on
the party in control.
JUDGE GRIESBACH: Even the Demonstration Plan
here has a small Republican efficiency gap.
MR. KEENAN: That's true.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: What does that tell us?
MR. KEENAN: I think it tells us that the
natural baseline of any sort of plan is going to end up being a pro-Republican plan, and in Wisconsin as of now, who knows what that becomes in the future, but \(I\) mean ken Mayer's plan, the Demonstration Plan, it was a negative 2.2 when he did his no incumbent, every seat contested. Then when he, in his rebuttal report, added back in the incumbency effects, it turned into, I believe, a three-and-a-half percent efficiency gap in favor of Republicans, which is half the way to the presumptive unconstitutionality, and this is, you know, a districting by someone who's, you know, hired by Democrats to draw a plan that's less -- that isn't discriminating against them and his plan shows a negative three-and-a-half percent efficiency gap.

You know, I think he doesn't determine what it would be in 2014 when things change, so I mean it's conceivable they would even have a negative 7 percent efficiency gap under that plan in 2014.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: And is that a
reverse-engineered plan?
MR. KEENAN: I think it is because it's taking
the electoral results that happened after the fact, going back and then districting to get particular results, which as I said before, I mean I think you could do that after the fact. You can look at what the election results were, you know what they were, and then you back _- kind of like work your way back to what the district is going to be so then you can say well yeah, the Democrats would have won the seat with 50.2 percent of the vote. Ahead of time I don't think you would really know one way or the other what exactly is going to happen. I mean you can make predictions, but in a sense Mayer is making predictions about the past about what already happened. And so yeah, I think it is a reverse-engineered plan when you get to district after the election has already occurred. You can get the result you want.

I think another problem with the standard here is it doesn't meet what Justice Kennedy has been calling for in a standard in his Vieth concurrence when he held out hope that perhaps some day a standard would emerge that courts could apply; that he wanted a limited and precise rationale that could correct any existing violation of the constitution. What Professor Jackman's own numbers
show is that at the 7 percent level, which is what the plaintiffs have offered, 36 percent of all plans had an efficiency gap above 7 percent in their first election. So it shows a fairly common thing, you know, when over one-third of plans are tripping this threshold.

Now, he finds that an acceptable level because out of that 36 percent, he believes that they won't change sign over the course of the plan. That's a key fact he uses; that when you look at the first election, you see a 7 percent gap. It's unlikely that the plan is going to then flip to have a positive EG at some point. We would say that's not tied to the constitution either, to have a plan that flip sign. But \(I\) think it also, I mean, shows that just the level of intrusion this could be.

In the response, the plaintiffs say well, 16 percent of those plans wouldn't actually be affected because they had no partisan control. So you're down to 20 percent of plans that had unified partisan control and the 7 percent efficiency gap. I think that shows still that one-fifth of plans are being roped into this standard which isn't -- doesn't seem to me that that's what Justice Kennedy envisioned in his Vieth concurrence.

But second, I think it shows that when 16 percent of plans have the 7 percent efficiency gap with no partisan control, it just highlights why the efficiency gap isn't
connecting up with any sort of discrimination or discriminatory effect or constitutional violation.

Even upping the standard 10 percent in the first election, 18 percent of plans had an EG above 10 percent in their first election, so now we're talking about one in five plans are above 10 percent. That's made up of 10 percent of plans with unified partisan control and 8 had no unified partisan control. So even at 10 percent as relatively common, 8 percent of all plans trigger the 10 percent threshold with no partisan control at all. So I think it shows that even these high efficiency gaps aren't really all that uncommon and so they can't really be seen as outliers of extreme partisan gerrymandering when they're showing up in, you know, 8 percent of -like one-fifth of all plans have a 10 percent efficiency gap in the first election and then it's not that uncommon.

I think the Jackman standard too is - I just want
19 to be clear on what he actually did -- is that he
20 examined the -- for example, you could look at the
21 Wisconsin plan. He just looks at what the first EG was
22 and then does an analysis looking at the next EG's in
seven-and-a-half EG, that would count as a negative
25 seven-and-a-half. And then he looks at the future
results and sees what happened. But I would say that this -- it shows what happened in the future, but it's not necessarily a guide to what's going to happen -- or it shows what happened in the past; it's not necessarily a guide to what will happen in the future in the 2022 election, 2030 election which is when the standard was, should the court adopt the standard, that's when this is going to be applied in full. It would be in the 2022 election.

Actually, I believe it's 53 percent of plans have an EG above 7 at any point in their existence, so it's like half of plans are triggered in that threshold. If you don't just limit yourself to the first election, you look at all of them in the plan.

And a plan is just going to produce a range of results. The first one isn't magic or anything, it's just what happened to occur first. And as a necessity, the plaintiffs are relying on that because that's what a plaintiff would look like is the first election. But where does that election fall on the spectrum of what this plan could expect? You know, we don't know.

If you look at the Wisconsin \(2000^{\prime}\) s plan, the gap was negative seven-and-a-half, I believe negative 10 , negative 12, negative 4, negative 5, something like that. Any one of those could have occurred first. So if, say,
the waive election of 2012 happened in 2002, well now it's a negative 4 percent efficiency gap in its first election escapes review, even though it goes on to produce efficiency gaps of negative 10 and negative 12. If those negative 10 and negative 12 show up first, well now it seems like this wide extreme partisan gerrymander when it did produce gaps of negative 4, negative 5, and negative 7 .

So just conditioning on the first election is a
little bit difficult because there's no way to know where does that fall, how is that representative of the whole. Jackman has done a historical analysis, but going forward in the future it's hard to say how that's going to play out. I mean you could even adopt the standard, have the Republican waive election in 2022 and have a bunch of plans escape review as gerrymanders even if they were because 2010 is the lowest EG that Wisconsin saw since, like, 1996 maybe, and that was actually a really good Republican year. So if that year happens in the first year, the efficiency gaps are low and you're evading review.

Or conversely maybe you just have a fluke year where there's a lot of high efficiency gaps that will eventually move down for whatever reason in 2022. Would those be unconstitutional? Everyone has to redistrict
when it was just a fluke election year that caused that result or perhaps even a fluke election in one state that caused a high efficiency gap and then you would expect maybe it will normalize over the rest of the plan.

I just had a question about the motion in limine, whether I should address that now or should I wait until the plaintiffs go.

JUDGE RIPPLE: I think you can go right ahead and address that now.

MR. KEENAN: Okay. On the motion in limine, our point mainly is that at this point in time, the court need only resolve the parts of Mr. Trende's opinion that were actually submitted on summary judgment. And those aren't actually even disputed, like the opinions he offered aren't disputed. What's disputed is what the Court should make of those opinions. The plaintiffs don't dispute that he accurately -- that he accurately calculated the partisan index the way he did. They don't contest that he accurately cites the vote totals that he cited that we used on summary judgment. In that sense I think there's really no reason to exclude that evidence given that they didn't contest it.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Is that expert testimony or are those historical facts?

MR. KEENAN: In some sense they're historical.

1 I would say that the election results are historical facts, but you kind of need a way to get them in. The partisan index, I think, is more of an expert analysis because it requires some calculation, although, I mean -yeah, I would say that partisan index is more along the lines. But for example, Trende's reliance on the fact that Bill Clinton's election results, how his vote, statewide vote share compared to Obama's in 2012, I mean you could get that from the GAB website and the wisconsin Blue Book. We need a way to get that into the evidence. But -- and I think the plaintiffs' motion more broadly suffers from a -- stems from a false premise that you need to be a Ph. D. in political science who publishes in peer-reviewed journals in order to be an expert witness. That's definitely not the case. Someone just needs to be qualified. We believe Mr. Trende is qualified, that he's a professional elections analyst who's ..

JUDGE CRABB: What would you say his
qualifications are?
MR. KEENAN: Sure. He has a master's in
political science from Duke University. He's --

JUDGE CRABB: Was he specializing in any kind of
election analysis?
MR. KEENAN: I think it's just a master's in
political science. I don't -- he has written now for, I believe it's seven or eight years professionally as an elections analyst for a website called realclearpolitics.com.

JUDGE CRABB: There's no peer review of that. MR. KEENAN: No, there not, and there doesn't need to be peer review of experts when they testify. That's one factor that the courts can consider, but I think the Kumho case and the Seventh Circuit cases made clear that peer review isn't required.

I will say that the plaintiffs rely on some things that aren't peer reviewed. Everything that comes before a court doesn't need to be --

JUDGE CRABB: But it is something to be considered if it does exist.

MR. KEENAN: Correct. He has written a book on demographic trends in politic study in American history from, like, the 20's onward and the part shifts and parties in their coalitions and their demographics. It's called The Lost Majority. He's contributed to a number of books and written articles. He writes professionally just day-to-day on elections using statistical analysis to look at election results and project elections and also, like, analyze past elections.

So we think he's well qualified to offer for what we
offered him for which is to provide some context and history as to elections that occurred in wisconsin and how Wisconsin has changed over time, which I mean \(I\) think we also have to be clear that we're aren't offering -what we're offering it for is that, not some sort of, like, overarching theory of redistricting or that he's going to come up with a quantifiable number as to what the expected efficiency gap is going to be or anything like that. We just thought given the plaintiffs' analysis by Mr. Jackman is looking over time at election results, someone should look at the history of how those election results have actually occurred, how has it changed over time, and that would be useful to the court in trying to evaluate whether the efficiency gap is really a standard that should be adopted by the courts. Because they use -- they're basically using historical averages and what's happened in the past that without context, it's really hard to determine whether someone should treat what's happened in the past is what should continue on in the future as a legal standard or is it something that was the result of a particular moment in time.

JUDGE CRABB: What do you understand his basis
saying that the reason that the Republicans have gained more seats in state legislatures is because there
are just natural pro-Republican advantages?
MR. KEENAN: Sure. It's based of his study of presidential election returns.

JUDGE CRABB: What kind of study did he make of the actual numbers of Republicans in certain districts as opposed to the number of Democrats?

MR. KEENAN: Well, what he does is he looks -he doesn't -- you don't look at specific districts, because those can change. So we need to look at --

JUDGE CRABB: Well then let's say the state.
MR. KEENAN: Yeah. So what he does is he looks at election results on smaller levels, like the counties or congressional districts, and then sees how has that changed over time. Where was the Democratic strength and the Republican strength versus now? So -- and what he does is he uses presidential vote share, which is

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the presidential vote share, so you take it back to the national average with the partisan index. And he just compares how does that differ over time. So it's a way to see what does Wisconsin look like in '88, '96 versus today. Does it look the same? Does it look different? And it looks very different.

That's basically the basis is the presidential vote share and then compare using the partisan index, which is controlling for the national vote share. So who is more or less, you can look at it either way, Democratic or Republican in the nation as a whole, what parts of the state. So obviously Milwaukee ends up being more Democratic than the state as a whole or the country as a whole, so that shows up as a Democratic strength in all years. But then you can also measure well, how much more is it in each year and it's actually more strong now than it was in the past. So it shows increasing
concentration. So that's a basis for his opinion.
I think -- you know, I think the plaintiffs'
criticisms of the opinion, they're fine to raise on cross-examination. The court can take those into consideration when considering Mr. Trende's opinions. We don't think they're a reason to, like, not hear him at all. And we think, with respect to the motion more broadly, that really now isn't the right time to rule on
it; that the preferred procedure would be to hear him testify. We don't disagree that Daubert still applies in a bench trial, but that the Salem case and the Medavante case, I believe, are the ones that say a court -- you know, let the expert witness testify and then after the trial, the Court can make the Daubert findings after hearing the expert himself explain his qualifications and his reasoning and see the cross-exam and see all that and then make the Daubert determination. We think that's the process that should be followed here.

We think that basically if you read the plaintiffs' motion, a lot of it is this quibbling about methodology and it's not about what he himself did, but about what should the court make of this. They say well, this isn't useful. Well, that's more an argument to the court about what usage you make of his analysis rather than not letting him testify and offer the analysis in the first place.

I guess I'd say to the extent that the court does want to rule on it, like the entirety of the motion before trial, that seems like it can even still do that on a more regular schedule when motions in limine would come before the court -- before, like, in general when most motions in limine would come rather than now. I think it only needs to rule on the summary judgment
portion of it for summary judgment. We think you could probably even avoid that because \(I\) think the plaintiffs' standard fails, even assuming that none of Trende's opinions that were cited in the summary judgment materials are adopted.

So I guess I may have more to say about it in the rebuttal after \(I\) hear the plaintiffs on their motion, and same with -- I think I'm done with the summary -- my main argument on summary judgment unless there's further questions from the court.

JUDGE RIPPLE: I don't think so, Mr. Keenan.
Thank you very much. The Court will take a ten-minute recess before we hear from the plaintiffs.
(Recess 10:30-10:41 a.m.)
THE CLERK: This Honorable Court is again in
session. Please be seated and come to order.
JUDGE RIPPLE: We're ready to hear now from the plaintiffs. Ms. Odorizzi.

MS. ODORIZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. Michele Odorizzi for plaintiffs.

With the Court's permission, we'd like to split our argument, and I'm going to talk about intent, the relationship between the intent and effects prong, clustering in the Trende motion, and Professor Stephanopoulos is going to talk about the efficiency gap,
our Demonstration Plan, and our third prong.
JUDGE RIPPLE: That's fine.

MS. ODORIZZI: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. We were a little surprised to see in defendants' reply brief that they argued that -- about the legal test for intent because we really didn't see that in their opening brief, which probably in some sense they probably waived it by not raising it in their opening brief. But in any event, their argument, I think, fails because it's basically an argument that there can't be any intent prong. They say that partisan intent is ordinary and lawful in districting, and that comes from the Vieth case from a four-person plurality, a four-justice plurality. The rest of the court didn't necessarily adopt that and even the plurality agrees that there is such a thing as unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and it is Equal Protection Clause 101 that you have to have both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects.

Defendants throughout their briefs and throughout their presentation tend to lump those two together and mix them up. So they say in their reply brief that we haven't shown that we can show that the partisan intent was excessive. I don't know what that means to have intent that's excessive. You really want to discriminate
against people? I don't know what it means and -JUDGE RIPPLE: But the object of the intent is an important one.

MS. ODORIZZI: Yes. Exactly, Your Honor. So it's not that the intent itself has to be at a certain level. We know what discriminatory intent is. Bandemer tells us what it is. It's the intent to treat a particular political group differently and to denigrate them and to dilute their votes.

JUDGE RIPPLE: There's been a lot of water under the dam since Bandemer. Is that still viable? MS. ODORIZZI: Yes. I think the intent test there is still viable. It was adopted by six justices, and in later cases the court -- people have tried to make the test more manageable by saying well, let's make it a predominant intent. And in Vieth, the court really didn't bite on that because they said -- the plurality anyway said predominance -- it's too hard to tell what motive predominates. And in LULAC, the plaintiffs there tried the notion that if we can prove it was a sole intent, then we don't have to prove effects, and the Court said no, no, no. Even if it's the sole intent, you still have to prove both intent and discriminatory effect.

So I think that does put us back to Bandemer, which
in the normal equal protection standard which is partisan intent, a discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in the plan.

JUDGE RIPPLE: You can have somewhat of a discriminatory intent in this area and be just fine, can't you?

MS. ODORIZZI: You can, Your Honor, but the excessiveness part of it \(I\) think comes in the effect part.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Well, are you saying that what is proven in the effect is, in fact, relevant and probative evidence that one had the intent to discriminate at a constitutional magnitude? Is that what you're telling me?

MS. ODORIZZI: It can be, Your Honor.
Absolutely. That there is certainly a synergy between the two. You can have a plan, and I'll get to this a little bit later, but you can have a plan that creates discriminatory effects that was not intended.

JUDGE RIPPLE: In other words, what you show in your prong two might be able to substantiate that the defendants did want it to do more than simply favor one party to a permissible degree.

MS. ODORIZZI: That's right, Your Honor.
Exactly. And that's how we show that it's excessive
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partisan gerrymandering. To show the intent, I mean the

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state concedes that the Republican leadership had the
intent. And we didn't talk about the evidence because in
our brief --

JUDGE RIPPLE: Counsel was very careful to say though while he'll concede they had the intent to favor the Republican Party, he will not concede that they had the intent to create a plan that would keep the
Republican Party --
    MS. ODORIZZI: Right.
    JUDGE RIPPLE: -- in control --
    MS. ODORIZZI: Right.
    JUDGE RIPPLE: -- for the entire period.
    MS. ODORIZZI: Right.
    JUDGE RIPPLE: Is it necessary to have such an
intent --
    MS. ODORIZZI: I don't think --
    JUDGE RIPPLE: -- to violate the constitution?
    MS. ODORIZZI: I don't think it has to be that
level, Your Honor. I think the intent to discriminate
against an identifiable political group is enough. But
if the standard were an intent to maximize your advantage
by packing and cracking your opponents as much as
possible, if that's the standard, we can meet it here.
We can show that that happened here.

JUDGE RIPPLE: Can you meet the intent -- if the standard is that the defendants intended to keep the Democrats out of control for the entire decennial period, can you prove that?

MS. ODORIZZI: That they wanted a durable gerrymander that would last as long as it possibly could? JUDGE RIPPLE: That's right.

MS. ODORIZZI: I think we can show that, Your Honor, that they thought about that issue and that they thought about it and that they went through various iterations of the plan in order to absolutely maximize their advantage for as long as possible.

JUDGE RIPPLE: My difficulty at least is in that if you want wasteland where the intent was clearly to do more than most state legislatures do, whatever that is.

MS. ODORIZZI: Whatever that is.

JUDGE RIPPLE: And what -- and trying to put it in concrete for the whole decennial period, how would we ever measure the intent in between those two extremes?

MS. ODORIZZI: I don't think you should be
measuring intent, Your Honor. I think here that it should be the intent to disadvantage people based on politics; that that's enough. And then you look at the effects, and I think you can have kind of a synergy between the two where you say good Lord, this was the
worst gerrymander, one of the worst in history. Yes, they were planning to do something of exactly that magnitude. That is constitutionally intolerable. They have hit the level where they have both the intentional gerrymandering is constitutionally intolerable.

JUDGE RIPPLE: As I read your pleadings on this,
I kept thinking of what would happen would be the usual practice of state legislatures will just get worse and worse and that that line between trying to ice it for the entire decennial period and what's common, the law of the shop, if you want, among state legislators, is just going to increase and increase and increase.

MS. ODORIZZI: That's right, Your Honor. If you have unified control of the redistricting process and it's okay, as defendants say, basically any partisan intent is okay.

JUDGE RIPPLE: What's the constitution -- what
does the constitution prohibit? If the state
legislatures just get, you know, raw and then more raw
and then more raw in the way they do things, at what
point is the constitution violated?
MS. ODORIZZI: Well, I think, Your Honor, in our
test in that situation where you have unified control and you have proof of partisan intent that the map was drawn with the intent to disadvantage your political opponents,
then you look at the efficiency gap to see what the effects would cause and if the effects are so far out of what has been previously the historical norm for the efficiency gap and it's durable, it's likely to last throughout the entire period, then you have a constitutional violation unless the state can come and show that was really the political geography of this particular state and there was no other way around it. I mean \(I\) think that is a discernible test because it's related to the concept that people have to be treated equally and it's a manageable test and it's not going to create a whole raft of new litigation because there are very few plans that actually would be subject to this.

I'd like, if \(I\) might, to address defendants' -- one
of their big arguments is courts, neutral parties
sometimes in the past have created plans with big
efficiency gaps. And that's true. And under our test,
those plans are not at risk because there's no partisan
intent. And counsel said well, we're using intent as,
you know, a way of protecting our efficiency gap
analysis. But we're using intent and effect because that
is the basic equal protection analysis. You look at
intent. You look at effect.
    You have a lot of cases under the Equal Protection
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effects. Because discriminatory effects happen for a lot of different reasons. But you don't have a claim that the state action violates the Equal Protection Clause unless you can show intent. So this is not anything unusual or strange.

And if you go back to Bandemer, I think it's interesting that Justice White noted, if I can find this here, that if you do, if you draw a map in a -- he called it a politically mindless fashion -- where you don't pay attention to partisan issues and to how you're districting and you're looking only at things like compactness and trying to respect boundaries and making sure that you have equal population, he says you can get a gross partisan gerrymander out of that. He recognized that.

And that's what happened in Wisconsin in the \(2000^{\prime}\) s. If you look back at the decision in that case, the court looked and it rejected the plans that were tendered to it because it thought they were too partisan. But then in drawing its own plan, the court didn't look at these partisan issues. Unlike the court in the previous decade which had really tried and succeeded in coming up with a map that was very balanced, the court this time around said we're going to try and do as little as possible to disturb the current boundaries and we're going to
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equalize the population. And that had the unintentional
effect of creating a fairly large pro-Republican
efficiency gap. But that doesn't show that what the

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legislature did in 2011 was somehow appropriate
constitutional because you had an accidental gerrymander.
There was nothing accidental about what happened here.
    At one point in their reply brief defendants say
well, the fact that because of the lawful -- what they
called the lawful partisan intent of the legislature,
there just happened to be this big efficiency gap. It
didn't just happen to be. It wasn't an accident. They
planned for it and they achieved it.
    So in that sense, the fact that we do have
efficiency gaps that come out of who knows why they came
out of those other maps, that's not relevant because
there was no intent in that case. But that doesn't mean
that you can create discriminatory effects that are
excessive in a case like this intentionally, just like
the race discrimination cases we would say.
    JUDGE CRABB: I have a question about your
proposal. There seems to be agreement among the justices
who believe that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable;
that court intervention for that kind of partisan
gerrymandering should be very limited and it should be
limited to extreme situations. And you seem to say that
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approximately 20 percent of the plans you could make a
prima facie case for showing that they're extreme
partisan gerrymandering. So how do we -- how do we
narrow this to the few extreme circumstances that the
court seems to have been willing to consider?
MS. ODORIZZI: Well, Your Honor, I think

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Professor stephanopoulos can give you the exact numbers.
I don't have them in my head and he does. But when you
take out -- when you look only at the plans where you had
unified control of redistricting by one party, which is a
good proxy for partisan intent, that cuts the number way
down of the plans that would be -- you could challenge.
And as to the rest, if they could be challenged, and
there's a number of current ones that could be challenged
under our standard, those are subject to the standard and
in the overall scheme of things there's not that many of
them.
    So I think the standard works in that it's getting
really the outliers. It's getting the ones where you
have partisan intent and where you have an extreme
efficiency gap that was intentionally created and
intentionally discriminates against a particular
political group.
    JUDGE GRIESBACH: I think, if I understand the
defendants correctly, they don't argue that they did not
have intent to benefit the Republican Party. They do not argue that they were compelled to enact this plan because of the traditional considerations. What's at issue here? What are the facts we have to decide?

Is the efficiency gap, is that a standard that we either adopt as a matter of law? Or -- and if so, is that a factual dispute? What are the -- why do you think we need a trial? Why aren't you moving for summary judgment given your position?

MS. ODORIZZI: Well --

JUDGE GRIESBACH: What are the facts that you think we need a trial to hear and to decide? MS. ODORIZZI: They do -- well, first of all on the intent prong, they've admitted some but not all. JUDGE GRIESBACH: But your argument is all you need to show is an intent to benefit the parties. MS. ODORIZZI: Right. JUDGE GRIESBACH: And you have that. MS. ODORIZZI: Right. Right. But Your Honors have to decide what they -- they also argue that there is no standard, legal standard for intent. So I'm not sure what they're asking the court to do except grant summary judgment because it doesn't matter what their intent is. JUDGE GRIESBACH: My question to you is what do you think are the facts that we have to decide. have an expert who we haven't challenged who challenges various aspects of the efficiency gap and whether it's the appropriate methodology to use, and we think that, you know, it's looking at those experts and hearing their testimony and you have to decide whether, in fact, the efficiency gap is that test that the supreme court has been searching for that enables you to decide and where the line is between, you know, kind of politics as usual and unconstitutional gerrymandering.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: What facts do we need to determine in order to make that assessment, that decision?

MS. ODORIZZI: Well, \(I\) think first of all you have to look at the efficiency gap and see if you agree with the way we've used it. We have questions of durability, which again Professor stephanopoulos, if you want to get into those facts, can talk more about it. And the defendants have challenged those -- some of what we've done on the efficiency gap, and that creates questions of fact.

Just like on the clustering issue which they argued sort of in their brief, we say Democrats and Republicans -- we have expert testimony that Democrats and

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Republicans are equally clustered in wisconsin. So to
the extent they want to argue about that it's clustering of adherence of various parties explains the efficiency gap, we have an issue of fact for the court to decide. JUDGE GRIESBACH: It's -- I mean it is demographically provable pretty -- and I doubt if there would be much dispute based on whatever statistics as to the density of the particular clusters, the respective clusters, and I think that was the argument here that the Democratic clusters are much more dense than the Republican clusters. But is that -- I mean if we decide that, that decides the case. I'm trying to figure out and understand what specific factual issues we're going to hear about at a trial that we'll need to resolve that will -- that require a trial, I guess, that you think we need to decide in order to determine whether or not the measure you're offering, which is the efficiency gap. MS. ODORIZZI: Right.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: There's no dispute as to what it is or how it's calculated.

MS. ODORIZZI: Calculated; right.
JUDGE GRIESBACH: So I'm wondering do we need a trial? And what are the facts that we have to decide at such a trial? Where are we going to hear disputes as to facts that aren't a matter of some historical event or record that are already -- you know, that are already in
the record that are not --
MS. ODORIZZI: Well, I think, Your Honor, we didn't move for summary judgment because we viewed this as having a battle of the experts about the efficiency gap and how it applies.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: So every one of these cases
will be a battle of the expert? Or did the supreme Court envision, you know, some -- not multiple -- I mean once we arrive at the standard, now we know.

MS. ODORIZZI: Now we know.
JUDGE GRIESBACH: But \(I\) mean is it your view that if, for example, this court ends up adopting the efficiency gap as a reasonable and manageable standard, that will be still a factual issue in every other redistricting case that comes up?

MS. ODORIZZI: It may or may not be, Your Honor. If you adopt the efficiency gap, it's easy to calculate it and so you may have issues as to intent and you may also have issues on the third prong as to whether or not the efficiency gap is unavoidable. Because of the political geography of the state, we don't have that issue in Wisconsin, but it may be in other states.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Thank you.
JUDGE CRABB: Who do you think should have the
25 burden of proof on that last question?

MS. ODORIZZI: On that last question, we think the burden should shift to the state. Once we've shown both intent and that the gerrymander is excessive under the efficiency gap, they should have to explain. They're in the best position to explain. They say that's not fair, you know, and that they don't like the unavoidable standard, but what other standard would you use when they've done this with the intent to give themselves a partisan advantage.

JUDGE CRABB: Are you proceeding from the one-person, one-vote cases when you say that the burden should be --

MS. ODORIZZI: Yes.

JUDGE CRABB: -- on the defendants?

MS. ODORIZZI: Yes. And also, I mean, they say here we've reverse engineered a Demonstration Plan. But Professor Gaddie, who was their expert before the fact, made the same predictions. We could have used his predictions and come up with the same thing because he was remarkably accurate about how the districts would perform. If we translate what he did into our efficiency gap, he gets the same efficiency gap that we found after the election. So...

JUDGE CRABB: Do you know of any case in which the Supreme Court or any justice of the supreme court has
said that the burden should be on the defendants to show that the gerrymandering was unavoidable?

MS. ODORIZZI: No, Your Honor. I think that
this is, you know -- this is -- we proceed from the one-person, one-vote cases because there there's a presumption that when you are over a certain limit, that it's unconstitutional. Here we think you should have a presumption when you have both intent and the proper amount of effect that when you've gotten to that level, you have excessive partisan gerrymandering, then you also should have a presumption.

And, you know, it's interesting because their opening brief says very confidently that Wisconsin is a pro-Republican state. It's just political geography. And then in their reply they say well, that's too high a burden. You can't put that burden on us. And it's impossible and plaintiffs could always do it. But if you read the Chen article, which they rely on, which talks about Elorida, it says in Florida it would be unavoidable, because according to this article, they say that the way Democrats are clustered in Florida, the only way to create districts that were balanced under an efficiency gap analysis would be by creating snake-like districts coming out of the -- one of the cities.

So there would be a place for defendants in some
states to be able to come back and say we had to do this in order to preserve ordinary districting rules. JUDGE CRABB: Are you imposing a standard of
necessity?
MS. ODORIZZI: We are of being unavoidable, but of course, you know, all of these standards are subject to whatever Your Honors decide they should be. And whatever it is, we think we can meet it on the facts of this particular case.

On the clustering point, I think for purposes of summary judgment that that's really a question of fact. So to the extent defendants are still relying on clustering and those maps that are in their brief, those are all the question of facts. Because as I say, our Professor Mayer, who does have a Ph.D. and used the kind of analysis that a social scientist used -- uses to decide population clustering, said Democrats and Republicans in Wisconsin are equally clustered. So that's really not an issue in this state. And at the very least, there's a question of fact.

JUDGE CRABB: If I could go back to this
justified necessity factor. If you said that the
defendants had to show that the plan they are using was
necessary, isn't that -- anything could be necessary.
    MS. ODORIZZI: Well, I think -- inherent. And yes, they could draw different maps. But no matter what map they drew, so long as it adhered to the other requirements of districting, it would produce a similar kind of efficiency gap. I don't think they have to show that these particular district Iines were absolutely necessary, but what they have to show is that any alternative would have resulted in roughly the same kind of excessive, if you will, efficiency gap.

I'm going to say two words about Mr. Trende before \(I\) you do clustering studies. He did not employ the kinds of methodologies that social scientists do to decide clustering. Instead he came up with his own methodology,
which at the end of the day doesn't show you anything because it only shows geographic clusters, and when you're doing districting, how far people are away from each other, you know, if something is blue on a map in a county really doesn't matter because the question is how can you district. Where is the population. And Trende doesn't deal with that at all. So... (11:11 a.m.)

THE COURT: Professor Stephanopoulos.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court.

I'd like to begin by saying a few more words about defendants' principle argument which is that there's no problem with or there is a problem with the efficiency gap because it's not exclusively a product of partisan intent, and then I'll address some other major issues that have come up during the argument with respect to the durability of gerrymandering, with respect to the workability of the third prong of our test, and with respect to the constitutional roots of our proposal.

So the single argument the defendants hammer at throughout their briefing is that it's a fatal flaw with the efficiency gap; that it has causes other than partisan intent. And \(I\) think there are several things to say about that. This is just an error of law on the part

First of all, they're repeating the mistake that the Bandemer plurality identified, which is to conflate, to blur the intent and effect prongs. It's clear both in the partisan gerrymandering context and in equal protection law more generally that the discriminatory effect does not have to stem exclusively from the discriminatory intent that underlies a challenged policy. The discriminatory effect has to stem from the policy that's being challenged, which in this case is a district plan, but it does not have to stem 100 percent from whatever discriminatory motivation underlies that policy. And the court has said so in Bandemer.

I would also point out that this supposed weakness of the efficiency gap is also a weakness of any conceivable measure of partisan effect in this area. So whether you look at partisan bias, which is the metric the court considered in Vieth; whether you consider something cruder like simple disproportionality, all of those other measures of partisan effect also are functions of (a) partisan intent, (b) political geography, (c) the candidates who are running. There's nothing distinctive about the efficiency gap in this regard.

I'd also point out that the partisan bias figures that the court itself cited in LULAC did not attempt to
make any adjustment for the proportion of the partisan bias that was attributable to the Texas legislature's partisan intent. They were raw partisan bias figures. There is no hint that those numbers had to be changed or modified in some way to reflect only the contribution of the Texas legislature's partisan intent.

And furthermore to the extent that causality matters here, that's specifically the point of the third prong of our proposed test. So if, in fact, it turns out that there are innocent explanations for a large efficiency gap, that's going to come out when the state tries to make its showing at the third prong. So there's no need for that causality question to also be intertwined with the second element, the calculation of efficiency gap itself. And so let me turn then to that burden-shifting inquiry which has been a topic of conversation.

So first of all, I would say we've plucked the language for that third prong directly from the supreme Court's one-person, one-vote cases. If this court wants to adapt or modify the third prong, we don't have an objection. But we thought that the most reliable intuitive place to look to figure out how this prong should operate are the court's one-person, one-vote precedence like Brown \(v\). Thompson, like Connor v. Finch, like Voinovich. So we envision the same exact inquiry
taking place here at the third stage as takes place in the one-person, one-vote cases at the third stage.

Now, is this an impossible burden for the state to carry as defendants claim? Clearly not. When the same precise question presents itself in the one-person, one-vote context, states routinely are able to demonstrate that large population deviations were the necessary product of some legitimate state policy like respecting county boundaries. Ohio succeeded in making that showing in Voinovich, Virginia succeeded in making that showing in Mahan \(v\). Howell, and there are other similar examples.

Moreover, it will often not be the case that a Demonstration Plan like Professor Mayer's will be possible. So my co-counsel mentioned the example of Florida where if you credit Chen and Rodden's analysis, it would not be possible to come up with a map that has a low efficiency gap and that complies with traditional redistricting criteria as well as the actual map in Florida. That's because Florida's geography prevents this kind of map from being drawn.

Judge Crabb asked whether there's any precedent in partisan gerrymandering law specifically for this kind of burden-shifting inquiry, and the answer actually is yes to that. So when Justice Stevens first addressed
    partisan gerrymandering in Karcher, he suggested that if
    a state could produce legitimate justifications for its
    plan, and this again is a plan that is intentionally and
    significantly discriminatory against a particular group,
    those legitimate justifications would rescue the plan.
    The Bandemer plurality said the same thing, that
    once you finish with the intent and effect prongs, you
        also ought to consider what potential legitimate
        justifications might underlie the plan. And Justice
        Souter more recently in Vieth also said the same thing,
        that the fifth of his five stages in his proposal was
        whether there happened to be -- whether the state can
        show that there happened to be legitimate justifications
        underlying its plan. So there is precedent for this sort
        of burden-shifting inquiry, not only in one-person,
        one-vote law, but also in partisan gerrymandering law,
        including in a plurality opinion in Bandemer.
    Let me address the issue of durability which has
    come up in Judge Ripple's comments in particular. We
        agree that the durability of a gerrymander is a very
        significant consideration in this area. The Bandemer
        court clearly said that durability was central. In fact,
        durability featured in the specific legal test that the
        Bandemer plurality adopted. You know, was there a
    consistent degradation of a group of voters' influence on
the political process. And so we think that the partisan effect that has to be demonstrated in these cases is that a plan both significantly and durably disadvantages the supporters of a particular party.

We think if there's evidence that the bias would not be durable, that ought to be considered and it ought to weigh heavily against the plaintiffs in this kind of case. And so we've presented evidence that Wisconsin's Act 43 is extremely likely to retain a very large pro-Republican bias throughout the decade, no matter what sorts of changes in the electoral environment take place.

In fact, the plan is skewed enough and durably
skewed enough that it would give Republicans a lockhold on the legislative majority even if Democrats are able to win a substantial majority of the popular vote. This is one of the scenarios that Professor Mayer tackled in his rebuttal report and he found that the -- that Act 43 retains its large efficiency gap and retains a Republican majority even in the face of a Democratic waive election like that of 2006 or 2008. So we think durability matters and we think it's clearly demonstrated here.

On the intent side as well, we would have no
objection to taking durability into account. And here also its present. There is overwhelming evidence that the drafters of Act 43 did not only intend to
significantly benefit the Republicans, they also intended
to durably benefit the Republicans. And we'll be
presenting explicit evidence to that effect at trial,
that they considered both the magnitude of the expected
bias and the durability of the expected bias when they
were crafting Act 43.
    Let me turn to an argument that defendants' counsel
made repeatedly which is that there are no constitutional
roots to plaintiffs' proposed approach, and let me
outline what \(I\) see as the constitutional roots of the
approach. The proximate constitutional foundation is the
principle of partisan symmetry in which five justices
expressed interest in LULAC. So a majority of the court
expressed at least some interest in that principle.
Partisan symmetry again is just the idea that the
electoral system has to treat the major parties
symmetrically when it comes to the conversion of their
popular support in the state into legislative
representation.
    Now, that principle of partisan symmetry didn't come
out of nowhere in LULAC. It's also implicit in all of
the court's partisan gerrymandering decisions. Every
time the court defines the practice of partisan
gerrymandering, it does so in language that is clearly
consistent with the principle of partisan symmetry.

That's true in Vieth, it's true in Bandemer, it's true in the more recent Arizona state legislature decision, it's true throughout.

And furthermore, this principle of partisan symmetry itself has clear constitutional roots in well-established doctrines under the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. So it's very clear that there's an individual right for the voter not to be discriminated against based on the voters' political views or partisan affiliation. That's true in the First Amendment context, in the political patronage cases like Elrod v. Burns, and it's also true in the Fourteenth Amendment right-to-vote context in cases like Harper and Crawford where the court explicitly says that partisan justifications are not a valid reason to burden the exercise of the franchise.

So I think here we have a principle recognized in LULAC that is just an articulation of an idea that's been floating around all of the Supreme Court's partisan gerrymandering decisions and that is just the obvious corollary at the party level of the fundamental
individual principle that you can't discriminate against somebody based on their political views or party affiliation.

Now, defendants say how in the world could you
seat-to-vote relationship, and they return to that point numerous times. And of course you wouldn't constitutionalize a two-to-one seat-to-vote relationship or any other seat-to-vote relationship. With the full method for calculating the efficiency gap, there is no necessary seat-to-vote relationship that's implied. With the simplified method for calculating the efficiency gap, there is also no seat-to-vote relationship implied whenever the efficiency gap is not precisely equal to zero. And if we allow, for example, the efficiency gap to vary between, say, plus or minus 7 percent, that allows any of myriad different seat-to-vote relationships to occur. So the court would absolutely not be entrenching or constitutionalizing any particular seat-to-vote relationship by adopting our approach.

And moreover, to the extent that the efficiency gap prods or encourages states to move toward the two-to-one relationship, that's a positive consequence. This is the historical norm for generations in American elections at both the state legislative and the congressional level. The fact that this is the norm is precisely why the defendants' own expert uses a measure effectively identical to the efficiency gap in his own analyses. He recognizes that the efficiency gap is really measuring the deviation of a particular plan from historical norms
and that's the same appeal that we see for the efficiency gap, that it really captures the extent to which a plan is more gerrymandered than you would expect based on the historical norms that have applied for generations in American elections.

JUDGE CRABB: Excuse me. Can I intervene? MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Sure.

JUDGE CRABB: At one point in your brief you say the court could use partisan bias in addition to the efficiency gap if the court thinks the efficiency gap is not as sufficient. How would that work?

MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: So we envision that working
sort of as a robustness check. So we have these two different measures of partisan symmetry out there: There's the older measure partisan bias and there's the more sophisticated newer measure of the efficiency gap. We might worry if partisan bias tells us that a plan is completely fair when the efficiency gap tells us that a plan is manifestly unfair. There are reasons in that conflict scenario to prefer the reading that's given by the efficiency gap. But to the extent that both of the metrics are consistent, that provides a court with even more of a basis for concluding that a particular plan really does have a very lopsided partisan impact.

And here that's absolutely the case. So the Act 43
had nearly identical partisan bias scores in both 2012 and 2014, as it did efficiency gap scores. So here both the older metric and a newer metric are completely consistent in the message that they're sending, which is that Act 43 is one of the most egregious and most tilted plans that had been observed over the last 40 odd years or so.

JUDGE CRABB: Do you know any other measures for determining partisan symmetry other than these two?

MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: These are the two that are featured in the literature. I suppose even older than partisan bias would be just literally to compare the seat share and the vote share for a party and just to look at the difference between the two. But that is literally a measure of the deviation from perfect proportionality. And so it's clear that that measure is prohibited by the court's precedence. That would tell you how much a plan is disproportional relative to perfect one-to-one proportionality. That can't be the test in this area.

But \(I\) can tell you though that -- so since the concept of partisan symmetry emerged, partisan bias was the first and the only scholar-designed measure of partisan symmetry up until the last few years when the efficiency gap also emerged in order to address some of the deficiencies that had been identified with partisan
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bias. I'm happy to address those deficiencies if that's
of interest to the Court.
JUDGE CRABB: That's okay.
JUDGE GRIESBACH: I want to ask you the same

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question I asked Ms. Odorizzi, Mr. Stephanopoulos. What
facts do you think we need to decide in order to make the
judgment, arrive at a judgment that the efficiency gap is
that elusive standard that the Supreme Court has been
seeking all these years? What factual disputes do you
think exist here that would -- we'll be resolving at a
trial in this case?
    MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Sure. So I think there are
factual disputes related to Wisconsin's own facts, but I
take Your Honor to be addressing the more general
question of what facts are in dispute with respect to the
efficiency gap and with respect to setting a general
standard as opposed to the particular case at hand.
    So defendants have made a host of factual arguments
that the efficiency gap is too volatile, too changeable
from election to election; that a 7 percent threshold is
not reasonable. Maybe the threshold has to be calibrated
up or down. They've argued that the clustering of
Democratic and Republican voters has some impact on the
efficiency gap, but we don't know yet how much of an
impact. And we also don't know whether that's a legally
significant fact or not.
The question of avoidability, so was a large
efficiency gap avoidable, is also, I think, a quintessentially factual question on which the parties differ.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: I thought that was conceded
here.
MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: What's that?
JUDGE GRIESBACH: I thought that was conceded
here. I mean as I see this, intent and avoidability are really not in dispute.

MR. Stephanopoulos: Well, I don't believe, if we went to trial, the defendants would concede those two points. Maybe they would and we would be happy to accept those concessions. I think that they would likely offer justifications, reasons for the large efficiency gap that we observed. I think it's likely they would claim that Act 43's large efficiency gap is the result of a pro-Democratic -- I'm sorry, pro-Republican political geography in the state of Wisconsin. Certainly they've argued at length in their briefing that Wisconsin has a natural pro-Republican geography and this accounts for large efficiency gaps. I take that to be specifically an argument about whether a large efficiency gap is or is not inevitable in Wisconsin.

So without knowing what particular stipulations defendants would make, I think it's hard to answer the question, but certainly their brief suggests that there are disputed factual issues at the third prong as well. JUDGE GRIESBACH: Thank you.

MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me address now one of Judge Crabb's questions from earlier about the volume of plans affected. So when defendants comment on the volume of plans affected, they completely overlook the first prong of our test. They assert that you would have to jeopardize all plans that are over "X" percent in their efficiency gap, whether that's in the first election or in any election over the course of the cycle. That's incorrect because our test does have these multiple prongs. You would also have to make sure that partisan intent was present.

Once we take partisan intent into account, at least by proxy by looking at how many cases are there where a single party had unified control over redistricting, the number of potentially affected cases drops dramatically to a few dozen all time, and only roughly ten today. And these numbers, I think, ought to be taken in perspective relative to the enormous volume of redistricting litigation that has taken place in the past and that currently takes place.

So in a world where the one-person, one-vote principle led to hundreds of plans being invalidated and in a world where Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has prompted hundreds upon hundreds of lawsuits over the years, in a world where in every cycle there are hundreds of cases in almost every state resulting in roughly two dozen plans being either invalidated or drawn by the courts, it's only an incremental increase if another ten plans might be in some jeopardy under plaintiffs' proposed test. So this is not a dramatic increase in the degree of judicial intervention in this area. We think it's a degree of judicial intervention that's perfectly consistent with current practice.

We'd also point out that to the extent the numbers of problematic plans still seem high, that's because the practice of partisan gerrymandering is ubiquitous and very severe. So if you have a clearly undemocratic practice taking place around the country, it doesn't strike us as a bad thing if there are a number of cases that emerge to tackle that undemocratic practice and to curb that undemocratic practice.

Let me also address one of counsel's arguments about the changeability of the efficiency gap. So counsel rightly points out that the efficiency gap can vary somewhat from election to election. That's because
different candidates run. National trends go in different directions in different years. But empirically this was one of the principal things that Professor Jackman examined in his two reports, just how volatile is the efficiency gap. What he found is that the vast majority of variability of the efficiency gap is across plans, not within plans. So within plans, you have a relatively high level of stickiness of the efficiency gap. Across plans, you see significant differences in the efficiency gap consistent with different plans being more or less symmetric in their treatment of the parties.

Professor Jackman also included a great deal of evidence on the dependability of the first score that you observe under a plan. And what he found confirms the plaintiffs' view that the efficiency gap is a sufficiently robust and reliable metric to be used in litigation. So he found that the first efficiency gap recorded predicts with a quite high degree of precision the lifetime average efficiency gap of the plan. So if a plan opens with a great deal of asymmetry, we can be quite confident that this plan over its lifetime will end up averaging out to have been a quite a symmetric plan.

He also arrived at extremely high confidence rates associated with the 7 percent threshold that he recommended. He further found that the rate of false
positives would be extremely low with a 7 percent threshold. So in other words, with a 7 percent threshold, the volume of cases where you might have thought based on the first efficiency gap that the lifetime average of the efficiency gap would be in the same direction, but it turns out that the lifetime average actually was in the opposite direction. There are very few of those cases, lower than 5 percent, with an efficiency gap threshold of 7 percent.

And he further found that if you take all of the current plans in effect around the country and you shift them by up to 5 percentage points in either direction, the original efficiency gaps end up being overwhelmingly highly correlated with the efficiency gaps that you get after you do the shifting. So this again addresses Judge Ripple's concern about durability and it shows us that current plans with large efficiency gaps have very durably very large efficiency gaps. They're going to preserve their current level of asymmetry under just about any electoral environment that you can realistically conceive of over the remainder of the decade.

I'm coming to the end of my points so I'll be happy
first election and instead any analysis ought to take into account all of the elections under a plan. But there are good reasons for focusing on the first election. First of all, based on Justice Kennedy's comments in LULAC, it appears that lawsuits before the first election are not allowed because those would be based on a counterfactual state of affairs. So the first election represents the moment at which lawsuits are allowed to be filed.

Second, plaintiffs are going to have every incentive to file suit as soon as they're allowed to. If they wait, that's another election that they have to endure under a plan that they consider to be fundamentally unconstitutional. And moreover, if plaintiffs wait until two or three or four elections have occurred under a plan, they won't be able to cherrypick the efficiency gap scores that look best for them. They'll have to accept the record as they find it, which will include all of the efficiency gaps that have been produced by that plan.

So here, for example, we absolutely could not ignore the 2014 efficiency gap score of Act 43. That's played a central role in our litigation and we think the same would be true any time that plaintiffs sue after multiple elections have taken place. They'll have to accept and work with and deal with all of the observed scores that
the plan has generated.
I think I've covered the points I wanted to hit, so let me close with two final brief observations. The first is how factual most of defendants' arguments are. So in their opening brief in particular, they've raised the issues of how geographically clustered are the two-party supporters in wisconsin? How geographically clustered are the two-party supporters in the nation as a whole? How many plans would be jeopardized by plaintiffs' proposed test? How variable are efficiency gap scores from election to election? Did Professor Mayer and Professor Jackman make certain methodological mistakes or did they rely on certain problematic
assumptions in carrying out their analyses? These are exactly the kinds of contested factual issues that can't be resolved at this stage and that require a trial to be decided.

And the second point is just to reiterate the defendants don't even try in their briefs to argue that Act 43 would be valid under plaintiffs' proposed test. And I think that's for good reason. There's overwhelming evidence that the plan was devised in order to maximize the number of districts the Repulolican candidates would win. Prior to the current cycle, there wasn't a single map in American history or modern American history that
was as severely asymmetric as the current plan in its first two elections. And it's also clear that this extreme level of asymmetry was immanently unavoidable. The Wisconsin Legislature easily could have, but chose not to, devise a plan that would have been much more fair to both parties and also would have accomplished all of its legitimate objectives just as well.

So our view is that if the courts are ever going to curb the deeply undemocratic practice of partisan gerrymandering, this case presents as good a place as could be imagined to begin that project.

Thank you, Your Honors. (11:42 a.m.)
JUDGE RIPPLE: Thank you, Professor. And we'll
hear now in rebuttal Mr. Keenan.
MR. KEENAN: Well, I'll start by saying that the plaintiffs' argument assumes what the definition of fairness in a districting plan is is equal results of elections in converting votes to seats. But that's not what the supreme court has said that fairness in
districting is. Both the federal courts in the District of Wisconsin in 1990 and 2000 were trying their utmost to be fair in districting. Those plans have resulted in very asymmetric results.

Now in 2010 when Republicans win control of the legislature, what the plaintiffs would demand is that the

Republicans enact a plan that's actually less favorable to themselves than the one that's been in place for 20 years.

This just can't be the standard for partisan gerrymandering claims to have a standard that would require such results when partisan motivation just isn't unconstitutional. I would say that that's not just a finding of or a holding of the Vieth plurality. The appropriateness of considering political factors is also in Gaffney \(v\). Cummings, which is a majority decision of the Supreme Court.

I think the problem is that the plaintiffs say this is extreme or an outlier or -- I'm trying to see some of the other terms used, but it's not. The elections that were seen in Wisconsin are actually entirely consistent with what just happened last decade. Mr. Stephanopoulos says well, the first two elections in this plan are just as, you know, have the highest efficiency gaps of any plan prior to this cycle. Well, that's true in the first two elections, but if you look at last time in wisconsin, there is efficiency gaps of negative 10 and negative 12. They happened to occurred in 2004 and 2006 so they aren't the first two elections in the cycle, but they were two elections in that plan. And so to the defendants, you
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then conclude that there's extreme partisan
gerrymandering going on when we saw the exact same
results under the last plan which was enacted by
disinterested federal judges.

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    I think that's the key is they say it's out of the
norm. Well, the norm of what? The norm in wisconsin as
seen is what was seen in the last two plans. Why is
Wisconsin being judged against the norm of all the other
states dating back to the \(1970^{\prime}\) s and \(1980^{\prime}\) s when the
political conditions were quite different? Frankly, I
don't know that it is possible to have a standard like
this that would apply to every single state equally
because each state is different.
    They also say that it would affect relatively few
plans, but that's just not true. I mean in this last
cycle, their own expert says when you consider partisan
intent, 25 percent of plans are being implicated at the 7
percent threshold and 16 percent at the 10 percent
threshold.
    I think some of this is like what is a partisan
plan. Well, they just say a partisan plan is one with a
asymmetrical result, but if you look at the Baumgart
case, it rejected the Democrat's plan as too partisan,
not because of the results but because, in their words,
they said the plan -- the district in Madison by starting
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at the state capitol and lines radiating out in the shape
of a pizza, kind of a pizza-mander, that it's a way to

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maximize their seats. It wasn't -- that was partisan
because it was ignoring traditional districting
principles to create more Democratic seats. It wasn't --
but under the plaintiffs' standard that might be totally
appropriate if statewide you end up with a more balanced
map. But the districting decisions aren't judged just on
the pure statewide vote as the supreme Court makes clear
that there's individual districts that candidates have to
win, not just a statewide vote total yielding into a seat
chair.

Mr. Stephanopoulos said that the efficiency gap
doesn't make a particular seats-to-votes relationship
constitutional, but it does. I mean the way they've
structured their test is based on the one-person,
one-vote, and the one-person, one-vote takes that
deviation from equal population. You get to a certain
point and then you're presumptively unconstitutional.
Well, the reason that is is because that is actually the
constitutional rule is equal population and that is what
is normalized. Well here, you're going to take the
efficiency gap and make that your baseline and see how
far you deviate from it. Well, if that's not
constitutionalizing the seats-to-votes relationship, then

I don't even really know what it's doing.
And \(I\) think just to reiterate the durability point, I would just like to clarify that their expert examined the durability of the efficiency gap, not the durability of party control of the House. Judge Ripple had asked about whether \(I\) was getting into a dispute of Findings-of-Facts land about how the efficiency gap did not translate, but our proposed finding 185 was not disputed. The plaintiffs say it's undisputed that the sign of the efficiency gap does not necessarily correlate to control the state legislature or that in five of the seven plans enacted under unified party control -- this is from the Jackman chart -- the party in control of the state House changed despite the fact that the efficiency gap remained the same sign.

So the efficiency gap in all the tests Jackman has done are looking at the efficiency gap, they're not necessarily looking at control of the state House and showing that that is durable. In the uniform swing they do, that's the same thing in that his analysis looks -well, say you shift the votes from 50 percent to 51 percent. That will change seats, but what he's measuring is then on the 51 percent line, how does that compare to the expected 52 percent share, not whether it's giving you control of the legislature.

And \(I\) think the main problem here is that the plaintiffs say this is a traditional equal protection case, but if that's really the case, then there is no protected class here. Shouldn't we just be in rational-basis review? Shouldn't the defendants just be able to say there is a rational basis for our plan? The plaintiffs have another plan, which they say is equally rational with a better result for the Democrats, but in a rational-basis review, that wouldn't be enough to invalidate a plan.

And I think going to Judge Griesbach's point, I also am not sure what we would try in terms of establishing the efficiency gap as a standard. We've put forward what I think is a fair view of what the plaintiffs' experts did as the basis for our motion and our argument is that that just isn't enough to constitutionalize the standard. I'm not sure what more you get by having Professor Jackman or Professor Mayer get up on the stand and testify to that.

I think to the extent the way this third part of the test works, I guess I would want to be able to meet the test if it truly isn't satisfied by the mere presence of the Demonstration Plan. I'm a little bit confused by the wording unavoidable and necessary. It seems like it's impossible to meet for a state. But to the extent it's
not, \(I\) guess \(I\) would like to put in evidence on that. JUDGE GRIESBACH: Why don't you think that the factual assertions that Mr. or Professor stephanopoulos mentioned aren't proper factual issues that this court needs to determine in order to assess whether the efficiency gap is that elusive standard the supreme court has been looking for?

MR. KEENAN: Sure. And I think that the facts that we've used are not disputed, it's what the court wants to make of those facts. I mean we've just tried to accurately lay out what the plaintiffs' experts have done --

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Apparently there's a
significant dispute over clustering.
MR. KEENAN: And \(I\) say that clustering, you
don't need to make a finding on that. So that could just be avoided. But in terms of what the plaintiff -- we're relying primarily on the --

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Isn't clustering part of your argument as to why efficiency gap isn't a fair measure? MR. KEENAN: It's context to explain why we've seen efficiency gaps in Wisconsin. I think, one, they haven't actually disputed the evidence we've offered on that. But further, I don't think it's necessary to make a particular finding on that. It is undisputed that
their proposal of it
JUDGE GRIESBACH: If it exists, then it does
skew that type of thing.
MR. KEENAN: It's something that would have to be considered in a standard it would seem; that it's recognized in Supreme Court case law that the geographic distribution of your voters is going to affect how you translate a statewide vote into seats. So that's something that should be considered in a legal standard that's trying to show partisan gerrymandering. The plaintiffs' first two steps don't look at it at all. We think that's a weakness.

JUDGE GRIESBACH: Do you think there are factual disputes as to the intent of the legislature?

MR. KEENAN: I would say for purposes of the summary judgment motion, I don't think so. I think there might be --

JUDGE GRIESBACH: At trial are there going to be factual disputes?

MR. KEENAN: Depending on what this intent element ends up being, there could be. The way the plaintiffs have phrased it where you just needed like a bare intent

JUDGE GRIESBACH: You're not going to admit you intended to violate the constitution.
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    MR. KEENAN: Yeah. And I think as we discussed
    earlier, there's not going to be an admission that - - I
think the witnesses would testify that they did not
intend to maximize Republicans seats; that there was
other concerns that would limit how much you really could
maximize the seats.
JUDGE GRIESBACH: Nor would the individual

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members?
    MR. KEENAN: The legislators, you know, just a
host of different things, that would just -- the
individual legislators, demands from the legislature what
their districts should be, things like that.
    JUDGE GRIESBACH: So there's no dispute they
wanted an advantage.
    MR. KEENAN: Yeah, there's no dispute on that,
to that point. Now, to the extent this element goes
other ways, maybe there's disputes to the extent - -
    JUDGE GRIESBACH: And there's really no dispute
that they could have designed a plan that would have
given them less advantage.
    MR. KEENAN: Yeah.
    JUDGE GRIESBACH: And consistent with the rules
governing traditional redistricting.
    MR. KEENAN: Yeah. I think there's no dispute
that a different plan could have been enacted that had a
There's probably -- I think that there's probably also no
dispute that there probably could even enacted a plan
that would be more favorable to them. So like depending
on how the third prong goes, if it really is truly like
the one-person, one-vote, that test is about whether you
were advancing a legitimate state policy, not about
whether it's necessary and unavoidable. So if that's it,
then we would need to put in evidence to show, like, that
there is, you know, legitimate reasons behind the
decisions that were made.

But in terms of using the efficiency gap and using the intent element as the plaintiffs have described it, I don't know what facts we're going to be trying at a trial on that. We've, I think, made a fair representation of what the plaintiffs' experts -- what the support is for using those standards. And there's no dispute about what they did and what they didn't do. It's just like what to make of that as a legal matter, which is a question of law for the Court, not really a political science issue.

And I guess I would just like to close with, like, the partisan bias and partisan symmetry. The plaintiffs act as if that's been constitutionalized and it's been accepted as a constitutional principle, and it hasn't. 25 Justice Kennedy says he wouldn't use it alone. He didn't
say that his problems with it were like very specific,
that he really likes it. But, you know, just address
these few concerns. It was like skepticism about it.
But maybe in the future it would provide some guidance.
But there is no holding that that type of analysis really
should guide -- should be what determines these claims.
    I think that's all I have. Unless there's any
    further questions, I'll sit down.
    JUDGE RIPPLE: Thank you, Mr. Keenan. The Court

I, LYNETTE SWENSON, Certified Realtime and

Merit Reporter in and for the State of Wisconsin, certify
that the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the proceedings held on the \(23 r d\) day of March 2016 before the Honorable Barbara B. Crabb, the Honorable William

Griesbach and the Honorable Kenneth Ripple, in my
presence and reduced to writing in accordance with my stenographic notes made at said time and place.

Dated this 25th day of March 2016.
- \(/ \mathrm{s} /\)

Lynette Swenson, RMR, CRR, CRC Federal Court Reporter

8 The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under the direct control and/or direction of the certifying court reporter.

The measure of partisanship should exist to establish the change in the partisan balance of the district. We are not in court this time; we do not need to show that we have created a fair, balanced, or even a reactive map. But, we do need to show to lawmakers the political potential of the district.

I have gone through the electoral data for state office and built a partisan score for the assembly districts. It is based on a regression analysis of the Assembly vote from 2006, 2008, and 2010, and it is based on prior election indicators of future election performance.

I am also building a series of visual aides to demonstrate the partisan structure of Wisconsin politics. The graphs will communicate the top-to-bottom party basis of the state politics. It is evident, from the recent Supreme Court race and also the Milwaukee County executive contest, that the partisanship of Wisconsin is invading the ostensibly nonpartisan races on the ballot this year.

\section*{from prof gaddie}

Joseph handrick <joeminocqua@msn,com>
Wed, Apr 20, 2011 at 7:34 AM
To: adam foltz <adamfoltz@gmail.com>, tad ottman <tottman@gmail.com>
SEE Keith's comments below.

From: rkgaddie@ou.edu
To: jeminocqua@msn.com
Subject: RE: Milwaukee county elections
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2011 03:47:20 +0000
Hey Joe-
I went ahead and ran the regression models for 2006, 2008, and 2010 to generate open seat estimates on all of the precincts. They expected GOP open seat assembly vote using the equations correlates at . 96 with the 2004 2010 composite, and at a .93 level with the 2006-2010 state constitutional office composite. Both of them are running a litte strong relative to one cluster of precincts - - \({ }^{\prime}\) ll look and see if they are up north.

But, at this point, if you asked me, the power of the relationships indicates that the partisanship proxy you are using (all races) is an almost perfect proxy for the open seat vote, and the best proxy you'll come up with.

This seems to prelty much wraps up the partisanship measure debate.
Have 3 im call me if he needs anything. Otherwise, fil be tweaking the polarization analysis.
Best,
Keith

Ronald Keith Gaddie
Professor of Political Science
Editor, Social Science Quarterly
The University of Oklahoma
455 West Lindsey Strect, Room 222
Norman, OK 73019-2001
Phone 405-325-4989
Fax 405-325-0718
E-mail: rkgaddie@ou,edu
http://faculty-staff.ou,edu/G/Ronald.K.Gaddie-1
htto://socialsciencequarterly.org
Fromk joseph handrick [ioeminocqua@msn.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 9:33 PM
To: Gaddie, Ronald \(K\).
Subject: RE: Milwaukee county elections
We looked at the different combos today.


2/19/19 Gmail - from pror gaddie
The 2006 and 2010 races combined tilt too much to the GOP. I thought 06 and 10 would balance but they don't. The northern seats were especially out of whack.

So I had Tad do a composite with the 2006 and 2010 state races and all the federal races from 04 to 2010 (in other words, all statewide races from 04 to 2010). This seems to work well both in absohte terms as well as seats in relation to each other.

From rkgaddie@ouedu
To: joeminocqua@msn.com
Subject: RE: Milwaukee county elections
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2011 02:18:46 +0000
Good. I am close to having a partisan baselining for you.
Ronald Keith Gaddie
Professor of Political Science
Editor, Social Science Quarterly
The University of Olahoma
455 West indsey Street, Room 222
Norman, OK 73019-2001
Phone 405-325-9989
Fax 405-325-0718
E-mail: rkgaddie@Qu.edu
http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/G/Ronald.K.Gaddie-1
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March 24, 2016

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Madison WI 53707-7857

\section*{Re: William Whitford, et al. v. Gerald Nichol, et al. Case No. 15-CV-421}

Dear Sirs,
In accordance with the Stipulation Regarding \(30(B)(6)\) Depositions of the Legislative
Technology Services Bureau and Wisconsin State Senate and Assembly dated March 18, 2016, I enclose the Amended Declaration of Mark Lanterman dated March 18, 2016.
I will forward a copy of this letter and the enclosed exhibits (including a DVD for Exhibit B) by U.S. Mail.

Sincerely,


Ruth Greenwood
Lead Attorney, Voting Rights Project
e: rgreenwood@clccrul.org | t: (312)-888-4194

Encl.
Cc. Douglas M. Poland
Cc. Peter G. Earle


WILLIAM WHITFORD, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No.: 15-CV-421-BBC
GERALD NICHOL, et. al.,
Defendants.

\section*{AMENDED DECLARATION OF MARK LANTERMAN}

I, Mark Lanterman, declare, under penalty of perjury and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true and correct:
1. I am the Chief Technology Officer for Computer Forensic Services, Inc. ("CFS") in Minnetonka, Minnesota. I have personal knowledge of all facts set forth in this declaration. A copy of my curriculum vitae has been attached as Exhibit A for reference.

\section*{SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT}
2. In 2012, I was retained as a consulting expert by counsel for the plaintiffs in the action captioned Baldus, et al. v. Brennan, et al., case number 11-CV-562, then pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. I was retained to provide computer forensic consulting services and opinions, including forensic examination and analyses, with respect to three state-owned computers in the custody of the Legislative Technology Services Bureau ("LTSB").
3. My work and opinions in the Baldus case were set forth, in part, in two declarations that I submitted in that action. One of those declarations is dated March 11,

2013, and the other is dated April 10, 2013. Copies of those declarations are attached to this declaration as Exhibit B and Exhibit C. I hereby reaffirm and adopt the statements made in those declarations as my truthful testimony, made under penalty of perjury and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 , as my testimony in this action.
4. In both of my declarations made in 2013, I stated that I had received a total of three computers used for the purpose of legislative redistricting in 2011. Each one of those computers contained two internal hard drives for a total of six. Additionally, each computer had associated with it one external hard drive. In all, CFS received a total of nine hard drives for preservation and analysis. Upon receipt, one of the three external hard drives was physical damaged and therefore could not be preserved. As stated in my previous affidavits, the data contained on eight of these nine hard drives were preserved according to industry standards by creating what is known as a "forensic image".
5. Upon the termination of the Baldus litigation in June 2013 and the conclusion of my work in that action, I determined that the most cost-efficient way to preserve and store the "forensic images" created in connection to that case was to transfer them from CFS's production environment to archival quality magnetic storage tape. The storage tape is created for the express purpose of storing data for long periods of time with no degradation or loss of data, and it is a common and generally accepted practice to store data for long periods of time on magnetic storage tape.

\section*{CURRENT DISPUTE AND SCOPE OF REQUEST}
6. On January 30, 2016, I was retained as a consultant in this action by counsel for the plaintiffs. I was asked to recover, identify and produce any Excel
spreadsheets created, accessed or modified during the months of April, May, or June of 2011 from the three workstation computers, and the three associated external hard drives.
7. To conduct the requested searches, I first had to restore the data on the hard disk drives from the magnetic storage tape on which it had been stored since June 2013.
8. Upon restoring the data on the hard disk drives from the backup tape, I verified the integrity of the data. Upon creation, the data contained within each forensic image was assigned a "hash value", which was subsequently logged. Hash values act as digital fingerprints, unique alphanumeric values. At the outset, these hash values show that the forensic image is an exact duplicate of the original media (hard drive). In order to verify that no data was changed, corrupted or otherwise altered after being stored on the backup tapes, the data within the forensic images was "hashed" a second time. The original hash value is compared with subsequent hash value. If the hash values are different, the data was changed, corrupted or otherwise altered. If the hash values are a perfect match, then the data is verified, sound, and original.
9. All eight of the forensic images CFS was asked to review were verified.
10. CFS noted that all three provided workstations contained internal two hard drives. Each hard drive was a member disk in what is known as a "mirrored RAID". Such a configuration duplicates, or backs up the data from one drive by copying it to the other. Despite the high probability of file duplicates between the two hard drives, CFS was asked to analyze each regardless.

\section*{SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH "WRK32864"}
11. First, CFS recovered, identified and produced any active or deleted Excel spreadsheets created, accessed or modified during the months of April, May, or June of 2011 from the system named "Sen Republican WRK 32864", which I understand was assigned to Joseph Handrick while employed by LTSB. Across the two hard drives in this system a total of 48 spreadsheets were responsive. However, the majority of these were exact duplicates. After identifying and removing duplicates, a total of 14 unique files remained.
12. I created an Excel spreadsheet detailing the locations, dates and other information of all responsive spreadsheets that were identified from WRK32864 system. ("WRK32864 Responsive Spreadsheets File Detail Report.xlsx"). I provided a copy of that spreadsheet, as well as the 14 unique spreadsheets, to counsel for the plaintiffs. Copies of the file detail spreadsheet that I created, as well as the 14 unique spreadsheets, are contained on the DVD-ROM provided contemporaneously with this declaration.
13. As noted in paragraph four above, the external hard drive associated with WRK32864 had been damaged before CFS took possession. This damage rendered the device unreadable, thus thwarting attempts to preserve the data and identify relevant files.

\section*{SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH "WRK32586"}
14. Second, CFS recovered, identified and produced any active or deleted Excel spreadsheets created, accessed or modified during the months of April, May, or June of 2011 from the system named "ASM Republican WRK 32586", which I understand was assigned to Adam Foltz. Across the two hard drives in this system, a total of 86 spreadsheets were responsive. However, the majority of these were exact
duplicates. After identifying and removing duplicates, a total of 27 unique files remained.
15. I provided a copy of the spreadsheet I created, as well as the 27 responsive spreadsheets, to counsel for the plaintiffs. Copies of the spreadsheet that I created, as well as the 27 responsive spreadsheets, are contained on the DVD-ROM provided contemporaneously with this declaration.
16. I also identified relevant spreadsheets from the external hard drive associated with the WRK32586 system. This external hard drive was used in conjunction with a backup program that packaged files within compressed ZIP volumes that first needed be be decompressed. After that, CFS identified a total of 57 spreadsheets that had been created or modified between April and June 2011. Of those 57, eleven files were duplicates, leaving a total of 46 unique files. I created an Excel spreadsheet detailing the locations, dates and other information of all responsive spreadsheets that were identified on the external hard drive associated with the WRK32586 system ("WRK32586 External HD Responsive Spreadsheets File Detail Report.xlsx"). I provided a copy of the spreadsheet I created, as well as the 46 unique identified spreadsheets, to counsel for the plaintiffs. Copies of the spreadsheet that I created, as well as the 46 unique identified spreadsheets, are contained on the DVD-ROM provided contemporaneously with this declaration.

\section*{SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH "WRK32587"}
17. Third, CFS recovered, identified and produced any active or deleted Excel spreadsheets created, accessed or modified during the months of April, May, or June of 2011 from the system named "Sen Republican WRK 32587", which I understand was
assigned to Tad Ottman. Across the two hard drives in this system, a total of 364 spreadsheets were responsive, being created between April and June 2011. However, the vast majority of these were exact duplicates. After identifying and removing duplicates, a total of 35 unique files remained.
18. I created an Excel spreadsheet detailing the locations, dates and other information of all responsive spreadsheets that were identified on the WRK32587 system("WRK32587 Responsive Spreadsheets File Detail Report.xlsx"). I provided a copy of that spreadsheet, as well as the 35 unique spreadsheets, to counsel for the plaintiffs. Copies of the file detail spreadsheet that I created, as well as the 35 unique spreadsheets, are contained on the DVD-ROM provided contemporaneously with this declaration.
19. I also identified relevant spreadsheets from the external hard drive associated with the WRK32587 system. This external hard drive was used in conjunction with a backup program that packaged files within compressed ZIP volumes that first needed be be decompressed. After that, CFS identified a total of 431 spreadsheets that had been created or modified between April and June 2011. Of those, the vast majority were found to be duplicates, leaving a total of 77 unique files. I created an Excel spreadsheet detailing the locations, dates and other information of all responsive spreadsheets that were identified on the external hard drive associated with the WRK32587 system ("WRK32587 External HD Responsive Spreadsheets File Detail Report.xlsx"). I provided a copy of the spreadsheet I created, as well as the 77 unique identified spreadsheets, to counsel for the plaintiffs. Copies of the spreadsheet that I
created, as well as the 77 unique identified spreadsheets, are contained on the DVD-ROM provided contemporaneously with this declaration.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: March 18, 2016


Mark Lanterman

\section*{Exhibit A}

Title
Chief Technology Officer

\section*{Professional Biography}

Mr. Lanterman has over 25 years of experience in computer forensic investigations. Prior to joining CFS, Mark was a sworn investigator for over eleven years at both state and federal law enforcement agencies. During his last three years in law enforcement, he was assigned to the United States Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force as its senior computer forensic analyst. The Director of the U.S. Secret Service has recognized Mark for his contributions to law enforcement.

Mark has successfully led thousands of computer forensic investigations, collaborating and supporting large legal organizations, corporations and government entities, and has provided expert witness testimony in over 2,000 matters. The Honorable Michael J. Davis, Chief Judge and the Honorable Magistrate Judge Tony Leung, United States District Court-Minnesota, as well as the Honorable Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Gregory Kishel have previously appointed him as their Courts' neutral computer forensic analyst The Honorable Mel Dickstein, the Honorable John Borg, the Honorable Michael O'Rourke, the Honorable Ann Poston (Hennepin County, MN) and the Honorable A.P. Fuller (Pennington Country Seventh Judicial Circuit, SD) have also appointed Mark as a neutral computer forensic analyst.

Mark is a sought-after speaker in the United States and abroad, and has presented for several government offices as well as private organizations representing a variety of different industries. Among these venues, Mark has spoken at the Minnesota Criminal Justice Institute, the Minnesota Employment Law Institute, the Minnesota Intellectual Property Institute, the Minnesota Family Law Institute, the Minnesota Private Investigators Conference, the Minnesota Judicial Conference, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, the International Association of Financial Crime Investigators, the American Society for Industrial Security, Hamline Law School, and the University of Minnesota Law School. Mark has also been a featured speaker for the State Bar Associations of Minnesota, California, Wisconsin, New York, and Tennessee. He represented the U.S. Secret Service at the International Association of Chiefs of Police National Conference. He conducts over forty CLE classes annually. Additionally, Mark is adjunct faculty of computer science at the University of Minnesota's Technological Leadership Institute, and is currently teaching in the Master of Science Security Technologies (MSST) program.

Mark provides frequent commentary about cyber security issues for national print and broadcast media, including ABC, Al Jazeera, Bloomberg, BusinessWeek, CBS, FOX News, NBC, The New York Times, NPR, and The Wall Street Journal.

\section*{Education and Certifications}

Upsala College - B.S. Computer Science (1988); M.S. Computer Science (1990)
Department of Homeland Security - Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension - Management Series Certification National White Collar Crime Center - Advanced Computer Forensics International Information Systems Forensics Association Pennsylvania Municipal Police Officer Training John Reid Advanced Interrogation Training SEARCH Internet Investigation Training

\section*{Publications}
"What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Computer Security for Lawyers," Bench \& Bar of Minnesota.

\footnotetext{
"Elephant in the Room" - Case Studies of Social Media in Civil and Criminal Cases," Next Generation eDiscovery Law and Tech Blog.
}

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\section*{Exhibit B}```

