

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

DEC 28 2011

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RICK PERRY, *et al.*,

Appellants,

v.

SHANNON PEREZ, *et al.*,

Appellees.

**ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS**

**BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
EDWARD CHEN AND THE PROJECT
ON FAIR REPRESENTATION
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS**

WILLIAM S. CONSOVOY
Counsel of Record
THOMAS R. McCARTHY
BRENDAN J. MORRISSEY
WILEY REIN LLP
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW SUPREME COURT CLINIC
1776 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 719-7000
wconsvoy@wileyrein.com

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE¹

Edward Chen is a resident of the City of Houston located in Harris County, Texas, and is a citizen of the United States and the State of Texas. He is a registered voter residing within the geographic boundaries of Texas House District 147 under Plan H302 (the court-ordered plan) and District 134 under Plan H283 (the State's plan). Mr. Chen also resides in Texas Senate District 17 under Plan S164 (the court-ordered plan) and Plan S148 (the State's plan). With respect to both, Mr. Chen's legislative district contains a greater number of citizens of voting age than it would if the districts had been apportioned using citizen voting age population. Mr. Chen regularly votes in Texas House and Senate elections, and plans to do so in the future. He also was the lead plaintiff in *Chen v. City of Houston*, 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1046, 121 S. Ct. 2020 (2001), which presented the question whether total population or citizen voting age population should be used to determine whether voting districts are equally populated for purposes of compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's one-person, one-vote requirement.

The Project on Fair Representation ("the Project") is a public interest organization dedicated to the promotion of equal opportunity and racial harmony. The Project works to advance race-neutral principles in the areas of

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1. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than the amicus curiae, or its counsel, made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

education, public contracting, public employment, and voting. It previously has submitted briefs *amicus curiae* in voting rights litigation in cases before this Court, including in *Riley v. Kennedy*, 533 U.S. 406 (2008) and *Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder*, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).

Mr. Chen and the Project have a direct interest in this case. Where a redistricting plan creates districts with widely varying numbers of voters, it dilutes the weight of votes cast in overpopulated districts. Under all of the proposed Texas House plans, Mr. Chen's district contains approximately twice as many citizens of voting age as the district with the lowest citizen voting age population, substantially diluting the weight of his vote. The Senate plans likewise dilute the weight of Mr. Chen's vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's one-person, one-vote principle. This runs contrary to the American ideal of individual equality to which the Project is profoundly committed. For these reasons, Mr. Chen and the Project respectfully submit this brief and urge the Court to vacate the orders adopting interim redistricting plans for the Texas House and Senate.

INTRODUCTION

Although there is agreement about little else, the district court, including Judge Smith in dissent, and the parties all acknowledge that any court-imposed interim redistricting plan must comply with statutory and constitutional law. The district court concluded that it had an obligation to independently draw the maps under review here, in large measure, to assure compliance with the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") and the Fourteenth

Amendment. App. 101-104, 114, 115-120; *id.* 185-86, 190-91, 202-203 (Smith, J., dissenting). The Appellees agree. Brief for Appellees the Texas State Conference NAACP Branches, et. al. (“Texas NAACP”) 8, 13; Brief for Appellees Texas Latino Redistricting Task Force, et. al. (“TLRTF”) 29-30, 34, 35, 47; Brief for Appellees League of United Latin Citizens, et. al. (“LULAC”) 32-33. The State of Texas (“the State”) counters that the district court was instead obligated to use its legislatively enacted maps as the “interim” redistricting plan “while preclearance is pending, unless the court makes a finding that some aspect of that plan is likely to violate the VRA or the Constitution.” Brief for Appellants (“Appellants”) 30. Thus, whether *any* of the proposed redistricting maps comply with the Fourteenth Amendment is central to this appeal.

Yet neither the district court nor the parties have alerted the Court to an important question regarding the constitutionality of the Texas House and Senate interim maps: whether they violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person, one-vote principle by using total population instead of citizen voting age population (“CVAP”) to equalize voting districts. The Court previously declined to resolve this issue, *Chen v. City of Houston*, 532 U.S. 1046, 121 S. Ct. 2020 (2001), but cannot avoid it here given the posture of this case. Under governing precedent, the Court has a legal duty to ensure that a court-imposed redistricting plan fully complies with the Fourteenth Amendment. *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 421 n.19 (1977). Thus, it is irrelevant that this issue was not addressed below or raised by the parties. The Court’s interim plan presumably will be used for the 2012 election cycle. It is the Court’s duty, therefore, to make certain

the Texas House and Senate maps that it imposes are constitutional in every respect.

The Court should hold that the one-person, one-vote principle requires voting districts to be equalized based on CVAP—not total population. The premise of the one-person, one-vote principle is that “[o]nce a geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote The concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equally among those who meet the basic qualifications.” *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 557-58 (1964) (quoting *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963)). The fundamental right to an equal vote is destroyed when districts are drawn to dilute or debase the votes of certain electors. As this Court has explained, “it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable.” *Id.* at 562. “Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable.” *Id.* at 563.

Hence, CVAP—not total population—must be the chief means of equalizing districts. The two categories will coincide in many cases. But when certain voting districts have a high concentration of persons ineligible to vote, using total population dilutes the votes of electors in other districts. This case illustrates the dilutive effect of using total population as the basis for apportionment. The Texas House and Senate maps—under each of the

plans at issue here—exhibit unjustifiably wide disparities in CVAP—and thus “[w]eight[] the votes of citizens differently.” *Id.* Under the district court’s Texas House map, there is 74.89% CVAP deviation between the largest and smallest districts. The plans offered by Judge Smith and the State have a 69.91% and 73.98% CVAP deviation respectively. The CVAP deviations are similarly large with respect to each of the proposed Texas Senate plans. While exact population equality is not required, such massive deviations are *per se* unconstitutional for both court-imposed and legislatively enacted redistricting maps. *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1975); *Brown v. Thomson*, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).

Addressing this issue will have the ancillary benefit of resolving a circuit split in which all three of the lower court cases were incorrectly decided. The Ninth Circuit, over Judge Kozinski’s dissent, held that using total population was constitutionally mandated because using CVAP statistics would overpopulate districts with high concentrations of non-voters in violation of the right to petition under the First Amendment and the right of “access” to elected representatives under the Fourteenth Amendment. *Garza v. County of Los Angeles*, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1991). As Judge Kozinski persuasively explained, that conclusion finds no support in this Court’s decisions or in the theoretical roots of the one-person, one-vote principle. Under *Reynolds*, the Equal Protection Clause protects against vote dilution—not diluted access to an elected representative.

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits wisely rejected the *Garza* majority’s rationale, but likewise declined to adopt Judge Kozinski’s view. Instead, these courts held that the

choice between total population and CVAP is committed to the political process and is thus judicially unreviewable. *Daly v. Hunt*, 93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996); *Chen v. City of Houston*, 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000). Because this is a court-drawn map, there is no “political process” to which this Court could defer. Further, while declining to attribute constitutional significance to the choice between total population and eligible voters may sound appealing, it flatly conflicts with *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1962), and the many cases resolving one-person, one-vote challenges since then. In *Baker*, the Court made clear that vote dilution challenges to legislative apportionment schemes are subject to judicial review notwithstanding the inherently political nature of the redistricting process. *Id.* Having “crossed the Rubicon,” *Branch v. Smith*, 538 U.S. 254, 278 (2003), there is no warrant for retreating to the political-question doctrine when subsidiary issues need to be resolved. So long as the Court retains the one-person, one-vote principle, it has “an obligation to explain to States and localities what it actually means.” *Chen*, 532 U.S. 1046, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT CANNOT AFFIRM THE INTERIM PLAN WITHOUT DECIDING WHETHER IT COMPLIES WITH THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE PRINCIPLE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Court-ordered state and local redistricting plans, like democratically-chosen plans, must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment. *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997); *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 26-27; *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 414; *Smith v. Cobb County Bd. of Elections and Registrations*, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1302-1303 (N.D. Ga. 2002). In particular, court-drawn plans must “ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than *de minimis* variation.” *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 26-27; *Abrams*, 521 U.S. at 98; *McDaniel v. Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130, 139 (1981). The parties to this appeal do not disagree. Appellants’ 61-62; TLRTF 35, 47; LULAC 32-33; Texas NAACP 8, 13. Nor did the district court, App. 115-116, or Judge Smith in dissent, *id.* 190-91, 202-203.

It therefore is immaterial whether a particular Fourteenth Amendment question was addressed below or whether the parties dispute it. Under no circumstance can this Court allow an unconstitutional redistricting plan to be implemented merely because it was drawn by a court or because neither party has a stake in having the map’s constitutional defect corrected. In this setting, the Court “has the authority and the duty ... to notice federal-court errors to which no exception has been taken” because failing to do so would “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 421 n.19 (citation and quotation omitted). If a court has the legal authority to draw legislative districts for state and local elections, it has the independent obligation to ensure that its maps comply with the Constitution.

Simply put, this Court cannot affirm the interim Texas House and Senate maps without first deciding the important question addressed herein: whether the district court’s reliance on “total population” as the basis for equalizing the Texas House and Senate districts comports with the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person, one-vote principle. As explained below, the answer to this question is clear: using “total population” severely dilutes the votes of millions of Texas voters and thus constitutes a flagrant denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

II. USING TOTAL POPULATION STATISTICS TO REAPPORTION STATE AND LOCAL VOTING DISTRICTS VIOLATES THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE PRINCIPLE.

A. The Court Has Not Decided How “Population” Should Be Measured For The Purpose of Ensuring Compliance With The One-Person, One-Vote Principle.

With regard to state and local elections, this Court has long held that “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election[.]” *Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metropolitan Kansas City, Mo.*, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970). This means

that “when members of an elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.” *Id.* As a result, “the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.” *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 568; *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 416. Although the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute population equality, *Brown*, 462 U.S. at 842, it forbids “substantial variation” from this constitutional norm, *Avery v. Midland County*, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).

While it has long been clear that state and local districts must be of roughly equal “population,” the Court has not decided how “population” should be measured. *Chen*, 532 U.S. 1046, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“We have never determined the relevant ‘population’ that States and localities must equally distribute among their districts.”). This is likely because the Court has never been squarely presented with a case in which the distribution of voting-age citizens among voting districts made a difference to the outcome of the case. See, e.g., *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1973) (noting that the use of total population may not equalize the number of voters, but nevertheless upholding a redistricting plan that used total population because voting age population deviations were only 4%); *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 416 n.13 (“The census is itself at best an approximate estimate of a State’s population at a frozen moment in time” and determining the proper population for a district is “complicated ... by the fact that proportionally more Negroes than whites are ineligible

to vote because of age," but finding that it did not need to decide the proper metric because the deviations were unconstitutionally large under any approach).

The fact that this important constitutional issue remains unresolved, however, has not escaped the Court's attention:

[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require the States to use total population figures derived from the federal census as the standard by which this substantial population equivalency is to be measured. Although total population figures were in fact the basis of comparison in [*Reynolds*] and most of the [other cases] decided that day, our discussion carefully left open the question what population was being referred to. At several points, we discussed substantial equivalence in terms of voter population or citizen population, making no distinction between the acceptability of such a test and a test based on total population.... Neither in *Reynolds v. Sims* nor in any other decision has this Court suggested that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime in the apportionment base by which their legislators are distributed and against which compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured.

Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-92 (1966).

Unlike previous cases, how “population” is defined matters here to millions of Texas voters. *Infra* at 26-31. As a consequence, this important question must be resolved before any Texas House and Senate interim redistricting plan is implemented for the 2012 election cycle.²

B. CVAP Is The Proper Basis For Determining Whether Legislative Districts Are Equally Populated For Purposes Of The One-Person, One-Vote Requirement.

1. The One-Person, One-Vote Principle Of The Fourteenth Amendment Secures The Rights Of Eligible Voters.

The District Court incorrectly assumed that total population was the proper basis for equalizing the Texas House and Senate voting districts. App. 115-116.³ But not

2. Amici’s one-person, one-vote challenge is limited to the Texas House and Senate because Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to require the apportionment of congressional districts on a total population basis. *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964). But that does not answer whether total population or eligible voter population is the proper metric for state and local elections under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 573 (finding the “federal analogy inappropriate and irrelevant to state legislative redistricting schemes”).

3. The Texas Constitution requires the use of total population as determined by the United States Census in redistricting the Texas House. Texas Const. art III, § 26. There is no parallel requirement for redistricting the Texas Senate (although, prior to 2001, it required apportionment based on the number of “qualified electors”). Texas Const. art III, § 25. It is clear, however, that

all residents of a given district are eligible to vote. The Fourteenth Amendment protects “the right of all qualified citizens to vote.” *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 554. Because that right “guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators,” *id.* at 566, “the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives,” *id.* at 567; *id.* at 568 (“[A]n individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”); *id.* at 561 (“[T]he judicial focus must be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against certain of the State’s citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote.”); *id.* at 563 (“Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable.”). The point of *Reynolds* and its progeny is clear: the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person, one-vote principle secures the rights of voters—not the population writ large. *See, e.g., Hadley*, 397 U.S. at 52, 56; *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 25; *Bd. of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris*, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989).

Importantly, then, the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a freestanding right to equally populated voting districts. “[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis,” *Reynolds*, 377

any such state-law policy must give way when in conflict with the requirements of the United States Constitution. *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 537-38 (striking down Alabama Constitution provisions apportioning one senator to each county on one-person, one-vote grounds).

U.S. at 568, in order to secure the equal-protection rights of voters, *id.* at 579 (“[T]he overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, *so that* the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.”) (emphasis added); *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 416 (“The Equal Protection Clause requires that legislative districts be of nearly equal population, *so that* each person’s vote may be given equal weight in the election of representatives.”) (emphasis added). Population equality is not an end—it is a means of protecting voters from dilution achieved through the redistricting process.

Indeed, protecting qualified voters from vote dilution is the basis for the entirety of the Court’s one-person, one-vote line of decisions. In *Baker*, which first found a legislative apportionment claim justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs were eligible voters claiming that they had been “denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of their votes.” 369 U.S. at 188 (internal quotation omitted). The Court found that the plaintiffs had standing as “voters of the State of Tennessee,” *id.* at 204, and that “voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue,” *id.* at 206.

In particular, the Court characterized the plaintiffs’ claim as arguing that the State had “effect[ed] a gross disproportion of representation to voting population. The injury which appellants assert is that this classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-à-vis voters in irrationally favored counties.”

Id. at 207-208. The vote-dilution claim was justiciable because a “citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution[.]” *Id.* at 208. It thus was the plaintiffs’ status as *voters* that afforded them Article III standing and it was their right to an undiluted *vote* under the Equal Protection Clause that made that claim justiciable. Absent those features, there is no reason to believe that the Court would have found a judicially-enforceable right to population equality in the Fourteenth Amendment.

The outcome of *Burns v. Richardson*, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), likewise depends on the understanding that the one-person, one-vote principle protects *voters*. In *Burns*, Oahu contained a large population of military personnel and other transients who were counted in the census, but were not registered to vote in Hawaii. *Id.* at 90-91. Hawaii’s redistricting plan assigned 37 of 51 state house seats to Oahu based on voter registration statistics from the 1964 general election. *Id.* at 90. Had redistricting been based on total population, Oahu would have been entitled to 40 seats. *Id.* The plan created deviations between districts of over 100% with respect to total population, but had only minor population deviations in terms of registered voters. *Id.* at 90-91 & n.18. The Court held “that the present apportionment satisfies the Equal Protection Clause,” *id.* at 93, and that using total population, in light of the high concentration of military and other transient persons on Oahu, would have been “grossly absurd and disastrous,” *id.* at 94 (quotation omitted). *Burns* can only be explained as a rejection of total population as a basis for redistricting because the total population of the Hawaiian districts did not coincide with the number of eligible voters in that state.

At base, reliance on total population as the starting point for reapportionment is plainly unconstitutional when it leads to a grossly unequal distribution of eligible voters. In many cases, the use of total population will sufficiently protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters as “eligible voters will frequently track the total population evenly.” *Chen*, 206 F.3d at 525. But where, as here, large numbers of persons ineligible to vote are concentrated in certain geographic locations, *infra* at 26-31, the use of total population cannot adequately protect the voters’ right to an equally weighted vote, *Gaffney*, 412 U.S. at 746 (“[I]f it is the weight of a person’s vote that matters, total population … may not accurately reflect that body of voters whose votes must be counted and weighed for the purposes of reapportionment, because ‘census persons’ are not voters.”).

2. Using CVAP Statistics Is The Best Means of Determining Whether Voting Districts Are Equally Populated.

Because the one-person, one-vote principle protects the rights of voters, districts must be drawn based on voter-based statistics—not federal-census total population statistics. The cases that have addressed the issue have identified voter registration statistics, *see, e.g., Burns*, 384 U.S. at 90-91, CVAP, *see, e.g., Chen*, 206 F.3d at 523-24; and voting age population, *see, e.g., Daly*, 93 F.3d at 1222; *Garza*, 918 F.2d at 773, as potential candidates. In reality, each of these metrics may be constitutionally acceptable in a particular case. In the main, however, CVAP is best suited to the task.

First, using CVAP would harmonize the one-person, one-vote inquiry with the test for evaluating vote dilution

claims under Section 2 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Under the *Gingles* test, the Court uses CVAP to determine when a constituency possesses electoral power in a particular area. See, e.g., *League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 427-28 (2006). Insisting on the use of total population for the one-person, one-vote standard (but using CVAP to evaluate vote dilution claims under Section 2) forces states and localities to choose between statutory compliance and constitutional fidelity when the two are irreconcilable. Indeed, that might be the result here if the Court were to uphold the court-imposed Texas House and Senate plans in this case, which were supposedly drawn to comply with Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, App. 117-120.⁴ The Court has always avoided this type of confrontation if at all possible. See, e.g., *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 922-23 (1995); *Ricci v. DeStefano*, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674-76 (2009). It should do so here.

4. Failing to harmonize the constitutional and statutory inquiries also makes the uneven distribution of voters throughout the State subject to manipulation and gamesmanship, as TLRTF's brief illustrates. In one place, TLRTF relies on the decrease in Anglo CVAP and the increase in Hispanic CVAP to argue that more Hispanic districts were needed in a particular area, TLRTF 7-8. Elsewhere, however, its argument is premised on Latino *total population* growth along the Mexican border, *id.* 11-12, and in another place it argues that "Latino voting age population" is the justification for the creation of certain favored districts, *id.* 31-32. And in arguing about Hispanic voting power, TLRTF cites "Spanish-surnamed voter registration" and "Latino registered voters," *id.* at 10-11, 50, rather than CVAP or total population. In the end, of course, TLRTF argues that the court-drawn Texas House and Senate plans in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment simply because the total population deviation between districts is acceptable. *Id.* at 48. The Court should avoid a legal regime where parties are able to rely on any particular statistic they find useful to make their case.

Second, CVAP is a figure readily available from the census itself (or the American Community Survey in conjunction with the census) and in nearly every instance will accurately track the population of potentially eligible voters. CVAP, by and large, resolves the issues with uneven distribution of the two largest groups who are generally ineligible to vote: (1) persons under 18; and (2) non-citizens. There are a few circumstances where CVAP will not track potentially eligible voters, such as where there are large groups of transients who have not met the jurisdiction's residency requirement, large groups of felons or prison populations ineligible to vote, or where a local jurisdiction has extended the right to vote to non-citizens or persons under 18. But situations in which these groups are unevenly distributed across the CVAP population will be few and far between, and can be addressed by using more specific demographic studies in those particular states and localities.

Third, and last, CVAP is superior to other metrics for tracking voters. As this Court has noted, the use of actual numbers of registered voters or voter turnout is problematic because it susceptible to manipulation and, in any event, can fluctuate from election to election depending on the issues at stake, candidates on the ballot, "or even weather conditions." *Burns*, 384 at 92-93. Simply put, the number of actual or registered voters often falls short of the number of individuals eligible to vote. And use of voting age population alone does not account for citizenship, which, as this case aptly illustrates, is a key indicator of voter eligibility.

In sum, the one-person, one-vote principle exists to protect those eligible to vote from having their vote diluted or debased. That fundamental constitutional right

is clearly violated when state and local voting districts include vastly unequal numbers of eligible voters. The only way to solve the problem is to mandate the use of voter-based statistics in the state and local redistricting process. And as this Court's experience with Section 2 of the VRA demonstrates, CVAP is generally the best tool for measuring eligible voters.

C. The Lower Court Decisions Deciding This Issue Are Flawed And Depend On Legal Theories Inapplicable To Court-Imposed Apportionment Plans.

Although this Court has not considered the issue, several lower courts have addressed it. *Garza*, 918 F.2d 763; *Daly*, 93 F.3d 1212; *Chen*, 206 F.3d 502. Not only are these cases wrongly decided, but they illustrate the danger in leaving the issue unresolved.

In *Garza*, the plaintiffs claimed the apportionment of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors violated Section 2 of the VRA by splintering the county's Hispanic population. 918 F.2d at 765. Siding with the plaintiffs, the district court "remedied" the problem by imposing on the County a new map that created districts with virtually equal total population, but a 39.92% deviation in CVAP. *Id.* at 773 nn.4-5. The County argued that, under *Reynolds*, CVAP—not total population—must be used to evaluate population equality because "many Hispanics in the County are noncitizens" and thus the creation of a majority-Hispanic district "unconstitutionally weight[ed] the votes of citizens in that district more heavily than those in other districts." *Id.* at 773.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the County's appeal. In its view, this Court's tacit approval of voter registration data as a satisfactory metric in *Burns* was "permissive" and the Fourteenth Amendment did not "require" state and local governments to consider the distribution of voting population for purposes of ensuring compliance with the one person, one vote principle. *Id.* at 774. According to the Ninth Circuit, because "the government should represent all the people," *Reynolds* "recognized that the people, including those who are ineligible to vote, form the basis for representative government." *Id.* The court thus held that total population was the "appropriate basis for state legislative apportionment." *Id.* Viewing the choice between total population and CVAP as mutually exclusive, the Ninth Circuit concluded that using CVAP to equalize voting districts would result in "serious population inequalities across districts," which, in turn, would result in "[r]esidents of the more populous districts [having] less access to their elected representative" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. *Id.* at 774-75. The court also concluded that using CVAP would violate the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. *Id.* at 775 ("Interference with individuals' free access to elected representatives impermissibly burdens their right to petition the government.").

Judge Kozinski's dissent thoroughly dismantled the majority opinion. As he explained, the majority not only turned *Reynolds* on its head, but enshrined into law an unsustainable conception of the Fourteenth Amendment where the right of "access" to elected representatives trumps the anti-dilution rights of eligible voters. *Id.* at 781-85 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ultimately, he found the majority's rationale "hard

to square with what the Supreme Court has said on this issue up to now.” *Id.* at 780.

As an initial matter, Judge Kozinski rejected the majority’s implicit conclusion that total population and CVAP are mutually exclusive. “In most cases, of course, the distinction between the two formulations makes no substantive difference: Absent significant demographic variations in the proportion of voting age citizens to total population, apportionment by population will assure equality of voting strength and vice versa.” *Id.* at 781. He was equally clear, however, that on occasion “the selection of an apportionment base does make a material difference.” *Id.* When that happens, both constitutional doctrine and theory suggest that CVAP must prevail. *Id.* at 784-85.

On a doctrinal level, “the name by which the Court has consistently identified this constitutional right—one person one vote—is an important clue that the Court’s primary concern is with equalizing the voting power of electors, making sure that each voter gets one vote—not two, five, or ten, or one-half.” *Id.* at 782 (internal citation omitted). “References to the personal nature of the right to vote as the bedrock on which the one person one vote principle is founded appear in the case law with monotonous regularity.” *Id.* In contrast, the Supreme Court’s “various statements in support of the principle of equal representation have been far more conditional.” *Id.* at 783. Indeed, Judge Kozinski explained, “a careful reading of the Court’s opinions suggests that equalizing total population is viewed not as an end in itself, but as a means of achieving electoral equality.” *Id.* If the rule were otherwise, he added, the Court’s decision in *Burns* would be inexplicable. *Id.* at 784.

Judge Kozinski thought, however, that “reliance on verbal formulations is not enough; we must try to distill the theory underlying the principle of one person one vote and, on the basis of that theory, select the philosophy embodied in the fourteenth amendment.” *Id.* at 781. He found that the “principle of equal representation serves important purposes” by assuring “more or less equal access to elected officials” and by potentially assuring an equal distribution of government benefits. *Id.* Were he free to choose, Judge Kozinski suggested he “might well find this argument persuasive.” *Id.* at 785.⁵

But Judge Kozinski concluded that he did not have that option because the theory “at the core of one person one vote is the principle of electoral equality, not that of equality of representation.” *Id.* at 782. As he explained, the right to vote “is an important power reserved only to certain members of society; states are not required to bestow it upon aliens, transients, short-term residents, persons convicted of crimes, or those considered too young.” *Id.* at 781 (citation omitted). The one-person, one-vote principle “assures that those eligible to vote do not suffer dilution of that important right by having their vote given less weight than that of electors in another location.” *Id.* at 782. Hence, the Fourteenth Amendment “protects a right belonging to the individual elector and the key question is whether the votes of some electors are materially undercounted because of the manner in which districts are apportioned.” *Id.*

5. Judge Kozinski was actually far too charitable to the majority’s representational “access” theory, which has no constitutional pedigree whatsoever. Scot A. Reader, *One Person, One Vote Revisited: Choosing a Population Basis to Form Political Districts*, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 521, 530-42 (1994).

Confronted with a case presenting this same choice between representational equality and electoral equality five years later, the Fourth Circuit chose neither. After thoroughly reviewing the applicable precedent, including the *Garza* majority and dissenting opinions, the Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no authority to “suggest that the principle of electoral equality is superior to the principle of representational equality.” *Daly*, 93 F.3d at 1223; *id.* at 1226-27 (“[W]hen all of the aspects of equal representation are considered as a whole, it becomes clear that representational equality is at least as important as electoral equality in a representative democracy.”). “Even if electoral equality were the paramount concern of the one person, one vote principle,” moreover, the court concluded that resolving the issue “would lead federal courts too far into the “political thicket.”” *Id.* at 1227 (quoting *Colegrove v. Green*, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Fourth Circuit held that “the decision to use an apportionment base other than total population is up to the state.” *Id.* at 1225. As North Carolina law specifically dictated that total population be used, the court found that the state had made its choice and thus had not violated the Equal Protection Clause. *Id.* at 1227.

The Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. *Chen*, 206 F.3d at 522-28. While chiding this Court for being “somewhat evasive in regard to which population must be equalized,” it found that the pertinent decisions “indicated with some clarity that the choice has political overtones that caution against judicial intrusion.” *Id.* at 524. The Fifth Circuit thought Judge Kozinski had set forth a “powerful case that the general tenor of the Court’s opinions mandates protection of the individual potential voter.” *Id.* at 525. And it “read *Burns* as compelling

rejection of the *Garza* majority view that the Equal Protection Clause mandates inclusion of aliens in the population base of electoral districts against which the equality requirements of *Reynolds* are applied.” *Id.* at 526. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless found “no justification to depart from the position of *Daly*.” *Id.* at 528. Pointing to evidence suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers “had a meaningful debate on the question, which cannot be said to have been definitively resolved,” the Fifth Circuit refused to interpret “the Equal Protection Clause to require the adoption of a particular theory of political equality.” *Id.* at 527. Like the Fourth Circuit, the court held that “the choice of population figures is a choice left to the political process.” *Id.* at 523.

This political-process approach is no more viable than the “access” theory that currently reigns in the Ninth Circuit. As an initial matter, as court-imposed redistricting plans do not arise from the “political process,” the “judicial intrusion” into the “political thicket” the Fourth and Fifth Circuits sought to avoid is inevitable. There is simply no political process to which this Court might defer. Indeed, the district court made clear that it could not defer to the State in drawing the Texas House and Senate maps, *see, e.g.*, App. 90-92, and Appellees have trumpeted this as key justification for the wholesale changes the district court has imposed, *see, e.g.*, LULAC 34-35; Texas NAACP 7, 15-19; TLRTF 35, 44-47. Thus, the reasoning of the Fourth and Fifth Circuit is inapplicable here. The Court—not the State through the political process—is choosing the population basis for the interim maps. It must decide whether the *Garza* majority or Judge Kozinski was correct.

But even setting aside the differences between court-imposed and democratically-chosen redistricting plans, the political-process rationale is still unsustainable. This question has been settled for nearly 50 years. As noted above, in *Baker* this Court held that a vote-dilution challenge by Tennessee voters to apportionment was “justiciable, and if discrimination is sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.” 369 U.S. at 209-210 (citation and internal quotations omitted); *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 556 (explaining that *Baker* held that “a claim ...challenging the constitutionality of a State’s apportionment of seats in its legislature, on the ground that the right to vote of certain citizens was effectively impaired since debased and diluted, in effect presented a justiciable controversy subject to adjudication by federal courts”).

Moreover, *Reynolds* squarely rejected the very reasoning that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits found so appealing in *Daly* and *Chen*:

We are told that the matter of apportioning representation in a state legislature is a complex and many-faceted one. We are advised that States can rationally consider factors other than population in apportioning legislative representation. We are admonished not to restrict the power of the States to impose differing views as to political philosophy on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights

demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us.

Id. at 566.

Accordingly, “[a]ny alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” *Id.* at 562; *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 416 (“The Equal Protection Clause requires that legislative districts be of nearly equal population, so that each person’s vote may be given equal weight in the election of representatives. It was recognition of that fundamental tenet that motivated judicial involvement in the first place in what had been called the ‘political thicket’ of legislative apportionment.”) (citations omitted)). This Court long ago determined that the Fourteenth Amendment includes a one-person, one-vote principle requiring States to equalize the population of voting districts, and that the judiciary has an obligation under Article III to enforce that rule notwithstanding the inherently political nature of these issues. Those seminal decisions were subject to substantial challenge at the time. *Baker*, 369 U.S. at 267-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 589-625 (Harlan, J., dissenting). If the Court is inclined to overrule them, it should do so forthrightly, not by converting subsidiary issues into unreviewable political questions. *Chen*, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“The one-person, one-vote principle may, in the end, be of little consequence if [the Court] decide[s] that each jurisdiction can choose its own measure of population.”). “[A]s long as [the Court] sustain[s] the one-person, one-vote principle, [it has] an obligation to explain to States and localities what it actually means.” *Id.*

III. THE INTERIM HOUSE AND SENATE PLANS DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE PRINCIPLE IF CVAP IS USED AS THE BASIS FOR REAPPORTIONMENT.

Using CVAP statistics reveals that all the proposed interim Texas House and Senate maps distribute electors across voting districts in a patently unequal way. The result is that the votes of voters in certain districts carry more than twice the weight of those in other districts. No interim map with such a massive disparity can withstand any level of constitutional scrutiny.

Under the court-ordered House map (H302), District 75 has the lowest CVAP with only 56,790 citizens of voting age, while District 134 has a CVAP of 132,415. There are, therefore, 2.33 citizens of voting age in District 134 for every citizen of voting age in District 75; there are 36 districts with a CVAP twice as great as District 75's. District 134 contains 33.44% more citizens of voting age than the ideal district, and there is a 76.21% CVAP deviation between the largest and smallest districts under the plan.

Judge Smith's map (H299) is hardly better. District 75 has a CVAP of 56,790, while District 134 has a CVAP of 127,300, giving District 134 2.24 citizens of voting age for every citizen of voting age in District 75; there are 35 districts with a CVAP twice as great as District 75's. District 134 contains 28.28% more citizens of voting age than the ideal district, and there is a 71.05% CVAP deviation between the largest and smallest districts under the plan. Finally, the State's map (Plan H283) places 130,995 citizens of voting age in District 134 but only

56,380 citizens of voting age in District 31, giving District 134 2.32 citizens of voting age for every one in District 31; there are 38 districts with a CVAP twice as great as District 31's. District 134 contains 32.01% more citizens of voting age than the ideal district, and there is a 75.19% CVAP deviation between the largest and smallest districts under the plan.

The problems with the various Senate maps are similarly pronounced. Under the court-ordered map (S164) and the State's map (S148), District 27 has the lowest CVAP with only 358,205 citizens of voting age, while District 3 has a CVAP of 588,210. There are, therefore, 1.64 citizens of voting age in District 3 for every citizen of voting age in District 27, and District 3 contains 22.43% more citizens of voting age than the ideal district. There is a 47.87% CVAP deviation between the largest and smallest districts under the plans.

These CVAP deviations are clearly unconstitutional. A population deviation between the largest and smallest districts (as a percentage of the ideal district) of 10% or more is *prima facie* evidence of a one-person, one-vote violation that triggers the State's obligation to set forth a compelling justification for the deviation. *Brown*, 462 at 852; see, e.g., *Gaffney*, 412 U.S. at 750-51 (concluding that a 7.83% deviation was permissible); *White v. Regester*, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973) (permitting a maximum deviation of 9.9%). But if the population discrepancy is large enough, the plan is *per se* unconstitutional. *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973) (concluding that a 16.4% discrepancy "may well approach tolerable limits" the Court was willing to accept irrespective of the State's justification).

Of course, that test applies to democratically-chosen redistricting plans. The rules are quite different for court-ordered plans as courts cannot rely on countervailing state policies as justification for population deviations. Only “*de minimis*” deviations are permitted in court-drawn maps. *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 26-27; *McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 138-39 (“[T]he Court has tolerated somewhat greater flexibility in the fashioning of legislative remedies for violation of the one-person, one-vote rule than when a federal court prepares its own remedial decree.”); *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 419-20 (“[T]he latitude in court-ordered plans for departure from the *Reynolds* standards … is considerably narrower than that accorded apportionments devised by state legislatures[.]”). In fact, the *Chapman* Court was unwilling to accept that even a 5.95% deviation between the largest and smallest districts would satisfy the *de minimis* deviation standard to which court-ordered maps are held. 420 U.S. at 25-26.⁶

Under any standard, however, there can be no doubt that the Texas House deviation of 76%, in which the votes

6. The District Court and the parties were keenly aware of this issue. The District Court explained that it was attempting to draw districts with only a *de minimis* population deviation, but nevertheless created interim maps in which even the *total population* deviation were 8.9% for the House and 8.0% for the Senate. Under *Chapman*, it is doubtful that the court-drawn maps comply with the one-person, one-vote principle even using a total population metric. The State, in drawing and enacting the House and Senate plans that are challenged in this litigation, likewise endeavored to stay within the 10% deviation threshold that it considered a safe harbor under this Court’s precedents, and it appears to have done so if *total population* is the only relevant metric.

of voters in one district carry twice the weight of voters in another district, or even the 48% deviation of the Senate plans, are *per se* unconstitutional:

[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of the State's voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable.

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562; *Morris*, 489 U.S. at 698 (“[A] citizen is . . . shortchanged if . . . he may vote for one representative and the voters in another district half the size also elect one representative.”).

Yet this is precisely what the district court’s maps (and indeed all of the proposed maps) necessarily impose. As noted above, the Court indicated in *Mahan* that a 16.4% deviation approached the constitutional limit, even where the redistricting plan was democratically chosen (unlike

in this case), and assuming that the State might have a compelling interest in drawing districts with such wide deviations. But this case exceeds the deviations found barely tolerable in *Mahan* by an order of magnitude. If the one-person, one-vote principle has any value, such deviations are clearly unconstitutional.

But even if the plan is not unconstitutional *per se*, and even if the District Court were entitled to subjugate population equality to other political goals, there can be no legitimate interest in making the votes of certain citizens worth half the votes of others. The only two policy goals that this Court has identified as possibly justifying deviations slightly larger than 9.9%—preservation of the integrity of political subdivisions and maintenance of compactness and contiguity—are clearly not driving the gross disparities present in this case. *Abate v. Mundt*, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); *Swann v. Adams*, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967); *Mahan*, 377 U.S. at 579. Rather, the disparities here are the result of unadorned attempts to do rough justice on total population and declare compliance with the Equal Protection Clause while ignoring the one-person, one-vote rights of the people who will actually be voting in the elections.

This Court has not hesitated to strike down court-drawn apportionment plans as violating the one-person, one-vote principle. In *Chapman*, for example, the Court found a deviation of 20.14% from the smallest district to the largest, and a population ratio of 1.23 to 1.00. 420 U.S. at 21-22. Because the district court failed to offer compelling reasons for these stark variations, this Court found that it would not have survived even under the more relaxed standard applied to legislative plans; hence, there was no way the district court could meet the “higher

standards” that are applied to court-drawn plans. *Id.* at 26. In *Connor*, the Court likewise rejected two court-drawn plans for the reapportionment of the Mississippi legislature, finding that the 18% population deviation violated the “fundamental tenet” that “legislative districts be of nearly equal population, so that each person’s vote may be given equal weight in the election of representatives.” 431 U.S. at 416; *id.* at 420-21 (“[T]here can be no alternative but to set aside the District Court’s decree for its failure to embody the equitable discretion necessary to effectuate the established standards of the Equal Protection Clause.”).

The Court should not hesitate in this case either. *Reynolds* and its progeny require population equalization in order to secure the equal-protection rights of the voter. And given Texas’s demographics, CVAP is the proper metric for making that determination. Under that standard, there can be no question that the court-imposed Texas House and Senate maps under review here are *per se* unconstitutional.

IV. THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER AND REMAND THIS CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

Appellees ask this Court to affirm the District Court on the ground that it “applied the correct legal standards in its crafting of the interim plans.” Texas NAACP 32. That is simply impossible. Not only has the State shown that the District Court committed a series of legal errors, but the constitutionality of the interim Texas House and Senate maps depend on the validity of using total population to equalize the voting districts. This Court thus cannot affirm the decision below without deciding

that issue. And, for the many reasons set forth above, total population is not a constitutionally acceptable basis for apportioning state and local voting districts.

The State argues that its Texas House and Senate maps should be the starting point for any interim plan and should be altered only “when necessary to remedy a likely statutory or constitutional violation.” Appellants’ 27. It also argues that, if the Court remands for further proceedings, it “should clarify that the district court cannot seek to equalize population among state legislative districts unless the population deviations in the legislatively enacted maps violate the law.” *Id.* at 32. The State is on strong legal footing with respect to both points. But that does not solve its problem. Amici have identified a “likely … constitutional violation” establishing that “the population deviations in the legislatively enacted maps violate the law.” Accordingly, the Court also cannot select the State’s maps as the “interim” plan for the 2012 election cycle if CVAP is the proper basis for equalizing state and local voting districts.

Once the Court embarks on a constitutional inquiry into any of the proposed Texas House and Senate maps before it, then, the only appropriate remedy is to vacate the district court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings. Any interim Texas House and Senate map must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment. That said, there is no question that the posture of this case makes the delay occasioned by further proceedings worrisome. Appellants’ 54-55. The State suggests that the Court may permit the use of its maps on an emergency basis until preclearance is secured. *Id.* Amici take no position on the legality of such an approach, but note that it is far superior

to affirming the District Court on the ground that there is insufficient time to correct its many errors. If there is indeed no time to redraw an interim Texas House and Senate maps that comply with the one-person, one-vote principle, it is because the District Court abandoned neutral principles of law in drawing maps that satisfied its own peculiar sense of justice and because Appellees nakedly manipulated the Section 5 preclearance process. *Id.* at 10-13, 41-42, 46-48. Remanding the matter so that the Texas House and Senate voting districts can be redrawn using CVAP would be best. But if the Court is forced to choose from one of the maps now before it on an emergency basis, it should not reward those that are chiefly responsible for this mess.

To be clear, however, because the State's maps would be implemented strictly on an "emergency" not "interim" basis, adopting this approach would require the Court to refrain from commenting on the constitutionality of the Texas House and Senate voting districts. It would simply defer resolution of the important constitutional issues at stake here until after preclearance is secured in light of the need to have some plan in place for the 2012 election cycle. Thus, if the Court finds this approach attractive, it must make abundantly clear that its decision is neither an endorsement of the legislatively enacted maps nor prejudicial to Mr. Chen's right to bring a one-person, one-vote challenge based on the use of total population to equalize voting districts once preclearance is secured and statutory and constitutional challenges to the precleared maps ensue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the orders entered in the captioned appeals should be vacated, and the matter remanded, to allow the district court to draw new interim Texas House and Senate districts that comply with the Equal Protection Clause.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM S. CONSOVOY
Counsel of Record
THOMAS R. McCARTHY
BRENDAN J. MORRISSEY
WILEY REIN LLP
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW SUPREME COURT CLINIC
1776 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 719-7000
wconsvoy@wileyrein.com

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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**American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data**

HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH302

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

2010 Census			Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error												
District	Total	CVAP	Hispanic CVAP			Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)						Not Hispanic or Latino			
			% CVAP	% Hispanic	% Black Alone + White Indian	% Black	% Black + White	% White Alone	% American Indian	% Asian Alone	% Hawaiian Alone	% Native + White	% American Indian	% Asian + White	% 2 or More Other
1	165,823	125,927	120,660 ($\pm 2,890$)	3.1 (± 0.9)	5.5 (± 0.7)	6.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	86.0 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
2	173,869	130,806	119,950 ($\pm 2,981$)	3.1 (± 0.9)	5.5 (± 0.7)	6.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	83.4 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 0.6)	1.9 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)
3	170,974	120,035	104,545 ($\pm 2,216$)	8.2 (± 0.8)	4.8 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	9.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)
4	165,345	121,168	107,905 ($\pm 2,689$)	6.4 (± 0.8)	5.2 (± 1.0)	12.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	80.4 (± 3.4)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
5	160,061	119,871	107,160 ($\pm 3,407$)	5.8 (± 0.8)	6.0 (± 0.9)	19.9 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	72.6 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
6	160,200	119,452	102,730 ($\pm 2,549$)	6.0 (± 0.9)	17.8 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	76.5 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
7	161,039	120,296	107,240 ($\pm 3,065$)	3.9 (± 0.7)	18.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)	76.6 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
8	161,098	123,550	113,660 ($\pm 3,281$)	8.8 (± 0.9)	19.6 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)	71.8 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
9	166,719	125,947	108,475 ($\pm 2,997$)	2.5 (± 1.0)	8.8 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.7 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
10	166,147	119,413	107,620 ($\pm 2,428$)	12.8 (± 1.0)	17.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.3 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
11	168,699	128,086	111,890 ($\pm 3,219$)	5.7 (± 0.8)	17.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	74.5 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
12	164,418	124,630	111,875 ($\pm 2,779$)	7.2 (± 1.0)	10.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	73.6 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
13	166,395	128,361	117,150 ($\pm 2,591$)	13.4 (± 1.0)	10.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	72.7 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.9)
14	162,621	131,036	103,475 ($\pm 2,991$)	14.1 (± 1.0)	4.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	84.1 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.8)	1.6 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.9)
15	166,182	122,026	101,315 ($\pm 2,362$)	8.1 (± 0.8)	8.8 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	84.1 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
16	165,766	119,264	95,380 ($\pm 2,741$)	10.9 (± 1.1)	5.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	81.8 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.9 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
17	165,843	122,575	109,355 ($\pm 3,381$)	23.1 (± 1.4)	9.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	66.0 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
18	169,888	132,877	124,465 ($\pm 2,849$)	3.7 (± 0.8)	18.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	72.3 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)
19	171,969	131,682	124,465 ($\pm 2,849$)	3.7 (± 0.8)	12.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	82.6 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)
20	163,485	124,125	105,180 ($\pm 2,648$)	11.4 (± 1.1)	3.5 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	83.5 (± 0.8)	0.5 (± 0.9)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)
21	167,481	126,815	123,780 ($\pm 2,733$)	4.8 (± 0.8)	8.8 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	84.1 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 1.1)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
22	166,629	126,390	106,745 ($\pm 3,397$)	8.2 (± 1.0)	6.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	38.8 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.3)	1.8 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
23	165,435	123,531	115,770 ($\pm 2,837$)	16.6 (± 1.1)	20.3 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	72.3 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.2)	1.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
24	162,970	118,696	98,615 ($\pm 2,321$)	11.3 (± 1.0)	7.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	77.5 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.0)	2.6 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)
25	174,922	129,637	116,795 ($\pm 2,903$)	20.8 (± 1.1)	12.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	64.7 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.2)	1.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)
26	163,669	117,096	84,720 ($\pm 2,547$)	14.5 (± 1.3)	15.6 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	45.3 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.0)	23.8 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)
27	165,609	116,001	93,685 ($\pm 2,773$)	15.2 (± 1.2)	43.9 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	31.9 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.0)	7.8 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
28	163,917	112,336	75,835 ($\pm 2,298$)	19.9 (± 1.6)	11.2 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	61.7 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.0)	6.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
29	174,946	123,575	100,500 ($\pm 2,364$)	17.4 (± 1.3)	10.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	65.8 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.0)	5.8 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)
30	163,877	117,603	97,155 ($\pm 2,589$)	19.4 (± 1.4)	12.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	62.7 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	5.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
31	162,969	103,520	93,155 ($\pm 2,369$)	9.3 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	60.5 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)
32	168,151	127,641	117,515 ($\pm 2,921$)	30.7 (± 1.3)	4.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	62.8 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.7 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
33	167,625	123,640	106,115 ($\pm 2,797$)	59.5 (± 1.6)	3.5 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	35.5 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.7 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
34	167,840	122,659	109,515 ($\pm 2,795$)	59.3 (± 1.6)	4.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	34.4 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	1.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.

The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

Black = Non-Hispanic Black

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH302

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error										Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)		
Not Hispanic or Latino				Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)								
Hispanic CVAP		CVAP		% Hispanic	% Black + American Indian			% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian Alone	% American Indian + White	% Asian + White	% Remainder 2 or More Other
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic	% Black Alone	% Black + White	Indian	% White Alone	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian Alone	% American Indian + White	% Asian + White
35	168,627	109,154	66,830 ($\pm 2,321$)	78.9 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	20.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
36	168,963	110,963	63,135 ($\pm 2,263$)	86.0 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	12.7 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)
37	169,088	113,454	74,465 ($\pm 2,215$)	81.5 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	17.5 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)
38	168,214	110,865	79,695 ($\pm 2,367$)	80.2 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.4)	18.2 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.8 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
39	168,559	110,751	70,595 ($\pm 2,484$)	78.9 (± 1.6)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	20.0 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.5)	0.4 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)
40	168,662	108,086	70,095 ($\pm 2,602$)	88.4 (± 1.4)	1.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	9.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
41	168,776	115,033	84,005 ($\pm 2,727$)	75.7 (± 1.8)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	21.8 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
42	162,321	108,129	77,740 ($\pm 2,238$)	91.4 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	7.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)
43	171,411	124,591	117,450 ($\pm 2,246$)	62.3 (± 1.4)	2.1 (± 2.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	34.7 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.2)
44	174,451	126,713	105,630 ($\pm 2,380$)	29.7 (± 1.5)	4.8 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	63.2 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	1.0 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
45	167,604	126,549	109,060 ($\pm 3,158$)	25.5 (± 1.5)	4.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	68.4 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 0.8)	1.0 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)
46	170,822	122,549	83,425 ($\pm 2,615$)	23.9 (± 1.7)	28.7 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)	41.9 (± 1.5)	0.6 (± 1.3)	3.7 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)
47	171,116	125,325	109,295 ($\pm 2,202$)	12.9 (± 1.0)	2.0 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	79.9 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.7)	3.4 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.8)
48	170,732	132,767	116,325 ($\pm 2,222$)	17.0 (± 1.0)	2.3 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.9 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 1.0)	2.7 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.0)
49	170,321	145,071	118,895 ($\pm 3,893$)	14.9 (± 1.1)	4.6 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	75.1 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 1.2)	3.7 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)
50	170,943	128,740	107,965 ($\pm 2,966$)	17.1 (± 1.2)	9.8 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 0.9)	65.5 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.9)	6.0 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 0.9)
51	170,332	124,577	83,165 ($\pm 2,597$)	44.1 (± 1.8)	12.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	40.2 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.3)	1.9 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
52	163,674	112,729	93,765 ($\pm 2,489$)	18.5 (± 1.4)	9.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	68.0 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 0.9)	2.5 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.9)
53	162,897	127,381	115,000 ($\pm 2,758$)	23.1 (± 1.2)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	74.2 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
54	165,145	115,049	96,230 ($\pm 2,671$)	17.8 (± 1.3)	28.8 (± 1.6)	0.8 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	46.3 (± 1.3)	0.8 (± 1.0)	3.1 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.0)
55	164,767	121,870	102,895 ($\pm 2,849$)	13.0 (± 1.1)	10.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	74.4 (± 0.6)	0.4 (± 1.1)	1.2 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
56	162,301	121,546	110,125 ($\pm 2,739$)	14.4 (± 1.0)	11.8 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	71.1 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	1.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
57	162,707	121,864	102,950 ($\pm 2,587$)	9.6 (± 0.9)	19.3 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	69.5 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)
58	169,146	123,826	115,500 ($\pm 2,749$)	8.7 (± 0.9)	3.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	86.0 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)
59	163,609	122,193	113,535 ($\pm 3,171$)	11.5 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.2 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
60	169,500	130,018	122,050 ($\pm 2,568$)	12.5 (± 0.9)	4.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	81.7 (± 0.7)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)
61	168,109	127,379	115,010 ($\pm 2,870$)	5.7 (± 0.7)	1.9 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	90.6 (± 0.7)	0.6 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 0.9)
62	160,023	122,203	113,650 ($\pm 2,711$)	4.2 (± 0.9)	6.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	86.9 (± 0.7)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)
63	166,139	115,765	97,100 ($\pm 2,348$)	8.3 (± 1.0)	4.8 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.8)	83.2 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.6)	2.3 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.7)
64	165,891	126,950	115,860 ($\pm 3,766$)	9.9 (± 0.9)	8.0 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.9)	78.1 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 0.9)	1.6 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)
65	165,742	124,977	104,365 ($\pm 2,714$)	9.8 (± 1.1)	10.9 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	70.6 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 0.8)	6.9 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.9)
66	172,696	131,434	116,110 ($\pm 2,429$)	5.8 (± 0.8)	8.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	74.9 (± 1.0)	0.7 (± 0.9)	9.7 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
67	172,517	126,146	108,605 ($\pm 2,289$)	8.4 (± 0.9)	6.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.2 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.0)	7.8 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
68	169,389	127,914	119,190 ($\pm 2,456$)	6.4 (± 0.8)	2.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	89.4 (± 0.5)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis. The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total. Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level. Black = Non-Hispanic Black.

**American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data**

HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH302

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error														
2010 Census			Not Hispanic or Latino											
District	Total	VAP	Hispanic CVAP			Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)			% Native Indian			% American Indian + White		
			% Hispanic	CVAP	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black Indian	% White Alone	% American Indian	% Asian Alone	% Hawaiian	% Asian + White	% Asian	% Remainder 2 or More Other
69	168,035	128,549	119,090 ($\pm 2,440$)	12,0 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.3)	74.2 (± 0.8)		0.7 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.7 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	
70	171,950	116,187	89,070 ($\pm 2,125$)	10.1 (± 1.1)	9.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.8)	75.7 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.6)	3.3 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.8)	0.4 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.7)	
71	167,617	126,392	117,715 ($\pm 2,670$)	18.7 (± 1.1)	5.9 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	73.1 (± 0.8)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.9 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)	
72	169,381	130,485	113,700 ($\pm 2,714$)	27.7 (± 1.3)	4.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	65.9 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	
73	166,719	127,882	115,665 ($\pm 2,883$)	16.6 (± 1.1)	1.2 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	80.6 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.8)	0.6 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.9)	
74	162,357	115,236	86,210 ($\pm 2,524$)	69.4 (± 1.5)	1.5 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	27.2 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.6 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	
75	160,080	103,934	56,790 ($\pm 1,924$)	89.0 (± 1.2)	1.3 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	8.1 (± 1.1)	0.7 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.2)	
76	160,095	116,574	90,595 ($\pm 2,811$)	83.1 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.5)	12.8 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.5)	62.8 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	
77	160,208	116,123	86,859 ($\pm 2,290$)	65.5 (± 1.5)	4.2 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.7)	27.1 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.6)	
78	160,181	113,117	80,340 ($\pm 2,123$)	64.0 (± 1.7)	3.8 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	29.3 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.3)	1.4 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	
79	160,083	110,586	81,405 ($\pm 2,228$)	75.9 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	18.8 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	
80	164,484	121,505	111,170 ($\pm 3,143$)	58.6 (± 1.6)	5.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	34.9 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	
81	169,684	120,535	101,715 ($\pm 2,406$)	39.0 (± 1.5)	3.8 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	54.8 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.4)	0.8 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	
82	163,234	118,623	101,635 ($\pm 2,426$)	28.6 (± 1.4)	6.9 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	62.5 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.4)	0.8 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	
83	167,834	122,712	104,715 ($\pm 2,338$)	25.9 (± 1.2)	4.3 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	68.2 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	
84	167,504	128,526	118,935 ($\pm 3,143$)	8.0 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	61.8 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	
85	167,078	120,217	105,565 ($\pm 2,554$)	28.4 (± 1.1)	4.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	65.1 (± 1.5)	0.5 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	
86	165,183	121,555	106,320 ($\pm 2,394$)	16.5 (± 1.0)	2.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	79.2 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.7 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	
87	168,161	120,765	105,930 ($\pm 2,488$)	22.4 (± 1.3)	7.8 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.4)	66.4 (± 0.9)	0.9 (± 1.1)	1.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	
88	164,842	112,662	75,815 ($\pm 2,193$)	8.7 (± 1.1)	6.6 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.8)	80.7 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 0.6)	2.6 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.8)	
89	172,541	118,092	88,495 ($\pm 2,259$)	8.2 (± 0.9)	7.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	76.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.8)	-6.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.8)	
90	164,567	112,975	72,680 ($\pm 2,400$)	45.4 (± 1.9)	14.6 (± 1.9)	0.0 (± 2.2)	0.0 (± 2.2)	37.9 (± 1.6)	0.4 (± 2.1)	1.3 (± 2.0)	0.0 (± 2.2)	0.3 (± 2.1)	0.1 (± 2.2)	
91	165,088	122,340	106,325 ($\pm 2,163$)	12.3 (± 1.0)	7.2 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	74.8 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.0)	3.6 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.8 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	
92	164,800	128,064	114,700 ($\pm 2,756$)	9.2 (± 0.8)	8.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	77.0 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	3.6 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	
93	164,126	111,206	76,640 ($\pm 2,227$)	28.8 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	44.7 (± 1.4)	0.6 (± 1.1)	6.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	
94	164,463	122,550	105,100 ($\pm 2,463$)	12.2 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	68.6 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.1)	4.8 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.8 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.2)	
95	164,467	114,202	87,800 ($\pm 2,467$)	12.9 (± 1.2)	5.52 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.6)	29.5 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.6)	1.3 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	
96	163,924	115,342	91,475 ($\pm 2,014$)	9.6 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	73.5 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 0.7)	2.4 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.9)	
97	164,518	126,501	114,445 ($\pm 2,393$)	10.8 (± 1.0)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	74.0 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.0)	2.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	
98	164,082	114,897	103,035 ($\pm 2,065$)	2.7 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	86.1 (± 0.7)	0.4 (± 0.9)	2.9 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	
99	164,791	122,214	103,935 ($\pm 2,952$)	13.9 (± 1.2)	5.9 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	77.1 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.2)	1.6 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	
100	168,904	117,729	86,975 ($\pm 2,645$)	26.6 (± 1.9)	51.9 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.2 (± 1.7)	19.3 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.7)	0.5 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.7)	
101	164,208	111,682	83,860 ($\pm 2,660$)	13.0 (± 1.1)	7.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	74.0 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 0.7)	4.3 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.8)	
102	169,171	127,508	103,390 ($\pm 2,484$)	12.0 (± 1.3)	8.8 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.4)	70.8 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.2)	6.5 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.4)	

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.

The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

Black = Non-Hispanic Black

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
 Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH302

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error									
		Hispanic CVAP		% Hispanic		Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)		Not Hispanic or Latino	
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic	CVA P	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% White Indian Alone	% Asian Alone
103	169,261	117,014	64,260 ($\pm 2,267$)	46.3 (± 2.2)	9.6 (± 2.0)	0.0 (± 2.3)	0.1 (± 2.3)	39.7 (± 1.5)	2.6 (± 2.0)
104	169,214	113,506	55,6 (± 2.0)	72,565 ($\pm 2,345$)	13.3 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.9)	0.0 (± 1.9)	28.6 (± 1.9)	0.5 (± 1.7)
105	169,235	122,239	87,545 ($\pm 2,228$)	23.8 (± 1.4)	14.5 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	55.8 (± 1.5)	0.5 (± 1.5)
106	163,027	115,407	96,175 ($\pm 2,475$)	13.0 (± 1.1)	4.5 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	77.1 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 0.7)
107	169,477	120,258	96,150 ($\pm 3,231$)	17.6 (± 1.4)	34.1 (± 1.7)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	43.9 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.3)
108	169,385	139,672	121,920 ($\pm 2,695$)	13.8 (± 1.2)	7.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.3)	74.0 (± 0.8)	2.2 (± 1.1)
109	169,212	118,388	100,805 ($\pm 2,706$)	11.9 (± 1.2)	51.1 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	33.4 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.0)
110	169,550	116,845	92,645 ($\pm 2,590$)	14.7 (± 1.4)	53.3 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.5)	30.4 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.4)
111	168,783	120,306	102,160 ($\pm 2,728$)	16.4 (± 1.4)	51.0 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	29.9 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
112	169,016	120,088	91,670 ($\pm 2,413$)	15.1 (± 1.3)	12.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.2)	61.8 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)
113	168,858	121,133	96,583 ($\pm 2,449$)	15.5 (± 1.3)	16.6 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.3)	62.0 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)
114	169,192	129,846	121,230 ($\pm 2,730$)	9.3 (± 1.1)	9.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	78.3 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 1.1)
115	168,791	129,290	97,930 ($\pm 2,265$)	12.8 (± 1.2)	11.4 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	66.4 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.1)
116	171,441	132,793	113,690 ($\pm 2,714$)	56.8 (± 1.5)	4.8 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	35.4 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)
117	171,478	118,741	79,660 ($\pm 2,942$)	62.0 (± 1.6)	6.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	29.8 (± 1.8)	0.3 (± 1.0)
118	171,805	122,702	99,915 ($\pm 2,927$)	64.6 (± 1.9)	2.9 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	30.6 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.3)
119	171,819	123,502	109,090 ($\pm 3,035$)	58.1 (± 1.6)	8.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	31.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)
120	171,299	121,148	93,790 ($\pm 2,735$)	35.7 (± 1.5)	29.0 (± 1.5)	0.4 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	31.4 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.5)
121	171,336	131,448	120,475 ($\pm 2,783$)	25.9 (± 1.3)	4.5 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	66.4 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.0)
122	172,009	95,335 ($\pm 2,034$)	33.1 (± 1.3)	3.1 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.8)	69.2 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.7)	3.2 (± 0.7)
123	171,122	132,419	116,460 ($\pm 3,169$)	61.0 (± 1.6)	4.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	33.2 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)
124	171,675	118,602	100,345 ($\pm 2,617$)	62.5 (± 1.7)	8.8 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	25.2 (± 1.1)	0.8 (± 0.9)
125	171,504	123,123	102,750 ($\pm 2,871$)	63.8 (± 1.3)	5.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	28.5 (± 2.0)	0.2 (± 1.3)
126	170,355	126,868	96,945 ($\pm 2,358$)	12.3 (± 1.1)	9.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	70.3 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 1.0)
127	169,083	120,292	112,695 ($\pm 2,474$)	11.1 (± 0.9)	8.6 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	77.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)
128	169,696	122,929	108,095 ($\pm 2,473$)	19.6 (± 1.1)	7.9 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	69.6 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)
129	171,447	128,510	111,455 ($\pm 2,535$)	14.1 (± 1.1)	6.8 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	70.3 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.0)
130	169,277	115,929	90,850 ($\pm 2,044$)	13.8 (± 1.1)	9.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	71.8 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.6)
131	170,771	118,979	82,290 ($\pm 2,697$)	20.0 (± 1.7)	54.6 (± 1.8)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	6.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)
132	171,811	116,576	78,070 ($\pm 1,895$)	20.0 (± 1.5)	10.3 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.8)	63.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.8)
133	171,746	137,113	118,795 ($\pm 2,653$)	9.8 (± 1.0)	7.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.8 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 1.1)
134	171,094	141,384	132,415 ($\pm 3,004$)	12.1 (± 0.9)	3.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	79.1 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 0.8)
135	171,315	125,036	94,365 ($\pm 2,415$)	22.4 (± 1.5)	13.4 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	8.2 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 0.9)
136	167,003	121,026	95,950 ($\pm 2,657$)	7.4 (± 0.9)	9.6 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	80.8 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.8)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.

The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

Black = Non-Hispanic; Black

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
 Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH302

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

2010 Census			Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)											
District	Total	CVAP	Not Hispanic or Latino			Hispanic			CVAP					
			% CVAP	% Hispanic	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black + American Indian	% White Alone	% American Indian	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian	% American Indian		
137	171,186	126,442	75,465 ($\pm 2,590$)	20.7 (± 1.6)	32.0 (± 2.1)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	34.4 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.4)	12.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)
138	171,632	121,090	80,065 ($\pm 2,345$)	23.3 (± 1.5)	12.9 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	55.9 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.0)	6.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)
139	170,711	118,349	85,645 ($\pm 2,606$)	19.5 (± 1.4)	54.4 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	20.4 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	4.9 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
140	170,679	112,582	65,545 ($\pm 2,311$)	50.8 (± 2.3)	25.2 (± 1.9)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.7)	20.5 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.6)	3.3 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.7)
141	170,952	119,460	86,620 ($\pm 2,144$)	16.2 (± 1.2)	50.4 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	29.9 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.2)	1.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)
142	170,597	118,538	84,420 ($\pm 2,467$)	25.0 (± 1.6)	52.4 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	20.6 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.3)	1.3 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)
143	169,126	112,892	76,950 ($\pm 2,638$)	54.5 (± 2.0)	11.1 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.8)	33.2 (± 1.7)	0.6 (± 1.7)	0.4 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.8)	0.2 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)
144	170,004	114,456	76,365 ($\pm 2,458$)	52.8 (± 1.8)	9.4 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	34.4 (± 1.7)	0.4 (± 1.6)	2.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.7 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)
145	169,251	118,781	84,985 ($\pm 2,665$)	53.0 (± 2.0)	15.6 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	26.6 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.4)	4.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)
146	169,971	122,042	81,625 ($\pm 2,425$)	55.3 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.5)	24.4 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	37.4 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)
147	169,724	139,969	113,330 ($\pm 4,525$)	12.5 (± 1.0)	51.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	30.8 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.3)	4.8 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)
148	169,642	119,705	79,870 ($\pm 2,664$)	10.7 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.5)	2.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.7)
149	171,075	125,586	91,320 ($\pm 3,195$)	16.8 (± 1.3)	27.4 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	35.8 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.6)	2.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.7)
150	171,314	120,116	86,225 ($\pm 2,130$)	12.1 (± 1.0)	9.5 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	73.8 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.8)	3.7 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis. The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

Black :: Non-Hispanic Black

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American Community Survey Special Tabulation Using Census and American Community Survey Data

HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH299

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

2010 Census		Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)										Non Hispanic or Latino									
		Hispanic CVAP		% Hispanic		% Black Alone		% Black + White		% Black Indian		% White Alone		% American Indian		% Native Hawaiian		% American Indian + White		% Asian + White	
1	165,823	125,927	10,660 ($\pm 2,890$)	3.1 (± 0.9)	17.8 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.2)	76.5 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
2	173,869	130,806	11,950 ($\pm 2,981$)	5.5 (± 0.7)	6.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	86.0 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	
3	164,955	119,595	9,259 ($\pm 2,720$)	5.7 (± 0.8)	9.8 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	78.7 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.7 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
4	168,429	123,603	11,082 ($\pm 2,711$)	6.3 (± 0.8)	8.7 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	83.1 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)
5	160,253	120,169	10,3245 ($\pm 3,376$)	5.2 (± 0.8)	10.9 (± 2.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	82.0 (± 3.6)	0.7 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
6	160,008	119,154	10,6645 ($\pm 2,591$)	6.5 (± 0.9)	20.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	71.3 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)
7	161,039	120,296	10,7240 ($\pm 3,065$)	3.9 (± 0.7)	17.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	76.5 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
8	161,098	113,660	8.8 (± 0.9)	18.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	88.6 (± 1.2)	0.8 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)			
9	166,719	125,947	11,8475 ($\pm 2,997$)	2.5 (± 0.8)	19.6 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	76.7 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
10	163,063	116,978	10,4675 ($\pm 2,403$)	13.1 (± 1.0)	9.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.1 (± 0.8)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
11	168,659	128,086	11,1890 ($\pm 3,219$)	5.7 (± 0.8)	17.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.3 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
12	160,573	120,556	11,8440 ($\pm 2,564$)	11.8 (± 1.0)	21.4 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	65.1 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
13	170,617	131,129	117,085 ($\pm 2,640$)	9.5 (± 0.9)	10.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.8 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	
14	163,187	131,479	10,3475 ($\pm 2,991$)	14.1 (± 1.0)	10.0 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	72.7 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	1.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
15	167,349	20,450	99,910 ($\pm 2,294$)	7.4 (± 0.8)	4.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	84.9 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.8)	2.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	
16	166,647	122,271	10,0140 ($\pm 2,737$)	9.3 (± 1.0)	5.8 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	83.0 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	
17	168,753	123,037	11,2400 ($\pm 3,306$)	9.5 (± 1.2)	25.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	64.5 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	
18	169,888	132,877	11,9850 ($\pm 3,439$)	8.1 (± 1.0)	18.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	72.3 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	
19	171,969	131,682	124,465 ($\pm 2,849$)	3.7 (± 0.8)	12.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	82.6 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	
20	159,816	121,754	10,810 ($\pm 2,573$)	10.3 (± 1.0)	3.4 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	84.6 (± 0.8)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	
21	172,180	122,308	12,2140 ($\pm 2,627$)	5.2 (± 0.8)	7.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	85.1 (± 0.8)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	
22	161,930	122,897	10,8385 ($\pm 3,480$)	7.7 (± 1.1)	51.3 (± 2.1)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.4)	38.3 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.4)	1.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	
23	163,720	123,736	11,5770 ($\pm 2,837$)	16.6 (± 1.1)	20.3 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	60.7 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.2)	1.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	
24	162,685	118,491	98,6115 ($\pm 2,321$)	11.3 (± 1.0)	7.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	77.5 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.0)	2.6 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	
25	174,168	129,247	116,7950 ($\pm 2,903$)	20.8 (± 1.1)	12.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	64.7 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.2)	1.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	
26	160,091	117,247	85,9250 ($\pm 2,456$)	11.6 (± 1.1)	10.6 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	57.3 (± 1.5)	0.4 (± 1.5)	0.9 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (<math						

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH299

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error											
			Not Hispanic or Latino			Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)					
			% American			% Native			% American		
District	Total	VAP	Hispanic CVAP	% Hispanic	CVAP	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black Indian	% White Alone	% Asian Alone + White	% Remainder 2 or More Other
35	168,627	109,154	66,830 ($\pm 2,321$)	78.9 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
36	168,963	110,963	63,135 ($\pm 2,263$)	86.0 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)
37	169,088	113,454	74,465 ($\pm 2,215$)	81.5 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.2 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)
38	168,214	110,895	79,605 ($\pm 2,367$)	80.2 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.8 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
39	168,659	110,751	70,595 ($\pm 2,384$)	78.9 (± 1.8)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)
40	168,662	108,086	70,095 ($\pm 2,602$)	88.4 (± 1.4)	1.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	9.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.2)
41	168,776	115,033	84,005 ($\pm 2,727$)	75.7 (± 1.8)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	21.8 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)
42	163,560	109,169	76,870 ($\pm 2,221$)	91.3 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.4 (± 1.4)	7.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)
43	162,634	119,522	111,210 ($\pm 0,044$)	60.1 (± 1.4)	2.8 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.1)	36.0 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)
44	174,451	126,713	105,630 ($\pm 2,380$)	29.7 ($\pm .5$)	4.8 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	63.2 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
45	167,604	126,549	109,060 ($\pm 2,158$)	25.5 (± 1.5)	4.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 0.8)	68.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 0.9)
46	166,410	118,539	81,745 ($\pm 2,659$)	24.6 (± 1.8)	2.86 (± 1.7)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	42.2 (± 1.4)	0.6 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.3)
47	175,314	127,689	116,795 ($\pm 2,272$)	12.3 (± 0.9)	2.0 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	80.5 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.7)	3.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)
48	173,008	135,385	112,175 ($\pm 2,131$)	16.7 (± 1.0)	2.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	77.5 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.8)
49	167,309	144,371	120,915 ($\pm 3,933$)	14.3 (± 1.0)	4.7 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.1 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)
50	166,516	124,252	99,900 ($\pm 2,841$)	17.7 (± 1.3)	10.8 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	63.5 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.0)	6.4 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 1.0)
51	175,709	128,793	86,740 ($\pm 2,646$)	44.0 (± 1.8)	1.23 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	40.5 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.3)	1.9 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)
52	165,994	114,146	95,865 ($\pm 2,515$)	19.6 (± 1.5)	9.6 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	66.9 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 0.9)
53	162,897	127,381	115,000 ($\pm 2,758$)	23.1 (± 1.2)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	74.2 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
54	167,736	117,164	92,035 ($\pm 2,637$)	15.8 (± 1.3)	2.22 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	56.1 (± 1.3)	0.7 (± 0.9)	2.6 (± 0.8)	0.5 (± 1.0)
55	162,176	107,380	123,900 ($\pm 2,380$)	14.9 (± 1.1)	16.4 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	50.5 (± 1.1)	1.7 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)
56	163,859	123,411	112,635 ($\pm 2,760$)	12.4 (± 1.0)	10.0 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	74.9 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.0)	1.4 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)
57	164,418	124,630	111,875 ($\pm 2,779$)	7.2 (± 1.0)	17.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	74.5 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)
58	169,146	123,826	115,500 ($\pm 2,749$)	8.7 (± 0.9)	3.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	86.0 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)
59	163,609	122,193	113,535 ($\pm 3,171$)	11.4 (± 0.9)	10.5 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.2 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)
60	171,769	131,870	123,985 ($\pm 2,749$)	9.2 (± 0.9)	2.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	86.9 (± 0.5)	0.7 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)
61	176,054	130,782	117,645 ($\pm 2,911$)	6.0 (± 0.7)	2.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	89.9 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)
62	160,023	122,203	113,630 ($\pm 2,711$)	4.2 (± 0.9)	6.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	86.9 (± 0.7)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)
63	167,337	115,634	104,695 ($\pm 2,433$)	8.0 (± 0.9)	4.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.7)	83.8 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.5)	2.3 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.7)
64	167,388	129,175	113,745 ($\pm 3,750$)	10.1 (± 0.9)	8.2 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.9)	77.8 (± 1.3)	1.5 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	1.2 (± 0.7)
65	165,742	124,977	104,365 ($\pm 2,714$)	9.8 (± 1.1)	10.9 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	70.6 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)
66	162,129	130,796	114,130 ($\pm 2,415$)	6.0 (± 0.8)	7.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	74.9 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	9.7 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)
67	172,141	126,368	113,715 ($\pm 2,340$)	7.5 (± 0.8)	6.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.0 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)
68	160,508	121,547	110,960 ($\pm 2,268$)	12.8 (± 0.9)	4.5 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	80.8 (± 0.8)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.9 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.5)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.
 The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.
 Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.
 Black = Non-Hispanic Black

**American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data**

HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH299

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error.

District	2010 Census		Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)										Not Hispanic or Latino			
	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black + American Indian	% White Alone	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian	% American Indian	% Asian + White	% American + White	% Asian + White	% Remainder 2 or More Other	
69	160,087	123,063	114,910 ($\pm 2,286$)	9.7 (± 0.8)	9.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	77.8 (± 0.8)	0.7 (± 1.1)	1.5 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.8 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)		
70	172,135	117,432	85,105 ($\pm 2,152$)	10.0 (± 1.1)	8.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	78.1 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 0.7)	2.5 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)		
71	166,924	127,097	117,980 ($\pm 2,586$)	17.9 (± 1.0)	6.9 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	72.8 (± 0.8)	0.4 (± 1.2)	1.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)		
72	170,479	130,771	113,985 ($\pm 2,708$)	27.6 (± 1.3)	3.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 0.9)	66.7 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 0.9)		
73	166,719	127,882	115,665 ($\pm 2,883$)	16.6 (± 1.1)	1.2 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	80.6 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.4 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.6 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.9)		
74	162,357	115,236	86,210 ($\pm 2,524$)	69.4 (± 1.5)	1.5 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	27.2 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.5)	0.5 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.6 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)		
75	159,591	103,209	56,790 ($\pm 1,924$)	89.0 (± 1.2)	1.3 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	12.4 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.6 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.3 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)		
76	159,392	116,392	89,640 ($\pm 2,819$)	83.5 (± 3.7)	2.6 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	19.7 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.8)	1.2 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.8)	0.2 (± 1.8)	0.4 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)		
77	159,949	113,374	80,424 ($\pm 2,231$)	73.4 (± 1.4)	4.3 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)	36.9 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.1)	2.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)		
78	160,589	114,460	84,980 ($\pm 2,107$)	55.2 (± 1.7)	4.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	18.6 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)		
79	160,658	112,399	84,155 ($\pm 2,291$)	76.7 (± 1.4)	3.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	36.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)		
80	171,694	127,067	116,490 ($\pm 1,921$)	57.4 (± 1.5)	5.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	36.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)		
81	169,684	120,535	101,715 ($\pm 2,406$)	39.0 (± 1.5)	3.8 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	54.8 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	1.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)		
82	163,234	118,623	101,635 ($\pm 2,426$)	28.6 (± 1.4)	6.9 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	62.5 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.4)	0.8 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)		
83	173,918	127,906	112,005 ($\pm 2,521$)	24.9 (± 1.2)	5.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	68.5 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)		
84	167,970	128,898	118,935 ($\pm 3,143$)	28.0 (± 1.3)	8.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	61.8 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)		
85	160,182	113,433	95,395 ($\pm 2,724$)	27.5 (± 1.6)	14.2 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	52.5 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)		
86	165,183	121,555	106,320 ($\pm 2,394$)	16.5 (± 1.0)	2.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	79.2 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)		
87	174,343	125,360	110,500 ($\pm 2,516$)	21.8 (± 1.2)	7.5 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.4)	67.3 (± 0.8)	0.9 (± 1.1)	1.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)		
88	160,896	115,622	100,995 ($\pm 2,527$)	29.4 (± 1.1)	4.6 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	64.1 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.8 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)		
89	172,138	128,010	104,010 ($\pm 2,169$)	7.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	76.3 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	5.2 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.7 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.0)		
90	159,428	105,582	67,570 ($\pm 2,347$)	49.7 (± 2.0)	15.6 (± 2.0)	0.0 (± 2.3)	0.1 (± 2.3)	32.5 (± 1.6)	0.3 (± 2.3)	1.2 (± 2.4)	0.1 (± 2.3)	0.1 (± 2.3)	0.2 (± 2.3)	0.1 (± 2.3)		
91	162,838	119,048	102,550 ($\pm 2,493$)	10.9 (± 0.9)	4.2 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	79.6 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.0)	3.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)		
92	162,326	126,260	113,260 ($\pm 2,541$)	9.6 (± 0.9)	8.7 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	75.9 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	3.7 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)		
93	162,161	113,584	86,295 ($\pm 2,066$)	14.8 (± 1.2)	2.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	66.5 (± 1.0)	0.7 (± 1.0)	4.8 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)		
94	167,374	125,516	114,385 ($\pm 2,485$)	10.2 (± 1.0)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	72.9 (± 0.9)	0.6 (± 0.9)	3.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.8 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)		
95	161,634	115,752	95,555 ($\pm 2,490$)	12.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.34.7 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)		
96	164,930	113,924	85,405 ($\pm 1,942$)	10.1 (± 1.0)	6.8 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	68.4 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 0.7)	2.6 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)		
97	168,901	131,335	118,065 ($\pm 2,439$)	9.8 (± 1.1)	10.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	77.2 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 1.0)	1.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)		
98	164,081	114,953	102,560 ($\pm 2,041$)	6.7 (± 0.9)	7.7 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	86.0 (± 0.6)	0.4 (± 0.9)	3.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)		
99	170,697	125,780	102,560 ($\pm 2,953$)	14.2 (± 1.2)	6.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	76.7 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 1.1)	1.6 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)		
100	169,339	119,598	91,865 ($\pm 3,179$)	22.4 (± 1.7)	5.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	23.4 (± 1.8)	0.3 (± 1.5)	1.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.5)		
101	164,664	110,269	74,855 ($\pm 2,242$)	28.0 (± 1.8)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.3)	42.9 (± 0.5)	0.78 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)		
102	168,549	124,397	98,015 ($\pm 2,449$)	12.5 (± 1.3)	16.7 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	64.8 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 1.3)	4.8 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)		

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.

The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

Black = Non-Hispanic Black

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH299

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

2010 Census		Hispanic CVAP		% Hispanic CVAP		% Black Alone		% Black + White		% Black + American Indian		Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)		Not Hispanic or Latino		
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic	CVAP	% Black Alone	% Black	% White	% Black Alone	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian Alone	% Native Indian + White	% Asian + White	% Native Hawaiian + White	% Asian + White	% Native Hawaiian + White
103	169,261	117,014	64,260 (#2,267)	46.8 (#2.2)	9.6 (#2.0)	0.0 (#2.3)	0.1 (#2.3)	39.7 (#1.5)	0.3 (#2.2)	2.6 (#2.0)	0.0 (#2.3)	0.4 (#2.2)	0.2 (#2.3)	0.1 (#2.3)	0.1 (#1.9)	0.0 (#1.9)
104	169,214	113,506	72,565 (#2,345)	55.6 (#2.0)	13.3 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.9)	0.0 (#1.9)	28.6 (#1.5)	0.5 (#1.7)	1.2 (#1.8)	0.1 (#1.9)	0.5 (#1.8)	0.1 (#1.9)	0.1 (#1.9)	0.1 (#1.9)	0.0 (#1.9)
105	169,019	121,395	88,100 (#2,337)	24.5 (#1.5)	13.6 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.2 (#1.6)	56.3 (#1.2)	0.6 (#1.4)	4.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.4 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)
106	161,947	110,368	74,515 (#2,180)	8.8 (#1.1)	6.5 (#1.2)	0.2 (#0.8)	0.2 (#0.8)	80.1 (#1.3)	0.3 (#0.7)	2.7 (#0.7)	0.1 (#0.7)	0.7 (#0.6)	0.2 (#0.6)	0.2 (#0.6)	0.2 (#0.6)	0.2 (#0.6)
107	169,080	121,770	97,305 (#2,711)	18.4 (#1.4)	14.2 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.5)	63.4 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.4)	2.7 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.4 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)
108	169,385	139,611	122,195 (#2,692)	14.0 (#1.2)	7.4 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)	74.1 (#0.8)	0.4 (#1.3)	2.2 (#1.1)	0.8 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)
109	168,974	117,975	103,515 (#2,735)	10.4 (#1.1)	58.7 (#1.6)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.1)	28.2 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.0)	1.3 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)
110	169,060	115,920	90,395 (#2,627)	18.8 (#1.6)	51.2 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	28.1 (#1.6)	0.2 (#1.4)	1.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.5)
111	169,394	120,759	100,830 (#2,729)	16.1 (#1.4)	50.6 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	30.0 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	1.6 (#1.1)	0.4 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.2)
112	169,492	124,337	98,800 (#2,565)	13.9 (#1.3)	11.8 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.6 (#1.3)	60.8 (#1.1)	0.5 (#1.1)	10.7 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	1.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)
113	169,489	119,143	96,095 (#2,516)	14.8 (#1.4)	16.2 (#1.4)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.3 (#1.2)	63.9 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.1)	3.4 (#1.1)	0.5 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)
114	168,815	127,952	113,245 (#2,520)	10.4 (#1.2)	14.7 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)	72.3 (#0.5)	0.2 (#1.3)	1.9 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)
115	169,068	130,499	98,930 (#2,223)	12.7 (#1.1)	11.6 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	66.0 (#1.0)	0.6 (#1.1)	0.6 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)
116	171,463	132,523	113,930 (#2,731)	57.1 (#1.5)	4.8 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.1)	35.0 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.1)	1.8 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)
117	171,395	116,261	63,218 (#2,128)	63.8 (#2.1)	4.6 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	29.0 (#1.2)	1.1 (#1.1)	1.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)
118	161,851	117,706	97,635 (#3,518)	64.7 (#1.7)	3.5 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	30.3 (#1.7)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.6 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)
119	159,981	114,477	103,575 (#2,969)	58.3 (#1.6)	8.2 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	30.7 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.3)	1.2 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.3)
120	175,132	124,829	97,475 (#2,718)	34.1 (#1.5)	28.0 (#1.4)	0.2 (#1.4)	0.2 (#1.4)	34.0 (#1.5)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.2 (#1.5)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.6 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)
121	174,867	133,224	117,915 (#2,606)	26.7 (#1.3)	4.9 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.1)	35.0 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.1)	1.8 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)
122	175,184	128,725	104,985 (#2,118)	23.4 (#1.3)	3.2 (#0.7)	0.0 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.8)	40.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	1.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)
123	175,674	133,763	116,365 (#2,176)	62.3 (#1.6)	4.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)	31.7 (#1.2)	0.6 (#1.4)	0.6 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)
124	174,823	120,521	103,935 (#2,639)	62.4 (#1.6)	8.8 (#1.0)	0.3 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)	25.2 (#1.1)	0.8 (#0.9)	1.6 (#0.8)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.3 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)
125	174,549	125,158	104,260 (#3,886)	64.3 (#1.2)	5.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	28.2 (#2.0)	0.2 (#1.2)	1.3 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)
126	170,601	124,072	90,960 (#2,526)	21.2 (#1.5)	14.0 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.1)	55.2 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.1)	1.4 (#0.9)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.5 (#1.0)	0.4 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)
127	170,606	120,218	107,909 (#2,429)	13.9 (#1.1)	12.4 (#1.2)	0.0 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.8)	69.0 (#0.8)	0.2 (#0.8)	3.0 (#0.6)	0.0 (#0.8)	0.5 (#0.7)	0.3 (#0.7)	0.3 (#0.7)	0.3 (#0.7)	0.3 (#0.7)
128	170,178	121,503	102,130 (#2,572)	17.0 (#1.1)	10.0 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	70.8 (#1.1)	0.5 (#1.2)	1.2 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)
129	170,629	128,215	109,160 (#2,593)	15.4 (#1.2)	8.7 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.0)	67.9 (#1.1)	0.3 (#0.9)	6.6 (#0.8)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.4 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)
130	170,422	117,974	86,840 (#1,986)	12.6 (#1.1)	7.1 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)	74.7 (#1.1)	0.3 (#0.7)	4.4 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.6 (#0.7)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)
131	170,733	118,333	82,880 (#2,624)	23.8 (#1.8)	54.9 (#1.7)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	15.4 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)
132	170,933	115,713	80,050 (#1,933)	11.8 (#1.1)	0.2 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)	62.0 (#1.2)	0.3 (#0.8)	5.4 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.3 (#0.8)	0.2 (#0.8)	0.2 (#0.8)	0.2 (#0.8)	0.2 (#0.8)
133	170,494	134,460	118,020 (#2,510)	9.3 (#0.9)	10.7 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.0)	73.1 (#0.9)	0.2 (#1.0)	6.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.0)
134	170,062	139,411	127,300 (#2,734)	11.5 (#1.0)	4.4 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.1)	77.6 (#0.8)	0.2 (#1.1)	5.5 (#0.8)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)
135	170,017	120,016	80,970 (#2,014)	19.3 (#1.4)	12.4 (#1.2)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)	57.7 (#1.4)	0.4 (#0.8)	9.5 (#1.0)	0.3 (#0.9)	0.3 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)
136	164,376	116,361	98,445 (#2,558)	12.9 (#1.1)	4.4 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.8)	77.4 (#1.2)	0.4 (#0.7)	3.8 (#0.7)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.5 (#0.8)	0.3 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis. The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Black = Non-Hispanic Black

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH299

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

2010 Census		Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)										Net Hispanic or Latino			
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic CVAP	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black + American Indian	% White Alone	% White Indian	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian	% Asian Indian	% Asian + White	% 2 or More Other	
137	170,006	126,263	65,625 ($\pm 2,324$)	23.8 (± 1.9)	25.6 (± 2.1)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	38.2 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.6)	11.6 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	
138	170,924	123,612	88,225 ($\pm 2,574$)	20.6 (± 1.4)	10.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	62.0 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	5.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	
139	171,403	121,634	97,760 ($\pm 2,679$)	18.2 (± 1.3)	49.2 (± 1.7)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	28.3 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.1)	3.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	
140	170,730	112,528	62,255 ($\pm 2,426$)	57.1 (± 2.4)	17.7 (± 1.9)	0.0 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)	22.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.7)	3.0 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)	
141	171,201	118,046	85,025 ($\pm 3,048$)	18.9 (± 1.2)	56.2 (± 1.6)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	21.5 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.2)	1.7 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	
142	170,992	118,927	83.75 ($\pm 2,595$)	53.4 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	23.8 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.4)	1.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	
143	170,138	114,167	77,600 ($\pm 2,650$)	54.0 (± 2.0)	17.3 (± 1.9)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	26.7 (± 1.6)	0.7 (± 1.6)	1.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	
144	170,556	120,317	101,295 ($\pm 2,379$)	26.5 (± 1.3)	2.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	66.0 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.0)	3.7 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	
145	170,057	122,115	88,620 ($\pm 2,734$)	53.5 (± 1.7)	7.5 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	35.8 (± 1.4)	0.2 (± 1.5)	2.2 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.5 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	
146	170,944	127,810	97,520 ($\pm 2,851$)	11.3 (± 1.2)	53.1 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	29.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.3)	5.7 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	
147	169,570	131,129	105,560 ($\pm 4,472$)	17.8 (± 1.2)	47.0 (± 1.7)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	31.1 (± 1.9)	0.2 (± 1.3)	3.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	
148	170,364	124,909	83,645 ($\pm 2,647$)	54.5 (± 2.0)	11.3 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	32.6 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.8 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.3 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	
149	170,226	122,322	83,030 ($\pm 3,242$)	19.8 (± 1.5)	31.4 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	31.7 (± 2.4)	0.3 (± 1.0)	16.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	
150	170,673	120,930	90,615 ($\pm 2,237$)	11.0 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	73.2 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 0.9)	3.9 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.9)	

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.
The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.
Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.
Black = Non-Hispanic Black

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American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH283

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

2010 Census		Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)										Non-Hispanic or Latino				
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic CVAP	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black + American	% White Alone	% Indian Alone	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian Alone	% American Indian	% Asian Indian	% American + White	% Asian + White	% Remainder 2 or More Other
1	165,823	125,927	120,660 ($\pm 2,830$)	3.1 (± 0.9)	17.8 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.2)	76.5 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
2	173,869	130,806	119,950 ($\pm 2,981$)	5.5 (± 0.7)	6.9 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	86.0 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
3	164,955	119,595	92,595 ($\pm 2,720$)	9.7 (± 1.1)	9.8 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	78.7 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.7 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
4	168,429	123,603	110,850 ($\pm 2,711$)	6.3 (± 0.8)	8.7 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	83.1 (± 0.8)	0.6 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)
5	160,253	120,169	103,245 ($\pm 3,376$)	5.2 (± 0.8)	10.9 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	82.0 (± 3.6)	0.7 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
6	160,008	119,154	106,645 ($\pm 2,591$)	6.3 (± 0.9)	20.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	71.3 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
7	161,039	120,296	107,240 ($\pm 3,065$)	3.9 (± 0.7)	17.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	76.5 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.7 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
8	161,098	123,550	113,660 ($\pm 3,281$)	8.8 (± 0.9)	18.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	71.8 (± 2.9)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
9	166,719	125,947	118,475 ($\pm 2,997$)	2.5 (± 1.0)	19.6 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	76.7 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)
10	163,063	116,978	104,675 ($\pm 2,403$)	13.1 (± 1.0)	9.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	76.1 (± 0.8)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
11	168,699	128,086	111,890 ($\pm 3,219$)	5.7 (± 0.8)	17.4 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.3 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
12	160,573	119,556	100,440 ($\pm 2,564$)	11.8 (± 1.0)	21.4 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	65.1 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)
13	170,617	131,129	117,085 ($\pm 2,640$)	9.5 (± 0.9)	12.7 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	76.8 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)
14	163,187	131,479	103,475 ($\pm 2,991$)	14.1 (± 1.0)	10.0 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	72.7 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.0)	1.9 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
15	167,349	120,450	99,910 ($\pm 2,294$)	7.4 (± 0.8)	4.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	84.9 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.8)	2.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)
16	166,647	122,271	100,140 ($\pm 2,737$)	9.3 (± 1.0)	5.8 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	83.0 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.8 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)
17	163,480	121,295	109,290 ($\pm 3,445$)	27.0 (± 1.5)	9.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	62.2 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)
18	169,888	132,877	119,850 ($\pm 2,391$)	8.1 (± 1.0)	18.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	72.3 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
19	171,969	131,682	124,465 ($\pm 2,849$)	3.7 (± 0.8)	10.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	82.6 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)
20	159,816	121,754	100,810 ($\pm 2,573$)	3.4 (± 0.9)	3.4 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	84.6 (± 0.8)	0.4 (± 1.0)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)
21	172,180	130,308	122,140 ($\pm 2,627$)	7.4 (± 0.8)	7.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	85.1 (± 0.8)	0.5 (± 1.1)	1.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
22	161,930	122,897	108,385 ($\pm 2,480$)	7.7 (± 1.1)	51.3 (± 2.1)	0.2 (± 1.9)	0.1 (± 1.9)	38.3 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	1.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)
23	163,720	133,736	115,770 ($\pm 2,837$)	16.6 (± 1.1)	20.3 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	60.7 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.4 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)
24	162,685	181,491	98,615 ($\pm 2,321$)	11.3 (± 1.0)	7.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	77.5 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 1.0)	2.6 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)
25	174,168	129,041	116,795 ($\pm 2,903$)	20.8 (± 1.1)	12.0 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	64.7 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.2)	1.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.3)
26	160,091	117,247	85,950 ($\pm 2,456$)	11.6 (± 1.1)	10.6 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	57.3 (± 1.5)	0.4 (± 1.0)	19.6 (± 1.7)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
27	160,084 [*]	162,920	92,920 ($\pm 2,776$)	14.8 (± 1.1)	44.3 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	3.0 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.9)	9.0 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
28	160,373	167,968	68,830 ($\pm 2,086$)	15.6 (± 1.5)	14.2 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	58.9 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 0.8)	10.4 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.8)
29	175,700	124,171	100,500 ($\pm 2,364$)	17.4 (± 1.3)	10.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	65.8 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.0)	5.8 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)
30	166,022	104,729	116,955 ($\pm 2,661$)	31.8 (± 1.3)	5.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.0)	60.8 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	1.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
31	168,636	104,939	88.9 (± 1.1)	1.3 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	9.3 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.1 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.2 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)	0.0 (± 1.6)
32	167,074	126,072	107,900 ($\pm 2,899$)	44.2 (± 1.5)	4.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	49.1 (± 1.3)	0.4 (± 1.1)	1.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)
33	172,135	109,518	109,865 ($\pm 2,261$)	8.5 (± 0.8)	5.9 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.7)	81.2 (± 0.9)	0.4 (± 0.5)	2.7 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)
34	173,149	125,826	112,345 ($\pm 2,961$)	64.6 (± 1.6)	3.7 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	30.5 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.2)	0.0					

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH283

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error											
			2010 Census			Hispanic CVAP			Not Hispanic or Latino Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)		
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic	% CVAP	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% White Indian	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian Alone	% American Indian + White
35	122,482	127,314	121,925 ($\pm 3,289$)	52.5 (± 1.5)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)
36	172,005	111,643	67,940 ($\pm 2,383$)	88.7 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)
37	169,364	114,145	75,240 ($\pm 2,157$)	82.3 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.1 (± 1.8)	0.0 (± 1.8)
38	167,793	110,065	78,985 ($\pm 2,392$)	80.6 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.2 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)
39	175,383	114,761	74,275 ($\pm 2,517$)	82.4 (± 1.6)	0.4 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.5)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)
40	173,493	112,756	69,900 ($\pm 2,303$)	89.0 (± 1.3)	0.6 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.3 (± 1.4)	0.1 (± 1.4)
41	160,238	111,689	79,770 ($\pm 2,614$)	72.1 (± 1.9)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
42	160,814	107,148	78,675 ($\pm 2,262$)	91.1 (± 0.9)	1.5 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)	0.7 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.3)	0.1 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.4)
43	172,636	105,445 ($\pm 3,062$)	71.7 (± 1.6)	1.6 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
44	124,451	126,713	105,630 ($\pm 2,380$)	29.7 (± 1.5)	4.8 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	63.2 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.0)
45	167,604	126,549	109,060 ($\pm 1,158$)	25.5 (± 1.5)	4.1 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 0.9)	68.4 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 0.9)
46	166,410	118,539	81,745 ($\pm 2,659$)	24.6 (± 1.8)	28.6 (± 1.7)	0.2 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)	42.2 (± 1.4)	0.6 (± 1.3)	2.8 (± 1.3)	0.2 (± 1.3)
47	127,689	127,314	123,795 ($\pm 2,272$)	12.3 (± 0.9)	2.0 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.8)	80.5 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.7)	3.6 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.8)
48	173,008	135,585	112,175 ($\pm 2,131$)	16.7 (± 1.0)	2.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	77.5 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 1.0)	2.6 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 1.0)
49	167,309	144,371	120,915 ($\pm 2,933$)	14.3 (± 1.0)	4.7 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.1 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 1.2)	4.2 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.2)
50	166,516	124,252	99,900 ($\pm 2,841$)	17.7 (± 1.3)	10.8 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.0 (± 1.0)	63.5 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.0)	6.4 (± 0.8)	0.6 (± 0.8)
51	175,709	128,793	86,740 ($\pm 2,646$)	44.0 (± 1.8)	12.3 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.4)	40.5 (± 1.5)	0.1 (± 1.3)	1.9 (± 1.2)	0.6 (± 1.3)
52	165,994	114,146	95,865 ($\pm 2,515$)	19.6 (± 1.5)	9.6 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	66.9 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.3 (± 0.8)
53	162,897	127,381	115,000 ($\pm 2,758$)	23.1 (± 1.2)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	74.2 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
54	167,736	117,164	92,035 ($\pm 2,637$)	15.8 (± 1.3)	22.2 (± 1.6)	0.5 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	56.1 (± 1.3)	0.7 (± 0.9)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.0)
55	162,176	119,755	107,090 ($\pm 2,380$)	14.9 (± 1.1)	16.4 (± 1.2)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	64.9 (± 0.9)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.6 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)
56	163,869	123,411	112,635 ($\pm 2,760$)	14.2 (± 1.0)	10.0 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)	74.9 (± 1.0)	0.3 (± 1.0)	1.4 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 1.0)
57	164,418	124,630	111,875 ($\pm 2,779$)	7.2 (± 1.0)	17.0 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	74.5 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 1.1)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)
58	169,146	123,826	115,500 ($\pm 2,749$)	8.7 (± 0.9)	3.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	86.0 (± 0.9)	0.7 (± 1.0)	0.4 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.1)
59	163,609	122,193	113,355 ($\pm 3,171$)	11.4 (± 0.9)	10.5 (± 1.7)	0.3 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)	75.2 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 1.1)	0.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)
60	171,429	131,870	123,985 ($\pm 2,749$)	9.2 (± 0.9)	2.3 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.2)	0.1 (± 1.3)	86.9 (± 0.5)	0.7 (± 1.1)	0.2 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.2)
61	176,054	130,782	117,645 ($\pm 2,911$)	6.0 (± 0.7)	2.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.0)	89.9 (± 0.7)	0.6 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)
62	160,023	122,203	113,650 ($\pm 2,711$)	6.3 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.3)	86.9 (± 0.7)	1.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.2)	0.0 (± 1.3)
63	167,337	115,634	104,695 ($\pm 2,433$)	8.0 (± 0.9)	4.5 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.7)	83.8 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.5)	2.3 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)
64	167,588	129,175	113,745 ($\pm 3,750$)	10.1 (± 0.9)	8.2 (± 0.9)	0.2 (± 0.8)	0.3 (± 0.9)	77.8 (± 1.3)	1.5 (± 0.8)	0.0 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)
65	165,742	124,977	104,365 ($\pm 2,714$)	10.9 (± 1.2)	10.9 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 0.9)	70.6 (± 1.3)	0.3 (± 0.8)	6.9 (± 1.0)	0.2 (± 0.8)
66	172,129	130,796	114,130 ($\pm 2,415$)	6.0 (± 0.8)	7.9 (± 1.1)	0.1 (± 1.0)	0.0 (± 1.1)	74.9 (± 1.1)	0.5 (± 1.0)	9.7 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)
67	172,141	126,368	113,715 ($\pm 2,340$)	7.5 (± 0.8)	6.2 (± 1.0)	0.1 (± 1.1)	0.0 (± 1.1)	76.0 (± 1.0)	0.6 (± 1.0)	8.8 (± 0.9)	0.1 (± 1.0)
68	160,508	121,547	110,960 ($\pm 2,268$)	12.8 (± 0.9)	4.5 (± 1.2)	0.2 (± 1.4)	0.0 (± 1.5)	80.8 (± 0.8)	0.5 (± 1.3)	0.0 (± 1.5)	0.0 (± 1.5)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.

Percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Black = Non-Hispanic Black

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH283

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)														
Not Hispanic or Latino CVAP														
District	Total	VAP	Hispanic CVAP	% Hispanic	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black Indian	% White Alone	% American Indian	% Asian Alone	% Native Hawaiian	% American Indian	% Asian + White	% Remainder 2 or More Other
69	160,087	123,063	114,910 (#2,286)	9.7 (#0.8)	9.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	77.8 (#0.8)	0.7 (#1.1)	1.5 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.8 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.2)
70	172,135	117,432	85,105 (#2,132)	10.0 (#1.1)	8.2 (#1.0)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)	78.1 (#1.0)	0.4 (#0.7)	2.5 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.5 (#0.7)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)
71	166,924	127,097	117,980 (#2,586)	17.9 (#4.0)	6.9 (#4.1)	0.1 (#4.3)	0.0 (#4.3)	72.8 (#0.8)	0.4 (#1.2)	1.0 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.5 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)
72	170,479	130,771	113,985 (#2,708)	27.6 (#1.3)	3.6 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)	66.7 (#0.9)	0.5 (#1.3)	0.6 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.5 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)
73	166,719	127,882	115,665 (#2,883)	16.6 (#4.1)	1.2 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)	80.6 (#1.1)	0.2 (#0.8)	0.4 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.6 (#0.7)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)
74	162,357	115,236	86,210 (#2,524)	69.4 (#1.5)	1.5 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)	27.2 (#1.2)	0.5 (#1.5)	0.5 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.6 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)
75	159,691	103,209	56,790 (#4,192)	89.0 (#4.2)	1.3 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)	8.1 (#1.1)	0.7 (#1.3)	0.6 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)
76	159,392	89,640	89.5 (#3.7)	2.6 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)	12.4 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.5)	0.6 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.3 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)
77	159,949	113,374	80,424 (#2,231)	73.4 (#1.4)	4.3 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.8)	0.0 (#1.8)	19.7 (#1.3)	0.5 (#1.8)	1.2 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.8)	0.4 (#1.8)	0.2 (#1.8)	0.1 (#1.8)
78	160,389	114,460	84,280 (#2,107)	55.2 (#1.7)	4.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	36.9 (#1.1)	0.5 (#1.1)	2.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)
79	160,658	112,399	84,155 (#2,291)	76.7 (#1.4)	3.4 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	18.6 (#1.0)	0.3 (#1.2)	0.6 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)
80	160,085	105,502	69.175 (#2,289)	79.7 (#1.6)	0.9 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	18.8 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.5)	0.3 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)
81	169,684	120,535	101,715 (#2,406)	39.0 (#1.5)	3.8 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.5)	54.8 (#1.2)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.5 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.6 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)
82	163,234	118,623	101,635 (#2,426)	28.6 (#1.4)	6.9 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)	62.5 (#1.0)	0.5 (#1.4)	0.8 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.4 (#1.8)	0.2 (#1.8)	0.1 (#1.8)
83	173,918	127,906	120,005 (#2,521)	24.9 (#1.2)	5.1 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.3)	68.5 (#1.0)	0.3 (#1.1)	2.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)
84	167,970	128,898	118,935 (#3,143)	28.0 (#1.3)	8.0 (#1.0)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	61.8 (#1.2)	0.3 (#1.2)	0.9 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.4 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)
85	160,182	113,433	95,395 (#2,724)	27.5 (#1.6)	14.2 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.3)	52.5 (#1.1)	0.3 (#1.2)	5.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)
86	165,183	121,555	106,320 (#2,394)	16.5 (#1.0)	2.0 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	79.2 (#1.0)	0.5 (#1.1)	0.7 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.7 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)
87	174,343	125,360	100,500 (#2,516)	21.8 (#1.2)	7.5 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.4)	67.3 (#0.8)	0.9 (#1.1)	1.3 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.5 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)
88	160,896	115,622	100,995 (#2,527)	29.4 (#1.1)	4.6 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.6)	64.1 (#0.6)	0.5 (#1.4)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.8 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)
89	172,138	118,380	84,010 (#2,159)	8.9 (#1.0)	7.9 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	76.3 (#1.1)	0.4 (#0.9)	5.2 (#0.8)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.7 (#0.9)	0.3 (#0.8)	0.0 (#1.0)
90	159,428	105,582	67,570 (#2,347)	49.7 (#2.0)	15.6 (#2.0)	0.0 (#2.3)	0.1 (#2.3)	32.5 (#1.6)	0.3 (#2.3)	1.2 (#2.2)	0.1 (#2.4)	0.4 (#2.3)	0.0 (#2.4)	0.0 (#2.3)
91	162,838	119,048	102,550 (#2,493)	10.9 (#0.9)	4.2 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.1)	79.6 (#1.2)	0.5 (#1.0)	3.4 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.9 (#1.0)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)
92	162,326	126,290	113,260 (#2,541)	9.6 (#0.9)	8.7 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	75.9 (#1.0)	0.2 (#1.1)	3.7 (#0.9)	0.7 (#1.1)	0.5 (#1.0)	0.4 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)
93	162,161	113,584	86,295 (#2,466)	14.8 (#1.2)	12.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.1)	66.5 (#1.0)	0.7 (#1.0)	4.8 (#0.9)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.4 (#1.0)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)
94	167,374	125,516	114,385 (#2,485)	10.2 (#1.0)	11.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	72.9 (#0.9)	0.6 (#0.9)	3.9 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.8 (#0.9)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)
95	161,634	115,752	95,555 (#2,490)	12.9 (#1.1)	49.8 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.5)	34.7 (#1.3)	0.4 (#1.4)	1.4 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.3 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)
96	164,930	113,924	83,405 (#1,942)	10.1 (#1.0)	16.8 (#1.2)	0.4 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)	79.6 (#1.2)	0.5 (#1.0)	3.4 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.9 (#1.0)	0.3 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)
97	168,901	131,335	118,065 (#2,439)	9.8 (#1.0)	16.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	77.2 (#0.9)	0.3 (#1.0)	1.9 (#0.9)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)
98	164,081	114,953	102,560 (#2,041)	6.7 (#0.9)	2.7 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.0 (#0.9)	86.0 (#0.6)	0.4 (#0.9)	3.0 (#0.7)	0.0 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.0)
99	170,697	125,780	102,560 (#2,959)	14.2 (#1.2)	6.2 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	76.7 (#1.0)	0.7 (#1.1)	1.6 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)
100	161,143	117,479	97,560 (#3,156)	18.3 (#1.4)	45.6 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.5)	33.5 (#1.8)	0.2 (#1.5)	1.1 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.6)	0.5 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.3 (#1.5)
101	164,664	110,209	74,835 (#2,242)	19.7 (#1.6)	28.0 (#1.8)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	42.9 (#1.5)	0.4 (#1.2)	7.8 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)
102	161,136	122,520	113 (#2,579)	12.7 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.6 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.4)	68.9 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.4 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.4)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.

The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.

Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

Black = Non-Hispanic Black

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH283

2010 Census

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

District	Total	VAP	Hispanic CVAP			Non-Hispanic or Latino Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)			% Native Hawaiian			% Asian + White			% Remainder 2 or More Other		
			CVAP			CVAP			CVAP			CVAP			CVAP		
			% Hispanic	% Hispanic	% Hispanic	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black Indian	% White Alone	% White	% White Indian	% Asian Alone	% Asian Indian	Hawaiian Alone	American Indian	American Indian	% Remainder 2 or More Other
103	176,016	123,719	69,725 ($\pm 2,363$)	44,6 ($\pm 2,1$)	24,1 ($\pm 2,1$)	13,8 ($\pm 1,9$)	0,0 ($\pm 2,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 2,1$)	0,5 ($\pm 2,0$)	0,5 ($\pm 2,0$)	0,5 ($\pm 2,0$)	0,7 ($\pm 2,1$)	0,7 ($\pm 2,0$)	0,7 ($\pm 2,0$)	0,7 ($\pm 2,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 2,1$)	
104	172,784	115,035	76,975 ($\pm 2,403$)	51,7 ($\pm 2,0$)	15,9 ($\pm 1,6$)	15,9 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,8$)	1,7 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,8$)	
105	127,528	127,590	91,315 ($\pm 2,401$)	24,1 ($\pm 1,5$)	11,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,6$)	59,3 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,5 ($\pm 1,4$)	4,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,5 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,6$)	
106	161,947	110,568	74,515 ($\pm 2,80$)	8,8 ($\pm 1,1$)	6,5 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	80,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,7$)	2,7 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,7 ($\pm 0,6$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	
107	171,872	123,986	102,435 ($\pm 2,746$)	15,6 ($\pm 1,3$)	14,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	66,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	2,9 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	
108	163,233	133,667	116,660 ($\pm 2,584$)	13,6 ($\pm 1,2$)	5,8 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	76,3 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,3$)	2,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,8 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,4$)	
109	122,353	104,735	104,735 ($\pm 2,742$)	11,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	5,66 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	29,7 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	1,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	
110	167,547	111,813	83,505 ($\pm 2,708$)	24,9 ($\pm 2,0$)	55,1 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,7$)	19,1 ($\pm 1,5$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,7$)	
111	166,979	118,406	98,255 ($\pm 2,741$)	15,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	53,9 ($\pm 1,6$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	28,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	1,5 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	
112	167,051	120,192	91,465 ($\pm 2,482$)	14,8 ($\pm 1,4$)	14,4 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,3$)	59,5 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	8,5 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	1,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,3$)	
113	171,410	120,829	94,835 ($\pm 2,391$)	15,5 ($\pm 1,3$)	17,6 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	60,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,0$)	5,4 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,5 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	
114	172,330	130,817	115,205 ($\pm 2,595$)	11,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	16,6 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	69,9 ($\pm 0,6$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	1,8 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	
115	166,734	125,470	94,730 ($\pm 2,216$)	14,9 ($\pm 1,2$)	10,6 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	64,3 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,2$)	8,6 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	
116	171,463	132,823	113,950 ($\pm 2,731$)	57,1 ($\pm 1,5$)	4,8 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	35,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,1$)	1,8 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	
117	171,249	116,261	71,395 ($\pm 2,128$)	63,8 ($\pm 2,1$)	4,6 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	29,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,1$)	1,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	
118	161,851	117,706	97,635 ($\pm 3,513$)	13,7 ($\pm 1,7$)	3,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	30,3 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	
119	159,981	114,477	103,575 ($\pm 2,969$)	58,3 ($\pm 1,6$)	8,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	30,7 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	1,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	
120	175,132	124,829	97,475 ($\pm 2,718$)	34,1 ($\pm 1,5$)	28,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,4$)	34,0 ($\pm 1,5$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,4$)	2,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,5$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	
121	174,867	133,224	117,915 ($\pm 2,606$)	26,7 ($\pm 1,3$)	4,9 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	65,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	1,4 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,5 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	
122	175,184	128,725	104,985 ($\pm 2,118$)	23,4 ($\pm 1,3$)	3,2 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,8$)	69,0 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,7$)	3,0 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,5 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,7$)	
123	175,673	135,763	116,365 ($\pm 3,176$)	62,3 ($\pm 1,6$)	4,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,4$)	31,7 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	
124	174,823	120,521	103,955 ($\pm 2,639$)	62,4 ($\pm 1,6$)	8,8 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,9$)	25,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,8 ($\pm 0,9$)	1,6 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,3$)	
125	174,549	125,158	104,260 ($\pm 3,886$)	64,3 ($\pm 1,2$)	5,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,2$)	28,2 ($\pm 2,0$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	1,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,6 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,4$)	
126	169,256	123,014	90,965 ($\pm 2,409$)	17,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	13,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	61,2 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	7,3 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,3 ($\pm 1,0$)	
127	172,983	115,865	105,020 ($\pm 2,376$)	12,4 ($\pm 1,1$)	10,3 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,8$)	73,9 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,4 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,4 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	
128	168,551	120,481	101,615 ($\pm 2,510$)	19,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	10,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	68,3 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,4 ($\pm 1,2$)	1,0 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,5 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	
129	171,751	128,953	115,970 ($\pm 2,628$)	14,7 ($\pm 1,1$)	8,4 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	68,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,8$)	7,5 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,4 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,9$)	
130	175,532	122,108	93,180 ($\pm 2,140$)	11,6 ($\pm 1,0$)	6,6 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,9$)	77,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	3,6 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,5 ($\pm 0,7$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,1 ($\pm 0,8$)	
131	175,227	121,368	83,715 ($\pm 2,656$)	24,0 ($\pm 1,8$)	53,2 ($\pm 1,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	16,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	5,9 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,3$)	
132	172,973	117,666	79,145 ($\pm 1,940$)	20,6 ($\pm 1,5$)	11,8 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	61,8 ($\pm 1,2$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,8$)	4,7 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,3 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,9$)	
133	173,041	128,877	99,535 ($\pm 3,039$)	12,5 ($\pm 1,1$)	16,4 ($\pm 1,4$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	58,9 ($\pm 1,7$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	11,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,2 ($\pm 0,9$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,0$)	
134	174,421	143,575	130,995 ($\pm 3,018$)	11,0 ($\pm 0,9$)	4,2 ($\pm 1,0$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	78,3 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	5,8 ($\pm 0,8$)	0,0 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,2 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	0,1 ($\pm 1,1$)	
135	172,422	121,136	85,790 ($\pm 2,114$)														

American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data

HOUSE DISTRICTS - PLANH283

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error

Not Hispanic or Latino										Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)															
2010 Census			Hispanic CVAP		Non-Hispanic CVAP		% Black Alone		% Black + White		% White Alone		% Asian Alone		% Asian Indian		% Native Indian		% American Indian		% Asian + White		2 or More Other		
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic	CVAP	% Hispanic	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% White Alone	% Asian Alone	% Asian Indian	% Asian Indian	% Asian Alone	% Asian Indian	% Native Indian	% Native Indian	% American Indian	% Asian Indian	% Asian + White	% Asian + White	% 2 or More Other				
137	173,598	122,142	63,545 (#2,434)	36.3 (#2.0)	26.3 (#2.1)	15.7 (#1.4)	28.9 (#2.1)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)	25.8 (#1.6)	0.2 (#1.5)	17.1 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)	0.4 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	
138	173,059	124,435	85,070 (#2,571)	49.0 (#2.3)	22.3 (#1.4)	11.4 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	57.7 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.1)	7.5 (#1.0)	0.0 (#1.1)	0.4 (#1.0)	0.2 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.1)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.2)	
139	175,733	123,875	96,265 (#2,752)	50.0 (#2.3)	19.0 (#1.4)	6.0 (#1.6)	0.2 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	26.1 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.1)	4.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.1)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.8)	3.6 (#1.7)	0.0 (#1.8)	0.0 (#1.8)	0.1 (#1.8)	0.1 (#1.8)	0.0 (#1.8)	0.0 (#1.8)
140	170,732	112,332	62,670 (#2,370)	58.5 (#2.3)	15.0 (#1.8)	0.0 (#1.8)	22.7 (#2.3)	0.1 (#1.8)	61.9 (#1.5)	0.3 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	1.7 (#1.6)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	
141	166,498	113,951	81,790 (#2,991)	78.020 (#2,441)	18.2 (#1.2)	21.3 (#1.5)	55.9 (#1.9)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	21.0 (#1.6)	0.2 (#1.4)	1.3 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	
142	159,541	113,288	78,020 (#2,441)	75.260 (#2,590)	57.0 (#2.0)	15.0 (#1.9)	0.0 (#1.7)	0.0 (#1.7)	25.2 (#1.6)	0.7 (#1.6)	0.9 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.7)	0.3 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.7)	0.3 (#1.6)	0.0 (#1.7)	0.0 (#1.7)	0.5 (#1.6)	0.4 (#1.6)	0.2 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.0 (#1.5)	
143	162,482	109,560	85,235 (#2,367)	31.2 (#1.5)	5.7 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	59.5 (#1.6)	0.4 (#1.2)	2.6 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.5 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	
144	161,878	112,596	85,235 (#2,367)	6.8 (#1.7)	6.8 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	33.8 (#1.5)	0.2 (#1.6)	2.2 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.5 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.5)	
145	170,821	121,835	85,235 (#2,585)	10.0,283 (#2,916)	11.2 (#1.2)	54.0 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.3)	28.2 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.3)	5.8 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.1 (#1.3)	
146	174,485	130,444	108,940 (#4,319)	18.4 (#1.2)	47.4 (#1.4)	0.0 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	30.2 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.2)	3.3 (#1.1)	0.1 (#1.3)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.2 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.1 (#1.2)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	0.0 (#1.3)	
147	175,873	116,034	108,940 (#4,319)	86,715 (#2,739)	51.4 (#2.0)	9.4 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	37.0 (#1.3)	0.3 (#1.5)	1.2 (#1.4)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.4 (#1.5)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	0.1 (#1.6)	
148	175,324	126,854	98,445 (#2,528)	12.9 (#1.1)	4.4 (#0.8)	0.0 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	77.4 (#1.2)	0.4 (#0.7)	3.8 (#0.7)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.5 (#0.8)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.3 (#0.7)	0.1 (#0.8)	0.3 (#0.7)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.3 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	
149	164,376	116,361	98,445 (#2,528)	9.1,935 (#2,297)	12.3 (#1.0)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)	70.4 (#1.1)	0.2 (#0.9)	3.4 (#0.8)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.4 (#1.0)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.3 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	
150	168,735	120,462	9.1,935 (#2,297)	12.3 (#1.0)	12.4 (#1.2)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)	0.1 (#0.9)	70.4 (#1.1)	0.2 (#0.9)	3.4 (#0.8)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.4 (#1.0)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.3 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.2 (#0.9)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	0.1 (#1.0)	

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis. The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total. Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

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American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data

SENATE DISTRICTS - PLANS 164

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error															
2010 Census			Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)												
District	Total	VAP	CVAP			% Hispanic		% Black			% White		Not Hispanic or Latino		
			% Alone	% + White	+ American Indian	% Alone	% Indian	% Alone	% Indian	% Asian	Hawaiian	% Native Hawaiian	% American Indian	% Asian	% Remainder 2 or More Other
1	819,976	616,458	557,525 ($\pm 6,784$)	4.3 (± 0.4)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
2	808,524	582,997	549,000 ($\pm 5,744$)	11.9 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
3	843,567	641,369	588,210 ($\pm 6,683$)	5.3 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
4	815,995	597,765	565,235 ($\pm 6,007$)	8.6 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	1.4 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
5	827,039	620,718	514,350 ($\pm 6,829$)	13.0 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.4)	1.8 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
6	812,881	551,137	368,950 ($\pm 5,840$)	53.0 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.27.3 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	
7	809,277	572,446	435,445 ($\pm 4,903$)	14.9 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.67.7 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.52 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.3 (± 0.4)	0.2 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	
8	794,900	572,635	476,975 ($\pm 4,991$)	8.5 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	73.9 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
9	815,424	582,760	460,225 ($\pm 5,246$)	17.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	64.0 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.6)	4.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.6 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
10	834,267	602,461	500,380 ($\pm 5,254$)	15.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	62.7 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	2.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
11	791,770	582,677	506,755 ($\pm 5,517$)	16.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	67.5 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	3.9 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
12	814,103	582,410	480,860 ($\pm 5,742$)	10.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	77.2 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	3.3 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.7 (± 0.4)	0.3 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	
13	808,680	590,736	416,360 ($\pm 6,798$)	16.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	19.5 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	6.0 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
14	834,750	560,349	523,010 ($\pm 6,717$)	17.9 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	67.4 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	3.7 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
15	793,108	574,255	482,665 ($\pm 5,737$)	22.2 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	25.9 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	4.1 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
16	816,670	614,614	486,655 ($\pm 5,425$)	13.8 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	66.6 (± 0.4)	0.3 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	5.0 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
17	804,162	605,764	495,810 ($\pm 5,868$)	13.2 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	64.4 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	9.5 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
18	809,726	587,890	475,120 ($\pm 6,530$)	20.9 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	63.1 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.6)	3.3 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
19	800,501	556,604	447,295 ($\pm 6,244$)	9.1 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	31.5 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.9 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.4 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
20	833,339	577,950	434,520 ($\pm 6,063$)	68.2 (± 0.8)	0.25 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	27.8 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.8 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	
21	807,460	567,099	433,510 ($\pm 6,019$)	59.8 (± 0.7)	0.4 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	33.8 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.7 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	
22	830,951	614,234	556,305 ($\pm 5,988$)	10.4 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	79.0 (± 0.4)	0.5 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.6 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
23	813,969	576,192	444,510 ($\pm 6,086$)	24.0 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.7)	25.8 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	1.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.4 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.7)	
24	798,189	566,939	532,450 ($\pm 6,204$)	12.8 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	73.4 (± 0.4)	0.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.4)	
25	815,771	610,120	525,160 ($\pm 5,572$)	22.9 (± 0.6)	0.37 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	70.2 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	1.6 (± 0.3)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.2 (± 0.4)	0.2 (± 0.4)	0.2 (± 0.4)	
26	802,046	589,522	499,425 ($\pm 6,723$)	60.9 (± 0.7)	0.69 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	29.4 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	1.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
27	786,946	524,120	358,205 ($\pm 5,261$)	79.8 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	18.7 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.4 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	
28	778,341	586,926	531,960 ($\pm 5,853$)	26.7 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	65.5 (± 0.4)	0.4 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
29	816,681	561,426	404,414 ($\pm 5,172$)	74.5 (± 0.6)	3.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.7)	20.2 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	
30	813,218	605,241	520,075 ($\pm 5,977$)	7.9 (± 0.4)	5.8 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	83.4 (± 0.4)	0.7 (± 0.4)	0.9 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.8 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	
31	792,600	573,847	489,810 ($\pm 5,158$)	25.1 (± 0.6)	4.8 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.7)	67.7 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.6)	0.8 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.7 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis. The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total. Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

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American Community Survey Special Tabulation
Using Census and American Community Survey Data
SENATE DISTRICTS - PLANS148

Special Tabulation of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with Margins of Error											
Not Hispanic or Latino											
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)											
District	Total	VAP	CVAP	% Hispanic CVAP	% Black Alone	% Black + White	% Black + American Indian	% White Alone	% Indian Alone	% Asian Alone	% Asian + White
1	8,19,976	6,16,458	5,57,525 ($\pm 6,764$)	4.3 (± 0.4)	17.7 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	76.0 (± 0.4)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)
2	8,08,524	5,82,997	4,93,000 ($\pm 6,744$)	11.9 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	73.0 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	1.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)
3	843,567	641,369	588,210 ($\pm 6,683$)	5.3 (± 0.4)	13.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	80.1 (± 0.4)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)
4	815,995	597,765	506,235 ($\pm 6,007$)	8.6 (± 0.4)	15.2 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	73.7 (± 0.4)	0.3 (± 0.5)	1.4 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)
5	827,039	620,718	514,350 ($\pm 6,829$)	13.0 (± 0.5)	10.8 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	73.1 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)
6	812,881	551,137	368,950 ($\pm 5,840$)	5.30 (± 0.9)	16.7 (± 0.8)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	72.3 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.7)	2.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)
7	809,277	572,446	435,445 ($\pm 5,903$)	14.9 (± 0.5)	11.0 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	67.7 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.4)	5.2 (± 0.4)	0.2 (± 0.4)
8	794,900	572,635	476,975 ($\pm 4,999$)	8.5 (± 0.5)	8.8 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	73.9 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.4)	0.4 (± 0.4)	0.3 (± 0.5)
9	826,873	590,291	472,435 ($\pm 5,136$)	15.8 (± 0.6)	13.2 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	64.6 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)
10	836,379	608,919	510,000 ($\pm 5,611$)	13.6 (± 0.5)	12.8 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	69.5 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)
11	791,770	582,677	506,755 ($\pm 5,517$)	16.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	67.7 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)
12	796,410	565,144	451,575 ($\pm 5,630$)	12.9 (± 0.5)	6.6 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	75.5 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.4)	3.3 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)
13	808,680	590,736	416,360 ($\pm 6,798$)	16.1 (± 0.7)	57.6 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	19.5 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.6)	6.0 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)
14	834,750	640,349	523,010 ($\pm 6,777$)	17.9 (± 0.6)	9.6 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	67.4 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	3.7 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)
15	793,108	574,255	428,365 ($\pm 6,737$)	22.2 (± 0.7)	25.9 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	46.7 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.5)	4.1 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)
16	816,670	614,614	486,655 ($\pm 5,425$)	13.8 (± 0.6)	11.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	68.6 (± 0.4)	0.3 (± 0.6)	5.0 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)
17	804,162	605,764	495,810 ($\pm 5,868$)	13.2 (± 0.5)	11.9 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	64.4 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	9.5 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)
18	809,726	587,890	475,120 ($\pm 5,630$)	20.9 (± 0.6)	11.9 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	63.1 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)	3.3 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)
19	800,501	566,604	447,295 ($\pm 6,244$)	59.1 (± 0.8)	7.3 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	56.3 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.6)	9.9 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)
20	833,339	577,960	434,520 ($\pm 6,063$)	68.2 (± 0.8)	2.5 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	27.8 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.8 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)
21	807,460	567,099	435,510 ($\pm 6,019$)	59.8 (± 0.7)	4.9 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	33.8 (± 0.6)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.7 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.6)
22	818,727	599,278	529,280 ($\pm 5,778$)	11.4 (± 0.4)	14.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	72.4 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.5)	0.7 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.5)
23	813,699	576,192	444,510 ($\pm 6,086$)	24.0 (± 0.7)	47.5 (± 0.8)	0.2 (± 0.7)	0.2 (± 0.7)	25.8 (± 0.7)	0.3 (± 0.7)	1.1 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)
24	798,189	596,939	532,450 ($\pm 6,204$)	12.8 (± 0.5)	0.3 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	73.4 (± 0.7)	0.6 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)
25	815,771	610,120	525,160 ($\pm 5,572$)	22.9 (± 0.6)	3.7 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.4)	0.0 (± 0.4)	47.2 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.4)	1.6 (± 0.3)	0.1 (± 0.4)
26	802,046	589,522	499,425 ($\pm 6,723$)	60.9 (± 0.7)	6.9 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	29.4 (± 0.7)	0.5 (± 0.6)	1.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.6)
27	786,946	524,120	338,205 ($\pm 5,261$)	79.8 (± 0.7)	0.7 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)	18.7 (± 0.6)	0.2 (± 0.7)	0.4 (± 0.7)	0.0 (± 0.7)
28	778,341	586,992	511,960 ($\pm 5,833$)	26.7 (± 0.6)	6.0 (± 0.5)	0.2 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	65.5 (± 0.4)	0.4 (± 0.6)	0.5 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)
29	816,681	571,426	404,414 ($\pm 5,172$)	74.5 (± 0.6)	3.2 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.6)	20.2 (± 0.5)	0.4 (± 0.6)	1.0 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.6)
30	829,574	623,474	544,555 ($\pm 6,060$)	7.6 (± 0.4)	5.3 (± 0.5)	0.1 (± 0.5)	0.0 (± 0.5)	84.5 (± 0.3)	0.7 (± 0.4)	0.8 (± 0.4)	0.1 (± 0.5)
31	793,600	573,847	428,810 ($\pm 5,158$)	25.1 (± 0.6)	4.8 (± 0.6)	0.1 (± 0.7)	0.1 (± 0.7)	67.7 (± 0.5)	0.5 (± 0.6)	0.8 (± 0.6)	0.0 (± 0.7)

The American Community Survey provided estimated citizen voting age population (CVAP) data at the block group level in a Special Tabulation. All block groups with more than 50% of the population in a district are included in the analysis.
The percent for each CVAP population category is that group's CVAP divided by the CVAP total.
Numbers in parentheses are margins of error at 90% confidence level.

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