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		DISTRICT COLUDT
17 18	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION	
19	NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, et al.,	CASE NO. 5:20-cv-05799-LHK
20	Plaintiffs,	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO
21	v.	DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR RULE 502(D) ORDER
22	WILBUR L. ROSS, JR., et al.,	Place: Courtroom 8
23	Defendants.	Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh
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Plaintiffs strongly oppose Defendants' Request For Rule 502(d) Order ("Request") (Dkt.		
388) and the proposed order accompanying it. As Defendants note in their Request, the parties		
had been engaged in good faith negotiations regarding the specific terms of a clawback		
agreement. Request at 1. Rather than continuing negotiations, however, Defendants informed		
Plaintiffs that they would instead seek a 502(d) Order on their own, ignored Plaintiffs' request to		
file a joint statement explaining the parties' positions, and proceeded to file their Request 10		
minutes later, containing positions and citations to cases Defendants had never raised with		
Plaintiffs (but which, as discussed below, do not support Defendants' position).		
As Defendants note, Plaintiffs were and remain agreeable to a normal course clawback		
agreement. One that states that the parties may claw back privileged materials <i>inadvertently</i>		
disclosed, without fear of waiver, subject to detailed procedures laid out in the agreement.		

agreement. One that states that the parties may claw back privileged materials *inadvertently* disclosed, without fear of waiver, subject to detailed procedures laid out in the agreement.

Defendants, however, insist that a clawback agreement must be put in place immediately to (1) cover all disclosure of privileged material, inadvertent **or advertent**, without fear of waiver—thereby allowing Defendants to cherry-pick privileged material for disclosure without the worry of subject matter waiver on items unhelpful for Defendants; and (2) fully displace the requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 502(b)(1), ensuring that Defendants do not need to do any sort of reasonable review at all of potentially privileged materials.

In other words, via a "Request" barely one and a half pages long, and in expedited fashion, Defendants now seek to obtain something they could not achieve via agreement between the parties and that normally would be sought through a normal noticed motion—a clawback order that is the opposite, in key respects, to principles contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence. *See Abington Emerson Capital, LLC v. Landash Corp.*, No. 2:17-CV-143, 2019 WL 3521649, at \*2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2019) ("Parties are free to contract for additional protections beyond those provided in the Rule...[b]ut where the parties cannot agree on additional protections beyond those provided in the Rule, the Court is reluctant to impose them absent exceptional circumstances."). Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court should reject this, for the following reasons.

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First, Defendants' "Request" is procedurally improper. Over one month ago—on a meet		
and confer prior to the November 13, 2020 CMC in this case—Plaintiffs asked Defendants'		
counsel whether they wanted to agree to and seek entry of a standard protective order in this		
case. Defendants brushed off the suggestion. That was their choice—but poor planning on		
Defendants' part does not and should not create an emergency on the Court's (or Plaintiffs' part).		
If Defendants want a broad, aggressive version of a clawback agreement to be put in place over		
Plaintiffs' objection, they should file an ordinary-course motion (or even an expedited request for		
a motion on a shortened time frame) and allow these issues to be appropriately briefed and		
considered.		
Second, omitting the concept of "inadvertent" from the agreement would permit		

Second, omitting the concept of "inadvertent" from the agreement would permit

Defendants to broadly claw back documents after any and all disclosures, inadvertent or
advertent, rather than permitting them to claw back only the narrower category of mistakenly
disclosed documents. There is no justification for this. See Abington, 2019 WL 3521649, at \*3.

And that would also allow them to permit disclosure of privileged materials that support

Defendants' case without fear of opening the door to subject matter waiver over the privileged
materials that undercut Defendants' case. In their short Request, Defendants do not address this
possibility, or that Defendants' proposed order would permit Defendants to shirk their duty to
conduct privilege review, only to recall large quantities of documents at a later date. In

Plaintiffs' view, this would likely exacerbate the ongoing delays in the expedited fact discovery
period. And Plaintiffs wish it were otherwise, but Defendants assurance that "Defendants have
represented to Plaintiffs, and now to this Court, that they have no intention of attempting to claw
back large volumes of documents post production" is scant comfort in this case, where
Defendants' defiance of their obligations and Court orders have unfortunately been a regular
occurrence, and their actions speak far louder than words. Dkt. 388 at 1.

Third, Defendants' requested insertion of unnumbered paragraph two is similarly problematic. By eliminating the requirements of Rules 502(b)(1) and (2), Defendants' paragraph (i) again removes the "inadvertent" requirement, and also (ii) eviscerates any assurance that Defendants are conducting a reasonable privilege review prior to producing documents. In doing

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so, it creates a privilege scheme for this case that largely absolves Defendants of any responsibility whatsoever, or the careful guidelines of Rule 502(b), while simultaneously giving them the ability to use privilege both as a sword and shield.

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Defendants do not offer the Court any substantive reason for why a Court-ordered, broad clawback agreement such as this—over Plaintiffs' objections, and in circumstances where any urgency is entirely of Defendants' deliberate decisions to refuse timely compliance with their discovery obligations—is advisable. Instead, their argument boils down to this: "Plaintiffs' proposed edits, which would delete any reference to the clawback displacing Fed. R. Evid. 502(b), would defeat the very purpose of a clawback order," because apparently it is "standard" to supplant FRE 502(b) in clawback agreements and to allow parties to claw back privileged materials advertently, intentionally or voluntarily produced. Dkt. 388 at 1.

One might imagine such a pronouncement would have a battalion of citations in support. Not here. While Defendants correctly note that clawback agreements permit parties to contract around the requirements of Rule 502(b), the very case Defendants rely on plainly states that "the requirements of Rule 502(b) can be superseded by a clawback agreement only to the extent such an order or agreement [provides] concrete directives regarding each prong of Rule 502(b) i.e., (1) what constitutes inadvertence; (2) what precautionary measures are required; and (3) what the privilege holder's post production responsibilities are to escape waiver." Irth Sols., LLC v. Windstream Commc'ns LLC, No. 2:16-cv-219, 2017 WL 3276021, at \*11 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2017) (quoting Burd v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-CV-20976, 2015 WL 1650447, at \*6 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 14, 2015) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the purpose is not to always "supplant" 502(b) entirely, as Defendants argue. A clawback agreement can of course still serve a valuable purpose by crystallizing what procedures the parties will abide by to avoid a waiver. Indeed, Defendants' counsel at DOJ never once say otherwise. They cannot, in good faith, given the many different sorts of clawback agreements/protective orders DOJ enters into—many of which assuredly do not always supplant 502(b) and protect advertent/intentional production of select privileged materials (as the lack of any DOJ declaration on this issue attests). While Rule 502(d) "may provide for return of documents without waiver irrespective of

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1	the care taken by the disclosing party," nothing requires such a broad approach as Defendants	
2	argue. Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) advisory committee's notes (emphasis added); see also Abington	
3	Emerson, 2019 WL 3521649, at *2.	
4	Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants' request. Plaintiffs will	
5	continue to work in good faith with Defendants to agree to, and submit for entry, an appropriate	
6	clawback agreement as set forth herein	
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