## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS
v.

MICHAEL HOWE, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Dakota, et al., Defendant.

## PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

## SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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## INTRODUCTION

For the first time since 1990, there is no Native American serving in the North Dakota state senate. And in 2022, Native American voters in northeast North Dakota saw their ability to elect state house representatives drop from two seats to one seat. This is the result of a classic example of vote dilution, attributable to packing a supermajority of Native citizens into District 9A—which has the fifth highest Native population among the thirty-one Native American majority district nationwide-while simultaneously cracking the remaining Native population across neighboring Districts 9B and 15. As the stark evidence of the 2022 election results demonstrates, the 2021 redistricting map minimized the voting strength of Native American voters in North Dakota even as the Native American share of the statewide population increased since the last decennial Census.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. Relying on the expert report of Dr. M.V. "Trey" Hood, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy two of the three preconditions necessary to establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). But Plaintiffs submitted expert testimony from Dr. Loren Collingwood demonstrating that both conditions are satisfied: the Native American population in the region is sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority Native American district from which three legislators would be elected, and white bloc voting usually operates to defeat Native voters' candidates of choice. This evidence is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact, precluding summary judgment.

Even more damning to Defendant's motion, however, is that Dr. Hood now disputes his own opinions-opinions on which Defendant's motion rests. After the motion was filed, Dr. Hood testified at his deposition that the grounds upon which Defendant has moved are incorrect. He testified that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 satisfies the majority-minority requirement and is reasonably compact, and that he incorrectly gave equal weight to all the election results he
evaluated in determining whether white bloc voting usually operates to defeat Native voters' candidates of choice in the region. He further testified that when the most probative contests are considered, Plaintiffs easily satisfy this precondition. Likewise, he testified that his own analysis of white bloc voting in District 9 shows that Plaintiffs have met their burden when he adds in the most recent elections-elections he agrees are probative and should be included, but which he ran out of time to include in his own analysis.

Furthermore, Defendant himself has now reversed course with respect to this precondition. Just yesterday, Defendant moved for summary judgment in Walen v. Burgum (No. 1:22-cv-00031-PDW-RRE-DLH). There, Defendant contends that Subdistrict 9A was necessary because enacted District 9 violates the VRA. See id. ECF No. 102 at 39 ("Walen MSJ"). In particular, Defendant asserts that the third Gingles precondition is satisfied in District 9. See id. ("[R]emoval of the subdivision in District 9 would result in Native American populations that would usually not be able to elect their candidate of choice . . . ."); id. at 40 (contending that, with respect to enacted District 9, "the preferred candidate of the Native American population in and around . . . Turtle Mountain would be regularly defeated by the White population."). There no longer appears to be any dispute that Gingles prong three is satisfied in District 9. The only remaining question is whether the VRA requires (1) a district configuration that reduces Native American voters' opportunity to elect from three legislative seats to just a one (the enacted plan), or (2) a configuration that maintains Native American voters' opportunity to elect in three legislative seats (Plaintiffs' demonstrative plan). Were there doubt, trial will show the answer is the latter.

Finally, despite concluding in his report that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 might be a racial gerrymander, Dr. Hood testified that he has no evidence to support this conclusion, is not actually claiming the district is gerrymandered, and the district does not subordinate traditional
districting principles to racial considerations. In sum, both Defendant's and Plaintiffs' expertsand even Defendant himself-now dispute the facts upon which Defendant's motion rests. Defendant has not and cannot demonstrate that he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The motion should be denied.

## FACTUAL BACKGROUND

## I. The prior North Dakota legislative districting plan and election results

The reservations of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians ("Turtle Mountain") and the Spirit Lake Nation ("Spirit Lake") are both located in northeast North Dakota. Prior to the 2021 redistricting, Rolette County-where the Turtle Mountain reservation is located—was its own state legislative district, District 9. The Spirit Lake reservation was in District 23. This region in the 2012-2020 ("benchmark") plan is shown below:

## 2012-2020 "Benchmark" Legislative Plan Regional View



Ex. 2 at App. G (Collingwood Rebuttal). From 1990 until 2022, District 9 elected a Native American candidate to the state senate, as well as two state representatives who were the candidates of choice of Native American voters. Ex. 2 at 5-7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Senator Richard

Marcellais, a Turtle Mountain member, represented District 9 from 2006 until 2022. Ex. 2 at 6 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

## II. The 2021 Redistricting

The Joint Redistricting Committee introduced House Bill 1504 as the proposed legislative redistricting plan and held a hearing on November 8, 2021. ECF No. 60-32. The new redistricting plan accounts for population changes as reflected in the 2020 Census. For example, the 2020 Census data revealed that benchmark District 9 was 4,389 people short of the ideal district size. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 9 at 1 (N.D. Legislative Council Population Change Summary). The Census data also showed that the Native American population grew from $5.1 \%$ of the statewide VAP in 2010 to $5.9 \%$ in 2020. Ex. 2 at 6 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

The proposed map substantially changed the districts in northeastern North Dakota and in particular the districts in which the Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake reservations are located. Parts of Towner and Cavalier Counties-the VAP of which are $96.0 \%$ and $95.6 \%$ white respectivelywere added to District 9. Ex. 2 at App. E, App. G (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 1 at 16 (Collingwood Initial Report). By extending District 9 east into overwhelmingly white counties, the enacted plan dramatically changed the demographic makeup of the district, reducing its NVAP by twenty percentage points, from $74.4 \%$ to $54.5 \%$. Ex. 1 at 31 (Collingwood Initial Report). ${ }^{1}$ Among the 31 Native American-majority state legislative districts in the country, the enacted version of District 9 has the second lowest NVAP share nationwide. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood

[^0]Rebuttal). The average NVAP of a majority-Native American legislative district nationwide is $68.1 \%$ and the median is $66.7 \%$. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). The Spirit Lake reservation was separated from all of the counties with which it previously shared a district and placed in District 15, neighboring District 9. Compare Ex. 2 at App G with App. E (Collingwood Rebuttal).

Citing the VRA, the legislature divided District 9 into two subdistricts each with one state representative seat, District 9A and 9B, Ex. 19 at 17:16-18:23 (Nov. 9, 2021, Redistricting Comm. Hr'g Tr.). Presumably this was because, as Defendant asserts in the Walen matter, the full District 9 violated the VRA. Walen MSJ at 40. The enacted map for the region is shown below:

## 2021 Enacted Plan Regional View



Ex. 2 at App. E (Collingwood Rebuttal). District 9A has a Native American VAP of 79.8\%. This is the fifth highest NVAP among the 31 Native American-majority state legislative districts nationwide. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). The remaining Native American population in northeastern North Dakota is split across Districts 9B and 15. District 9B has a NVAP of 29.4\%. ECF No. 60-33 at 3. District 15 has a NVAP of 20.39\%. ECF No. 60-33 at 4.

A map illustrating the fragmenting of northeastern North Dakota's Native American voters among Districts 9A, 9B, and 15 is shown below, with concentrations of Native Americans shown in blue and the district lines shown in red.

## Enacted Plan Fragmenting of Native American Population



Ex. 2 at App. A (Collingwood Rebuttal).
Both Chairman Azure of Turtle Mountain and Chairman Yankton of Spirit Lake testified to the Joint Redistricting Committee on November 8, 2021 in support of an amendment offered by Sen. Marcellais to redraw District 9 to join Benson and Rolette Counties in a district that would retain Native American voters' opportunity to elect a state senator and two state representatives rather than reducing their opportunity to elect a single state representative in one subdistrict. ECF No. 60-32 at 12. The legislature rejected that amendment and adopted House Bill 1504.

## III. District 9's white-majority electorate and the unusual circumstances of the 2018 election

Although the redrawn District 9 has a small majority NVAP (down twenty percentage points from the benchmark district), its voting electorate is, under usual circumstances, substantially majority white. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). The chart below shows the demographic composition of the voting electorate in District 9 for the past five election cycles:

## Enacted District 9 Electorate Demographic Composition

| Election | White Electorate <br> Share | Native American <br> Electorate Share |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2014 | $67 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| 2016 | $63 \%$ | $37 \%$ |
| 2018 | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| 2020 | $63 \%$ | $37 \%$ |
| 2022 | $60 \%$ | $40 \%$ |

Ex. 2 at 4 (Figure 1) and 5 ( $\boldsymbol{T} 1)$ (Collingwood Rebuttal). Notably, the 2018 election marked a stark departure from the usual electoral conditions in District 9. As Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Collingwood reports, Native American voter turnout nationwide, in North Dakota, and specifically in District 9, is typically substantially lower than white voter turnout. Ex. 2 at 3-4 (Collingwood Rebuttal). In District 9, Native American voter turnout is "usually in the neighborhood of 20-30 percentage points" lower than white turnout. Ex. 2 at 4 (Collingwood Rebuttal). For all categories of voters, turnout in presidential election cycles exceeds turnout in midterm election cycles as a general matter. Ex. 2 at 4 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

The 2018 North Dakota election was different. As the graph below shows, Native American turnout in 2018 skyrocketed to $57.6 \%$ in District 9, exceeding statewide overall turnout and approaching (but not reaching) white turnout in the district. Ex. 2 at 4 (Collingwood Rebuttal).


Ex． 2 at 4 （Figure 1）（Collingwood Rebuttal）．As Dr．Collingwood explains，＂［i］n all the many elections in different jurisdictions that I have studied，I have never seen a Native American turnout number begin to approach $60 \%$ in a federal，state，or local contest．Rather，the figures often hover around $30 \%$－which is in line with my estimates in every other election year in LD－9．＂Ex． 2 at 4 （Collingwood Rebuttal）．Furthermore，the pattern of midterm versus presidential cycle turnout for Native Americans is＂strikingly inverted＂with respect to the 2018 election．Id．Dr．Hood similarly testified that he could not think of another example where a group had a twenty－percentage－point higher turnout in a midterm than in a presidential election．Ex． 3 at 83：13－20（Hood Dep．）．

As Chairman Azure of Turtle Mountain and Chairman Yankton of Spirit Lake explain，the 2018 election featured＂unique circumstances＂Ex． 4 【 26 （Azure Decl．）；Ex． 5 § 27 （Yankton Decl．）．The state＇s voter ID law，which required proof of residential street addresses－something many Native American voters lacked—had previously been enjoined by this Court but was permitted to go in effect by the U．S．Supreme Court just before the 2018 election．Ex． 4 बबा 24－26 （Azure Decl．）；Ex． 5 9โ1 25－27（Yankton Decl．）．As a result，＂substantial amounts of money spent by national，local，and regional organizations focused on educating and turning out Native voters．＂ Ex． 4 ๆ 27 （Azure Decl．）；Ex． 5 § 34 （Yankton Decl．）．In addition，national celebrities like Dave Matthews Band and Mark Ruffalo toured North Dakota Reservations and held get－out－the－vote events．Ex． 4 『 28 （Azure Decl．）；Ex． 5 『 35 （Yankton Decl．）．This type of sustained spending and electoral education focused on Native American voters had never occurred prior to the 2018 election and has not happened since．Ex． 4 ๆ 29 （Azure Decl．）；Ex． 5 § 36 （Yankton Decl．）．The turnout among Native American voters in 2018 was＂extraordinarily unusual＂and the result of ＂substantial outrage among Native American voters at what seemed clearly to us to be a blatant effort to suppress our voting power．＂Ex． 4 बी 30－31（Azure Decl．）；Ex． 5 बी 37－38（Yankton Decl．）．

## IV. The November 2022 election

The first election under the new legislative redistricting plan was held on November 8 , 2022. In District 9, incumbent Sen. Marcellais-who is Native American and the candidate of choice of Native American voters-lost his bid for re-election to his white challenger by a margin of $53.7 \%$ to $46.1 \%$. Ex. 1 at 17 (Collingwood Initial Report). Sen. Marcellais carried Rolette County by $60.1 \%$ to $39.7 \%$ but lost in the newly added white-majority counties by a margin of $79.9 \%$ to $19.8 \%$ (Cavalier County) and $65.0 \%$ to $34.7 \%$ (Towner County). Ex. 10 (2022 District 9 Election Results). In District 9A, Jayme Davis-a Native American who was the candidate of choice of Native Americans-won election over her white opponent by $68.6 \%$ to $31.1 \%$. Ex. 11 (2022 District 9A Election Results); see also Ex. 1 at 15 (Collingwood Initial Report). But in District 9B, incumbent Marvin Nelson-the candidate of choice of Native American voters-lost to his opponent by $56.5 \%$ to $37.6 \%$. Ex. 12 (2022 District 9B Election Results); see also Ex. 1 at 16 (Collingwood Initial Report). Notably, white voters in Towner County supported Mr. Nelsonwho is a white Democrat - at a rate more than 12 percentage points higher than they did Mr . Marcellais, a Native American Democrat. Ex. 1 at 16 (Collingwood Initial Report).

In District 15, Plaintiff Collette Brown-who is Native American and the candidate of choice of Native American voters in the district-lost to her white opponent by $65.5 \%$ to $33.9 \%$. Ex. 13 (2022 District 15 Election Results); see also Ex. 1 at 26 (Collingwood Initial Report). Ms. Brown carried the Benson County portion of the district by a wide margin ( $63.4 \%$ to $36.0 \%$ ) but was defeated in every other county in the district by an even wider margin. Ex. 13 (2022 District 15 Election Results). In the race for state representative, two white candidates were elected, with 41.6\% and 38.6\%-over the Native American candidate Heather Lawrence-Skadsem, who was the candidate of choice of Native American voters in the district. Ex. 13 (2022 District 15 Election

Results); see also Ex. 1 at 26 (Collingwood Initial Report). Ms. Lawrence-Skadsem easily carried Benson County but lost the remainder of the district. Ex. 13 (2022 District 15 Election Results).

Under the benchmark plan, Native American voters in northeastern North Dakota succeeded in electing their candidate of choice to all three seats in District 9. Under the 2021 enacted plan, Native American voters in the region were able to elect just one candidate of choice—Jayme Davis-to the state house in District 9A. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Because of the configuration of districts in the new redistricting plan, for the first time in over thirty years, no member of a North Dakota Native American Tribe serves in the state senate today. Ex. 2 at 6 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

## V. Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District

Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 creates a new District 9 centered primarily in Rolette and Benson Counties. The district ("Demonstrative District 9") is shown in both a regional view and set into the enacted plan:

Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 Regional View


Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 Statewide View


Demonstrative District 9 has a NVAP of $66.1 \%$, which is near exactly the median NVAP of the 31 Native American majority state legislative districts nationwide, and lower than the NVAP of District 9 in the benchmark plan. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). In Demonstrative District 9, the candidates of choice of Native American voters would have prevailed in 32 of 35 tested contests. Ex. 1 at 32-37 (Collingwood Initial Report).

Demonstrative District 9 does not split any voting precincts or municipalities. Ex. 2 at 16 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Its population deviation is $+3.14 \%$, lower than twenty-three of the other districts in the enacted plan. Ex. 2 at 9 (Collingwood Rebuttal). As both Dr. Collingwood and Dr. Hood explain, although the water boundaries of Devil's Lake and the Sheyenne River have a distortionary lowering effect on Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9's mathematical compactness scores, see Ex. 2 at 10 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 3 at 136:6-137:4, 155:2-157:6 (Hood Dep.),
the district still scores as more compact than several other districts in the enacted plan, Ex. 2 at 9-
11 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 3 at 146:24-147:19 (Hood Dep.).
At his deposition, Defendant's expert Dr. Hood agreed that Demonstrative District 9 adheres to traditional districting criteria:

Q: [P]laintiffs' proposed District 9 satisfies the population deviation legislative goal, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: We talked about how, under your own metric for Virginia and applied here, that the district is sufficiently or reasonably compact, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: And with respect to county splits, we noted that there was an error in your report with respect to the number of counties, right, that the enacted plan splits?
A: Correct. That's correct.
Q: And demonstrative District 9 has the same number of county splits as does District 15, which is also under challenge in this case, right?
A: Correct.
And it has the same number of county splits as the state house map for [enacted] District 9, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: It splits Eddy County only to adhere to the boundaries of the Spirit Lake Nation, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: And that's the same split of Eddy County that the enacted District 15 makes, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: And we discussed how plaintiffs' demonstrative plan restores Towner County to its prior configuration in terms of core retention, moving it to District 15 entirely.
A: $\quad$ That is true.
Q: And we've discussed how the enacted map has features in terms of land bridges or necks or connecting points in districts that are a fair bit smaller than what you termed the land bridge in plaintiffs' demonstrative District 9, right?
A: Correct.
Q: And a number of the enacted districts in the map span much larger - either similar or larger geographic distances than does . . . demonstrative District 9 , correct?
A: That's correct, yes.
Q: And . . . enacted District 9, in fact, from east to west is just about as long as plaintiffs' demonstrative District [9] is from north to south, correct?

A: From what I remember, yes.
Q: Okay. We discussed how Benson County and Rolette County are closer geographically than Rolette County is to Cavalier County, right?
A: That's true, yes.
Ex. 3 at 188:23-192:2 (Hood Dep.).

## VI. Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain have shared non-racial interests related to legislative representation.

Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain-as well as their members and voting public-share many common characteristics and interests that relate to their common representational needs in the state legislature. The two reservations are just 55 miles apart. Ex. 2 at 17 (Collingwood Rebuttal). As the chairmen of the two tribes explain, their residents have "shared values and beliefs" and "share the experience of living in rural North Dakota tribal communities." Ex. 4 - 8 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 - 9 (Yankton Decl.). In that respect, they share "similar socio-economic statuses" and have "similar representational needs from our state legislature related to economic investment, state-sponsored services, and legislative appropriations that differ from other North Dakota rural communities, where agricultural and energy interests predominate, and from the state's urban areas." Ex. 4 - 8 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 I 9 (Yankton Decl.). Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake "partner together in many political, economic, educational, and public safety organizations," such as United Tribes of North Dakota, United Tribes Technical College, North Dakota Tribal College System, National Congress of American Indians, North Dakota Native Tourism Alliance, and the National Indian Gaming Association. Ex. 4 - 9 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 - 10 (Yankton Decl.). The two tribes have shared interactions with the North Dakota government, including through the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission and the legislature's Tribal and State Relations Committee. Ex. 4 ब 10 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 § 11 (Yankton Decl.).

The two tribes often join together to "pursue similar policy objectives," including in the state legislature and the state government on "funding for tribal colleges, negotiating the tribalstate gaming compact, taxation on tribal lands, hunting and fishing regulation, tribal and state law enforcement, and funding for education, foster care, health care, etc." Ex. 4 ब 11 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 § 12 (Yankton Decl.). Legislation often has similar effects on both tribes, including currently pending House Bill 1536 to enact a state Indian Child Welfare Act. Ex. 4 § 12 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 ब 13 (Yankton Decl.). Both tribal chairmen serve on the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission, which seeks to "keep the public informed about the current laws and legislative issues that impact Indian country." Ex. 4 ब 13 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 § 14 (Yankton Decl.). The tribes work together with respect to United Tribes Technical College, on which both chairmen serve on the Board, and in that capacity lobby the legislature for funding, including workforce development grants and funding for non-member students. Ex. 4 बी 14 -15 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 9母1 15-16 (Yankton Decl.).

## VII. White bloc voting usually defeats Native American voters' candidates of choice.

White bloc voting usually defeats Native American voters' candidates of choice in Districts 9, 9B, and 15. As Dr. Collingwood explains, three categories of elections are most probative for determining whether the white majority block votes against Native American voters' candidates of choice: (1) "endogenous" elections, or elections for the office that is at issue (here state legislative elections as opposed to statewide, or "exogenous" elections), (2) more recent elections, and (3) elections featuring a Native American candidate. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex 1 at 21 (Collingwood Initial Report). At his deposition, Dr. Hood agreed that these elections were more probative. Ex. 3 at 39:3-44:8 (Hood Dep.). Dr. Hood testified that exogenous elections "should be given far less weight," Ex. 3 at 41:25-42:17 (Hood Dep.), and agreed that the 2022
state senate election in which Senator Marcellais was defeated is the "single most probative contest" for assessing white bloc voting in District 9 "because it features an endogenous election with a Native American candidate and it's the most recent." Ex. 3 at 45:15-24 (Hood Dep.).

Dr. Collingwood explains that white bloc voting defeats the Native American preferred candidates in $100 \%$ of the endogenous elections in District 9 , in $100 \%$ of the most recent (2022) elections in District 9, 71\% of elections in the most recent two cycles 2022 and 2020, and in $60 \%$ of elections in District 9 featuring a Native American candidate. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Dr. Collingwood further explains that the 2018 elections exhibited "special circumstances" and "it would be appropriate to entirely disregard the 2018 elections" or at least give them "very little weight" in assessing white bloc voting. Ex. 2 at 8 (Collingwood Rebuttal). If the 2022, 2020, and 2016 elections are all considered-and even if afforded equal weight rather than differentiating based upon probative value-then Dr. Collingwood reports that white bloc voting would prevent the Native American preferred candidates from winning in 12 of 21 contests, or $57 \%$ of the time. Ex. 2 at 8 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

Dr. Collingwood further explains that when District 9 and 9B are summed together, the white-preferred candidate wins $58 \%$ of the time. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Although Dr. Hood included packed District 9A in his calculations, he later testified that he "didn't necessarily disagree" that it made more sense to exclude District 9A from the combined calculation given District 9A’s overwhelmingly high NVAP. Ex. 3 at 96:4-15, 98:10-99:6 (Hood Dep.). Dr. Hood agreed that including the results for District 9 and 9B and excluding the results of packed District 9A would show that white bloc voting usually defeats Native American preferred candidates in District 9. Ex. 3 at 98:10-99:6 (Hood Dep.). Further, as Dr. Collingwood explains, given the regional focus of the claim in this case-affecting several districts and a subdistrict-the "most
sensible approach" is to consider District 9 and 15 together for purposes of assessing white bloc voting. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). By that measure white voters block Native American voters' preferred candidate from winning $64 \%$ of the time in the region. Id. This is true even without giving additional weight to the more probative endogenous, recent, and racially contested elections, which show even more powerful white bloc voting defeating Native American voters' preferred candidates. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

Dr. Hood conducted his own analysis of white bloc voting in District 9 in his expert report for Defendants in the related Walen v. Burgum case (Case No. 1:22-cv-00031-PDW-RRE-DLH). Ex. 14 at 5-6 (Hood Walen Report). In that report, Dr. Hood examined six exogenous electionsthree from 2018 and three from 2020-and concluded that Native American-preferred candidates won four of the six, and thus that white bloc voting did not prevent Native American voters' preferred candidates from prevailing in enacted District 9. At his deposition, however, Dr. Hood testified that he "did not get to a full analysis" and "did not perform any kind of statistical analysis on the 2022 elections" because he had insufficient time to do so before his expert report was due. Ex. 3 at 101:19-102:8 (Hood Dep.). He testified that he agreed it would have been "preferable" to include the 2022 elections because "they certainly are the most recent set of elections." Ex. 3 at 102:9-16 (Hood Dep.). Dr. Hood then identified during his deposition four 2022 contests he thought were particularly probative and should be added to his analysis: the 2022 elections for U.S. Senate, Attorney General, District 9 state senator, and Public Service Commissioner (which included a Native American candidate). Ex. 3 at 108:8-16 (Hood Dep.). Dr. Hood testified that if the four 2022 elections he agreed should be added to his analysis were included, "that would show $60 \%$ defeat rate for the Native American preferred candidates in District 9," which would demonstrate that white voters usually defeat the candidates preferred by Native American voters
in enacted District 9. Ex. 3 at 109:13-111:15 (Hood Dep.). Including the additional elections that Dr. Hood himself identified thus creates a material dispute between Dr. Hood's testimony-which confirms the conclusions reached by Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Collingwood-and the written opinion offered by Dr. Hood with respect to the effect of white bloc voting in the district. It is therefore unsurprising that Defendant himself has reversed course since filing his motion and confirmed that the third Gingles precondition is satisfied in District 9. See Walen, ECF No. 102 at 39-40.

In sum, Plaintiffs, Defendant, and both experts now agree that white voters in Districts 9, 9B and 15 usually defeat Native American voters' preferred candidates. Ex. 2 at 8 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 1 at 26 (Collingwood Initial Report); ECF No. 60-35 at 4 (Hood Report); Ex. 15 at HOOD-0256 (Ex. 6 of Hood Dep. showing calculations); Walen, ECF No. 102 at 39-40.

## LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "when the record establishes that there is 'no genuine dispute as to any material fact' and the moving party is 'entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Brand v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 934 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). "Courts must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party." Id. Summary judgment is not appropriate where the court must "weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any factual issue." Walz v. Randall, 2 F.4th 1091, 1099 (8th Cir. 2021).


#### Abstract

ARGUMENT Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. The evidence-including the deposition testimony of Defendant's expert Dr. Hood—shows that Plaintiffs have satisfied both of the Gingles preconditions that are subject of Defendant's motion, and thus Defendant has failed to meet his burden to show he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.


Section 2 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. § 10301, prohibits the dilution of minority voters' voting strength in redistricting plans. "Dilution of racial minority group voting strength may be caused by the dispersal of [minority voters] into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters or from the concentration of [minority voters] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n .11 (1986). The former is called "cracking" and the latter "packing." As the Eighth Circuit has explained, a minority group that is a "bare numerical majority" of a district may "still face actual impediments and disadvantages" to electoral participation that result from "the history of discrimination and disenfranchisement." Missouri State Conf. of NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 924, 933 (8th Cir. 2018). Thus, a majority-minority district may violate Section 2 when the "citizen voting-age majority . . . lack[s] real electoral opportunity." League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006) ("LULAC").

The Court's inquiry under Section 2 "requires an 'intensely local appraisal' of the challenged district," $L U L A C, 548$ U.S. at 437, and is "peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case," Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 621 (1982)). In states with multi-member state legislative districts, like North Dakota, that "intensely local appraisal" may require creating a multi-member Section 2 minority opportunity district, it may require the creation of subdistricts for the state house elections, or it may require a mix of both statewide. The Section 2 remedy depends on local conditions in each district and on which configuration affords the minority group an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. For example, in Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a ruling that South Dakota's state legislative plan violated Section 2 by minimizing the number of legislators Native American voters could elect. 461 F.3d 1011, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2006). In Bone Shirt, the district court ordered a remedial plan that
included one multi-member NVAP majority district (District 27), because the election data showed that district would permit Native American voters to elect their preferred candidates for all three legislative positions. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039, 1041 (D.S.D. 2005) (remedial order). The remedial map also included two subdistricts, however-District 26A and 28A-in which the electoral data showed Native American voters could elect their candidates of choice to a single house seat but not the second house seat or the senate seat. Id. at 1039; see also Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989 (D.S.D. 2004) (trial order). The NVAP of the two subdistricts and one multi-member district adopted by the court ranged from $65.6 \%$ to $74.4 \%$. Id. (Plan E). Moreover, District 28A combined two separate Native American Reservations-the Cheyenne River Reservation and the Standing Rock Reservation. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's remedial order. Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1023-24.

To succeed on a Section 2 claim, plaintiffs must first meet three elements known as the Gingles preconditions:
(1) [T]he racial group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) the racial group is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority votes as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.

Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1018 (quoting $L U L A C, 548$ U.S. at 425) (bracket in original).
Both experts agree and Defendant concedes that voting in the region is racially polarized and thus that the second Gingles prong is met. Ex. 1 at 14-16, 22 (Collingwood Initial Report); ECF No. 60-35 at 2, 4 (Hood Report); Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at 16, ECF 59. Defendant moves only with respect to the first and third Gingles preconditions. The motion is without merit and should be denied.

## I. Plaintiffs have satisfied the first Gingles precondition.

## A. Plaintiffs' demonstrative district is majority NVAP.

Plaintiffs have satisfied the first Gingles precondition. Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 contains a proposed District 9 with a NVAP of $66.1 \%$. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). This easily surpasses the Gingles prong one required majority-minority district showing.

Defendant, however, contends that Gingles prong one is not met because the enacted versions of Districts 9B and 15 are not majority NVAP. ECF No. 59 at 17-18. This misapprehends the purpose of the first Gingles precondition, which focuses on a potential alternative district, not whether the challenged districts are majority-minority. Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1018 (explaining that first Gingles precondition is about a "proposed" district). Dr. Hood abandoned his expert report's conclusion regarding the first Gingles precondition at his deposition, agreeing that the "conclusion about Gingles prong 1 here in your report isn't actually about Gingles prong 1; it’s just an observation that the enacted District 15 isn't itself a majority Native voting age population district." Ex. 3 at 158:1-159:12 (Hood Dep.); See also Ex. 2 at 8-9 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

Defendant's focus on the demographic makeup of the enacted districts is therefore misplaced; it is undisputed that Plaintiffs' have proffered majority NVAP demonstrative districts.

## B. Plaintiffs' demonstrative district is reasonably compact and joins Native American voters with shared non-racial interests.

Next, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot establish Gingles $I$ because their demonstrative district is not reasonably compact. But Plaintiffs' expert analysis, Defendant's expert testimony, and Supreme Court precedent all confirm that Demonstrative District $9^{2}$ is

[^1]reasonably compact and joins Native Americans with shared non-racial interests. At the least this creates a dispute of fact with respect to Defendant's motion, precluding summary judgment.

The first Gingles precondition requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that Native American voters can constitute the majority of voters "in some reasonably configured legislative district." Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 301 (2017); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 430 ("[T]he first Gingles condition requires the possibility of creating more than the existing number of reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority population to elect candidate of its choice." (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1008 (1994)). ${ }^{3}$

## 1. Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is reasonably compact and respects traditional districting criteria.

Here, Plaintiffs' expert analysis demonstrates that Demonstrative District 9 is reasonably compact for VRA purposes, in its shape and its adherence to traditional districting criteria. Indeed, Dr. Hood conceded as much at his deposition after Defendant moved for summary judgment.

As Dr. Collingwood explains, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 scores higher on mathematical compactness metrics than several congressional districts the Supreme Court has held to be "reasonably compact" for purposes of Gingles prong one. Ex. 2 at 12 (Collingwood Rebuttal). In LULAC, the Supreme Court considered the compactness aspect of Gingles prong one in the context of two Texas congressional plans-one drawn by a federal court and used in the 2002 election and a subsequent legislatively adopted plan used in the 2004 election. 548 U.S. at 409. The Court affirmed the lower court's holding that the 2002 court-drawn plan, known as "Plan 1151C," contained six "reasonably compact" Latino opportunity districts for VRA purposes in

[^2]south and west Texas. Id. at 423, 435; see Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 488 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (identifying Districts $15,16,20,23,27$, and 28 as the "reasonably compact" Latino opportunity districts for purposes of VRA compliance). Those districts are shown below:


Ex. 2 at 12 (Collingwood Rebuttal). As Dr. Collingwood found, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 has a higher Reock score than two of the districts the $L U L A C$ Court found to be reasonably compact for purposes of the VRA, and a higher Polsby-Popper score than four of the six districts. ${ }^{4}$

Likewise, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is substantially more compact than a district the Supreme Court recently upheld. In Abbott v. Perez, the Supreme Court held that the 2013 Texas legislature had good reasons to believe that then-enacted District 35 met the Gingles preconditions. 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2331-32 (2018). District 35-upheld by the Supreme Court-is shown below:

[^3]

Ex. 2 at 13 (Collingwood Rebuttal). By mathematical scores-and by using one's eyes-it is clear that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is substantially more compact than then-enacted Texas District 35. Ex. 2 at 13 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 exceeds the threshold for "reasonable compactness" applied to VRA districts by the Supreme Court, which should resolve the issue. It is at least sufficient to create a dispute of fact with respect to Defendant's motion. See also Ex. 3 at 151:825 (Hood Dep.) (Dr. Hood testifying that comparing a demonstrative plan to VRA districts upheld by the Supreme Court is the type of analysis he has done in the past but did not do here).

Notably, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 scores higher on mathematical compactness scores than several other state legislative districts in the 2021 enacted plan. Ex. 2 at 9-11 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 3 at 146:24-147:19 (Hood Dep.). Unless Defendant contends that enacted districts with lower scores than Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 are unlawful, he cannot claim that Plaintiffs' proposed district is not reasonably compact. See N.D. Const. art. IV, § 2 (requiring that districts be "compact and contiguous"). Indeed, Dr. Hood-who had previously testified as an expert on the subject of compactness in Virginia redistricting litigation-testified at
his deposition that under his previous methodology, all of the enacted North Dakota districts and Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 are "reasonably compact." Ex. 3 at 143:25-144:8 (Hood Dep.); see id. at 189:2-6 ("Q: [U]nder your own metric from Virginia and applied here, . . . [Plaintiffs' demonstrative] district is sufficiently or reasonably compact, correct? A: Correct."). ${ }^{5}$

Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 adheres to other traditional districting criteria as well. As Dr. Collingwood explains, the district splits the same number of counties (three) as does enacted District 15 and the enacted state house version of District 9 (9A and 9B). Ex. 2 at 19-20 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Demonstrative District 9 has the same Eddy County split as the enacted map to follow the Spirit Lake Reservation boundary-a principle the legislature declared important. Ex. 2 at 20 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 splits zero voting precincts and zero municipalities. Ex. 2 at 16 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 3 at 174:12-19 (Hood Dep.). Demonstrative District 9 spans about the same distance north-to-south as the enacted District 9 does east-to-west. Ex. 2 at 18 (Collingwood Rebuttal). And a number of North Dakota's legislative districts are geographically large-including many that are larger than Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9-because of the sparse population in rural areas of the state. Ex. 2 at 18 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 3 at 170:12-172:19 (Hood Dep.).

Defendant nonetheless contends that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is not compact because it contains a "narrow land bridge." ECF No. 59 at 13 (quoting Hood Rep. at 6). At his deposition, Dr. Hood conceded that the "land bridge" to which Defendant referred was the Pierce

[^4]County voting precinct-kept whole-that links Rolette to Benson County in Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 1. Ex. 3 at 174:1-11 (Hood Dep.); Ex. 16 (County Precinct Maps). Notably, Dr. Hood acknowledged that Rolette and Benson Counties are geographically closer to one another than Rolette and Cavalier Counties (the counties linked together in the enacted plan). Ex. 3 at 177:3-20 (Hood Dep.). And he agreed that the "land bridge" in Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is larger than a number of other "land bridges" and connecting points in other enacted districts in the state. Ex. 3 at 176:17-177:2 (Hood Dep.); see also Ex. 2 at 14-16 (Collingwood Rebuttal) (Dr. Collingwood showing other North Dakota districts with connections ranging from 659 feet to 2.5 miles). Indeed, as Dr. Collingwood explains, the Pierce County precinct included in Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 "spans 180 square miles and is itself larger than a majority of the other districts in the plan." Ex. 2 at 13 (Collingwood Rebuttal). A precinct separating two proximate counties that is kept whole and is geographically larger than a majority of districts in the plan cannot plausibly be labeled a "narrow land bridge." Especially not in comparison to the much thinner connections approved by the Supreme Court, as evidenced in the maps shown above.

Moreover, there is at least a dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiffs' demonstrative plan facilitates core retention, another criterion relied on by Defendant to assert that Plaintiffs have failed to establish the first Gingles prong. First, the Fifth Circuit has afforded "little value" to Dr. Hood's "core retention" analysis in another case in which he testified last year because it found that there was no reason that the "previous districting should be used as a measuring stick for compactness" under Gingles prong one. Robinson v. Ardoin, 37 F.4th 208, 220-21 (5th Cir. 2022). As such, even if there were no dispute, Dr. Hood's opinion regarding the core retention of Demonstrative District 9 would be insufficient to establish that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Second, as Dr. Collingwood explains, the demonstrative district retains sixty-
three percent of the population that previously resided in District 9-a core retention figure greater than eight other districts in the enacted plan. Ex. 2 at 21 (Collingwood Rebuttal). And Dr. Hood's discussion of core retention overstates the demonstrative district's effect on the enacted map, by comparing it to the benchmark plan rather than the enacted plan, which also moved Spirit Lake out of its prior district. Ex. 2 at 22-23 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Only 13\% of the residents of Demonstrative District 9 ( 2,195 people) are newly moved compared to the enacted plan; $87 \%$ either were previously in District 9 or were also moved to a new district in the enacted plan. Ex. 2 at 22-23 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Thus, while core retention is not a particularly useful criterion in the Gingles prong one context, there is at least a dispute of fact regarding this issue.

Finally, unlike the enacted plan, which splits the Turtle Mountain Reservation from its trust lands between Districts 9A and 9B, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 keeps the Reservation and the trust lands together-a feature Dr. Hood agreed at his deposition was important and could be a community of interest consideration. Ex. 3 at 169:5-24 (Hood Dep.). Below is the map illustrating how the enacted plan splits the Reservation from the trust lands (shown in $\tan$ ):


Ex. 2 at 21 (Collingwood Rebuttal).
Ultimately, the best explanation of how Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is reasonably compact and adheres to traditional districting principles comes from Defendant's expert Dr. Hood. His colloquy on the topic at his deposition, quoted at length supra at 12-13, suffices to defeat Defendant's motion on these issues. See Ex. 3 at 188:23-192:2 (Hood Dep.).

## 2. Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake are geographically proximate and their voters share common needs and interests.

There is sufficient evidence that Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake are geographically proximate and share common needs and interests to, at a minimum, create a genuine dispute of fact as to Defendants' claim that the first Gingles precondition is not met. As Dr. Collingwood and the two tribes' chairmen explain, the two communities are just 55 miles apart. Ex. 2 at 16-17 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 4 - 6 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 § 7 (Yankton Decl.). ${ }^{6}$ As Dr. Hood admits, it is impossible to avoid these types of distances in rural North Dakota legislative districts, given the sparse population. Ex. 3 at 170:12-172:19 (Hood Dep.). In light of the geography of the state and the two Tribal Nation's shared interests, see supra at 13-14, this does not represent the type of "enormous geographical distance," that the Supreme Court has held precludes a finding that the first Gingles prong is met. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435.

As discussed above, in LULAC the Court was tasked with evaluating two separate congressional plans. After the court-enacted Plan 1151C went into effect for the 2002 elections, see supra at 21-22, the legislature adopted a new plan, known as "Plan 1374C," in 2003. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 413. In order to shore up the District 23 incumbent who had nearly lost the 2002 election because of "an increasingly powerful Latino population," id. at 423, the legislature made

[^5]changes that dropped District 23's "Latino share of the total voting-age population [to] just over $50 \%$." Id. at 424. To make up for the degradation in Latino opportunity in District 23, the legislature added a newly configured District 25. Id. Map 1374C is shown below:

Texas Plan 1374C


Ex. 18 (Tex. Legislative Council Plan 1374C).
The Court found that the 2003-enacted District 25 was not compact because it was "a long, narrow strip that winds its way from McAllen and the Mexican-border towns in the south to Austin, in the center of the State and 300 miles away," and because "[t]he Latino communities at the opposite ends of District 25 have divergent 'needs and interest,' owing to differences in socioeconomic status, education, employment, health, and other characteristics." LULAC, 548 U.S. at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 435 ("We emphasize it is the enormous geographic distance separating the Austin and Mexican-border communities, coupled with the
disparate needs and interests in these populations-not either factor alone-that renders District 25 noncompact for $\S 2$ purposes.").

Even if 55 miles were a sufficient geographic distance to implicate the first Gingles precondition, however, the $L U L A C$ Court made clear that the presence of shared needs and interests overcomes geographic distance in evaluating whether a district is reasonably compact. See 548 U.S. at 435. There, the Court found that the previously-enacted District 23 satisfied the first Gingles prong despite stretching 500 miles from El Paso to Laredo, because "the Latino population in old District 23 is, for the most part, in closer geographic proximity than is the Latino population in new District $25^{\prime \prime}$ and because of Latino voters' shared interests in both communities. Id. at 424, 435; id. at 500 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Here, Defendant has not proffered any evidence to suggest that the two Tribes have substantially disparate representational needs sufficient to preclude a finding that together they constitute a community of interest that ought to be preserved. Cf. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435 (finding district compact where "there has been no contention that the different pockets of the Latino population . . . have divergent needs and interests . . . ."). By contrast, Chairman Azure of Turtle Mountain and Chairman Yankton of Spirit Lake have explained how the Native Americans of both tribes share a host of needs and interests having nothing to do with race. This includes a unique rural experience that differs from other rural North Dakotans who are united by agricultural and energy interests. Ex. 4 斤 8 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 § 9 (Yankton Decl.). Moreover, the communities share "similar socio-economic statuses," and "similar representational needs from our state legislature related to economic investment, state-sponsored services, and legislative appropriations." Id.; see generally Ex. 20 (W. McCool Report). The Tribes partner across a host of educational, tourism, and gaming organizations. Ex. 4 ब 9 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 ब 10 (Yankton

Decl.). Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain also work together to pursue legislative objectives such as "funding for tribal colleges, negotiating the tribal-state gaming compact, taxation on tribal lands, hunting and fishing regulation, tribal and state law enforcement, and funding for education, foster care, health care, etc." Ex. 4 \| 11 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 § 12 (Yankton Decl.). And the Tribes have shared needs and interests with respect to their legislative representation on a host of issues unrelated to race, making their combination appropriate under Gingles prong one. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 434-35 (noting that shared interests beyond race is an appropriate basis to combine geographically dispersed minority voters).

As Dr. Hood's testimony shows, Demonstrative District 9 satisfies the first Gingles precondition, precluding summary judgment in favor of Defendant on that issue.

## II. Plaintiffs have satisfied-or at the very least shown genuine disputes of material facts-as to the third Gingles precondition.

Where the parties are in dispute, summary judgment on Gingles prong three is typically inappropriate because it requires "weighing the evidence." Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections \& Registration, 657 F. App'x 871, 872-73 (11th Cir. 2016) (reversing grant of summary judgment that rested upon discounting one expert's calculations, choosing which elections to consider, and improperly weighing past elections more than recent elections"). Here, the evidence shows that Plaintiffs have satisfied the third Gingles precondition, or at the very least there are genuine disputes of material fact that would require the Court to weigh the evidence presented by the parties' experts. This is apparent both from Dr. Collingwood's analysis in his attached reports, Dr. Hood's deposition testimony, and now Defendant's own position in Walen. As such, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the third Gingles precondition.

To determine whether white bloc voting exists, such that the third prong is satisfied, courts must look to "election results from the majority-white district" in a region, i.e., the district that is
alleged to have a cracked minority population, and not on neighboring "packed" districts. Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1027 (Gruender, J., concurring) ("If the State's approach were correct, packing would be both the problem and the solution-i.e., having illegally packed Indians into one district, the State could then point out that Indians are sometimes able to elect their preferred candidate in the packed district"); see also Bone Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (same); De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1003-04 (focusing on whether white voters vote as bloc "to bar minority groups from electing their chosen candidates except in a district where a given minority makes up the voting majority"); Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that counting results of majority minority district in Gingles prong three would "permit white bloc voting in a majoritywhite district to be washed clean by electoral success in neighboring majority-Indian districts").

After selecting the appropriate district(s) to analyze, the Court must analyze election results in those districts according to their relative probative value-not simply sum all elections and afford them equal weight. "Endogenous and interracial elections are the best indicators of whether the white majority usually defeats the minority candidate." Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1020-21. Moreover, " $[t]$ he more recent the election, the higher its probative value." Id. at 1021. Exogenous elections-here, those for statewide office reconstituted within the challenged district-"are not as probative as endogenous elections," though they can "hold some probative value." Id.

Finally, in assessing the third precondition the Court must also consider whether "special circumstances . . . may explain minority electoral success in a polarized contest." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57 \& n.26. Special circumstances will remove an election from consideration in Gingles prong three if "the election was not representative of the typical way in which the electoral process functions." Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 557 (9th Cir. 1998). "Only minority electoral
success in typical elections is relevant to whether a Section 2 majority voting bloc usually defeats the minority's preferred candidate." Id. at 558. Here, the evidence is in Plaintiffs' favor.

First, Dr. Collingwood explains that "in each category of election that is considered most probative, there is a clear and compelling pattern of white voters usually defeating Native American voters' candidates of choice in District 9." Ex. 2 at 6 (Collingwood Rebuttal). This is so in $100 \%$ of the endogenous contests and $100 \%$ of the most recent 2022 elections. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). If the 2022 and 2020 elections are considered together, white voters block the election of Native American voters' preferred candidates in 71\% of elections. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). In elections featuring Native American candidates across all election cycles considered, the Native American candidates lose $60 \%$ of the time. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). This is sufficient to demonstrate that the white majority "typically votes in a bloc to defeat the minority candidate" in District 9. Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1020.

In reaching the opposite conclusion in his expert report, Dr. Hood (and, Defendant, in his motion in this case) merely added all possible elections together and gave every election equal weight to conclude that the Native American-preferred candidates win more often than not. But doing so places far too great of weight on the exogenous, statewide, and older elections that overstate the potential for Native American-preferred candidates-and certainly Native American candidates-to win. At his deposition, Dr. Hood conceded that this was not the correct approach. Rather, he testified that exogenous elections "should be accorded far less weight," that more recent elections are more probative, and that elections featuring Native American candidates are also more probative. Ex. 3 at 39:3-44:8 (Hood Dep.). Importantly, Dr. Hood agreed that the defeat of Native American Sen. Richard Marcellais in the 2022 election in District 9 is the "single most probative contest" for assessing the third Gingles precondition "because it features an endogenous
election with a Native American and it's the most recent." Ex. 3 at 45:15-24 (Hood Dep.). Thus even the testimony of Defendant's expert points strongly in favor of a Gingles prong three showing.

Further, as Dr. Collingwood explains and as the case law establishes, see supra, Dr. Hood's review of Dr. Collingwood's data is flawed because he added District 9A—with its near 80\% NVAP—into his calculations for Gingles prong three. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal); ECF No. 60-35 at 3 (Hood Report). Dr. Hood acknowledged that the $100 \%$ win rate for Native American voters in District 9A "doesn't tell us what's happening in the cracked-the allegedly cracked populations outside District 9A," and testified that he "do[es]n't disagree necessarily" that a better approach to his analysis is to remove District 9A form the calculus and focus on Districts 9 and 9B. Ex. 3 at 95:19-97:7 (Hood Dep.). Dr. Hood agreed that doing so would yield a 58\% defeat rate in the districts for Native American preferred candidates. Ex. 3 at 98:10-99:6 (Hood Dep.); see also Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Focusing the analysis on District 9 and 15, Dr. Collingwood's analysis shows a $64 \%$ combined defeat rate for Native American preferred candidates. Ex. 2 at 7 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

Second, Dr. Hood's report and Defendant's motion do not account for the special circumstances that define the 2018 elections. As explained above, the 2018 elections were not close to the typical electoral environment in North Dakota or District 9 with respect to Native American turnout. See supra at 7-8; see also Ex. 2 at 4, 8 (Collingwood Rebuttal). As Dr. Collingwood explained, "I have studied and conducted many turnout analyses . . . in areas with large shares of Native American eligible voters. In all the many elections in different jurisdiction[s] I have studied, I have never seen a Native American turnout number" like the 57.6\% among Native Americans in District 9 in 2018. Ex. 2 at 4 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Dr. Collingwood explained
this was highly unusual as well because it inverted the normal presidential to midterm turnout pattern and changed the electoral composition of District 9 from its ordinary $60-67 \%$ white share to being split evenly $50-50 \%$ between white voters and Native American voters. Ex. 2 at 4-5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). Chairmen Azure and Yankton explain that the 2018 election, with its intense focus on Native American turnout from regional, state, and national groups with considerable financial resources, the presence of national celebrities holding get-out-the-vote concerts on the reservations, and the outrage among Native Americans at what they viewed as an effort to suppress their voting strength with the "residential street address" voter ID requirement, made the election unlike any before or since. Ex. 4 बी 24-31 (Azure Decl.); Ex. 5 बी 25-38 (Yankton Decl.). Indeed, Dr. Hood could not think of another example where a group had such higher turnout in a midterm than in a presidential election. Ex. 3 at 82:21-83:20 (Hood Dep.).

If the 2018 elections are excluded as special circumstances as Dr. Collingwood advises, Ex. 2 at 8 (Collingwood Rebuttal); see also Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 558 ("Only minority electoral success in typical elections is relevant to whether a Section 2 majority voting bloc usually defeats the minority's preferred candidate"), and the 2022, 2020, and 2016 elections are considered in combination-even weighing the elections equally-then Native American voters' preferred candidates in District 9 lose 57\% of the time. Ex. 2 at 8 (Collingwood Rebuttal); Ex. 3 at 90:1023 (Hood Dep.); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 61 (finding Gingles prong three satisfied based upon data from three probative election cycles).

Third, Dr. Hood's own independent analysis-updated by him during his depositionshows that Gingles prong three is satisfied in District 9. Although Dr. Hood's expert report in this case merely responds to Dr. Collingwood's analysis, in the related Walen matter he produced an expert report conducting an independent analysis of all three Gingles preconditions for Districts 9,

9A, and 9B. Ex. 14 (Hood Walen Report). In that report, he analyzed six elections from 2018 and 2020, and found that Native American voters' preferred candidates were defeated in two of the six. Ex. 14 at 6 (Hood Walen Report). When asked at his deposition why he had not included any 2022 elections in his analysis-considering that his handwritten notes included at least the 2022 District 9 result showing Sen. Marcellais' loss—Dr. Hood testified: "I did not get to a full analysis" because he ran out of time before his report was due. Ex. 3 at 101:9-102:16 (Hood Dep.). He further testified that including the 2022 elections was "preferable" as the "most recent set of elections." Id. Dr. Hood then identified four additional 2022 contests that he thought should be included and agreed, presuming Dr. Collingwood's reported results for 2022 were correct, that these results would change Dr. Hood's own determination with respect to Gingles prong three. Ex. 3 at 108:8-16; 109:13-111:15 (Hood Dep.). With the addition of the 2022 elections he selected as most probative, Dr. Hood determined that his analysis "would show 60 percent defeat rate for the Native American preferred candidates in District 9." Ex. 3 at 109:24-111:3 (Hood Dep.).

Q: And a 60 percent defeat rate for Native preferred candidates would constitute usually being defeated by white bloc voting, correct?
A: Well, I guess it would meet the definition of more typically than not.
Q: And that's the definition that you apply to your Gingles prong 3 analysis?
A: Correct, yes.
Ex. 3 at 111:8-15 (Hood Dep.).
Moreover, Defendant has abandoned the position taken in his motion and now affirmatively contends that the third Gingles precondition is satisfied and that elections held in the full District 9 violate the VRA. Walen, ECF No. 102 at 39-40. This is not surprising in light of Dr. Collingwood's analysis, Dr. Hood's testimony, the 2022 election results. But this about-face means that both parties-and their experts-now agree the third Gingles precondition is satisfied in District 9, precluding Defendant's request for summary judgment to the contrary.

Fourth, and finally, Defendant does not dispute that Gingles prong three is satisfied in Districts 9B and 15. ECF No. 60-35 at 4 (Hood Report); Ex. 1 at 26 (Collingwood Initial Report); Ex. 14 at 6 (Hood Walen Report); Ex. 2 at 8 (Collingwood Rebuttal). This likewise precludes the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on third Gingles precondition.

## III. Defendant's contention that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is a racial gerrymander has no basis in evidence and is belied by Supreme Court precedent.

Defendant's claim that Demonstrative District 9 is a racial gerrymander is unsupported by the evidence and belied by Supreme Court precedent. A party alleging a racial gerrymander must show that race was the "predominant factor" in the decision to "place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291. This requires a showing that other factors, like compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and others, were "subordinated . . . to racial considerations." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if race does predominate in the drawing of a district, compliance with Section 2 of the VRA is a compelling interest that precludes a district from being deemed an Equal Protection violation. Id. at 292.

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is a racial gerrymander because it "do[es] not properly account for the traditional redistricting principles" and "combine[s] the populations of two distinct and geographically separated Native American Tribes." ECF No. 59 at 25 . But as the above discussion regarding Gingles prong one shows, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 satisfies the traditional redistricting criteria as well or better than enacted Districts $9,9 \mathrm{~A}, 9 \mathrm{~B}$, and 15 , and many other enacted districts. It also beats out districts that the Supreme Court has found to comply with traditional districting principles for VRA purposes. See supra Part I. Moreover, Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain have a host of shared needs and interests having nothing to do with race, and thus are properly combined in a VRA district. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 434-35.

All Defendant cites for his supposition that Demonstrative District 9 is a racial gerrymander is Dr. Hood's statement that the district raises such "questions" in his expert report. ECF No. 59 at 21-25. But at his deposition, Dr. Hood testified that he is "not saying that" it is a racial gerrymander, that he "do[es]n't believe [he] can make that determination," and that he doesn't "have the evidentiary basis to say that." Ex. 3 at 199:22-200:12 (Hood Dep.). He further testified:

Q: And your testimony with respect to traditional districting criteria is not that plaintiffs' demonstrative district subordinates those criteria in favor of a racial classification, right? You don't have that evidence?
A: No, I didn't say that.
Ex. 3 at 203:2-8 (Hood Dep.). Dr. Hood further agreed that "just the fact that there are two Native American tribes in a district does not on its own mean that the district is a racial gerrymander," that "Native American reservations are more than just racial groups, [ ] they are sovereign nations," that they have non-racial interests, and that "Native American tribes might have shared interests that relate to issues with respect to representation in the state legislature." Ex. 3 at 198:10-14, 202:4-17 (Hood Dep.). But Dr. Hood testified that he could not speak to the presence or absence of nonracial shared interests between Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain. Ex. 3 at 17:15-23 (Hood Dep.) ("Q: And so you're not opining on anything related to those two tribes with respect to their shared interests or common interests or socioeconomic status or anything of the like. Is that right? A: Correct. Q: And you wouldn't have any knowledge or basis to do that, right? A: Correct.").

Ultimately Dr. Hood testified it was just as likely that the legislature's version of District 9 was a racial gerrymander by stretching eastward to pick up white voters:

Q: And it can be a racial gerrymander to include white voters in a district instead of other races of voters, right?
A: That is correct, certainly.
Q: And so to the extent that enacted District 9 stretches across to include rural white voters instead of Native American voters, under your view, that too could be an indication of a racial gerrymander?
A: Potentially.

Ex. 3 at 197:25-198:9 (Hood Dep.).
Defendant next cites Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004), in support of his claim that Demonstrative District 9 is a racial gerrymander. In Sensley, the court rejected the plaintiffs' demonstrative plan because it was "irregular," had an "extended and distorted shape," with a "narrow corridor [ ] carefully drawn to avoid areas of higher Caucasian population concentration[s]," and at certain points was "only a city block wide." Id. at 597 \& n.4. The plan split municipal boundaries and connected Black voters who "share[d] few community interests." Id. at 598. As Dr. Hood acknowledged, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 does none of these things. See supra at 12-13. Moreover, the court's concern regarding the 15 -mile distance between connected populations in Sensley, id. at 597, must be understood in the context of the map at issue-a nine-district parish police jury board. Id. at 591. It is unremarkable that a 15-mile distance might weigh against compactness for a nine-member county police board plan, but it would be unreasonable to apply the same yardstick to a sparsely populated, rural North Dakota state legislative district. See, e.g., Ex. 3 at 170:12-172:19 (Hood Dep.).

Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 bears no resemblance to the districts the Supreme Court has invalidated as racial gerrymanders. In Shaw v. Reno, for example, the Court rejected North Carolina District 12 as a racial gerrymander, describing it as " 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the [interstate] corridor" that "winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods." 509 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1993). Later, the Court in Cooper rejected a modern iteration of the same district ruled unconstitutional in Shaw, because it similarly went block-byblock adding Black voters and subtracting white voters in a way the Court held was only explainable by race. 137 S. Ct. at 1474-76. In Miler v. Johnson, the Court invalidated a Georgia
congressional district that carefully included Black voters and excluded white voters block-byblock. 515 U.S. 900, 909 (1995). And in Bush v. Vera, the Court invalidated a Texas congressional district that appeared "like a jigsaw puzzle . . . in which it might be impossible to get the pieces apart." 517 U.S. 952, 965, 973 (1996). The maps are shown below:

Shaw Invalidate District


Miller Invalidated District

Cooper Invalidated District


Bush Invalidated District


Defendant also suggests that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 is not proper because its NVAP is $66.1 \%$ rather than the bare majority NVAP of the enacted District 9. ECF No. 59 at 21. But, as discussed above, the enacted District 9 is dilutive and its actual electorate is supermajority white in normal electoral conditions. See supra at 7. Moreover, a $66.1 \%$ NVAP is exactly in line with the national median for Native American majority legislative districts. See Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). It is likewise similar to the NVAP of enacted District 4A, which

Defendant is defending in Walen as required by the VRA. Ex. 17 (N.D. Legislative Council District 4A Data). Moreover, Demonstrative District 9's NVAP accords with the remedial plan the Eighth Circuit affirmed in Bone Shirt. There, the court noted that the remedial districts had $65 \%$ and $74 \%$ NVAPs, respectively, and noted the importance of considering "other factors, including turnout." 461 F.3d at 1023. Defendant's suggestion that there is something improper about a $66 \%$ NVAP district is especially peculiar, considering he is simultaneously defending District 9A—which at $79.8 \%$ NVAP is the fifth highest in the nation—against Plaintiffs' allegation that it is excessively packed. Ex. 2 at 5 (Collingwood Rebuttal). These two positions are irreconcilable.

Moreover, Defendant's contention that Demonstrative District 9 is an improper remedy because it is a multi-member district is misplaced. ECF No. 59 at 21. As Plaintiffs discussed above, see supra at 17-19, whether an appropriate VRA remedy is single-member or multi-member districts depends upon an intensely local appraisal of the electoral conditions of each district—not a blunt one-size-fits-all rule. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Bone Shirt upholding a combination of single member and multi-member Native American majority VRA remedial districts in South Dakota underscores this fact.

The evidence forecloses Defendant's suggestion that Demonstrative District 9 would somehow violate the Equal Protection Clause. The district is required by the VRA, complies with traditional districting principles, joins Native American voters and tribes that share common interests and needs across a host of issues having nothing to do with race, and would remedy the enacted plan's dilutive effect which has reduced from three to one the number of legislators Native American voters in northeastern North Dakota can elect to the state legislature.

## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

March 1, 2023
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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via the Court's CM/ECF system.
/s/ Mark P. Gaber
Mark P. Gaber
Counsel for Plaintiffs

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS

MICHAEL HOWE, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Dakota, et al., Defendant.

## DECLARATION OF MARK P. GABER

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Mark P. Gaber, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney for the Campaign Legal Center, duly licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and admitted to practice before this Court.
2. Together with co-counsel, I represent Plaintiffs the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, Spirit Lake Tribe, Wesley Davis, Zachary S. King, and Collette Brown.
3. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Loren Collingwood's rebuttal report, served by Plaintiffs on Defendant in this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the transcription of the deposition of Defendant's expert Dr. M.V. "Trey" Hood, taken in this matter on February 13, 2023.
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of the North Dakota Legislative Council 2020 Census - Population Change Summary prepared for the Redistricting Committee and dated August 2021, which can be found in the public record at
https://www.ndlegis.gov/sites/default/files/resource/committee-
memorandum/23.9119.01000.pdf.
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of the 2022 N.D. Secretary of State Election Results for District 9, which can be found in the public record at $\underline{\text { https: } / / \text { results.sos.nd.gov/resultsSW.aspx?text=Race\&type=LG\&map=DIST. }}$
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of the 2022 N.D. Secretary of State Election Results for District 9A, which can be found in the public record at $\underline{\text { https: } / / \text { results.sos.nd.gov/resultsSW.aspx?text=Race\&type=LG\&map=DIST. }}$
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of the 2022 N.D. Secretary of State Election Results for District 9B, which can be found in the public record at https://results.sos.nd.gov/resultsSW.aspx?text=Race\&type=LG\&map=DIST.
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of the 2022 N.D. Secretary of State Election Results for District 15, which can be found in the public record at $\underline{\text { https: } / / \text { results.sos.nd.gov/resultsSW.aspx?text=Race\&type=LG\&map=DIST. }}$
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 14 is a true and correct copy of the report produced by Defendant's expert Dr. M.V. "Trey" Hood in the related matter, Walen v. Burgum.
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit 15 is a true and correct copy of notes taken by Defendant's expert Dr. M.V. "Trey" Hood and produced in response to a subpoena duces tecum served in this matter.
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit 16 is a true and correct copy of the country precinct maps for Pierce County, which can be found in the public record at https://www.piercecountynd.gov/image/cache/doc10633120220301130731.pdf; Rolette County, which can be found in the public record at
https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Precinct\ Maps/Rolette\ COunty.pdf; Eddy County, which can be found in the public at https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Precinct\ Maps/Eddy\ COunty.pdf; and Benson Counties, which can be found in the public record at https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Precinct\ Maps/Benson\ COunty.pdf.
14. Attached hereto as Exhibit 17 is a true and correct copy of the North Dakota Legislative Council District Data for District 4A, which can be found at https://www.ndlegis.gov/files/committees/67-2021/map for_consideration_092921.pdf.
15. Attached hereto as Exhibit 18 is a true and correct copy of the Texas Legislative Council Plan 1374C, which can be found at https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/redistricting/documents/15157.pdf. The Texas Legislative Council is routinely called upon by federal courts to provide technical assistance in Texas redistricting litigation. See, e.g., Perez v. Texas, 891 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811-812 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
16. Attached hereto as Exhibit 19 is a true and correct copy of the transcription of the November 9, 2021 Redistricting Committee meeting, which was produced by the Defendant to all parties in the related matter Walen v. Burgum.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge.

Executed this 1st day of March, 2023 in Washington, DC.

/s/ Mark P. Gaber<br>Mark P. Gaber<br>Senior Director, Redistricting<br>Campaign Legal Center<br>1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400<br>Washington, DC 20005<br>campaignlegalcenter.org

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## EXHIBIT 1

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA 

## TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.

ALVIN JAEGER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Dakota, et al.,

Civil No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS

Defendant.

## DECLARATION TO ACCOMPANY THE EXPERT REPORT OF LOREN COLLINGWOOD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Loren Collingwood, declare that:
My name is Loren Collingwood. I am an expert witness designated by Plaintiffs in the above referenced case now pending in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.

A true and correct copy of my curriculum vitae is attached hereto as a part of my report. The following report, a true and correct copy of which is attached and incorporated herein for all purposes, is a summary of my opinions and conclusions. The materials I relied upon to develop my analyses and opinions are cited therein and/or produced herewith for all counsel.

The court testimony and publications I am required to disclose are described in my attached report and/or curriculum vitae.

My reasonable and necessary hourly rate for my time in this case is $\$ 325$.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this 30th day of November, 2022


# Expert Report of Dr. Loren Collingwood 

Loren Collingwood

2022-11-30

## Executive Summary

In this report, I examine past election results in North Dakota statewide, and the areas comprising the newly adopted Legislative Districts 9, 9A, 9B, and 15. I do this to determine if voting is racially polarized-i.e., if Native American voters generally prefer one candidate, and white voters vote as a bloc against that preferred candidate. In conducting this analysis, I analyzed 40 general elections from 2014 to 2022, and used the Ecological Inference (EI) statistical method to evaluate if racially polarized voting (RPV) exists. RPV is present in every election contest except for two contests.

I also conducted electoral performance analyses in the following jurisdictions: The newly adopted Legislative District 9, and Sub-Districts 9A and 9B, and Legislative District 15. An electoral performance analysis reconstructs previous election results based on new district boundaries to assess whether a Native or white preferred candidate is most likely to win in a given jurisdiction under consideration (i.e., the newly adopted legislative map). I only conduct performance analysis in contests with RPV because those elections are the ones that provide meaningful information about the effects of white bloc voting.

Finally, I conducted an electoral performance analysis and assessed map metrics on two demonstrative maps proposed by plaintiffs.

Overall, the accumulated evidence leads me to conclude the following:

- Racially polarized voting (RPV) is present in North Dakota statewide elections, and specifically in the areas comprising Legislative Districts 9 and 15. This is particularly clear in the 2016 elections featuring three Native American candidates.
- It is not necessary to rely only on exogenous (statewide) elections, because endogenous elections have now been conducted in the November 2022 election for state legislature in Districts 9,9A, 9B, and 15. RPV is present in all these contests, and is particularly stark in contests featuring Native American candidates. This is true among both Native American voters and white voters, with both either supporting or opposing Native American candidates at even higher rates than when the groups' respective candidates of choice are both white.
- I used well-known statistical methods to assess RPV - ecological inference (EI) and Rows by Columns (RxC) - which consistently demonstrated racially polarized voting patterns between Native Americans and non-Hispanic white voters.
- In statewide elections featuring Native American candidates, racially polarized voting is present, and white voters effectively block Native American voters from being able to elect their candidates of choice in $4 / 4$ elections analyzed.
- Native American voters cohesively prefer the same candidates for political office in the newly adopted Legislative Districts 9, Subdistricts 9A and 9B, and Legislative District 15. White voters cohesively prefer a different set of candidates for political office.
- In my reconstituted electoral performance analysis, Native American-preferred candidates tend to win in the full District 9 prior to the 2022 elections, but lose in every single 2022 contest for a block rate of $100 \%$ ( 8 out of 8 ). This includes the more probative endogenous contest featuring the Native American state senate incumbent Richard Marcellais, who was defeated for reelection by his white opponent. Of the five contests from 2014-2022 featuring Native American candidates as the preferred candidate of Native American voters, the Native American candidate loses District 9 in 60\% of those contests.
- In my reconstituted electoral performance analysis, Native American-preferred candidates win handily in the newly adopted Legislative Sub-District 9A. However, Native American-preferred candidates disproportionately lose in the newly adopted Legislative Sub-District 9B because because white voters cohesively vote as a bloc against Native American voters' preferred candidates.
- In Sub-District 9B, of the 36 contests analyzed for bloc voting, white voters block the Native American-preferred candidate 29 times for a block rate of $81 \%$. In cases involving Native American candidates, the block rate climbs even higher, to 100\%.
- In Legislative District 15, the Native-American preferred candidate loses in 29 of 30 analyzed elections, for a block-rate of $96 \%$. Just Heidi Heitkamp won in this district in an election that featured unusually intensive get-out-the-vote efforts aimed at North Dakota Native American voters as a backlash to the state's residential street address voter ID requirements in 2018.
- An analysis of plaintiff's demonstrative maps shows that Native American-preferred candidates would succeed in carrying these districts. In Demonstrative 1, of the 35 contests I analyzed, the Native American-preferred candidate won 32 of 35 (91\%). In Demonstrative 2, of the 28 contests I analyzed, the Native American-preferred candidate won 26 of 28 (93\%). ${ }^{1}$

My opinions are based on the following data sources: Statewide North Dakota general elections from 2014-2022; 2022 legislative district elections, Census Voting Age Population (VAP) block data (PL-94-171 North Dakota file), Dave's Redistricting 2020 Census VTD file

[^6]for relevant VTD/precincts in North Dakota, North Dakota Legislative Districts shape files, and plaintiff's Proposed State House Districts GIS files.

## Background and Qualifications

I am an associate professor of political science at the University of New Mexico. Previously, I was an associate professor of political science and co-director of civic engagement at the Center for Social Innovation at the University of California, Riverside. I have published two books with Oxford University Press, 39 peer-reviewed journal articles, and nearly a dozen book chapters focusing on sanctuary cities, race/ethnic politics, election administration, and racially polarized voting. I received a Ph.D. in political science with a concentration in political methodology and applied statistics from the University of Washington in 2012 and a B.A. in psychology from the California State University, Chico, in 2002. I have attached my curriculum vitae, which includes an up-to-date list of publications.

In between my B.A. and Ph.D., I spent 3-4 years working in private consulting for the survey research firm Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research in Washington, D.C. I also founded the research firm Collingwood Research, which focuses primarily on the statistical and demographic analysis of political data for a wide array of clients, and lead redistricting and map-drawing and demographic analysis for the Inland Empire Funding Alliance in Southern California. I am the redistricting consultant for the West Contra Costa Unified School District, CA, independent redistricting commission in which I am charged with drawing court-ordered single member districts.

I served as a testifying expert for the plaintiff in the Voting Rights Act Section 2 case NAACP v. East Ramapo Central School District, No. 17 Civ. 8943 (S.D.N.Y.), on which I worked from 2018 to 2020. In that case, I used the statistical software eiCompare and WRU to implement Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) to identify the racial/ethnic demographics of voters and estimate candidate preference by race using ecological data. I am the quantitative expert in $L U L A C$ vs. Pate (Iowa), 2021, and have filed an expert report in that case. I am the BISG expert in LULAC Texas et al. v. John Scott et al. (1:21-cv-0786-XR), 2022. I filed two reports and have been deposed in that case. I am the RPV expert for Fair Maps plaintiff in LULAC v. Abbott. I have filed three reports and have been deposed in that case. I was the RPV expert for the plaintiff in East St. Louis Branch NAACP, et al. vs. Illinois State Board of Elections, et al., having filed two reports in that case. I am the Senate Factors expert for plaintiff in Pendergrass v. Raffensperger (N.D. Ga. 2021), having filed a report in that case. I was the RPV expert for intervenors in Johnson, et al., v. WEC, et al., No. 2021AP1450-OA, having filed three reports in that case. I was the RPV expert for plaintiff in Faith Rivera, et al. v. Scott Schwab and Michael Abbott. I filed a report, was deposed, and testified at trial in that case. I served as the RPV expert for the intervenor in Walen and Henderson v. Burgum and Jaeger No 1:22-cv-00031-PDW-CRH, where I filed a report and testified at a preliminary injunction hearing. I am the RPV expert in Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Lyman County where I filed a report and testified at trial. I am the RPV expert for plaintiff in Soto Palmer et al. vs. Hobbs et al. and have filed a report.

## Racially Polarized Voting

Racially polarized voting (RPV) occurs when one racial group (i.e., Native American voters) consistently votes for one candidate or set of candidates, and another racial group (i.e., non-Hispanic white voters) regularly votes for another candidate or set of candidates. I analyze multiple elections across five election years to determine whether a pattern of RPV is present in a given geography and/or political jurisdiction (i.e., statewide, Legislative District 9, etc.). In an election contest between two candidates, RPV is present when voters belonging to one racial/ethnic group vote for one candidate and voters who belong to another racial/ethnic group prefer the other candidate. The favored candidate of a given racial group is called a "candidate of choice." However, if a majority of voters of both racial groups back the same candidate in a contest, then RPV is not present in that contest.

Racially polarized voting does not mean voters are racist or intend to discriminate. In situations where RPV is clearly present, majority voters may often be able to block minority voters from electing candidates of choice by voting as a broadly unified bloc against minority voters' preferred candidate. At issue in this report, however, is whether the recently passed Legislative Districts 9 (including subdistricts 9A and 9B) and 15 of North Dakota's state legislative plan potentially dilutes Native American voters' ability to elect candidates of choice.

I examine RPV in the context of North Dakota of both exogenous statewide general elections reconstituted within Districts 9, 9A, 9B, and 15, as well as the most recent endogenous 2022 state legislative contests for those seats.

## Ecological Inference

To determine if RPV exists, experts must generally infer individual level voting behavior from aggregate data - a problem called ecological inference. We turn to aggregate data because most of the time we do not have publicly available survey data on all election contests and in particular geographic areas where we want to see if RPV is present. In general, we want to know how groups of voters (i.e., Native Americans or non-Hispanic whites) voted in a particular election when all we have to analyze are precinct vote returns and the demographic composition of the people who live in those precincts.

Experts have at their disposal several methods to analyze RPV: homogeneous precinct analysis (i.e., taking the vote average across high density white precincts vs. high density Black precincts), ecological regression (ER), ecological inference (EI), and ecological inference Rows by Columns, which is designed specifically for the multi-candidate, multiracial group environment. However, all methods can be used to assess whether RPV is present in diverse election environments involving multiple candidates and multiple groups. In this report I rely on the ecological inference (EI) method and the Rows by Columns (RxC) method to assess whether voting is racially polarized. I also focus my attention on the two top of the ticket candidates in each contest.

The R software package, eiCompare (Collingwood et al. 2020), builds upon packages eiPack (Lau, Moore, and Kellermann 2020) and ei (King and Roberts 2016) to streamline RPV
analysis, and includes all of these aforementioned statistical methods. In this report I include ecological inference estimates accounting for variation in turnout by race. That is, I divide candidate vote by voting age population (rather than out of total voted in that contest) and include an estimate for no vote. I then calculate vote choice estimates by race for only people who voted. In this way, the method prevents non-voters from skewing the analysis and accounts for variation in turnout by race.

The rest of the report presents my results: 1) A list of the elections analyzed; 2) Results and analysis; 3) District 9, 9a, and 9b results and analysis; 4) District 15 results and analysis; 5) Plaintiff map results and analysis.

## List of Elections Analyzed

Table 1 and 2 present the elections I analyzed. Native American candidates have an asterisk after their name. Overall, there are 40 elections. To establish statewide RPV, I only analyze the contests featuring Native American candidates: the 2016 U.S. Congress, the 2016 Insurance Commissioner, the 2016 Public Services Commissioner, and the 2022 Public Services Commissioner. I do this to establish RPV and blocking occur against Native American candidates in North Dakota in general.

In District 9, I analyze 38 elections across four election cycles finding RPV in each contest. However, in District 15, I analyzed 32 contests because I could not adequately convert the new District 15 to the 2014 precincts to join previous results with the new district boundaries. This is due to collapsed precincts falling within the district occurring between 2014 and 2016 that did not affect the merge in District 9 but did do so in District 15. Nonetheless, I find RPV in every single contest I analyzed in District 15.

Table 1. List of contests analyzed, between 2014-2022. Native American candidates have an asterisk after their name.

| Year | Contest | Dem Candidate | GOP Candidate | Statewide Winner | D9 RPV | D15 RPV | tatewide RPV |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2022 | Agriculture Commissioner | Dooley | Goehring | Goehring | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2022 | Attorney General | Lamb | Wrigley | Wrigley | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2022 | Public Service Commissioner 4 yr | Hammer | Hoffart | Hoffart | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2022 | Public Service Commissioner | Moniz* | Fedorchak | Fedorchak | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 2022 | Secretary of State | Powell | Howe | Howe | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2022 | U.S. House | Mund | Armstrong | Armstrong | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2022 | U.S. Senate | Christiansen | Hoeven | Hoeven | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2022 | State Senate D9 | Marcellais* | Weston | Weston | Yes |  |  |
| 2022 | State Senate D15 | Brown* | Estenson |  |  | Yes |  |
| 2022 | State House D15 | Lawrence* | Johnson/Frelich | Johnson/Frelich |  | Yes |  |
| 2020 | President | Biden | Trump | Trump | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2020 | U.S. House | Raknerud | Armstrong | Armstrong | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2020 | Governor | Lenz | Burgum | Burgum | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2020 | Auditor | Hart | Gallion | Gallion | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2020 | Treasurer | Haugen | Beadle | Beadle | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2020 | Public Services Commissioner | Buchmann | Kroshus | Kroshus | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | U.S. Senate | Heitkamp | Cramer | Cramer | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | U.S. House | Schneider | Armstrong | Armstrong | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | Secretary of State | Boschee | Jaeger (l) | Jaeger | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | Attorney General | Thompson | Stenhjem | Stenehjem | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | Agriculture Commissioner | Dotzenrod | Goehring | Goehring | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | Public Services Commissioner | Brandt | Christmann | Christmann | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | Public Services Commissioner 2yr | Buchmann | Kroshus | Kroshus | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2018 | Tax Commmissioner | Oversen | Rauschenberge r | Raushenberger | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2016 | President | Clinton | Trump | Trump | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2016 | U.S. Senate | Glassheim | Hoeven | Hoeven | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2016 | U.S. House | Iron Eyes* | Cramer | Cramer | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 2016 | Governor | Nelson | Burgum | Burgum | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2016 | Insurance | Buffalo* | Godfread | Godfread | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 2016 | Public Services Commissioner | Hunte Beaubrun* | Fedorchak | Fedorchak | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 2016 | Treasurer | Mathern | Schmidt | Schmidt | Yes | Yes |  |
| 2014 | Attorney General | Kraus | Stenehjem | Stenehjem | Yes |  |  |
| 2014 | Agriculture Commissioner | Taylor | Goehring | Goehring | Yes |  |  |
| 2014 | Public Service Commissioner 2yr | Axness | Fedorchak | Fedorchak | Yes |  |  |
| 2014 | Public Service Commissioner | Reisenauer | Kalk | Kalk | Yes |  |  |
| 2014 | Secretary of State | Fairfield | Jaeger | Jaeger | Yes |  |  |
| 2014 | Tax Commmissioner | Astrup | Rauschenberge r | Rauschenberge r | Yes |  |  |
| 2014 | U.S. House | Sinner | Cramer | Cramer | Yes |  |  |

Table 2. List of non-partisan contests analyzed, 2016.

| Year | Contest | Candidate 1 | Candidate 2 | Statewide <br> Winner | D9 RPV | D15 RPV | Statewide RPV |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2016 | Justice of Supreme Court | Bolinske | Tufte | Tufte | No | No |  |
| 2016 | Supervisor of Public Inst. | Chiang | Baesler | Baesler | No | No |  |

## Racially Polarized Voting Statewide

I analyzed three statewide contests including Native American candidates in 2016 and one in 2022:

- 2016 Insurance Commissioner featuring Ruth Buffalo (Native American) and Jon Godfread
- 2016 U.S. House of Representatives featuring Chase Iron Eyes (Native American) and Kevin Cramer (as well as Libertarian Jack Seaman)
- 2016 Public Service Commissioner featuring Marlo Hunte-Beaubrun (Native American), Julie Fedorchak, and Thomas Skadeland (Libertarian)
- 2022 Public Service Commissioner featuring Melanie Moniz (Native American) and Julie Fedorchak.

To conduct the analysis and all analyses, I gathered precinct election returns for candidates running in each contest either from the redistricting data hub ${ }^{2}$ or the North Dakota Secretary of State, which provides precinct vote returns ${ }^{3}$ While the redistricting data hub data come formatted in VTDs and in shape files, not all contests are always available. In the case where I downloaded data from the Secretary of State website I joined the data with VTD shape files based on VTD to precinct crosswalk column.

Next, I downloaded the 2020 VTD Census file from Dave's Redistricting - publicly available software. This file aggregates Census block demographic data to the VTD level. I join this file with the voting data based on the GEOID20 column - which is a unique ID for each VTD/precinct.

The last step is to develop the inputs to the ecological inference model. I convert the now precinct racial estimates to a percent, generating a percent Native American by dividing the

[^7]estimated number of VAP Native American individuals by the total number of VAP individuals in a precinct. I do the same for non-Hispanic white, then generate a race:other category. I convert candidate choice to a percent by dividing candidate vote by VAP (rather than out of total voted in that contest) and include an estimate for no vote. I then calculate vote choice estimates by race for only people who voted. In this way, the method accounts for non-voters and accounts for variation in turnout by race.

Figure 1 presents the racially polarized voting results. For every analysis, I include both iterative Ecological Inference results, and Rows by Columns ( RxC ) results - the most commonly accepted EI methods. The two methods consistently produce substantively similar findings. Beginning with the 2016 U.S. House of Representatives contest, in the EI analysis, Native Americans backed Chase Iron Eyes with 98\%. White voters, however, supported Cramer with $81 \%$. In the RxC analysis, results are complementary: Native Americans backed Chase Iron Eyes with $92 \%$. White voters, however, supported Cramer with 79\%.

In the 2016 Public Service Commissioner race, the Native American vote backed Hunte Beaubrun at 85\% (76\% with RxC model). However, white voters backed preferred Fedorchak with 75\% (73\% in the RxC model).

On the Insurance Commissioner contest, the Native American vote supported Ruth Buffalo with $99 \%$ of the vote ( $90 \%$ in the RxC model). Meanwhile, white vote backed Godfread with $77 \%$ (75\% in the RxC model).

Finally, in 2022, the patterns are consistent: Native American voters supported Moniz for Public Service Commissioner (81\% EI, 74\% RxC), whereas white voters supported Fedorchak (75\% EI, 76\% RxC).

Figure 1. Racially Polarized Voting assessment statewide involving native American candidates, 2016 general election, and 2022 general election.


The above section reveals stark racially polarized voting between Native American voters and white voters in North Dakota. Moreover, the findings show that whites are blocking Native Americans from electing candidates of choice. Based on official statewide results, ${ }^{4}$ of the three Native American candidates that ran statewide all lost:

- In the 2016 U.S. House race, Cramer (white) won 69\% to Iron Eyes' 24\%.
- In the 2016 Insurance Commissioner race, Godfread (white) defeated Buffalo (Native American) 64\% to 27\%.
- In the 2016 Public Service Commissioner contest, Fedorchak bested HunteBeaubrun by a margin of $69 \%$ to $23 \%$.
- In the 2022 Public Service Commissioner contest, Fedorchak beat Moniz 71\% to 29\%. ${ }^{5}$

Thus, all four Native American candidates lose handily; as whites bloc-vote against the Native American candidates.

[^8]
## Racially Polarized Voting in District 9

I analyzed 30 previous contests between 2014-2020 in the new Legislative District 9, and eight contests in 2022 for a total of 38 contests. To do so, first, I took the legislative shape file boundary from the state of North Dakota and subset it to just District 9. I then overlaid these boundaries against the voting district (VTD) boundaries for the state of North Dakota. Figure 2 presents the map with precinct boundaries in turquoise, precinct name written as text, and black boundary. Just one precinct is split between being in the district and outside of the district - Precinct 1 from Cavalier County. However, most of Cavalier's population and geography is kept within the district.

Figure 2. District 9 under new North Dakota map.


Figures 3-7 present the results of the RPV analysis across 38 election contests spanning five election years from 2014-2022. For each election cycle I present two columns: The EI estimates (Column 1) and RxC estimates (Column 2). On the y-axis I list each contest, and the candidate surnames. Surnames labeled with an asterisk feature Native American candidates. Vote choice estimates for both whites and Native Americans are displayed visually with the blue bar representing the Native American vote share for a given candidate, and the green bar representing the white vote for a candidate. Each model's $95 \%$ confidence intervals present the underlying statistical uncertainty (the likely range the true estimate would fall into given the statistical model).

There are so many contests that I will not list every single result here because the pattern is exceptionally clear: Native American voters tend to prefer one set of candidates, white voters prefer another set of candidates. In only two contests in 2016 (Justice of the Supreme Court and Supervisor of Public Instruction) are elections not racially polarized. For example, in the 2014 Agriculture Commissioner contest, the EI model estimates that $58 \%$ of white voters backed Goehring, whereas $94 \%$ of Native Americans backed Taylor. The RxC shows similar patterns: $54 \%$ of whites backing Goehring and $87 \%$ of Native Americans backings Taylor. The Attorney General contest shows a similar result: 88\% ( $74 \%$ in RxC ) of Native American voters supported Kraus Parr whereas 80\% (75\% in RxC) of white voters backed Stenehjem. A similar pattern is repeated in all the other 2014 contests for an RPV rate of $100 \%$.

Figure 3. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2014 contests.


Figure 4 presents results from the 2016 RPV analysis, displayed in the exact same format as 2014. The findings are exceedingly consistent with the 2014 analysis. RPV is present in seven of nine contests (78\%). For example, the EI analysis shows 89\% (82\% in RxC model) of Native American voters backing Nelson, whereas 74\% (72\% in RxC model) of white voters supporting Burgum. Moreover, of particular note, the results show a tendency for Native American candidates to receive greater support among Native American voters than do white candidates. For example, $98 \%$ ( $89 \%$ in RxC model) of Native American voters supported Ruth Buffalo for Insurance Commissioner; and 98\% (90\% in RxC model) supported Chase Iron Eyes for U.S. Congress.

The only exceptions to the patterns of RPV are the Justice of the Supreme Court and Supervisor of Public Instruction contests. There, a majority of both white and Native American voters support the same candidates: Tufte for Supreme Court and Baesler for Public Instruction, respectively.

Figure 4. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2016 contests.


I examined eight 2018 contests subset to Legislative District 9. Each contest shows very clear patterns of racially polarized voting. For example, in the U.S. House of Representatives election, the EI model shows Native Americans backing Schneider with $86 \%$ and the RxC model puts the number at 81\%. Meanwhile, white voters instead back Armstrong at 69\% (EI model) to $62 \%$ (RxC model). Every contest here shows consistent patterns.

Figure 5. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2018 contests.


Figure 6 presents the 2020 RPV results. All six contests once again show very clear and consistent patterns of racially polarized voting. For example, $98 \%$ ( $87 \%$ in the RxC model) of Native American voters backed Joe Biden for president; whereas 76\% (73\% in RxC model) of whites instead backed Donald Trump. Every other contest reflects these patterns bar none.

Figure 6. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2020 contests.


Finally, I analyzed the recent round of general election contests subset to District 9. I include here the analysis of the actual results in the new Legislative District 9 - an endogenous contest. The patterns are again consistent with earlier years: Native American voters back one set of candidates and white voters back a different set of candidates. This is true in all eight contests, but especially in the endogenous contest (LD 9) between the Native American candidate (Marcellais) and Weston. In that contest, Native American voters backed Marcellais (81\% in EI model, 79\% in RxC model), whereas white voters preferred Weston between 75\% (RxC model) to 76\% (EI model). Taken in total then, RPV is present in 36 of 38 (95\%) contests analyzed in D9 over a five-cycle period.

Figure 7. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2020 contests.


I do not conduct an EI or RxC RPV analysis in subdistricts 9A and 9B because 1) there are so few precincts in each subdistrict, and 2) subdistrict 9A has a large share of Native Americans, whereas 9B does not, so there are no truly homogeneous precincts of both racial groups in both subdistricts.

But because it is clear that RPV exists within District 9 as a whole, and because subdistrict 9A contains $68.5 \%$ of the total Native VAP within District 9 and subdistrict 9B contains $79.7 \%$ of the total white VAP within District 9, it necessarily follows that voting within the two subdistricts is likewise racially polarized.

This pattern can be confirmed by a review of the demographic makeup of the precincts within each subdistrict and their election results. For example, the charts below present the Native American and white VAPs within the precincts in both subdistricts as well as the 2022 election results for state house and state senate within those precincts. As is clear from the chart below, the election results within the precincts change in relation to the increase or decrease in the Native American or white VAPs. In subdistrict 9A, it is clear from the homogeneous Native American Rolette Precinct 3 that the two Native American state legislative candidates - Davis and Marcellais - were Native American voters' candidates of choice. Their vote share decreases in the remaining two precincts in correlation to their corresponding decrease in VAP share.

Table 3. Subdistrict 9A - Demographics and 2022 Legislative Results.

| Precinct | Native VAP | White VAP | 2022 State House Native Cand. | 2022 State House White Cand. | 2022 State Senate Native Cand. | 2022 State Senate White Cand. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rolette 3 | 0.936 | 0.055 | Davis: $90.3 \%$ | Malo: 9.6\% | Marcellais: 87.3\% | Weston: 12.6\% |
| Rolette 4 | 0.783 | 0.205 | Davis: 70.9\% | Malo: $29.2 \%$ | Marcellais: 74.9\% | Weston: 25.1\% |
| Rolette 5 | 0.373 | 0.609 | Davis: $\mathbf{2 6 . 9 \%}$ | Malo: 72.5\% | Marcellais: 30.0\% | Weston: 69.8\% |

In subdistrict 9B, it is clear from the homogeneous white precincts in Towner and Cavalier Counties that Weston and Henderson are the candidates of choice of white voters in subdistrict 9B. But Marcellais and Nelson prevail in the majority Native American Rolette Precinct 2. Notably, Nelson - who is white and was the incumbent state house representative before District 9 was split into subdistricts - receives over 12 percentage points higher among the white voters in Towner County than the Native American incumbent senator Marcellais. This illustrates the trend noted above that white bloc voting increases when the candidates preferred by Native American voters are themselves Native Americans.

Table 4. Subdistrict 9B - Demographics and 2022 Legislative Results.

| Precinct | Native VAP | White VAP | 2022 State House Native <br> Cand. | 2022 State House White <br> Cand. | 2022 State Senate <br> Cand. | 2022 State Senate White <br> Cand. |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Rolette 1 | 0.398 | 0.562 | Nelson: $49.3 \%$ | Henderson: $\mathbf{4 9 . 3 \%}$ | Marcellais: $39.2 \%$ | Weston: $60.4 \%$ |

Given the clear RPV from the EI and RxC analysis in District 9 as a whole, the high concentration of District 9's Native American voters within subdistrict 9A and its white voters within subdistrict 9B, and the correlation observable between the subdistricts' precincts' demographics and election results, it is clear that the subdistricts both feature RPV.

## Performance Analysis District 9

To conduct the performance analysis, I subset the precinct vote returns to the appropriate precincts then sum votes for candidate 1 and candidate 2 , respectively, dividing by total votes. I also take care to weight split precincts by underlying population voting age
population. For instance, if a precinct's population is half inside subdistrict 9A and half in 9 B , I weight all precinct votes according to this share.

Figure 8 presents the 2022 election results of the full District 9 then also subdistricts 9A, and 9B. The full district results are presented in the left-most panel, 9A the middle panel, and 9B the rightmost panel. The main finding is very straightforward: White-preferred candidates (as adjudged by the RPV analysis above) won every single 2022 election in the full District 9, including the legislative district itself (Weston 53.7\% to $46.1 \%$ for Marcellais). In general the victories tend to range from 5\% to 10\%, but Goehring beats Dooley by more than 20 points in the Agriculture Commission contest.

However, Districts 9A and 9B show diverging results: Native-preferred candidates prevailed in all eight contests within the 9A boundaries, but white-preferred candidates prevailed in all eight contests within the 9B boundaries.

Figure 8. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, as well as endogenous LD-9 2022 elections.


I also conducted a performance analysis in the 2020 contests, displayed in Figure 9. These contests show a mixed result at the full district level: Native-preferred candidates prevail in four of six contests; however the contests are generally very competitive. At the subdistrict level, once again Native-preferred candidates convincingly win in Subdistrict 9A (6/6, $100 \%$ success) and convincingly lose in Subdistrict 9B ( $0 / 6,0 \%$ success).

Figure 9. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2020 elections.


I conducted a similar performance analysis in the 2018 statewide contests (see Figure 10). The 2018 election presents special circumstances that warrant caution and counsel against mechanically interpreting that year's election results. First, nationwide this was a Democratic wave election. Second, there was a unique and unprecedented voter turnout effort targeted to Native American voters in North Dakota that year as a backlash to the residential street address voter ID law that came back into effect following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision lifting the injunction against that law in the weeks prior to the November 2018 election. That election featured an intense voter turnout effort from state, regional, and national Native American rights groups as well as celebrity appearances and concerts at Turtle Mountain and other reservations seeking to boost turnout and overcome the effects of the challenged law. Third, the top of the ticket was a nationwide marquee U.S. Senate race between then-Sen. Heitkamp and now-Sen. Cramer. In these exceptional circumstances, the Native-preferred candidates were able to win the full District 9 (8/8, $100 \%$ success rate). At the subdistrict level, once again Native-preferred candidates convincingly win in Subdistrict 9A (8/8, 100\% success) and win more often than not in Subdistrict 9B (5/8, 63\% success).

Figure 10. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2018 elections.


Figure 11 shows my performance analysis results of 2016 contests subset to Districts 9, 9A, and 9B. Note this analysis excludes the two contests in which RPV is not present. The full District 9 results show Native-preferred candidates winning in 5 of 7 contests, but the margins are extremely close. For example, in the Gubernatorial contest Nelson (Nativepreferred) bests Burgum 48.7\% to 48.3\%. The subdistrict results, however, once again show clear Native-preferred candidate victories in 9A (7 of 7, 100\% success) and whitepreferred candidate victories in 9B (0 of 7 Native-preferred victories, $0 \%$ success).

Figure 11. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2016 elections.


Finally, Figure 12 shows the 2014 contests results. The results show Native-preferred candidates tending to prevail in the full District 9, always prevailing in subdistrict 9A and prevailing two of seven times in 9B.

Figure 12. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 9 boundaries, 2014 elections.


Taken in total, in the newly passed Legislative District 9, earlier elections show that the Native-preferred candidate tended to win the full District 9 (although with the 2018 election presenting special circumstances that counsel against providing them undue weight), always win subdistrict 9A, and almost always lose subdistrict 9B. However, when we examine the most recent round of elections (2022) we observe that the Nativepreferred candidate lost every single contest, including the defeat of the Native American candidate (Marcellais) in the actual District 9 contest for state senate, and the defeat of Native American-preferred incumbent state representative Nelson in subdistrict 9B. The result is that following the 2022 elections, Native American voters in District 9 went from being able to elect 3 of 3 state legislators to instead just 1 of 3 state legislators within District 9.

Overall, the results point to three conclusions with respect to white bloc voting in District 9 . First, the more recent election data-which is generally accepted as the most probative of current local conditions and voting patterns-reveals a stark pattern of white bloc voting preventing Native American voters from being able to elect their preferred candidates in District 9. Second, in the endogenous contests - which are generally accepted as having greater probative value than exogenous contests - there is a clear pattern of white bloc voting preventing Native American voters from being able to elect their preferred candidates in District 9. Third, across all analyzed years when the candidate of choice of Native American voters in District 9 is a Native American (as opposed to a white candidate), then white bloc voting results in the Native American candidate losing $60 \%$ of the contests in District 9.

## Racially Polarized Voting in District 15

I analyzed 32 contests in the new legislative District 15. Figure 13 presents the district boundaries with precincts lined in turquoise and labeled at each respective precinct's geospatial centroid.

Figure 13. District 15 under new North Dakota map.


Figures 14-17 present the results of the RPV analysis across 32 election contests spanning five election years from 2016-2022. The results are consistent with the District 9 analysis: RPV is present in 30 of 32 contests for a rate of $94 \%$ RPV. This is likewise true in the 2022 endogenous contests for District 15 state senate and state house - both of which featured Native American candidates who were the candidates of choice of Native American voters.

Figure 14. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2016.


Voters' Race: $\quad$ Native $\quad$ White

Figure 15. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2018.


Figure 16. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2020.


Figure 17. Racially Polarized Voting assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2022.


## Performance Analysis District 15

I conduct a similar analysis here as I did on District 9 . Figures $18-21$ present electoral performance analysis on the 30 contests between 2016-2022 that exhibited RPV in D15. Overall, the results are very clear: the white-preferred candidate wins every single contest by a large margin with the exception of the 2018 U.S. Senate race where Heidi Heitkamp carried the district. Thus, the block rate by which white voters prevent the Native American preferred candidate from prevailing in District 15 is $97 \%$.

Figure 18. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2022 elections.


Figure 19. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2020 elections.


Figure 20. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2018 elections.


Figure 21. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to the new District 15 boundaries, 2016 elections.


## Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Maps

Plaintiffs have asked me to examine the electoral performance of two demonstrative districts, both of which create a new District 9 that would include the Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake reservations. Demonstrative 1 is shown below. Figure 22 presents the map the black line indicates the district boundary.

Figure 22. Demonstrative Plan 1.

LD-9 (Demonstrative 1)


District 9 within Demonstrative Plan 1 maintains all the 2022 precincts (which were redrawn following redistricting) whole. Its version of District 9 has a Native American VAP of $66.1 \%$ compared to enacted District 9's 54.5\% and the prior decade's District 9's 74.4\%. The map below shows Demonstrative Plan 1 fit into the enacted statewide plan.

Figure 22. Demonstrative Plan 1 whole state.

## LD-9 (Demonstrative 1 Whole State)



As the map above shows, the reconfiguration of District 9 in Demonstrative Plan 1 requires minor adjustments to neighboring Districts 14, 15, and 29. Both the enacted plan and Demonstrative Plan 1 have an overall population deviation of $9.87 \%$. District 9 in Demonstrative Plan 1 has a Reock compactness score that is higher (i.e., more compact) than five other districts in the plan enacted by the legislature. The overall Reock compactness score of the enacted plan and Demonstrative Plan 1 are equal at 0.41. Both the enacted plan and Demonstrative Plan 1 feature similar numbers of county splits. The enacted plan splits 20 counties 49 times; Demonstrative Plan 1 splits 21 counties 51 times.

Figures 23-27 show the reconstituted performance analysis results for elections 2014-22, in a similar way I showed for enacted Districts 9 and 15. Overall, this plan performs much more favorably for Native Americans - giving them a strong ability to elect a candidate of choice at the full district. The Native American candidate of choice wins all but three contests over the five-year period.

Figure 23. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 1 boundaries, 2022 elections.


Figure 24. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 1 boundaries, 2020 elections.


Figure 25. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 1 boundaries, 2018 elections.


Figure 26. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 1 boundaries, 2016 elections.


Figure 27. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 1 boundaries, 2014 elections.


I have also analyzed a second map, Demonstrative Plan 2, which is shown below.

Figure 28. Demonstrative Plan 2.

## LD-9 (Demonstrative 2)



In Demonstrative Plan 2, District 9 has a Native American VAP of 69.1\%. Demonstrative Plan 2 illustrates an alternative way in which District 9 could be modified to afford Native American voters the ability to elect their preferred candidates with the most minimal effect on neighboring districts. By splitting Benson County Precinct 1 and Pierce County Precinct 1 rather than assigning them entirely to District 9 (as Demonstrative Plan 1 does), it is possible to shift population from District 14 to District 9 without necessitating a subsequent addition of new territory to District 14. This is so because in the enacted plan District 14 has a population deviation of +613 , and so has room to shed population without needing a concomitant gain somewhere else. As a result, unlike in Demonstrative Plan 1, Demonstrative Plan 2 requires no changes to District 29 - limiting to just two neighboring districts (District 14 and 15) the necessary modifications. The statewide map of Demonstrative Plan 2 is shown below.

Figure 29. Demonstrative Plan 2 whole state.


In both the enacted plan and Demonstrative Plan 2, the overall population deviation is $9.87 \%$. District 9 in Demonstrative Plan 2 has a Reock compactness score that is higher (i.e., more compact) than two other districts enacted by the legislature. The overall Reock compactness score of the enacted plan and Demonstrative Plan 2 are equal at 0.41 . Both the enacted plan and Demonstrative Plan 2 feature the same number of county splits; both split 20 counties 49 times.

Figures 30-33 show the reconstituted election performance analysis under Demonstrative plan 2. It is clear from this analysis - and particularly from the 2022 results - that Native American voters are very likely to elect candidates of choice in this reconfigured district relative to the enacted D9. Of particular note, in 2022, the Native-preferred candidates wins seven of eight contests compared to losing all contests in enacted District 9.

Figure 30. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 2 boundaries, 2022 elections.


Figure 31. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 2 boundaries, 2020 elections.


Figure 32. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 2 boundaries, 2018 elections.


Figure 33. Performance analysis assessment in statewide contests subset to Demonstrative 2 boundaries, 2016 elections.


Overall, the alternative map shows that Native American-preferred candidates, as well as the Native American candidates, win relatively comfortably in both Demonstrative Plans 1 and 2.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, without any doubt, racially polarized voting between Native Americans and non-Hispanic white voters is present in North Dakota broadly and specifically in the new District 9, subdistricts 9A and 9B, and District 15. RPV is especially clear in elections featuring Native American candidates - but is present across every single elections - save two - I analyzed across five election years (2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022). An analysis statewide reveals that whites are voting as a bloc to block Native Americans from electing candidates of choice. Narrowing in on the new District 9, white voters are voting as a bloc to prevent Native Americans from electing candidates of choice in recent elections, in endogenous elections (including the 2022 defeat of the longtime incumbent Native American state senator), and in the $60 \%$ of contests across all tested years in which the Native American preferred candidate was a Native American. In subdistrict 9A, Nativepreferred candidates win 100\% of the time. However, in subdistrict 9B, Native-preferred candidates rarely win meaning that they generally lose contests in that subdistrict. In District 15, Native American preferred candidates lost $97 \%$ (29/30) of the time across all tested contests, including in particular the endogenous 2022 contests featuring Native American candidates.

Finally, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plans 1 and 2 illustrate a reconfigured District 9 with a Native American VAP ranging between roughly 66-69\%. While still a reduction from the $74.4 \%$ Native American VAP in the prior decade's map, this reflects a much less drastic reduction than in the 2021 enacted plan (54.5\%). Demonstrative Plans 1 and 2 maintain the same overall population deviation as the enacted plan, respect communities of interest in reconfingured District 9, have similarly compact versions of District 9 compared to other districts enacted by the legislature, and similarly respect other traditional districting criteria compared to the enacted plan. Unlike the enacted plan, which reduced from 3 to 1 the number of Native American preferred legislators elected in northeastern North Dakota, Demonstrative Plans 1 and 2 would retain the ability of Native American voters in District 9 to elect three candidates of choice to the state senate and state house.

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## Loren Collingwood

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## Employment

Associate Professor, University of New Mexico, 2020 - Present
Associate Professor, University of California, Riverside 2019-2020
Assistant Professor, University of California, Riverside 2012-2019
Assistant Analyst, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, Washington DC 2005-2007
Field Associate, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, Washington DC 2003-2005

## Education

Ph.D., Political Science, University of Washington 2007-2012
Committee: Matt Barreto (chair), Chris Parker, Luis Fraga, Chris Adolph, Peter Hoff
M.A., Political Science, University of Washington, 2009
B.A., Psychology, California State University, Chico, 1998-2002

Minor: Political Science
Honors: Cum Laude, NCAA Scholar-Athlete in soccer

## Research Fields

American Politics, Political Behavior, Methods, Race and Ethnic Politics, Immigration

## Books

2. Collingwood, Loren. Campaigning in a Racially Diversifying America: When and How Cross-Racial Electoral Mobilization Works. 2020. Oxford University Press.

Featured in Veja, Brazil

1. Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge. 2019. Oxford University Press.

Featured in Teen Vogue, Seattle Times; Phoenix New Times

## Articles

39. Collingwood, Loren, Gabriel Martinez, and Kassra Oskooii. "Undermining Sanctuary? When Local and National Partisan Cues Diverge." Urban Affairs Review. (Forthcoming).
40. Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. "Is Distance to Drop Box an Appropriate Proxy for Drop Box Treatment? A Case Study of Washington State." American Politics Research. (Forthcoming)
41. Barreto, Matt, Michael Cohen, Loren Collingwood, Chad Dunn, and Sonni Waknin. "A Novel Method for Showing Racially Polarized Voting: The Promise of Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding." New York University Review of Law and Social Change. 46(1). (Forthcoming)
42. Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Sergio Garcia-Rios, and Kassra Oskooii. "Estimating Candidate Support: Comparing Iterative EI \& EI-RxC Methods." Sociological Methods \& Research. (Forthcoming).
43. Morín, Jason L., Rachel Torres, and Loren Collingwood. 2021. "Cosponsoring and Cashing in: U.S. House Members' support for punitive immigration policy and financial payoffs from the private prison industry." Business and Politics. 23(4): 492-509.

Featured in KOAT-ABQ news
34. Newman, Benjamin; Merolla, Jennifer; Shah, Sono; Lemi, Danielle; Collingwood, Loren; Ramakrishnan, Karthick. 2021. "The Trump Effect: An Experimental Investigation of the Emboldening Effect of Racially Inflammatory Elite Communication." British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 1138-1159.

Featured in New York Times; Washington Post; The Times of India; Washington Post; NBC News; New York Times; Forbes; NBC News
33. Collingwood, Loren and Sean Long. 2021. "Can States Promote Minority Representation? Assessing the Effects of the California Voting Rights Act." Urban Affairs Review. 57(3): 731-762.

Featured in NPR; Modesto Bee, IVN News San Diego; Woodland Daily Democrat; Silicon Valley Voice; Spectrum 1; Washington Post; Politico
32. Oskooii, Kassra, Nazita Lajevardi, and Loren Collingwood. 2021. "Opinion Shift and Stability: Enduring Individual-Level Opposition to Trump's 'Muslim Ban'." Political Behavior. 43: 301-337.

Featured in Washington Post
31. Hickel, Flavio, Rudy Alamillo, Kassra Oskooii, and Loren Collingwood. 2020. "When American Identity Trumps Latinx Identity: Explaining Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies." Public Opinion Quarterly. 84(4), 860-891.

Featured in Academic Times
30. Walker, Hannah, Loren Collingwood, and Tehama Lopez Bunyasi. 2020. "White Response to Black Death: A Racialized Theory of White Attitudes About Gun Control." DuBois Review: Social Science Research on Race. 17(1): 165-188.
29. Filindra, Alexandra, Loren Collingwood, and Noah Kaplan. 2020. "Anxiety and Social Violence: The Emotional Underpinnings of Support for Gun Control." Social Science Quarterly. 101: 2101-2120.
28. McGuire, William, Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Katherine Baird, Benjamin Corbett, and Loren Collingwood. 2020. "Does Distance Matter? Evaluating the Impact of Drop Boxes on Voter Turnout." Social Science Quarterly. 101: 1789-1809.
27. Reny, Tyler, Ali Valenzuela, and Loren Collingwood. 2020. ""No, You're Playing the Race Card": Testing the Effects of Anti-Black, Anti-Latino, and Anti-Immigrant Appeals in the Post-Obama Era." Political Psychology. 41(2): 283-302.

Featured in VOX The Weeds Podcast
26. Collingwood, Loren, Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien, and Joe Tafoya. 2020. "Partisan Learning or Racial Learning: Opinion Change on Sanctuary City Policy Preferences in California and Texas." Journal of Race and Ethnic Politics. 5(1): 92-129.
25. Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez. 2019. "Covert Cross-Racial Mobilization, Black Activism, and Political Participation Pre-Voting Rights Act." Florida Historical Quarterly 97(4) Spring.
24. Gonzalez O'Brien, Ben, Elizabeth Hurst, Justin Reedy, and Loren Collingwood. 2019. "Framing Refuge: Media, Framing, and Sanctuary Cities." Mass Communication and Society. 22(6), 756-778.
23. DeMora, Stephanie, Loren Collingwood, and Adriana Ninci. 2019. "The Role of Super Interest Groups in Public Policy Diffusion." Policy and Politics. 47(4): 513-541.
22. Collingwood, Loren, Stephen Omar El-Khatib, Ben Gonzalez O’Brien. 2019. "Sustained Organizational Influence: American Legislative Exchange Council and the Diffusion of AntiSanctuary Policy." Policy Studies Journal. 47(3): 735-773.
21. Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. 2019. "Public Opposition to Sanctuary Cities in Texas: Criminal Threat or Immigration Threat?" Social Science Quarterly. 100(4): 1182-1196.
20. Reny, Tyler, Loren Collingwood, and Ali Valenzuela. 2019. "Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explains Shifts in White Voting." Public Opinion Quarterly. 83(1): 91-113.

Featured in VOX; The Week; The Economist; New York Times; The Economist
19. Gonzalez-O'Brien, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen Omar El-Khatib. 2019. "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration." Urban Affairs Review. 55(1): 3-40.

Featured in WaPo Monkey Cage I; and Monkey Cage II; WaPo Fact Check; InsideHigherEd; PolitiFact; The Hill; Christian Science Monitor; Pacific Standard; NBC News; Huffington Post; Seattle Times; The Denver Post; San Jose Mercury News; Chicago Tribune; San Diego Union Tribune; VOX
18. Oskooii, Kassra, Sarah Dreier, and Loren Collingwood. 2018. "Partisan Attitudes Toward Sanctuary Cities: The Asymmetrical Effects of Political Knowledge." Politics and Policy 46(6): 951-984.
17. Collingwood, Loren, Jason Morín, and Stephen Omar El-Khatib. 2018. "Expanding Carceral Markets: Detention Facilities, ICE Contracts, and the Financial Interests of Punitive Immigration Policy." Race and Social Problems. 10(4): 275-292.

Featured in CityLab; The Guardian; Mother Jones; NPR
16. Collingwood, Loren, Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien, and Sarah K. Dreier. 2018. "Evaluating Public Support for Legalized Marijuana: The Case of Washington." International Journal of Drug Policy. 56: 6-20.
15. Collingwood, Loren, McGuire, Will, Gonzalez O'Brien, Ben, Baird, Katie, and Hampson, Sarah. 2018. "Do Dropboxes Improve Voter Turnout? Evidence from King County, Washington." Election Law Journal. 17:1.

Featured in Seattle Times; CBS News
14. Collingwood, Loren, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra Oskooii. 2018. "A Change of Heart? How Demonstrations Shifted Individual-Level Public Opinion on Trump's Muslim Ban." Political Behavior. 40(4): 1035-1072.

Featured in VOX; ThinkProgress; LSE Blog; Al Jazeera; San Francisco Chronicle; NPR; Business Insider; Washington Post
13. Collingwood, Loren, Ashley Jochim, and Kassra Oskooii. 2018. "The Politics of Choice Reconsidered: Partisanship and Minority Politics in Washington's Charter School Initiative." State Politics \& Policy Quarterly 18(1): 61-92.
12. Newman, Ben, Sono Shah, and Loren Collingwood. 2018. "Race, Place, and Building a Base: Ethnic Change, Perceived Threat, and the Nascent Trump Campaign for President." Public Opinion Quarterly. 82(1): 122-134.

Featured in Pacific Standard; LSE Blog; Newsweek
11. Skulley, Carrie, Andrea Silva, Marcus J. Long, Loren Collingwood, and Ben Bishin, "Majority Rule vs. Minority Rights: Immigrant Representation Despite Public Opposition on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act." 2018. Politics of Groups and Identities. 6(4): 593-611.
10. Alamillo, Rudy and Loren Collingwood. 2017. "Chameleon Politics: Social Identity and Racial Cross-Over Appeals." Politics of Groups and Identities. 5(4): 533-650.

Featured in WaPo's Monkey Cage; NBC News; Los Angeles Times
9. Collingwood, Loren, Kassra Oskooii, Sergio Garcia-Rios, and Matt Barreto. 2016. "eiCompare: Comparing ecological inference estimates across EI and EI:RxC." The R Journal. 8(2): 92-101.

Featured in Investigate West
8. Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Christopher Parker, and Francisco Pedraza. 2015. "Racial Attitudes and Race of Interviewer Item Non-Response." Survey Practice. 8:5.
7. Barreto, Matt and Loren Collingwood. 2015. "Group-based Appeals and the Latino Vote in 2012: How Immigration Became a Mobilizing Issue." Electoral Studies. 40:490-499.

Featured in Latino Decisions blog
6. Collingwood, Loren, Matt Barreto, and Sergio Garcia-Rios. 2014. "Revisiting Latino Voting: Cross-Racial Mobilization in the 2012 Election." Political Research Quarterly. 67(3): 632-645.

Featured in LSE Blog
5. Jurka, Tim, Loren Collingwood, Amber Boydstun, Emiliano Grossman, and Wouter van Atteveldt. 2013. "RTextTools: A Supervised Learning Package for Text Classification in R" The $R$ Journal. 5(1).
4. Collingwood, Loren. 2012. "Education Levels and Support for Direct Democracy." American Politics Research, 40(4): 571-602.
3. Collingwood, Loren and John Wilkerson. 2012. "Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning Methods." Journal of Information Technology and Politics, 9(3).
2. Collingwood, Loren, Matt Barreto and Todd Donovan. 2012. "Early Primaries, Viability, and Changing Preferences for Presidential Candidates." Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42(2).

1. Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, and Sylvia Manzano. 2010. "A New Measure of Group Influence in Presidential Elections: Assessing Latino Influence in 2008." Political Research Quarterly. 63(4).

Featured in Latino Decisions blog

## Book Chapters

11. Collingwood, Loren, Stephanie DeMora, and Sean Long. "Demographic Change, White Decline, and the Changing Nature of Racial Politics in Election Campaigns." In Cambridge Handbook in Political Psychology. Edited by Danny Osborne and Chris Sibley. [Forthcoming].
12. Morín, Jason L. and Loren Collingwood. "Contractor Politics: How Political Events Influence Private Prison Company Stock Shares in the Pre and Post Trump Era." In Anti-immigrant Rhetoric, Actions, and Policies during the Trump Era (2017-2019). [Forthcoming]
13. Parker, Christopher S., Christopher C. Towler, Loren Collingwood, and Kassra Oskooii. 2020. "Race and Racism in Campaigns." In Oxford Encyclopedia of Persuasion in Political Campaigns. Edited by Elizabeth Suhay, Bernard Grofman, and Alexander H. Trechsel. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.013.38
14. Collingwood, Loren, and DeMora, Stephanie. 2019. "Latinos and Obama." In Jessica Lavariega Monforti (ed.) Latinos in the American Political System: An Encyclopedia of Latinos as Voters, Candidates, and Office Holders.
15. DeMora, Stephanie, and Collingwood, Loren. 2019. "George P. Bush." In Jessica Lavariega Monforti (ed.) Latinos in the American Political System: An Encyclopedia of Latinos as Voters, Candidates, and Office Holders.
16. El-Khatib, Stephen Omar, and Collingwood, Loren. 2019. "Ted Cruz." In Jessica Lavariega Monforti (ed.) Latinos in the American Political System: An Encyclopedia of Latinos as Voters, Candidates, and Office Holders.
17. Collingwood, Loren, Sylvia Manzano and Ali Valenzuela. 2014. "November 2008: The Latino vote in Obama's general election landslide." In Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population Is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation. By Matt Barreto and Gary Segura. New York: Public Affairs Press. (co-authored chapter with Matt Barreto and Gary Segura)
18. Collingwood, Loren, Justin Gross and Francisco Pedraza. 2014. "A 'decisive voting bloc' in 2012." In Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population Is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation. By Matt Barreto and Gary Segura. New York: Public Affairs Press. (co-authored chapter with Matt Barreto and Gary Segura)
19. Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Ben Gonzalez, and Chris Parker. 2011. "Tea Party Politics in a Blue State: Dino Rossi and the 2010 Washington Senate Election." In William Miller and Jeremy Walling (eds.) Stuck in the Middle to Lose: Tea Party Effects on 2010 U.S. Senate Elections. Rowan and Littlefield Publishing Group.
20. Collingwood, Loren and Justin Reedy. "Criticisms of Deliberative Democracy." In Nabatchi, Tina, Michael Weiksner, John Gastil, and Matt Leighninger, eds., Democracy in motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
21. Collingwood, Loren. "Initiatives." In Haider-Markel, Donald P., and Michael A. Card. Political Encyclopedia of U.S. States and Regions. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009.

## Software

R package: RTextTools. This package uses supervised learning methods to automate text classification. Coauthors include Jurka, Boydstun, Grossman, and van Atteveldt. Available on CRAN.

R package: eiCompare. This package compares outcomes between ecological inference (EI) estimates and EI:Rows by Columns (RxC) estimates. Primary purpose is employed in racially polarized voting analysis. Development Version available here: eiCompare or on CRAN. Coauthors include Barreto, Oskooii, Garcia-Rios, Burke, Decter-Frain, Murayama, Sachdeva, Henderson, Wood, and Gross.

R package: Rvoterdistance. Calculates distance between voters and multiple polling locations and/or ballot drop boxes. Ports C++ code for high speed efficiency. Available on CRAN.

R package: Rweights. Creates survey weights via iterative variable raking. Survey design object and weights vector are produced for use with R, Stata, and other programs. Currently in alpha form with unix tarball available here: Rweights.

R package: Rmturkcheck. Functions for cleaning and analyzing two-wave MTurk (or other) panel studies. Available: Rmturkcheck

R package: RCopyFind. Functions for extracting data frames then plotting results from WCopyFind plagiarism text program. Co-authored with and Maintained by Steph DeMora. Available: RCopyFind

## Under Review / Working Papers

Barreto, Matt, Michael Cohen, Loren Collingwood, Chad Dunn, and Sonni Waknin. "Using Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) to Assess Racially Polarized Voting in Voting Rights Act Challenges." [Revise \& Resubmit]

Gonzalez O'Brien, Ben, Loren Collingwood, and Michael A. Paarlberg. "What Leads to Refuge? Sanctuary Policies and the Influence of Local Demographics and Partisanship." [Revise \& Resubmit]

Decter-Frain, Ari, Pratik Sachdeva, Loren Collingwood, Juandalyn Burke, Hikari Murayama, Matt Barreto, Scott Henderson, Spencer Wood, and Joshua Zingher. "Comparing BISG to CVAP Estimates in Racially Polarized Voting Analyses." [Revise \& Resubmit]

Hickel Jr., Flavio R., Kassra A.R. Oskooii, and Loren Collingwood. "Social Mobility Through Immigrant Resentment: Explaining Latinx Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies and AntiImmigrant Candidates." [Revise \& Resubmit]

Collingwood, Loren, Jason Morín, and Edward Vargas. "Protesting Detention: How Protests Activated Group Empathy and Party ID to Shift Attitudes on Child Detention." [Working Paper]

Paarlberg, Michael A. and Loren Collingwood. "Fact or Fiction: Testing the link between local immigration policy and the MS-13 'Threat'." [Working Paper]

## Awards, Grants, and Fellowships

Matt Barreto and Loren Collingwood. Detection of Vote Dilution: New tools and methods for protecting voting rights. Data Science for Social Good project selection, University of Washington. 2020

Loren Collingwood. Measuring Cross-Racial Voter Preferences. UCR Faculty Senate. \$3,500. 2019.

Francisco Pedraza and Loren Collingwood. Evaluating AltaMed's 2018 GOTV Efforts in Los Angeles. \$12,000. 2018-2019.

Allan Colbern, Loren Collingwood, Marcel Roman. A Mess in Texas: The Deleterious Effects of SB4 on Public Trust in Law Enforcement. Center for American Progress. \$7,100. 2018.

Karthick Ramakrishnan, Mindy Romero, Loren Collingwood, Francisco Pedraza, Evaluating California's Voter's Choice Act. Irvine Foundation. \$150,000, 2018-2019.

William McGuire, Loren Collingwood, Ben Gonzalez O'Brien, and Katie Baird, "Evaluating the Impact of Drop Boxes and Get-Out-The-Vote Advertising on Voter Turnout in Pierce County, WA." MIT Election Data and Science Lab, \$16,365, 2017

Justin Freebourn and Loren Collingwood, Blum Initiative \$4,000, 2017
Hellman Fellowship Grant, UC Riverside, \$30,000, 2014-2015
Best Dissertation Award, 2013 Western Political Science Association
UC Riverside Harrison \& Ethel Silver Fund, \$2,000, 2013

Best Graduate Student Paper Award State Politics section, 2012 American Political Science Association

Texas A\&M Experimental Methods Winter Institute, \$800, January, 2011
UseR! 2011 Conference travel grant, \$1000, August, 2011
Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences travel grant, \$870, January, 2011
David J. Olson Research Grant, University of Washington Political Science, $\$ 2,000$, January, 2011
Warren Miller Scholarship Award, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Summer 2009

Matthews Fellowship, University of Washington, Winter 2008 - Spring 2009
Brennan Center for Justice, New York University [with Matt Barreto]
Indiana Voter Identification Study, $\$ 40,000$ - Oct. 2007, 6 months

## Teaching Experience

POSC 10 (American Politics); POSC 146 (Mass Media \& Public Opinion); POSC 171 (State Politics); POSC 104S (Race and Ethnic Politics Special Topics); POSC 108 (Race and Ethnic Politics)

POLS 300: Immigration Politics with Focus on Latino Politics
POLS 300: The Voting Rights Act: Causes and Effects
POSC 202A: Introduction to Quantitative Methods (Graduate)
POSC 207: Statistical Programming and Data Science for the Social Sciences (Graduate)
POSC 207: Quantitative Text Analysis (Graduate)
POSC 220: Graduate Seminar in Race and Ethnic Politics in the U.S.
POSC 256: Graduate Seminar in Public Opinion
POSC 253: Graduate Seminar in Electoral Politics
Text Classification with $R$ using the RTextTools package, UNC-Chapel Hill Workshop
Text Analysis with Political Data, Claremont Graduate School, 2019
CSSS Intermediate R Workshop 2011, Instructor (Summer)
POLS 501: Advanced Research Design and Analysis, Teaching Assistant (2 quarters)
ICPSR Summer Course: Methodological Issues in Quantitative Research on Race and Ethnicity, Teaching Assistant

POLS 202: Introduction to American Politics, Teaching Assistant
CSSS Math Camp 2011, Teaching Assistant
POLS 499D: Center for American Politics and Public Policy Undergraduate Honors Seminar (2 quarters)

## Professional Service

Co-editor, Politics of Groups and Identities, 2020-2021
Reviewer, Political Behavior, Journal of Information Technology and Politics, American Politics Research, Social Sciences Quarterly, Journal of Politics, Politics of Groups and Identities, American Journal of Political Science, Political Research Quarterly, State Politics and Public Policy, American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Race and Ethnic Politics, Urban Studies, Urban Affairs Review; many other journals

## Conference Papers and Presentations

Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk California Lutheran University. (October 2020).

Collingwood, Loren. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk California State University, Chico. (March 2020).

Collingwood, Loren. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk Humboldt State University. (March 2020).

Collingwood, Loren. "Campaigning in a Racially Diversifying America: Whether and How CrossRacial Electoral Mobilization Works." Invited Talk Oregon State University. (February 2020).

Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk University of San Diego. (November 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Campaigning in a Racially Diversifying America: Whether and How CrossRacial Electoral Mobilization Works." Invited Talk University of Massachusetts. (January 2020).

Collingwood, Loren. "Campaigning in a Racially Diversifying America: Whether and How CrossRacial Electoral Mobilization Works." Invited Talk University of New Mexico. (December 2019).

Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk California State University, Northridge, Los Angeles. (November 2019).

Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk Occidental College, Los Angeles. (November 2019).

Collingwood, Loren (with Sean Long). "Can States Promote Minority Representation? Assessing the Effects of the California Voting Rights Act." UC Irvine Critical Observations on Race and Ethnicity Conference. (November 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk University of Geneva, Switzerland. (November 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk University of Bern, Switzerland. (October 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk ETH Zurich, Switzerland. (October 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk London School of Economics, U.K. (October 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge." Invited Talk University of Leeds, U.K. (October 2019).

Valenzuela, Ali, Kassra Oskooii, and Loren Collingwood. "Threat or Reassurance? Framing Midterms Results among Latinos and Whites." American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. (August 2019).

Paarlberg, Michael A. and Loren Collingwood. "Much Ado about Nothing: Local Immigration Policy and the MS-13 'Threat' ." American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. (August 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "A Mess in Texas: The Deleterious Effects of SB4 on Public Trust in Law Enforcement." International Center for Local Democracy (ICLD) Conference on Local Democracy. Umae, Sweden (June 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "The \#FamiliesBelongTogether Outcry: How Protests Shifted Attitudes on Immigrant Family Separation and Child Detention." Invited Talk University of California, Irvine (May 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Text Analysis with R." Invited talk and presentation. Claremont Graduate University (May 2019)

Collingwood, Loren. "The \#FamiliesBelongTogether Outcry: How Protests Shifted Attitudes on Immigrant Family Separation and Child Detention." PRIEC. UC Davis (May 2019).

Collingwood, Loren. "Data Analysis with R." Invited presentation and training Cal Poly Pomona (May 2019)

Collingwood, Loren. "The \#FamiliesBelongTogether Outcry: How Protests Shifted Attitudes on Immigrant Family Separation and Child Detention." Invited Talk Northern Arizona University (May 2019)
Collingwood, Loren (with Jason Morín). "Contractor Politics: How Political Events Influence Private Prison Company Stock Shares in the Pre and Post Trump Era." Invited Talk Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Distrito Federal, Mexico (February 2019).

Roman, Marcel, Allan Colbern, and Loren Collingwood. "A Mess in Texas: The Deleterious Effects of SB4 on Public Trust in Law Enforcement." PRIEC Consortium. University of Houston (December 2018)

Collingwood, Loren. "The \#FamiliesBelongTogether Outcry: How Protests Shifted Attitudes on Immigrant Family Separation and Child Detention." Invited Talk University of Illinois Chicago (November 2018)

Collingwood, Loren. "Ongoing Research in Sanctuary Cities and Immigration Politics." Invited Talk University of Pennsylvania Perry World House (November 2018)

Collingwood, Loren. "Unfair Detention: How Protests Activated Racial Group Empathy to Shift Attitudes on Child Detention." Invited Talk Rutgers University (October 2018)

Collingwood, Loren. "Unfair Detention: How Protests Activated Racial Group Empathy to Shift Attitudes on Child Detention." UCR Alumni Research Presentation Washington and Philadelphia (October 2018)

Collingwood, Loren, Jason Morin. "Expanding Carceral Markets: Detention Facilities, ICE Contracts, and the Financial Interests of Punitive Immigration Policy." Invited Talk UCLA (October 2018).

Collingwood, Loren, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra Oskooii. "Opinion Shift and Stability: Enduring Opposition to Trump's "Muslim Ban". APSA (September 2018).

Collingwood, Loren, Jason Morin, and Stephen Omar El-Khatib. "Expanding Carceral Markets: Detention Facilities, ICE Contracts, and the Financial Interests of Punitive Immigration Policy." American Political Science Association Conference (August 2018).

Collingwood, Loren, Sergio Garcia-Rios, and Hannah Walker. "The Impact of Exposure to Police Brutality on Political Attitudes Among Black and White Americans." Cooperative Comparative Post-Election Survey (CMPS) Conference. (August, 2018).

Collingwood, Loren, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra Oskooii. "Opinion Shift and Stability: Enduring Opposition to Trump's "Muslim Ban". Politics of Race Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium (August 2018).

Collingwood, Loren, Jason Morin, and Stephen Omar El-Khatib. "Expanding Carceral Markets: Detention Facilities, ICE Contracts, and the Financial Interests of Punitive Immigration Policy." Politics of Race Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium, Michigan State University (April 2018)

Collingwood, Loren, Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien, and Joe Tafoya. "Partisan Learning or Racial Learning: Opinion Change on Sanctuary City Policy Preferences in California and Texas." Midwest Political Science Association Conference (April 2018).

El-Khatib, Stephen Omar and Loren Collingwood. "State Policy Responses to Sanctuary Cities: Explaining the Rise of Sanctuary City Legislative Proposals." Midwest Political Science Association Conference (April 2018).

Hannah Walker, Loren Collingwood, and Tehama Lopez Bunyasi. "Under the Gun: Black Responsiveness and White Ambivalence to Racialized Black Death." Midwest Political Science Association Conference (April 2018).

Hannah Walker, Loren Collingwood, and Tehama Lopez Bunyasi. "Under the Gun: Black Responsiveness and White Ambivalence to Racialized Black Death." Western Political Science Association Conference (April 2018).

DeMora, Stephanie, Adriana Ninci, and Loren Collingwood. "Shoot First in ALEC's Castle: The Diffusion of Stand Your Ground Laws." Politics of Race Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium, ASU (February 2018).

El-Khatib, Stephen Omar and Loren Collingwood. "State Policy Responses to Sanctuary Cities: Explaining the Rise of Sanctuary City Legislative Proposals." Politics of Race Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium, UCR (September 2017).

Collingwood, Loren, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra Oskooii. "A Change of Heart? How Protests Shifted Individual-Level Public Opinion on Trump's Muslim Ban." APSA (September 2017).

Collingwood, Loren, McGuire, Will, Gonzalez O'Brien Ben, Hampson, Sarah, and Baird, Katie. "Do Dropboxes Improve Voter Turnout? Evidence from King County, Washington." APSA (September 2017).

Collingwood, Loren, Reny, Tyler, Valenzuela, Ali. "Flipping for Trump: In 2016, Immigration and Not Economic Anxiety Explains White Working Class Vote Switching." UCLA (May 2017).

Collingwood, Loren, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra Oskooii. "A Change of Heart? How Protests Shifted Individual-Level Public Opinion on Trump's Muslim Ban." UCLA (May 2017).

Collingwood, Loren, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra Oskooii. "A Change of Heart? How Protests Shifted Individual-Level Public Opinion on Trump's Muslim Ban." Politics of Race Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium, UCSB (May 2017).

Reny, Tyler, Ali Valenzuela, and Loren Collingwood. "Public Reactions to Anti-Latino Appeals in the Age of Obama: Race, Illegality and Changing Norms." Vancouver, Western Political Science Association Conference (April. 2017).

Collingwood, Loren, McGuire, Will, Gonzalez-O'Brien Ben, Hampson, Sarah, and Baird, Katie. "Do Dropboxes Improve Voter Turnout? Evidence from King County, Washington." WPSA (April 2017).

Gonzalez-O'Brien, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen El-Khatib. "Gimme Shelter: The Myth and Reality of the American Sanctuary City". Vancouver, Western Political Science Association Conference WPSA (April 2017).

Rush, Tye, Pedraza, Francisco, Collingwood, Loren. "Relieving the Conscience: White Guilt and Candidate Evaluation." Politics of Race Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium, UCI (March 2017).

Reny, Tyler, Ali Valenzuela, and Loren Collingwood. "Public Reactions to Anti-Latino Appeals in the Age of Obama: Race, Illegality and Changing Norms." Philadelphia, American Political Science Association Conference (Sept. 2016)

Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Sergio Garcia-Rios, and Kassra Oskooii. "Estimating Candidate Support: Comparing EI \& EI-RxC." Chicago, Midwest Political Science Association Conference (April 2016)

Bishin, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and Erinn Lauterbach. "Cross-Racial Mobilization in a Rapidly Diversifying Polity: Latino Candidates and Anglo Voters" Chicago, Midwest Political Science Association Conference (April 2016)

Gonzalez-O'Brien, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen El-Khatib. "Gimme Shelter: The Myth and Reality of the American Sanctuary City". San Diego, Western Political Science Association Conference (April 2016)

Collingwood, Loren and Antoine Yoshinaka. The new carpetbaggers? Analyzing the effects of migration on Southern politics. The Citadel Conference on Southern Poliics, Charleston, SC (Mar 2016)

Alamillo, Rudy and Loren Collingwood. Chameleon Politics: Social Identity and Racial CrossOver Appeals. American Political Science Association Conference, San Francisco (Sept 2015)

Reny, Tyler, Ali Valenzuela, and Loren Collingwood. "Public Reactions to Anti-Latino Appeals in the Age of Obama: Race, Illegality and Changing Norms." San Francisco, American Political Science Association Conference (Sept 2015)

Alamillo, Rudy and Loren Collingwood. Chameleon Politics: Social Identity and Racial CrossOver Appeals. Western Political Science Association Conference, Las Vegas (April 2015)

Barreto, Matt and Loren Collingwood. Confirming Electoral Change: The 2012 U.S. Presidential Election OSU Conference (October, 2013). "Earning and Learning the Latino Vote in 2008 and 2012: How the Obama Campaign Tried, Refined, Learned, and Made Big Steps in Cross-Racial Mobilization to Latinos.

Collingwood, Loren and Ashley Jochim. 2012 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference (April) Chicago, IL. "Electoral Competition and Latino Representation: The Partisan Politics of Immigration Policy in the 104th Congress."

Collingwood, Loren. 2012 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference (March) Portland, OR. "The Development and Use of Cross-Racial Mobilization as Campaign Strategy in U.S. Elections: The Case of Texas 1948-2010."

Collingwood, Loren. 2012 Institute for Pragmatic Practice Annual Conference (March) Seattle, WA. "Changing Demographics, Rural Electorates, and the Future of American Politics."

Collingwood, Loren. 2012 Politics of Race, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consortium (January) Riverside, CA. "The Development of Cross-Racial Mobilization: The Case of Texas 1948-2010."

Collingwood, Loren. 2011 American Political Science Association Annual Conference (September) Seattle, WA. "The Pursuit of Victory and Incorporation: Elite Strategy, Group Pressure, and Cross Racial Mobilization."

Forman, Adam and Loren Collingwood. 2011 American Political Science Association Annual Conference (September) Seattle, WA. "Measuring Power via Presidential Phone Records." (Poster)

Collingwood, Loren with (Tim Jurka, Wouter Van Atteveldt, Amber Boydstun, and Emiliano Grossman). UseR! 2011 Conference. (August) Coventry, United Kingdom. "RTextTools: A Supervised Learning Package for Text Classification in R."

Jurka, Tim, Loren Collingwood, Wouter Van Atteveldt, Amber Boydstun, and Emiliano Grossman. 2011 Comparative Agendas Project Conference. (June) Catania, Italy. "RTextTools: A Supervised Learning Package for Text Classification in R."

Collingwood, Loren and John Wilkerson. 2011 Journal of Information Technology \& Politics Conference. (May) Seattle, WA. "Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning Methods."

Collingwood, Loren. 2011 Politics of Race, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consortium (May) Davis, CA. "The Pursuit of Victory and Incorporation: Elite Strategy, Group Pressure, and Cross Racial Mobilization"

Collingwood, Loren. 2011 Western Political Science Conference (April) San Antonio, TX. "RaceMatching as Targeted Mobilization."

Collingwood, Loren. 2011 Western Political Science Conference (April) San Antonio, TX. "The Pursuit of Victory and Incorporation: Elite Strategy, Group Pressure, and Cross Racial Mobilization"

Collingwood, Loren (with John Wilkerson). Invited Talk: Texas A\&M University. (April, 2011) "Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning Methods."

Collingwood, Loren (with John Wilkerson). Invited Talk: Rice University. (April, 2011) "Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning Methods."

Collingwood, Loren. 2011 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference (April) Chicago, IL. "Race-Matching as Targeted Mobilization."

Collingwood, Loren and John Wilkerson. 2011 Text as Data Conference. (March) Evanston, IL. "Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning Methods."

Collingwood, Loren and John Wilkerson. 2011 Southern Political Science Conference. (January) New Orleans, LA. "Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning Methods."
Collingwood, Loren (with Ben Gonzalez). 2010 American Political Science Association Annual Conference. (September) Washington, DC. "The Political Process in Florida: Modeling African American Registration Rates Post Smith v. Allwright, 1944-1964."

Wilkerson, John, Steve Purpura, and Loren Collingwood. 2010 NSF Funded Tools for Text Workshop. (June) Seattle, WA. "Rtexttools: A Supervised Machine Learning Package in an R-Wrapper."

Collingwood, Loren and Marcela Garcia-Castanon. 2010 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference. (April) San Francisco, CA. "Negativity as a Tool: candidate poll standing and attack politics."

Collingwood, Loren. 2010 Politics of Race, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consortium. (January) Riverside, CA. "White Outreach: A spatial approach to modeling black incorporation in Florida post Smith v. Allwright, 1944-1965."

Collingwood, Loren. 2009 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference. (March) Vancouver, BC. "Levels of Education, Political Knowledge and Support for Direct Democracy."

Collingwood, Loren. 2009 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference. (March) Vancouver, BC. "The Negativity Effect: Psychological underpinnings of advertising recall in modern political campaigns."

Collingwood, Loren and Marcela Garcia-Castanon. 2009 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference. (March) Vancouver, BC. "Negativity as a Tool: predicting negative responses and their effectiveness in the 2008 campaign season."

Collingwood, Loren and Marcela Garcia-Castanon. 2009 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference. (March) Vancouver, BC. "Switching codes: analyzing Obama's strategy for addressing Latinos in the 2008 presidential campaign."

Collingwood, Loren, (with Matt Barreto and Sylvia Manzano) 2009 Shambaugh Conference. (March) University of Iowa, IA. "More than one way to shuck a tamale: Latino influence in the 2008 general election."

Collingwood, Loren and Marcela Garcia-Castanon. 2009 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference. (April) Chicago, IL. "Switching codes: analyzing Obama's strategy for addressing Latinos in the 2008 presidential campaign."

Collingwood, Loren and Marcela Garcia-Castanon. 2009 Pacific Northwest Political Science Conference. (October) Victoria, BC. "Negativity as a Tool: predicting negative responses and their effectiveness in the 2008 campaign season."

Collingwood, Loren and Francisco Pedraza (with Matt Barreto and Chris Parker). 2009 Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences 10th Anniversary Conference. (May) Seattle, WA. "Race of interviewer effects: perceived versus actual."

Collingwood, Loren (with Matt Barreto, Chris Parker, and Francisco Pedraza). 2009 Pacific Northwest Political Science Conference. (October) Victoria, BC. "Race of interviewer effects: perceived versus actual."

Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood and Todd Donovan. 2008 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference. (April) Chicago, IL. "Early Presidential Primaries, Viability, and Vote Switching in 2008."

Collingwood, Loren. 2008 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference. (April) Chicago, IL. "Levels of Education and Support for Direct Democracy: A Survey Experiment."

Collingwood, Loren. 2008 American Political Science Association Annual Conference. (September) Boston, MA. "Levels of Education and Support for Direct Democracy: A Survey Experiment." (Poster)

Collingwood, Loren. 2008 American Political Science Association Annual Conference. (September) Boston, MA. "Response Effects in Multi-Candidate Primary Vote Questions." (Poster)

## Computer Skills

R, Stata, Python, WinBugs/JAGS, IATEX, SPSS, MySQL, Access, ArcGIS, Some C++ when interacting with R.

## Reports

Collingwood, Loren. (2008). The Washington Poll: pre-election analysis. www.washingtonpoll.org.
Collingwood, Loren. (2008). Democratic underperformance in the 2004 gubernatorial election: explaining 2004 voting patterns with an eye towards 2008. www.washingtonpoll.org.

Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Francisco Pedraza, and Barry Pump. (2009). Online voter registration in Washington State and Arizona. Commissioned by Pew Research Center.

Collingwood, Loren, Todd Donovan, and Matt Barreto. (2009). An assessment of ranked choice voting in Pierce County, WA.

Collingwood, Loren. (2009). An assessment of the fiscal impact of ranked choice voting in Pierce County, WA. Commissioned by the League of Women Voters.

Barreto, Matt, and Loren Collingwood. (2009). Latino candidates and racial block voting in primary and judicial elections: An analysis of voting in Los Angeles County board districts. Commissioned by the Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association.

Barreto, Matt, and Loren Collingwood. (2011). A Review of Racially Polarized Voting For and Against Latino Candidates in Los Angeles County 1994-2010. Commissioned by Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina. August 4.

Collingwood, Loren. (2012). Recent Political History of Washington State: A Political Map. Commissioned by the Korean Consulate.

Collingwood, Loren. (2012). Analysis of Polling on Marijuana Initiatives. Commissioned by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner.

Collingwood, Loren, Sean Long, and Francisco Pedraza. (2019). Evaluating AltaMed Voter Mobilization in Southern California, November 2018. Commissioned by AltaMed.

## Relevant Work Experience

## Collingwood Research, LLC

Statistical Consulting and Analysis
January 2008 - Present
Conducted over 200 projects involving political research, polling, statistical modeling, redistricting analysis and mapping, data analysis, micro-targeting, and R software development for political and non-profit clients. Clients include: Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, Latino Decisions, Pacific Market Research, Beck Research, Squier Knapp Dunn Communications, Anzalone-Lizst Research, League of Women Voters, Shelia Smoot for Congress, pollster.com, Comparative Agendas Project, Amplified Strategies, Gerstein Bocian \& Agne, Strategies 360, the Korean Consulate, the California Redistricting Commission, Monterey County Redistricting Commission, ClearPath Strategies, Los Angeles County Council, Demchak \& Baller Legal, Arnold \& Porter LLP, JPM Strategic Solutions, National Democratic Institute (NDI) - on site in Iraq, Latham \& Watkins, New York ACLU, United States Department of Justice (Demography), Inland Empire Funder's Alliance (Demography), Perkins \& Coie, Elias Law Group; Campaign Legal Center; Santa Clara County (RPV Analysis); Native American Rights Fund (NARF); West Contra Costa Unified School District (Demography); Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Voces de Frontera; Roswell, NM Independent School District

## Expert Witness Work

Expert Witness: LOWER BRULE SIOUX TRIBE v. LYMAN COUNTY, 2022
Expert Witness: Walen and Henderson v. Burgum and Jaeger No 1:22-cv-00031-PDW-CRH, 2022

Expert Witness: Faith Rivera, et al. v. Scott Schwab and Michael Abbott No. 2022-CV-000089, 2022

Expert Witness: LULAC Texas et al. v. John Scott et al (1:21-cv-0786-XR), 2022
Expert Witness: Pendergrass v. Raffensperger (N.D. Ga. 2021),
Expert Witness: Johnson, et al., v. WEC, et al., No. 2021AP1450-OA, 2021
Expert Witness: East St. Louis Branch NAACP vs. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2021
Expert Witness: LULAC of Iowa vs. Pate, 2021-2022
Expert Witness: United States Department of Justice vs. City of Hesperia, 2021-2022
Expert Witness: NAACP vs. East Ramapo Central School District, New York, 2018-2019
Riverside County, Corona and Eastvale, 2015
Los Angeles County Redistricting Commission, 2011
Racially Polarized Voting analysis of Latino and Asian candidates in San Mateo County and alternative map creation, 2010-2011

State of California, Citizens Redistricting Commission, including Blythe, CA, in Riverside County, 2011

Monterey County, CA Redistricting, alternative map creation, 2011

## Greenberg Quinlan Rosner

Assistant Analyst, Anna Greenberg
June 2005 - May 2007

Assisted in the development of questionnaires, focus group guidelines, memos, and survey reports for political, non-profit, and corporate clients. Moderated in-depth interviews and focus groups.

## Greenberg Quinlan Rosner

Field Associate
December 2003-June 2005

Managed qualitative and quantitative data collection process in the U.S. and internationally. Provided methodological advice, including sample stratification, sampling Latino populations, and modal sampling strategies.

## Congressman Adam Schiff

Database Manager
March 2003 - June 2003

Managed constituent mail and survey databases; updated and maintained Member's Congressional voting record.

## Strategic Consulting Group

Field Organizer, Carol Roberts for Congress July 2002 - November 2002

Recruited and coordinated over 100 volunteers for mailings, canvassing, phone banking, and GOTV operations. Developed internship program and managed 15 interns from local colleges and high schools.

Institute for Policy Studies
Intern, John Cavanagh May 2001 - August 2001
Provided research assistance for projects advocating reform of the WTO, World Bank, and IMF. Worked on reports and op-ed pieces on global economic issues advocating fair trade.

## EXHIBIT 2

# Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Loren Collingwood 

Loren Collingwood

2023-02-16

## Executive Summary

I previously provided a report in this matter, dated November 30, 2022. I refer to that report as the "Collingwood November 2022" report. Since then, the defense expert, Dr. M.V. (Trey) Hood III, provided his response report. This report is my rebuttal.

Key Findings:

- Dr. Hood incorrectly characterizes LD-9 as a Native American opportunity district because he fails to account for turnout differentials that make white voters a substantial majority of the usual electorate in the district.
- Dr. Hood's Gingles III analysis is methodologically flawed because (1) he equally weighs all elections even though some are significantly more probative than others, (2) he includes election results from packed subdistrict 9A in his combined analysis but excludes election results from cracked District 15 (3) he does not address subdistrict 9B alone, and (4) he fails to account for special circumstances that make the 2018 elections of little or no probative value.
- Dr. Hood's conclusion that LD-15 satisfies Gingles II and III but not Gingles I because the existing LD-15 is not majority NVAP is methodologically flawed. Gingles I looks to the possibility of an alternative majority minority district, not whether the challenged district itself is majority minority.
- Dr. Hood's analysis of Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plans is flawed. The demonstrative districts satisfy population deviation goals, and are more compact than other adopted districts and districts that the Supreme Court has concluded to be reasonably compact for VRA purposes. Dr. Hood misreports the number of county splits in the enacted plan, and Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9 splits the same number of counties as enacted LD-15 and the state house version of enacted LD-9. The demonstrative plan performs comparably or better on other districting criteria as well.


## Background and Qualifications

I am an associate professor of political science at the University of New Mexico. Previously, I was an associate professor of political science and co-director of civic engagement at the Center for Social Innovation at the University of California, Riverside. I have published two books with Oxford University Press, 40 peer-reviewed journal articles, and nearly a dozen
book chapters focusing on sanctuary cities, race/ethnic politics, election administration, and racially polarized voting. I received a Ph.D. in political science with a concentration in political methodology and applied statistics from the University of Washington in 2012 and a B.A. in psychology from the California State University, Chico, in 2002. I have attached my curriculum vitae, which includes an up-to-date list of publications.

In between my B.A. and Ph.D., I spent 3-4 years working in private consulting for the survey research firm Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research in Washington, D.C. I also founded the research firm Collingwood Research, which focuses primarily on the statistical and demographic analysis of political data for a wide array of clients, and lead redistricting and map-drawing and demographic analysis for the Inland Empire Funding Alliance in Southern California. I am the redistricting consultant for the West Contra Costa Unified School District, CA, independent redistricting commission in which I am charged with drawing court-ordered single member districts.

I served as a testifying expert for the plaintiff in the Voting Rights Act Section 2 case NAACP v. East Ramapo Central School District, No. 17 Civ. 8943 (S.D.N.Y.), on which I worked from 2018 to 2020. In that case, I used the statistical software eiCompare and WRU to implement Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) to identify the racial/ethnic demographics of voters and estimate candidate preference by race using ecological data. I am the quantitative expert in $L U L A C$ vs. Pate (Iowa), 2021, and have filed an expert report in that case. I am the BISG expert in LULAC Texas et al. v. John Scott et al. (1:21-cv-0786-XR), 2022. I filed two reports and have been deposed in that case. I am the RPV expert for Fair Maps plaintiff in LULAC v. Abbott. I have filed three reports and have been deposed in that case. I was the RPV expert for the plaintiff in East St. Louis Branch NAACP, et al. vs. Illinois State Board of Elections, et al., having filed two reports in that case. I am the Senate Factors expert for plaintiff in Pendergrass v. Raffensperger (N.D. Ga. 2021), having filed a report in that case. I was the RPV expert for intervenors in Johnson, et al., v. WEC, et al., No. 2021AP1450-OA, having filed three reports in that case. I was the RPV expert for plaintiff in Faith Rivera, et al. v. Scott Schwab and Michael Abbott. I filed a report, was deposed, and testified at trial in that case. I served as the RPV expert for the intervenor in Walen and Henderson v. Burgum and Jaeger No 1:22-cv-00031-PDW-CRH, where I filed a report and testified at a preliminary injunction hearing. I was the RPV expert in Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Lyman County where I filed a report and testified at trial. I am the RPV expert for plaintiff in Soto Palmer et al. vs. Hobbs et al. and have filed a report and been deposed. I am the RPV expert in Dixon v. Lewisville Independent School District No. 4:22-cv00304, and have filed a report.

## LD-9 is not a functioning Native American opportunity district

Dr. Hood argues that white-preferred candidates do not prevail more often than do Nativepreferred candidates in the full District 9 and thus Gingles III is not triggered. I disagree for a variety of reasons.

To begin, Dr. Hood asserts that because LD-9 is over 50\% Native American Voting Age Population (NVAP) it is definitionally a minority opportunity district - meaning that Native
voters have the ability to elect candidates of choice. But whether a district functions as a minority opportunity district depends upon more than demographics. One must account for variation in turnout by race, the degree of racially polarized voting, and importantly place greater weight on probative contests.

Typically, minority populations turn out to vote at lower rates than do white voters - due to their historical exclusion in the political process. In the South and around the country, white legislatures implemented laws to bar and/or limit minorities from voting. The literature is stacked on this but see Zelden (2004). The same was true for Native American voters across the country. This is an historical fact and undisputed in the literature.

Unfortunately, these imbalances in turnout by race continue through today. For instance, in the 2020 general election, according to the Current Population Survey (CPS), non-Hispanic whites turned out at $70.9 \%$, Blacks at $62.6 \%$, Asians at $59.7 \%$, and Hispanics at $53.7 \%$ (see data provided for reference). The CPS does not provide readily available estimates for Native turnout; therefore, I conducted my own analysis of Native vs. white turnout in LD-9 over the past five election cycles, which demonstrates the flaw in Dr. Hood's opinion that LD-9 is a Native American opportunity district because it is bare majority Native American VAP. ${ }^{1}$

Using the same ecological inference methods as I used to estimate vote choice by race, I estimated voter turnout by race. The method is very similar to the RPV method, except I swap in voter turnout (total vote / total VAP) for candidate vote.

I then calculate the average turnout across each year's respective contests by racial group. I also gathered turnout data from the Secretary of State's website - which is readily available. Next, I plotted the data in a line graph, which conveys average turnout by race by year. These data rely on my EI estimates, but the RxC estimates are almost identical. The white turnout estimates are in purple, the Native American turnout estimates in navy blue, and statewide turnout numbers in peach.
${ }^{1}$ In his report, Dr. Hood states that LD-9 is $51.7 \%$ Native VAP, using the single-race metric (i.e., only those who identify as exclusively Native American). The figure is slightly different using the Census figure that the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft indicated should be normally used in vote dilution cases (i.e., those who identify as exclusively and part Native American); the figure is $54.5 \%$ under that measure. Because there is no dispute a majorityNVAP district can be drawn, the distinction is not particularly important in this case.

Figure 1. Voter Turnout by Race, 2014-2022 contests subset to LD-9. Statewide estimate is statewide turnout reported from ND Secretary of State.

## Estimated Turnout by Race Over Time

Average Turnout by Year LD-9 Subset


Two points immediately emerge. First, white voters always cast ballots at significantly higher rates than do Native voters - usually in the neighborhood of 20-30 percentage points. Second, the 2018 election is an extreme anomaly. In that year, I place the Native turnout rate at $57.6 \%$ - which is higher than the statewide estimate of $57 \%$. I have studied and conducted many turnout analyses using this method in areas with large shares of Native American eligible voters. In all the many elections in different jurisdiction that I have studied, I have never seen a Native American turnout number that begins to approach $60 \%$ in a federal, state, or local contest. Rather, the figures often hover around $30 \%$ - which is in line with my estimates in every other election year in LD-9.

This is anomalous for another reason-2018 was a midterm election. It is exceedingly unusual for any group to turn out at a higher rate in a midterm election than in a presidential election-let alone to have turnout that is over $50 \%$ higher in the midterm than in the presidential election. The graph below illustrates the anomaly; white turnout in LD-9 and statewide turnout was slightly higher in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections than in the 2014, 2018, and 2022 midterm elections. That pattern was true for Native American voters in LD-9 for the 2014 and 2022 midterm elections versus the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, but then was strikingly inverted for the 2018 midterm election. I address this data further below in the special circumstances discussion.

With these turnout estimates, I next estimate the Native American and white composition of the electorate for each election year. ${ }^{2}$ To do so I multiply each group's share of the voting age population by each group's estimated turnout rate. For the 2014 election, $67 \%$ of LD9's electorate was white and 33\% was Native American. For the 2016 election, $63 \%$ of LD9's electorate was white and $37 \%$ was Native American. For the 2018 election, $50 \%$ of LD9's electorate was white and 50\% was Native American. For the 2020 election, $63 \%$ of LD9's electorate was white and $37 \%$ was Native American. And for the 2022 election, $60 \%$ of LD-9's electorate was white and 40\% was Native American.

This illustrates the flaw in Dr. Hood's statement that LD-9 is necessarily a minority opportunity district merely because it has a bare majority NVAP. The usual electorate in the district has a substantial white majority, and even with unprecedented Native American turnout in 2018, that group still did not constitute a majority of the electorate.

In this regard, it is informative to evaluate LD-9 in the context of the other majority Native American state legislative districts across the country. There are 31 such districts, located in North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, New Mexico, Arizona, and Alaska. Counting any person who identifies as Native American, see footnote 1, these districts range from $53.4 \%$ NVAP on the low end to $85.8 \%$ NVAP on the high end. The mean NVAP for a Native American majority legislative district in the country is $68.1 \%$ and the median Native American majority legislative district in the country has an NVAP of 66.7\%.

Prior to the 2021 redistricting-when ND-9 was exclusively contained within Rolette County-its NVAP was $74.4 \%$, slightly above the national mean and median. The 2021 redistricting drastically reduced that figure by twenty percentage points. Now, the enacted version of SD-9 has the second lowest NVAP of any majority Native American legislative district in the country. Meanwhile, subdistrict 9A has the fifth highest NVAP percentage in the nation (79.8\%). By contrast, Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 1 has an NVAP of 66.1\%-nearly identical to the median district among the nation's 31 majority Native American legislative districts.

This national context-together with the turnout and actual electoral composition data of the district shown above-illustrates why LD-9 is not an effective Native American opportunity district and why Dr. Hood's conception is incorrect.

## Dr. Hood's Gingles III Analysis Is Methodologically Flawed

Dr. Hood summed all the election data I included in my report (including by adding together the results for Districts 9, 9A, and 9B), equally weighed each election, and concluded that white voters do not usually defeat the candidates of choice of Native

[^9]American voters in LD-9. There are a number of serious methodological flaws in Dr. Hood's analysis and approach, which I address in turn below.

## A. Equally Weighing the Elections Is Methodologically Incorrect.

First, it is methodologically flawed to equally weigh elections when conducting a Gingles III analysis. It is well established in court opinion and in the academic literature-including in literature written by Dr. Hood that he references in his report ${ }^{3}$-that certain elections are more probative than others in ascertaining whether white voters usually defeat the minority voters' preferred candidates. Endogenous elections (here, elections for the state legislature) are the most probative, and exogenous elections (e.g., for President, Governor, U.S. Senator, etc.) are less probative. National and statewide candidates often are better funded and have elections decided on a different set of issues and circumstances than elections for lower office. In addition, recent elections are more probative than past elections. Finally, elections featuring a candidate of the race or ethnicity of the group bringing the Section 2 challenge are more probative than those featuring two white candidates.

As I discussed in my initial report, in each category of election that is considered most probative, there is a clear and compelling pattern of white voters usually defeating Native American voters' candidates of choice in District 9.

Endogenous Elections: The November 2022 elections were the first conducted under the new plan. Incumbent Native American Senator Richard Marcellais lost to his white opponent in District 9. This is the single most probative contests because it has all three probative characteristics-it is (1) endogenous, (2) the most recent, and (3) features a Native American candidate as the candidate of choice of Native American voters.

It bears noting that the defeat of Senator Marcellais marks the first time since the 1988 election-35 years ago-that a member of a North Dakota Tribe has not been elected to the state senate from District 9. From the election in District 9 of Daniel F. Jérome in 1990 to Les. J. LaFountain in 1994, Dennis Bercier in 1998, and Richard Marcellais in 2006, a member of a North Dakota Tribe has served in the state senate-until 2022 under the new district lines. ${ }^{4}$ Statewide, the total NVAP share of the population grew from 5.1\% to 5.9\% from the 2010 to the 2020 Census. Proportionally, that would equate to 3 state senate seats and 6 state house seats. Following the 2022 elections, Native American candidates of choice are elected to 0 state senate seats and 2 state house seats.

[^10]Similarly probative is the defeat of incumbent state representative Marvin Nelson-the Native American candidate of choice (who was also the candidate of choice when he ran for Governor in 2016) in subdistrict 9B. This race is both endogenous and the most recent.

Most Recent Elections: The Native American candidates of choice lost all 8 elections in 2022 in District 9. That is a $100 \%$ block rate. If we add the 2020 elections, then the Native American candidates of choice lost 10 of 14 elections. That is a $71 \%$ block rate.

Elections Featuring Native American Candidates: In the five elections featuring Native American candidates, the Native American candidates lost three, for a block rate of $60 \%$.

Across the three most probative categories of elections, white voters' preferred candidates defeat Native American voters' preferred candidates at rates of $60 \%, 71 \%$, and $100 \%$. This is a clear Gingles III pattern.

Dr. Hood's approach of simply summing together all the election contests and equally weighing them - particularly where, as here, the most probative elections (of which there is a robust set of data spanning several election cycles) point clearly in the opposite direction of his conclusion-is methodologically incorrect.

## B. Including Subdistrict 9A in the Gingles III Analysis is Methodologically Incorrect.

In Table 1 of his report, Dr. Hood added together all elections in Districts 9, 9A, and 9B to report that the Native American-preferred candidate was defeated in 38.2\% of elections in the challenged districts, and thus Gingles III was not satisfied in his view.

But this is not the correct analysis. District 9A has a NVAP of 79.8\%, see note 1, which is the fifth largest NVAP among all 31 Native American majority state legislative districts in the country. Of course white voters' preferred candidates do not usually-or ever-defeat Native American voters' preferred candidates in District 9A. It does not make sense to analyze Gingles III in the context of packed districts, but instead it is focused on districts where there is insufficient minority voting population to overcome white bloc voting. A map illustrating the cracking and packing of Native American voters across LD-9A, LD-9B, and LD-15 is attached as Appendix A.

When District 9 and 9B are summed without District 9A, then Native American preferred candidates win only 30 of 72 elections. This is a block rate by white preferred candidates of 58\%.

The most sensible approach, however, is to sum District 9 and District 15 together, because the focus of the claim is on how the configuration of district lines in the region reduced from three to one the number of Native American preferred legislators elected. When that is done-even if all elections are weighed equally (which is not the correct approach), Native American preferred candidates lose 42 of 66 elections, for a block rate by white preferred candidates of $64 \%$.

## C. Dr. Hood Does Not Address District 9B.

Dr. Hood does not address District 9B at all in his analysis, other than to include it in his combined analysis of District 9, 9A, and 9B. But 9B is alleged to be a cracked district, and Gingles III is clearly established-Native American preferred candidates lost $81 \%$ of tested elections.

## D. Dr. Hood Does Not Account for the Special Circumstances of the 2018 Election Cycle.

Dr. Hood's analysis is also methodologically flawed because he does not account for the special circumstances of the 2018 election cycle. As I discussed in my initial report and as the turnout data shows above, the 2018 election in North Dakota-including specifically in LD-9—was unlike any other election in that the Native American turnout rate exceeded the statewide rate and was over 50\% higher than Native American turnout in the presidential elections. In my professional career, I have never seen an election in which Native American turnout even came close to being this high, and it runs in stark contrast to the usual trend of turnout increasing in presidential elections. There clearly was an overwhelming backlash to the voter ID law and the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court lifting the injunction on that law, aided by an intense get-out-the-vote effort that received national attention at the time. ${ }^{5}$ This turnout pattern is not seen in prior or subsequent elections.

Given the stark departure from the ordinary electoral conditions, it would be appropriate to entirely disregard the 2018 elections in assessing whether candidates supported by white voters usually defeat Native American preferred candidates in LD-9. At the very least, the 2018 elections should be given very little weight. Not only are they skewed by extremely unusual circumstances, but there are no endogenous contests in the new district lines and no Native American candidates on the ballot that year.

Notably, if the 2018 elections are excluded or given little weight, then in the most recent three election cycles $(2022,2020$, and 2016) the Native American preferred candidates lost in 12 of 21 elections, for a block rate by white preferred candidates of $57 \%$. Again, that is without affording more probative value to the endogenous, most recent (2022), and racially contested elections. This is a clear pattern of Gingles III across these three election cycles in LD-9.

## Dr. Hood's LD-15 Analysis Misapprehends Gingles I.

Dr. Hood's analysis of LD-15 misapprehends Gingles I. On page 4 of his report, Dr. Hood concedes that Gingles II and III are satisfied in LD-15, but he says that Gingles I is not

[^11]because LD-15 is not majority NVAP. But Gingles I is about whether an alternative district that is majority-minority can be drawn. It is not about whether the challenged district is majority minority. Plaintiffs' demonstrative districts, which include Spirit Lake (currently in LD-15), satisfy the Gingles I majority NVAP requirement.

## Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Districts

In his report, Dr. Hood evaluates Plaintiffs' two demonstrative districts with respect to their adherence to a number of traditional districting criteria, including population deviation, compactness, communities of interest, and core retention. He contends that the demonstrative districts "degrade" on these criteria compared to enacted LD-9. His analysis is flawed with respect to each criterion he considers.

I will focus my discussion on Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 1 to avoid repetition, but most of this discussion applies equally to Demonstrative District 2.

## A. Population Deviation

Dr. Hood notes that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9 has a higher population deviation ( $+3.14 \%$ ) than does enacted LD-9 ( $-2.52 \%$ ). This is not a degradation of traditional district criteria. The North Dakota legislature adopted a goal that its legislative plan have an overall population deviation below $10 \%$, and expressed no preference for approaching 0 . Indeed, 23 of the 47 legislative districts have a higher population deviation than Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1.

## B. Compactness

Dr. Hood reports the compactness score of Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9 for three compactness metrics: Reock (.25), Polsby-Popper (.22) and Schwartzberg-Adjusted (.28). He notes that these scores would rank 45th, 44th, and 45th respectively among North Dakota's 47 state senate legislative districts, and that enacted LD-9 scores higher. Dr. Hood's compactness discussion is flawed for several reasons.

## 1. The Effect of Water Boundaries

First, he does not account for the effect that natural boundaries, like rivers and lakes, have on compactness scores. Plaintiffs' demonstrative LD-9 contains all of Benson County, which has a squiggly line border along Devil's Lake, as well as the portion of Eddy County that is within the Spirit Lake Reservation-bounded by the Sheyenne River. The district is shown below and the full map is included in Appendix F.

Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9


These types of water boundaries have the effect of depressing mathematical compactness scores, like those reported by Dr. Hood. This is most acutely the case with perimeter-based scores, like the Polsby-Popper and Schwartzberg scores, but also affects the area-based Reock score by reducing the area of the district compared to a straight line.

This is aptly illustrated by the other legislative districts enacted by the legislature that have similar or lower compactness scores than Plaintiffs' demonstrative LD-9. In particular, LD18 and LD-34 have lower Reock scores than Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9. LD-35 and LD-46 have Reock scores that are 0.01 and 0.02 higher than Plaintiff's district. LD-34 and LD-46 have Polsby-Popper scores that are lower than Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9, while LD-18 has the same Polsby-Popper score as Plaintiffs' LD-9. These districts are shown below, and are attached as Appendix B, C, and D. A statewide map of the enacted plan is attached as Appendix E.

## Enacted North Dakota Legislative Plan Districts



LD-18 in Grand Forks and LD-46 in Fargo are bordered by the Red River of the North and LD-34 is bordered by the Missouri River. While LD-35 is not bordered by water, it has a nearly equal Reock score to Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9. In his deposition, Dr. Hood acknowledged that all these districts were reasonably or sufficiently compact, and one can tell from these images that relying on mathematical compactness scores alone for districts bounded by water-the adherence to which is itself a traditional districting criteria-can obscure their compactness.

## 2. Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plans Are Reasonably Compact Compared to Districts Deemed Reasonably Compact for VRA Purposes by the Supreme Court.

To assess whether a proposed district is reasonably compact for purposes of Gingles I, it is useful to consider districts that the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed to be compact for purposes of Gingles I. In the 2006 case $L U L A C$ v. Perry the Supreme Court ruled that the congressional redistricting plan for Texas's 2002 elections ("Plan 1151C") contained six "reasonably compact" Latino opportunity districts in south and west Texas.

This region of Texas in Plan 1151C is shown below. The six "reasonably compact" Latino opportunity districts the Supreme Court considered were Districts 15, 16, 20, 23, 27, and 28.

## Texas Plan 1151C



In this Plan, District 15 had a Reock score of .20 and a Polsby-Popper score of .12, District 16 had a Reock score of .34 and a Polsby-Popper score of .26, District 20 had a Reock score of .35 and a Polsby-Popper score of .12, District 23 had a Reock score of .23 and a PolsbyPopper score of.16, District 27 had a Reock score of .33 and a Polsby-Popper score of .23, and District 28 had a Reock score of .27 and a Polsby-Popper score of .18.

Of these Texas districts deemed by the Supreme Court to be reasonably compact for purposes of the VRA, Districts 15 and 23 have lower Reock scores than Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9 and Districts 15, 20, 23, and 28 have Polsby-Popper scores lower than Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9.

More recently, the Supreme Court ruled in 2018 in the case Abbott v. Perez that Texas had not engaged in racial gerrymandering with respect to the version of congressional district 35 it enacted in 2013 (Plan C235) because the legislature had good reasons to believe Section 2 of the VRA required a Latino opportunity district stretching along I-35, with Latino populations on either end of the district in San Antonio and Austin. That district is shown below.

Texas Plan C235 District 35


District 35 had a Reock score of 10 and a Polsby-Popper score of .05 , substantially lower than Plaintiffs Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9.

## 3. "Land Bridge"

Dr. Hood also says that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9 contains a "land bridge"-the portion of Pierce County contained in the district between Rolette and Benson Counties. The "land bridge" to which Dr. Hood refers is a whole voting precinct from Pierce County. That Pierce County precinct is larger than a number of other districts' connecting features across the state (as well as Texas CD35 shown above and approved by the Supreme Court). Indeed, the Pierce County precinct at issue spans 180 square miles and is itself larger than a majority of other districts in the plan ( 24 of the 45 non sub-district districts $=53 \%$ ). For example, LD-23 in northwestern North Dakota has two sections connected by a much narrower "land bridge" that is just 2.5 miles wide and that split a then-existing Williams County precinct:

North Dakota LD-23


Distance Across LD-23 "Land Bridge"


District 31, shown below, is a larger district that stretches from Mandan to the South Dakota border, but includes a narrow incursion through Mandan to the Missouri River that is just 659 feet across and likewise involved splitting then-existing voting precincts:

North Dakota Enacted LD-31


## District 31 "Land Bridge" Distance



Notably, adherence to voting precincts is a generally acknowledged traditional districting criteria, and Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 contains no split precincts.

## 4. Distance

Dr. Hood observes that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9 includes two Native American reservations that are 77 miles apart "[c]entroid to centroid" (Hood Report at 10). But because of significant population dispersion in rural North Dakota, geographically large districts are a necessity.

First, the centroid-to-centroid measurement overstates the distance. The two reservations are 55 miles apart, as shown below:

## Distance Between Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake Reservations



Second, enacted LD-9 spans a similar distance east to west as Plaintiffs' demonstrative LD9 does north to south. Indeed, Rolette County is closer to Benson County (which Plaintiffs' demonstrative plan pairs with it) than it is to Cavalier County (which the enacted plan reaches to include in LD-9).

Moreover, as the statewide map of Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 shows, a number of the enacted plan's districts are larger in geographic size than Plaintiffs' demonstrative LD-9:

Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1


Finally, it is noteworthy that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9 is similar in its configuration to the 1993-2002 version of LD-12, shown below. ${ }^{6}$ That district's northern section is essentially the mirror image of Plaintiffs' proposed district, and illustrates the legislature's prior approval and the history of the type of north-south district configuration in this region proposed by Plaintiffs in this case.

[^12]
## 1993-2002 North Dakota Legislative Plan



## C. Communities of Interest

Dr. Hood next discusses communities of interest, but narrowly addresses that concept to discuss only county splits. He reports that enacted LD-9 has just one county split. But that's not true. As the map below shows, the senate version of LD-9 splits two counties (Towner and Cavalier), while the state house version splits three counties (Rolette, Towner, and Cavalier). The enacted legislative map shown below is included as Appendix E.

## 2021 Enacted North Dakota Legislative Plan



Dr. Hood correctly notes that Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 contains 1 whole county (Benson) and three partial counties (Rolette, Pierce, and Eddy). But he fails to note that this is the exact same number of whole and partial counties as enacted LD-15, which Plaintiffs also challenge (Ramsey County whole, and parts of Benson, Eddy, and Towner Counties). Moreover, he fails to note that Plaintiffs' demonstrative LD-9 only splits Eddy County to adhere to the border of the Spirit Lake reservation-one of the legislature's stated redistricting criteria-and the same exact Eddy County split that enacted LD-15 makes.

Dr. Hood's narrow focus on county splits for communities of interest ignores other communities of interest. For example, the legislature recognizes the importance of tribal boundaries as political and governmental units. Enacted LD-9 splits the Turtle Mountain reservation from much of its off-reservation trust lands-which Plaintiffs' demonstrative Plan LD-9 does not do-as shown below.

Enacted LD-9 Split of Turtle Mountain Reservation and Trust Lands


## D. Core Retention

Dr. Hood notes that in enacted LD-9, 75\% of its population comes from the prior decade's version of LD-9, while in Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9, that figure is $63 \%$. But 63\% core retention is not particularly low. Indeed, that would place its core retention higher than 8 other districts in the enacted plan. Moreover, this is an overly simplistic calculation. The more salient question is how much additional disturbance to actual voters would Plaintiffs' demonstrative plan cause compared to the enacted plan. The map below shows the total population of three segments of Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9: (1) 10,780 residents of Rolette County (shown in yellow) who were in LD-9 in the 2011-2020 plan and remain in LD-9 in Plaintiffs' demonstrative plan, (2) 2,195 Pierce and Benson County residents shown in pink who remained in their same district (LD-14) in both the enacted and the 2011-2020 plan, and (3) 4,121 Benson and Eddy County residents who were
moved to a new district in the state's enacted plan (LD-23 to LD-15) and would be moved to a new district (LD-9) in Plaintiffs' demonstrative plan.

## Population Movement and Stasis in Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9



As this map illustrates, of the 17,096 people in Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1 LD-9, only $13 \%$ would be newly moved in the plan compared to the enacted plan's alterations. On the
other hand, $87 \%$ of the people in Plaintiffs' demonstrative LD-9 either remain in the same district or were themselves moved to a new district by the legislature's enacted plan.

Moreover, Dr. Hood notes that having a higher "core retention" figure is an indicator of incumbency protection, which he labels a traditional districting criteria. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the incumbent Native American state senator, Richard Marcellais, lost reelection.

## Conclusion

In the most probative elections-the endogenous, the most recent, and those involving Native American candidates-there is a clear pattern of white bloc voting usually defeating Native American preferred candidates. When Dr. Hood's analysis is adjusted to focus on the correct districts-even without properly weighing according to probative value-there is a clear Gingles III pattern. Moreover, there is striking data supporting the exclusion or granting of little weight to the 2018 elections.

Dr. Hood's conclusion that LD-15 fails to satisfy Gingles 1 misapprehends to the purpose of Gingles I, which focuses on an alternative possible district. Plaintiffs' demonstration plans satisfy Gingles I.

Dr. Hood's analysis of traditional districting principles is flawed. A comparison of Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan I LD-9 to other districts in the enacted plan and to other districts the Supreme Court has approved as reasonably compact easily demonstrates that Plaintiffs' demonstrative plans satisfy traditional redistricting principles and the demonstrative LD-9 is reasonably compact.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.


Loren Collingwood, 2/16/2023

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2021 Enacted Plan - Northeastern North Dakota
Native American VAP Shading


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## 2021 ENACTED ND LEGISLATIVE PLAN GRAND FORKS CLOSE-UP VIEW




## 2021 ENACTED ND LEGISLATIVE PLAN BISMARCK AREA CLOSE-UP VIEW



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## 2021 ENACTED ND LEGISLATIVE PLAN FARGO CLOSE-UP VIEW



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## 2021 ENACTED STATE LEGISLATIVE PLAN



PLAINTIFFS' DEMONSTRATIVE PLAN 1


Case 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS APPcument $6.5-3$ Filed 03/01/23 Page 32 of 32

2012-2020 LEGISLATIVE PLAN


## EXHIBIT 3

We Make It Happen" ${ }^{\text {" }}$

# Transcript of M.V. Hood, Ph.D. 

Date: February 13, 2023
Case: Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, et al. -v- Howe, et al.

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February 13, 2023




| 13 | 15 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 work? | 1 A Yes. It was a very, very specific kind |
| 2 A The state. | 2 of case. |
| 3 Q And that was after your retention -- | $3 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ Have you testified in any case in which |
| 4 A Yes. | 4 the plaintiff was a minority group alleging a |
| 5 Q -- last spring? | 5 violation of Section 2? |
| 6 A Yes. | 6 A Yes. I mean, not -- again, if you |
| $7 \quad$ Q Were you involved at all in advising the | 7 include a larger set of cases, yes. |
| 8 North Dakota legislature about redistricting? | $8 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And what do you mean by that? |
| 9 A No. | 9 A Well, outside of redistricting. |
| 10 Q And how many times have you testified, | 10 Q Okay. In the context of redistricting, |
| 11 would you say, in redistricting cases? | 11 when the claim has been on behalf of racial |
| 12 A I really don't know. Maybe half the | 12 minority groups, you've always been on the side of |
| 13 times I've testified in court involved | 13 the defendants in your expert work. |
| 14 redistricting, which would include Section 2 | 14 Is that right? |
| 15 cases, or I would include Section 2 cases. So... | 15 A From what I recall, yes. |
| 16 Q And as your expert testimony work | 16 Q Now, I gather from your CV that the bulk |
| 17 generally been on behalf of governmental entities | 17 of your scholarship has been about -- or the |
| 18 or defendants defending maps? | 18 specialty has been about politics in the south and |
| 19 A Typically, although I have testified for | 19 vote dilution in the context of southern states. |
| 20 plaintiffs. And I've testified for both | 20 Is that a fair assessment? |
| 21 Democratic and Republican administrations. So... | 21 A Well, I would say big picture, I do |
| 22 Q And in terms of your plaintiff work, | 22 southern politics and election administration are |
| 23 what were some examples of that? | 23 two of the sort of topical areas under American |
| 24 A There was a case in Dallas, a Section 2 | 24 politics that I study. |
| 25 case, involving the county court, which are like | 25 Q And to the extent you focus in, it's |
| 14 | 16 |
| 1 county commissioners other places. So Dallas | 1 mostly in the south. |
| 2 County. I remember that case. | 2 Is that correct? |
| 3 I worked for the Democratic | 3 A Well, sometimes -- election |
| 4 administration in the state of Virginia on a | 4 administration is not necessarily in the south. |
| 5 redistricting matter. | 5 But, you know, I mean, obviously southern politics |
| 6 Q Any others that come to mind? | 6 is in the south. So... |
| $7 \quad$ A Not that are jumping out at me right | $7 \quad$ Q It doesn't appear to me, and correct me |
| 8 now. | 8 if I'm wrong, that you've written any articles, |
| 9 Q The Dallas case, that was the Harding | 9 books, or other scholarly works about Native |
| 10 versus Dallas County case? | 10 American voting patterns. |
| 11 A Correct, that sounds familiar. | 11 A That would be fair, yes. |
| 12 Q And the claim in that case was on behalf | 12 Q And is the same true with respect to |
| 13 of white voters who were alleging a Section 2 | 13 tribal and state relations? |
| 14 violation, that the minority voters were diluting | 14 A Yes. |
| 15 the white voters' vote. | 15 Q And Native American voting rights? |
| 16 Is that correct? | 16 A Correct. |
| 17 A Yeah. In a nutshell, yes. | 17 Q And I don't think I saw anything in |
| 18 Q And in Virginia, is that the Vesilind | 18 particular about North Dakota or the Great Plains |
| 19 case? | 19 states in terms of their voting patterns or |
| 20 A Yes. | 20 political behavior. |
| 21 Q And one of the main topics of that case | 21 Is that right? |
| 22 was whether or not the Virginia 2011 state senate | 22 A Correct. |
| 23 districts complied with the compactness | 23 Q So I gather you don't consider yourself |
| 24 requirement of the state constitution. | 24 an expert in Native American politics? |
| 25 Is that right? | 25 A No. I've never claimed that. |


|  | 17 |  | 19 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 Q And topics such as anthropology or |  | 1 A Yes. |  |
| 2 sociology or history related to Native Americans? |  | 2 Q You don't anticipate giving any opinions |  |
| $3 \quad A \quad$ No. No. I'm a political scientist. |  | 3 that are not set forth in the report? |  |
| 4 Q Do you have any expertise related to the |  | 4 A I don't anticipate, you know, unless I'm |  |
| 5 Turtle Mountain band of Chippewa Indians? |  | 5 asked to perform some additional work, perhaps. |  |
| 6 A Not specifically. |  | 6 Q At this time, you haven't done. |  |
| $7 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And the same is true with respect to |  | 7 Is that right? |  |
| 8 Spirit Lake Nation? |  | 8 A That's correct. |  |
| 9 A Correct. |  | $9 \quad$ Q And you didn't do any additional |  |
| 10 Q Have you ever been to North Dakota? |  | 10 analysis in this case after submitting your |  |
| 11 A No. |  | 11 report? |  |
| 12 Q Have you ever spoken to a member of the |  | 12 A Correct. |  |
| 13 Turtle Mountain or Spirit Lake tribes? |  | 13 Q I might, during today's deposition, ask |  |
| 14 A No. |  | 14 you to do a little math, too. |  |
| 15 Q And so you're not opining on anything |  | 15 Do you have a calculator in your office? |  |
| 16 related to those two tribes with respect to their |  | $16 \text { A I do. }$ |  |
| 17 shared interests or common interests or |  | 17 Q Okay. Good. Keep that nearby. I |  |
| 18 socioeconomic status or anything of the like. |  | 18 promise it won't be too taxing. Nothing more than |  |
| 19 Is that right? |  | 19 I can do. So it's not going to be too hard. |  |
| 20 A Correct. |  | 20 A Okay. |  |
| 21 Q And you wouldn't have any knowledge or |  | 21 Q So let's start, and I'm going to kind of |  |
| 22 basis to do that, right? |  | 22 walk through -- we're going to bounce back and |  |
| 23 A Correct. |  | 23 forth between your report and some other exhibits, |  |
| 24 Q You're also not providing any opinion |  | 24 but let's start on page 2 of your report, if you |  |
| 25 with respect to the totality of the circumstances |  | 25 don't mind. And I want to ask you about section 3 |  |
|  | 18 |  | 20 |
| 1 factors for this case. |  | 1 at the top. |  |
| 2 Is that right? |  | 2 You set forth the Gingles factors there. |  |
| 3 A That's correct. |  | 3 Is that right? |  |
| 4 Q And you have no opinion on that? |  | 4 A Correct. |  |
| 5 A I didn't offer an opinion in my report, |  | 5 Q And I have it, so I don't need to see |  |
| 6 so no. |  | 6 it. But I think, LaVar, it's page 2, the numbered |  |
| 7 MR. GABER: I am going to mark as |  | 7 page 2, which is probably the third page of the |  |
| 8 Exhibit 1 the document Hood TM Expert Report. |  | 8 PDF . In case anyone in the audience here wants to |  |
| $9 \quad$ (Exhibit Hood-1 marked for |  | 9 follow along. |  |
| 10 identification and attached to the transcript.) |  | 10 So in this section, you just set forth |  |
| 11 BY MR. GABER: |  | 11 the test under Thornburg versus Gingles for a |  |
| 12 Q Do you have a copy? |  | 12 Section 2 claim. |  |
| 13 A I do want to disclose I do have an |  | 13 Is that right? |  |
| 14 unwritten-on copy of my expert report so I can |  | 14 A Yes. |  |
| 15 look at that. |  | 15 Q And with respect to the first |  |
| 16 Q That's good. I'm happy about that. |  | 16 precondition, the requirement is that the minority |  |
| 17 We'll pull it up as well on the screen, but it |  | 17 group be sufficiently large and geographically |  |
| 18 will be easier for you if you have it with you. |  | 18 compact to form a majority in a new single-member |  |
| 19 So we've pulled up on the screen your |  | 19 district. |  |
| 20 expert report. |  | 20 Is that fair? |  |
| 21 Do you recognize this as your expert |  | 21 A Yes, yes. |  |
| 22 report in this case? |  | 22 Q Now, with respect to the first prong of |  |
| 23 A Yes. |  | 23 Gingles, the focus of the analysis is on a |  |
| 24 Q Now, are all of your opinions in this |  | 24 potential alternative district. |  |
| 25 matter contained in your expert report? |  | 25 Is that correct? |  |




## February 13, 2023

|  | 29 |  | 31 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 percent, but... |  | 1 A Yes, that's correct. |  |
| 2 (Cross-talk.) |  | 2 Q And then the turnout rate among white |  |
| 3 A Certainly more often than not. So... |  | 3 voters was 69.7 percent. |  |
| 4 Q I'll just represent, in the six |  | 4 Is that right? |  |
| 5 elections you looked at, the Gingles prong 2, it |  | 5 A Correct, correct. |  |
| 6 appears, at least to me, was your opinion that it |  | 6 Q And among other voters, it was 50.0 |  |
| 7 was established. |  | 7 percent? |  |
| 8 Does that sound right? |  | 8 A Yes, correct. |  |
| 9 A Yes. I mean, yeah, that's fair. |  | $9 \quad$ Q And so this is where I'm going to ask |  |
| 10 MR. GABER: I'm going to mark two more |  | 10 you to do a little math. I have already done it, |  |
| 11 exhibits that relate to this. I'll mark as |  | 11 but if you want to check my work, I would |  |
| 12 Exhibit 3 the file LD 9 Hypothetical 2020 |  | 12 encourage that. |  |
| 13 President. |  | 13 So you show the number of voters, and so |  |
| 14 (Exhibit Hood-3 marked for |  | 14 then we can calculate by dividing by the total the |  |
| 15 identification and attached to the transcript.) |  | 15 percentage of the electorate that was of each |  |
| 16 BY MR. GABER: |  | 16 racial group. |  |
| 17 Q And I'll represent to you, Dr. Hood, |  | 17 Is that fair enough? |  |
| 18 this is one of the Excel spreadsheets for |  | 18 A That's fair, yes. |  |
| 19 District 9 for the 2020 presidential race. |  | 19 Q And so I have calculated that if we take |  |
| 20 I did -- because the spreadsheet didn't |  | 20 the 2250 for Native American voters and divide it |  |
| 21 have any title within it, it was just a file name |  | 21 by the total of 5955, that yields 37.8 percent of |  |
| 22 and, like, the folder it was saved in that was |  | 22 the electorate in enacted District 9 for the 2020 |  |
| 23 titled, I did add that title you see at the top of |  | 23 presidential race as being Native American. |  |
| 24 the page and then converted this to a PDF. |  | 24 Does that sound right? |  |
| 25 But otherwise, does this look like the |  | 25 A Correct. That's what I'm getting, yes. |  |
|  | 30 |  | 32 |
| 1 spreadsheet you produced with data related to the |  | 1 Q And then if we do the same for white |  |
| 22020 presidential election for District 9? |  | 2 voters, that yields 57.7 percent of the electorate |  |
| $3 \quad$ A Yes. |  | 3 in the district being white voters. |  |
| $4 \quad$ Q And in the first column -- the first |  | 4 Is that correct? |  |
| 5 column is about District 9; the second column is |  | 5 A Correct. |  |
| 6 Subdistrict 9A; and the third column is |  | 6 Q And so in the presidential election, |  |
| 7 Subdistrict 9B, correct? |  | 7 despite the fact that the district has 51.7 |  |
| 8 A Correct. |  | 8 percent Native VAP, voting age population, a |  |
| $9 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And in column 1 for the full district, I |  | 9 substantial majority of the electorate was |  |
| 10 guess two sort of sections down, you report the |  | 10 actually white voters, right? |  |
| 11 turnout percentage and then the number of voters |  | 11 A In this scenario, yes. |  |
| 12 by Native American, white, and other. |  | 12 Q And this is the type of information that |  |
| 13 Is that right? |  | 13 is important to consider in whether or not a |  |
| 14 A Yes, correct. |  | 14 district actually performs to elect -- or to |  |
| 15 Q And so your analysis showed that in the |  | 15 provide an opportunity for Native American, or |  |
| 162020 presidential election, within the boundaries |  | 16 whatever the minority group is, to elect their |  |
| 17 of the new District $9,38.8$ or 38.9 percent of the |  | 17 candidate of choice, right? |  |
| 18 electorate was Native American. |  | 18 A Well, there has to be some information |  |
| 19 Is that right? |  | 19 like this. I mean, I guess different people may |  |
| 20 A Yes, correct. |  | 20 measure this factor in different ways. I mean, |  |
| 21 Q And -- I'm sorry. |  | 21 Prof. Collingwood doesn't do this. |  |
| 22 (Cross-talk.) |  | 22 But yes, there has to be some |  |
| 23 Q That's wrong. The turnout among Native |  | 23 information related to this. |  |
| 24 Americans was 38.9 percent. |  | 24 MR. GABER: And I'm going to mark as |  |
| $25 \quad$ Is that right? |  | 25 well, as Exhibit 4, LD 9 Hypothetical 2018 U.S. |  |





| 45 | 47 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 the minority group that's challenging the | 1 2022? |
| 2 district, and that candidate is also an existing | 2 A I don't remember that as being part of |
| 3 incumbent, then if that candidate loses, that | 3 his report. I'm just not recalling. |
| 4 would be even more indicative of the effect of | 4 MR. GABER: Okay. Let's mark as -- |
| 5 white bloc voting. | 5 well, I'm not going to mark it yet because I don't |
| 6 Is that a fair statement? | 6 want to get my numbers out of order. But let's |
| 7 A Well, I don't know that I would include | 7 pull up, if we can, the file -- I think it's |
| 8 incumbency in that list necessarily. Again, it's | 8 probably TM Collingwood report, or -- yeah, TM |
| 9 something that we're seeing some changes related | 9 Collingwood Expert Report. And we won't mark it |
| 10 to in terms of, you know, how much of an advantage | 10 as an exhibit for now. We may not mark it. |
| 11 it is or isn't in more recent history. So... | 11 THE WITNESS: Okay. |
| 12 Q Okay. But the other three, you agree | 12 Q All right. And let me just find it in |
| 13 with? | 13 my copy. |
| 14 A Yes, as we've discussed. | 14 So if we can go to page 15 of the PDF. |
| 15 Q So in the context of the elections that | 15 Do you see here that Dr. Collingwood reports the |
| 16 Dr. Collingwood analyzed, would you agree that the | 16 racially polarized voting assessment for all the |
| 17 single most probative contest would be the 2022 | 17 statewide and the endogenous 2022 elections for |
| 18 election -- at least with respect to District 9, | 18 District 9? |
| 19 the 2022 election for the state senate in | 19 A Yes, I see that, yes. |
| 20 District 9, that's the most probative under | 20 Q And would you agree that from this |
| 21 Gingles prong 3 because it features an endogenous | 21 table, you can identify who the candidates of |
| 22 election with a Native American candidate and it's | 22 choice were for Native American voters? |
| 23 the most recent election? | 23 A Yes, that's fair. |
| 24 A Yes. | 24 Q And do you see in -- and this is for the |
| 25 Q And in District 9B, that -- for the 2022 | 25 full District 9. You see that Richard Marcellais |
| 46 | 48 |
| 1 election for the U.S. -- sorry -- for the state | 1 is the candidate of choice for Native American |
| 2 house, is also -- that's an endogenous context, | 2 voters in the state senate race in 2022? |
| 3 right? | $3 \quad$ A Yes, I do. |
| 4 A 2022? | 4 Q And then do you understand -- I don't |
| $5 \quad$ Q 2022. | 5 know if it says it on this page, but the asterisk |
| 6 A Yes, yes. | 6 next to his name indicates that he is himself a |
| $7 \quad$ Q And that is the most recent contest for | 7 Native American. |
| 8 the state house in District 9B? | 8 Do you understand that? |
| 9 A Yes, correct. | $9 \quad$ A Yes. |
| 10 Q And the difference between that election | 10 Q And then -- |
| 11 and the state senate is, the Native American | 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Mark, it's been about an |
| 12 preferred candidate was a white incumbent. | 12 hour. If we could take a small break when it |
| 13 Is that your understanding? | 13 makes sense in the near future. |
| 14 A I don't recall, just sitting here. I'm | 14 MR. GABER: Okay. |
| 15 not saying that's incorrect. | 15 Q And then if we pull up page 21 of the |
| 16 Q The candidate was Marvin Nelson. | 16 PDF and go to the paragraph underneath -- scroll |
| 17 Does that sound right? | 17 down just a little bit. In that paragraph under |
| 18 A Well, I guess what I'm saying is, I | 18 the table, towards the bottom of that paragraph, |
| 19 don't -- in order to infer who the Native American | 19 do you see where Dr. Collingwood refers to the |
| 20 preferred candidate is, there would have to be | 20 defeat of Marvin Nelson, the Native American |
| 21 some analysis performed. I did not do that | 21 preferred candidate, in Subdistrict 9B in 2022? |
| 22 analysis in 2022. | 22 A Yes, I see that. |
| 23 Q You didn't have any reason to disagree | 23 Q Do you have any reason to disagree with |
| 24 or criticize Dr. Collingwood's determinations as 25 to who the Native preferred candidates were in | 24 Dr. Collingwood's conclusion that Marvin Nelson or <br> 25 Richard Marcellais were the candidates of choice |
| 25 to who the Native preferred candidates were in | 25 Richard Marcellais were the candidates of choice |


| 49 | 51 |
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| 1 of Native American voters in those two elections? | 1 Q So the -- for the most part, the only |
| 2 A Well, Ithink this is what I was | 2 Native Americans in District 9B are all |
| 3 remembering. I mean, so in terms of Marcellais, I | 3 concentrated in the area that's in 9B but close to |
| 4 mean, a statistical analysis was conducted that | 4 the border of 9A. |
| 5 showed that he was the Native American preferred | $5 \quad$ Is that your understanding? |
| 6 candidate of choice. The same statistical | 6 A From what I remember, yes. |
| 7 analysis was not conducted for Nelson. It's just | $7 \quad$ Q And so to the extent those voting |
| 8 being inferred. | 8 precincts have a high concentration of Native |
| 9 That's what I was remembering, yeah. | 9 American voters and is also the precinct in which |
| 10 Q And part of the reason for that is that | 10 Marvin Nelson prevailed, and if Marvin Nelson lost |
| 11 the subdistricts don't have a sufficient number of | 11 by large margins, the precinct in the white |
| 12 precincts to do a complete -- or at least the same | 12 counties, there is a fair inference that can be |
| 13 type of RPV analysis that you would do in the | 13 drawn as to who the candidate of choice is in |
| 14 district as a whole. | 14 those -- in that race. |
| 15 Is that right? | 15 Wouldn't you agree? |
| 16 A I would agree with that. | 16 A Well, I would respectfully, I guess, |
| 17 Q But what you can do is look at the | 17 disagree. I mean, you know, there are different |
| 18 election returns within the precincts and | 18 methods you can use to uncover racially polarized |
| 19 correlate them with the demographic data from that | 19 voting, one of those being homogeneous precinct |
| 20 precinct and can make a reasonable inference as to | 20 analysis, which is a very old method. |
| 21 who the candidates of choice are | 21 I didn't detect, from my memory at least |
| 22 Is that fair? | 22 sitting here, any precincts in the area where |
| 23 A Well, again, you know, that's why we | 23 you're describing that had a high enough |
| 24 test for these things, and that's not the | 24 percentage of Native American population to make |
| 25 procedure that we use to test to determine whether | 25 that kind of inference using, say, homogeneous |
| 50 | 52 |
| 1 or not racially polarized voting exists or not. | 1 precinct analysis. |
| 2 So that's not the typical procedure. | 2 Q With respect to the white voters, there |
| 3 If there's not enough statistical power, | 3 is homogeneous precincts -- |
| 4 there's just not enough statistical power. And I | 4 (Cross-talk.) |
| 5 probably would agree there's not. | 5 A That's true, yes. But there has to be |
| 6 Q With respect to the Subdistrict 9B, it | 6 homogeneous precincts for both groups or however |
| 7 covers part of Rolette County and then parts of | 7 many groups you're analyzing. So... |
| 8 Towner and Cavalier County to the east of Turtle | $8 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ So to the extent -- so do you understand |
| 9 Mountain. | 9 that Marvin Nelson was the incumbent state house |
| 10 Is that your understanding? | 10 rep from the prior District 9 ? |
| 11 A So B is the one to the east, if I'm | 11 A Yes, I recall that. |
| 12 remembering right, yes. | 12 Q And so one way to test whether he's the |
| 13 Q Right. And so the Native American -- | 13 candidate of choice of Native American voters, to |
| 14 are you familiar with the demographic makeup of | 14 the extent you have a dispute over the correlation |
| 15 District 9B geographically? | 15 method, is to look in the past elections in which |
| 16 A Alittle bit, yes. | 16 he's been elected to determine whether he was the |
| 17 Q So is it your understanding that the | 17 candidate of choice using the more traditional |
| 18 populations of Cavalier and Towner counties are | 18 statistical analysis. |
| 19 close to 100 percent white? | 19 Is that fair? |
| 20 A Well, from my memory, this is what I | 20 A If it's possible. You know, I would |
| 21 would say, you know, outside of the reservation in | 21 have to see if it were possible in the past. |
| 22 that particular legislative district, in the areas | 22 Q And if there's a consistent pattern of |
| 23 right around the reservation, the rest of the | 23 him being the Native American voters' candidate of |
| 24 district does not contain many, if any, Native 25 Americans. | 24 choice, then you would expect that to be the case 25 for 2022 as well, right? |


|  | 53 | 55 |
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| 1 A Well, again, I'm going to just have to |  | 1 Q Okay. If all the Native American voters |
| 2 push back on that. I mean, that's why we test |  | 2 are essentially in one county, then we can look at |
| 3 things. |  | 3 that county, and if it's possible, perform an |
| 4 So it would make logical sense perhaps |  | 4 analysis to try and make that determination. |
| 5 if that were the case. But again, we -- we don't |  | 5 Is that right? |
| 6 just make inferences without testing for things. |  | 6 A Well, again, if the data are present to |
| 7 So... |  | 7 make that determination, I don't know. You know, |
| $8 \quad$ Q If we combined that data showing that he |  | 8 there would have to be -- even if we were looking |
| 9 was the candidate of choice in the prior state |  | 9 at a single county, there would have to be enough |
| 10 representative elections for District 9 Native |  | 10 precincts within the county to make a proper |
| 11 American voters with the inferences that can be |  | 11 inference, I guess. So... |
| 12 drawn from the demographics and the election |  | 12 Q You haven't done that analysis in your |
| 13 results for the 2022 election, that would provide |  | 13 report. |
| 14 at least a preponderance of evidence that he was, |  | 14 Is that right? |
| 15 in fact, the candidate of choice in 2022 as well. |  | 15 A That's correct. |
| 16 Wouldn't you agree with that? |  | 16 Q And you don't have any -- you don't |
| 17 A I don't -- I mean, I'm not trying to be |  | 17 opine anything with respect to Dr. Collingwood's |
| 18 flippant. I don't know that what you just said is |  | 18 selection of who the candidates of choice of white |
| 19 all that much different from what we just talked |  | 19 or Native American voters are in his report, |
| 20 about previously. So... |  | 20 correct? |
| 21 Q Are you aware that former Representative |  | 21 A Well, except for this example we're |
| 22 Nelson was the Democratic candidate for governor |  | 22 talking about where he's making an inference about |
| 24 A No, I was not aware of that. |  | 24 testing that's been performed. Otherwise, no. |
| 25 Q And Dr. Collingwood reports that he was |  | 25 Q Okay. But for your report, you don't, |
|  | 54 | 56 |
| 1 the candidate of choice of Native American voters |  | 1 in your report, make any criticism of |
| 2 in the region. |  | 2 Dr. Collingwood's analysis of Subdistricts 9A or |
| 3 Do you have any reason to disagree with |  | 3 9B, right? |
| 4 that? |  | 4 A I don't believe I do specifically, no. |
| 5 A Not on its face. |  | 5 Q And you haven't done any analysis to |
| $6 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And it's your view that in the entire |  | 6 show that he's incorrect in his conclusions? |
| 7 District 9, there's a clear pattern of the |  | 7 A No. |
| 8 Democratic candidate being the candidate of choice |  | 8 Q Sorry, I missed that. What was that |
| 9 of Native American voters, right? |  | 9 answer? |
| 10 A That's true, yes. |  | $10 \quad$ A No. It was just "no." |
| 11 Q And so -- and that's true regardless of |  | 11 Q And you don't dispute in your report |
| 12 where they are -- where the Native American voters |  | 12 that Dr. Collingwood's conclusion that in the |
| 13 reside in District 9. There's no evidence to |  | 13 endogenous elections in District 9, there is a |
| 14 suggest that there's a difference among candidates |  | 14100 percent defeat rate for the Native American |
| 15 of choice. |  | 15 candidates of choice? |
| 16 Is that right? |  | 16 A Well, again, with the caveat that if we |
| 17 A I'm not following -- I didn't follow |  | 17 can determine specifically who the Native American |
| 18 what you just said. |  | 18 candidate of choice is, then yes. |
| 19 Q Well, if Native American voters are -- |  | 19 Q And for District 9 as a whole, you agree |
| 20 have a clear candidate of choice in District 9, |  | 20 with Dr. Collingwood's analysis that Richard |
| 21 then there is not a basis to conclude that that |  | 21 Marcellais is the candidate of choice of Native |
| 22 fact varies depending on where in District 9 |  | 22 American voters in the 2022 election? |
| 23 you're looking? |  | 23 A I didn't dispute that. So yes. |
| 24 A Well, I don't know that that's the case |  | 24 Q And so that is -- that's a 100 percent |
| 25 or not. I just don't know. |  | 25 defeat rate for that -- for endogenous elections |




| 65 | 67 |
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| 1 pattern uncovered at the district level. That's | 1 to really make an inference from that. So... |
| 2 true. I can say that. | 2 Q But nevertheless, you would give greater |
| 3 Q Okay. And would you agree with me that | 3 weight to that -- when you're looking individually |
| 4 it would be unlikely that the subdistricts would | 4 at each election, you would give significantly |
| 5 have a different voting pattern than the district | 5 greater weight to the endogenous election, to the |
| 6 as a whole? | 6 extent it points in a different direction than the |
| 7 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, calls for | 7 exogenous election? |
| 8 speculation. | 8 A I think someone like the Court would be |
| 9 A Again, I guess this is where I -- you | 9 better positioned to do that than I would, |
| 10 know, it's difficult to make inferences without | 10 necessarily. So... |
| 11 testing. | 11 Q And so the Court would need to be the |
| 12 Q But that is -- and we've agreed, that is | 12 one to make those determinations about probative |
| 13 the inference that you found reliable to make in | 13 value between the elections? |
| 14 the Walen report? | 14 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, calls for a |
| 15 A I made that inference, yes. | 15 legal conclusion. |
| 16 Q Now, given that endogenous elections, | 16 A Well, yes, and again, to the extent of |
| 17 more recent elections, and elections featuring a | 17 which how many elections are -- how many |
| 18 Native American candidate are more probative than | 18 endogenous elections do we have versus exogenous, |
| 19 other elections -- exogenous elections, more | 19 what type of exogenous elections, you know, what |
| 20 distant elections, and elections featuring only | 20 time period. I mean, there's a lot of factors to |
| 21 white candidates -- would you agree with me that | 21 weigh here. |
| 22 equally weighing them in an analysis is not | 22 So I typically don't -- I guess what I'm |
| 23 methodologically correct? | 23 saying is, as a political scientist, I typically |
| 24 A Well, again, I freely admit endogenous | 24 am looking for a pattern, not for, you know, a |
| 25 elections are more probative, certainly. I mean, | 25 detailed dive into a single election, per se. |
| 66 | 68 |
| 1 Prof. Collingwood provided these same sort of | 1 Q If there's a limit to the number of |
| 2 global stats that I do in this report that I | 2 endogenous elections and there are more recent |
| 3 turnedin. So... | 3 exogenous elections available, you would agree |
| $4 \quad$ Q But in terms of interpreting the | 4 that the better approach -- or a good approach |
| 5 election results, the proper methodology is to | 5 would be to go to those first because they have |
| 6 accord greater weight to the endogenous elections, | 6 more probative value than more distant exogenous |
| 7 the elections featuring Native American | 7 elections, correct? |
| 8 candidates, and the more recent elections. | 8 A Yeah. I mean, typically, in these kinds |
| 9 Do you agree with that? | 9 of analyses -- and I've written about this |
| 10 A Yes, as we've discussed. | 10 academically -- I typically don't go back more |
| 11 Q And so when we get to the point of | 11 than ten years, just as sort of a general rule. I |
| 12 reaching a conclusion about Gingles prong 3, | 12 mean, that's not -- there's no principle on that. |
| 13 either an academic or a court should not weigh the | 13 But I typically don't go back further than ten |
| 14 elections equally? | 14 years. So... |
| 15 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection to the | 15 Q And you would agree, within that ten |
| 16 extent -- I'll say speculation and calls for a | 16 years, the probative value increases as you get |
| 17 legal conclusion. | 17 closer to today? |
| 18 A Well, I can't speak for the Court, | 18 A Yes, as we've discussed, yes. I think |
| 19 but -- and again, this sort of gets into another | 19 that's fair. |
| 20 issue we have sometimes in vote dilution cases of | 20 Q Now, if the endogenous election and the |
| 21 how many, you know, endogenous elections there are | 21 more recent exogenous elections and the elections |
| 22 to compare with the rest of the elections out | 22 in which there are Native American candidates of |
| 23 there. | 23 choice point in favor of a Gingles prong 3 |
| 24 If there's -- I'm just saying | 24 finding, and the less probative elections point in |
| 25 hypothetically, if there's two, then that's hard | 25 the opposite direction, then the Court would need |







|  | 89 |  | 91 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 A Yes. |  | 1 A I believe so. |  |
| 2 Q It would be the second to the last page |  | 2 Q You would agree that's a larger sample |  |
| 3 of the PDF, which is going to be 13, that's Bates |  | 3 size than the six that you analyzed for your Walen |  |
| 4 stamped HOOD-0256. |  | 4 report? |  |
| 5 Now, is this the sort of underlying work |  | 5 A That's true, yes. |  |
| 6 that you did to create the table for your report |  | 6 Q And, in fact, just the 2022 contests |  |
| 7 that is on page 3? |  | 7 alone would be a larger sample size than what you |  |
| $8 \quad$ A It should be, yes. |  | 8 looked at in the -- in your Walen report? |  |
| $9 \quad$ Q So what you show here is that -- and |  | 9 A Correct. |  |
| 10 this is, again, LD 9, LD 9A, LD 9B, and the total, |  | 10 Q And as a general matter, the more |  |
| 11 the total being the number of elections that were |  | 11 elections -- looking at more elections is better |  |
| 12 available statewide or for endogenous in that |  | 12 than looking at fewer elections. |  |
| 13 given election year? |  | 13 Is that a generally fair statement? |  |
| 14 A Yes, yes. |  | 14 A Typically. Again, you know, as long as |  |
| 15 Q And so just looking at LD 9, there's |  | 15 they're somewhat probative. |  |
| 16 eight elections available to be analyzed in 2022, |  | 16 Q Well, in fact, if you're looking at -- |  |
| 17 correct? |  | 17 A I'm not saying 2022 wasn't. I'm just |  |
| 18 A Yes. |  | 18 adding that qualifier to that general statement. |  |
| 19 Q And the Native American preferred |  | 19 (Inaudible) any election at any time, you know. |  |
| 20 candidate lost all eight of those, right? |  | 20 So... |  |
| 21 A Yes. |  | 21 Q Yeah. And, in fact, as we discussed, |  |
| 22 Q If we add the 2020 elections to the 2022 |  | 22 the more probative elections would be the more |  |
| 23 elections, then we have 14 total contests. |  | 23 recent, endogenous, and those featuring a minority |  |
| 24 Is that right? |  | 24 candidate of the minority group challenging the |  |
| 25 A Yes, correct. |  | 25 map? |  |
|  | 90 |  | 92 |
| 1 Q And that would include a mix of at least |  | 1 A Yes. |  |
| 2 one endogenous race and then the most recent two |  | 2 Q Now, both in these notes but also in |  |
| 3 election cycles of statewide contests? |  | 3 your report on page 3, Table 1 on page 3 -- so I |  |
| 4 A Correct. |  | 4 guess what you've done here is, you have combined |  |
| $5 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And so if the time period we're looking |  | 5 District 9, District 9A, and District 9B and |  |
| 6 at is 2022 and 2020, then the Native preferred |  | 6 summed up all the elections in those three |  |
| 7 candidate would have won 4 out of the 14 contests. |  | 7 districts to report the defeat rate for Native |  |
| 8 Is that correct? |  | 8 American preferred candidates across these five |  |
| $9 \quad A \quad$ Based on these notes, yes. |  | 9 election cycles. |  |
| 10 Q And then if we skip over 2018 but add in |  | 10 Is that right? |  |
| 11 the 2016 to the 2020 and the 2022, then there are |  | 11 A In Table 1, yes. That's correct. |  |
| 12 nine contests for those three election cycles in |  | 12 Q So there's 108 elections where there's a |  |
| 13 which the Native preferred candidate prevailed. |  | 13 clear Native American candidate of choice. |  |
| 14 Am I right? |  | 14 Is that right? |  |
| 15 A Yes, that's correct. |  | 15 A Yes. |  |
| 16 Q And that's 9 out of 21 contests, right? |  | 16 Q And that's -- you get there by adding up |  |
| 17 A Yes. |  | 17 District 9, District 9A, and District 9B, right? |  |
| 18 Q So setting aside 2018, for the other |  | 18 A Correct. |  |
| 19 most recent three election cycles, the white |  | 19 Q Now, we've discussed a bit that |  |
| 20 candidate prevailed in District 9 in the majority |  | 20 District 9A has a very high Native American voting |  |
| 21 of the elections in those three election cycles, |  | 21 age population. |  |
| 22 correct? |  | 22 Would you agree with that? |  |
| 23 A That would be correct. |  | 23 A Yes. |  |
| 24 Q And that's -- we said -- is that 21 |  | 24 Q It's nearly 80 -- |  |
| 25 contests, right? |  | 25 (Reporter interruption.) |  |


| 93 | 95 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 Q It's nearly 80 percent. | 1 surrounding voters. |
| 2 Is that your understanding? | 2 Does that make sense? |
| 3 A It's high. I don't remember the | 3 A Yes, yes. |
| 4 exact -- I mean, unless I put it in my report | $4 \quad$ Q So you would not -- the Gingles prong 3 |
| 5 somewhere, I don't remember the exact number. But | 5 doesn't get at whether white voters are defeating |
| 6 it's high. | 6 the Native candidate of choice in a packed |
| 7 Q Okay. | 7 district, right? The purpose is to look at the |
| 8 A Subdistrict 9A is 77.0 percent Native | 8 districts where there's allegedly too few Native |
| 9 American VAP. That's what I wrote. | 9 American voters, given the way that the lines were |
| 10 Q Okay. Now, we talked a bit earlier when | 10 drawn? |
| 11 we were talking about sort of your presentation of | 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, calls for a |
| 12 the three Gingles factors that one typically would | 12 legal conclusion. |
| 13 not include a district with such a high minority | 13 A Well, again, I mean, I guess I would say |
| 14 population in the Gingles prong 3 analysis because | 14 it's just something that can be analyzed. That's |
| 15 the purpose of the Gingles prong 3 analysis is to | 15 probably not going to be the case where the Native |
| 16 determine whether white voters are blocking Native | 16 American preferred candidate of choice is losing |
| 17 preferred candidates in an area where there aren't | 17 in a district that's packed in a hypothetical |
| 18 enough Native voters. | 18 sense, no. |
| 19 Is that correct? | 19 Q And, in fact, when we look at your notes |
| 20 A Well, I mean, I included this because I | 20 here that are on the screen, which I think is |
| 21 was responding to Prof. Collingwood, and he | 21 Exhibit 6, on page 13 of the notes, you show that |
| 22 included it. | 22 the Native preferred candidate wins 100 percent of |
| 23 Q But Dr. Collingwood didn't add 9A, 9B, | 23 the tested elections in District 9A, right? |
| 24 and 9 together, right? You did that. | 24 A Yes. |
| 25 A I did that, yes. | 25 Q And so that doesn't tell us what's |
| 94 | 96 |
| 1 Q Okay. And so do you agree with me, | 1 happening in the cracked -- the allegedly cracked |
| 2 though, that in a district with a large minority | 2 populations outside of District 9A, right? |
| 3 population, well above a majority and over | 3 A That's correct. |
| 4 three-quarters of the population of voters, that | $4 \quad$ Q And so if we're trying to determine |
| 5 conducting a Gingles prong 3 analysis doesn't even | 5 whether or not white voters usually defeat Native |
| 6 make sense for that district? | 6 preferred candidates in those areas outside of the |
| 7 A Well, it makes sense insofar as it | 7 packed district, we would most appropriately |
| 8 confirms that where there's racially polarized | 8 confine our Gingles prong 3 analysis to those |
| 9 voting and the district contains that many of a | 9 areas outside the packed district. |
| 10 racial group, the time their preferred candidate | 10 Do you agree with that? |
| 11 of choice should win. | 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, calls for a |
| 12 Q Do you understand the plaintiffs to be | 12 legal conclusion. |
| 13 alleging that District 9A is packed with Native | 13 A Again, I don't disagree necessarily. |
| 14 American voters, and the surrounding districts, | 14 But to the extent to which 9A is part of this set |
| 15 there's cracked Native American voting population? | 15 of districts that's being analyzed, I included it. |
| 16 A I mean, are you representing that that | 16 Q Yeah, I get that. |
| 17 is the case? | 17 And it is being challenged insofar as |
| 18 Q Yes. So the allegation is that | 18 the allegation is that it's been packed so heavily |
| 19 District 9A is packed; there is cracked population | 19 that that's the only district in which a Native |
| 20 in District 9B and in neighboring District 15. | 20 preferred candidate would win. |
| 21 A So it's not District 9 is packed, then. | 21 But to examine whether white bloc voting |
| 22 Q The allegation is that District 9 is | 22 is usually defeating the candidates of choice in |
| 23 dilutive because it has an insufficient effective | 23 more districts than what was drawn, you would not |
| 24 Native population, but the allegation is that 9A | 24 look at the allegedly packed district for Gingles |
| 25 is packed and Native voters are cracked in the | 25 prong 3? |


| 97 | 99 |
| :---: | :---: |
| MR. PHILLIPS: Same objection. <br> A Well, I would just say that the district under challenge, I did look at it. <br> Q Okay. But let's take my proposition and assume that's true. And I think you've said you didn't necessarily disagree with that, right? <br> A Correct. <br> Q And if we exclude District 9A, the allegedly packed district, and look just at District 9 and District 9B in combination, then there are -- across the five analyzed years, there are -- is it 72 total elections? <br> A I guess it would be. <br> Q And among those 72 elections, the Native preferred candidate wins 30 , and the white 6 preferred candidate wins 40. <br> Is that correct? Or 42, rather. <br> A Yes. 40, right? If I'm looking at this right. <br> Q Maybe it's 40. So it's -- I'm just trying to help myself do math here. <br> So there's 23 Native -- you counted 23 <br> Native victories in LD 9. And is that 7 in 9B? <br> A Yes, looks like 7 to me. <br> Q So that's 30 for the Native preferred | Gingles prong 3 being present that the white preferred candidate is usually defeating the Native preferred candidate? <br> MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, calls for a legal conclusion. <br> A In 9 and 9B added together, yes. <br> Q Okay. Now, you understand, based on our discussion earlier -- did you review the Complaint and the supplemental Complaint that were filed by 10 plaintiffs in this case? <br> A I probably did. I can't tell you that I can remember much from it. <br> Q But you understand and you did some 4 analysis -- or rather, you reviewed <br> 5 Dr. Collingwood's analysis and understand that 16 District 15, the neighboring district, is also part of the claim in this case, right? <br> A Yes, yes. <br> Q And to the extent that plaintiffs claim, which I can represent it is, is about vote dilution as a regional matter, and not with regard 22 to, you know, the particular district lines, 23 because the challenge is to the lines, one could 24 also add in District 15's results to District 9 <br> 25 and District 9B to get a full picture of the |
| candidates. And there's -- there are 72 <br> elections. Maybe it's the case -- we're trying to <br> get at whether it's 40 or 42 victories for the <br> white preferred candidate. It's possible that <br> those are the two elections that didn't feature a <br> racially polarized voting, perhaps. But -- <br> (Cross-talk.) <br> A I don't think those two races are being <br> counted in this table I drew out by hand. <br> Q Okay. So then it would be 42 contests <br> in which the white preferred candidate prevailed <br> when we sum up District 9 and District 9B, and 30 <br> in which the Native preferred candidate prevailed? <br> A I believe that's correct, yes. <br> Q So that would be 58 percent of the time 6 when we look at the districts that are alleged to <br> have too little Native population to provide an <br> equal opportunity to elect; 58 percent of the <br> time, the white preferred candidate is winning, <br> and 42 percent of the time, the Native preferred <br> candidate is winning. <br> Is that correct? <br> A Based on those calculations, that would <br> be correct, yes. <br> 25 Q And that would be indicative of a | racially polarized voting and the Gingles prong 3 <br> factors for the whole challenged area, correct? <br> MR. PHILLIPS: Object to the form, <br> compound question. <br> Q That was very compound. Let me break it down. <br> So to the extent -- given that <br> plaintiffs are challenging the regional drawing of <br> the districts, then it would be -- it would make <br> 0 sense to -- as you did to some extent, to add <br> together the challenged election results from both <br> 2 Districts 9 and 15 ? <br> A Well, I mean, one could make that <br> argument. I don't know that two -- I mean, we're <br> using this term "region." I don't know that two <br> legislative districts are a region, per se. <br> I mean, you can do what you're saying, <br> certainly. I mean, it's just a matter of <br> arithmetic. <br> Q And given the results that you saw in -given what we just saw with respect to District 9 and District 9B, if we add in the results in <br> District 15 , there's an even stronger indication <br> 24 of the presence of Gingles prong 3 using that 25 approach, correct? |





| 113 | 115 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 elections, then the evidence in favor of white | 1 trying to discern what, you know, a group of |
| 2 bloc voting would be even higher than the 42 out | 2 people were thinking exactly. So... |
| 3 of 72 that we see including those elections, | 3 Q Doesn't that just -- isn't it just |
| 4 right? | 4 purely logical? So if what you did glean was that |
| 5 A If we took out 2018, there would be | 5 they believed they needed to draw the subdistrict |
| 6 fewer Native preferred candidates who would have | 6 to comply with the Voting Rights Act and the |
| 7 won under those criteria, so yes. | 7 subdistricts are a portion of the full districts, |
| 8 MR. GABER: I think this is a good time | 8 the only reason to do that would be because there |
| 9 for us to break. | 9 was concern that the full district would not |
| 10 (Recess from 1:25 p.m. until 2:02 p.m.) | 10 provide an opportunity and, therefore, there |
| 11 MR. GABER: Back on the record. | 11 needed to be at least one state house seat, or |
| 12 BY MR. GABER: | 12 there was that opportunity. |
| 13 Q Dr. Hood, welcome back from lunch. Did | 13 Is there any other reason why one would |
| 14 you have a chance to get something to eat? | 14 do that to comply with the Voting Rights Act? |
| 15 A I did. Thank you. | 15 MR. PHILLIPS: I'll object that it |
| 16 Q So I'm going to shift gears this | 16 misstates his testimony and that it's a compound |
| 17 afternoon, but just a couple more points on the | 17 question and calls for speculation. |
| 18 racially polarized voting topic. | 18 A Well, you know, splitting the |
| 19 Is it your understanding that the state | 19 legislative district as a whole into subdistricts |
| 20 legislature adopted subdistricts in District 9 and | 20 in this case does provide for two single-member |
| 21 in District 4 because of its belief that the | 21 house districts, as we know. |
| 22 Voting Rights Act would have required -- or might | 22 And given the fact that the Native |
| 23 have been violated had elections occurred with the | 23 American population is geographically sort of |
| 24 full district? | 24 close to each other in terms of where they're |
| 25 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, calls for | 25 located, you know, if you draw a subdistrict -- in |
| 114 | 116 |
| 1 speculation and outside the scope of Dr. Hood's | 1 a lot of cases, I guess there are many different |
| 2 opinion and work on this case. | 2 possibilities or permutations. |
| 3 A Well, I mean, all I have to rely on in | 3 But if you draw a subdistrict like the |
| 4 regard to that particular question is the | 4 legislature did or the redistricting committee |
| 5 legislative record and the transcripts I read from | 5 did, then you're certainly going to increase the |
| 6 meetings that were held with the redistricting | 6 odds that a Native American candidate of choice |
| 7 committee and various groups around the state. | 7 can be elected from a subdistrict. |
| 8 And I mean, again, this is just my | $8 \quad$ Q But if it's the case that the rationale |
| 9 opinion, obviously, from the outside looking in. | 9 was to comply with the Voting Rights Act, then the |
| 10 But yes, I believe that the redistricting | 10 belief would have to be that there's a problem |
| 11 committee thought they were complying with the | 11 under the Voting Rights Act with the full |
| 12 Voting Rights Act by creating these subdistricts. | 12 district, right? There's no other explanation, at |
| 13 Q And the reason for that is, the concern | 13 least with respect to the VRA rationale? |
| 14 that in the absence of the subdistricts, if the | 14 MR. PHILLIPS: I'll object to the extent |
| 15 state house elections were conducted in the full | 15 it misstates his testimony. |
| 16 district, the Native American voters in the full | 16 I believe his testimony was that it did |
| 17 district would not have the opportunity to elect | 17 comply with the Voting Rights Act and that the |
| 18 their candidate of choice? | 18 legislature thought it was in compliance with the |
| 19 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection. You're asking | 19 Voting Rights Act. I think you've sort of |
| 20 him to just speculate about what the legislature | 20 misstated his testimony. |
| 21 did and why. The question is pure speculation. | 21 So that's my objection. |
| 22 A I'm not sure if I can answer the second | 22 Q I'm not trying to state your testimony |
| 23 question as to what they believed. I was able to | 23 at all. What I'm trying to ask is, to the extent |
| 24 glean enough from the records I read on the first 25 point, but I honestly am not very comfortable with | 24 the VRA is the reason that the legislature adopted 25 the subdistricts, then it follows that the concern |



|  | 121 | 123 |
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| 1 in the compactness of these particular districts |  | 1 that's an appropriate, reliable methodology for |
| 2 from the prior plan to the 2011 plan? |  | 2 determining whether an enacted district satisfies |
| 3 A That's correct. |  | 3 a compactness requirement? |
| 4 Q Now, the Reock -- so you report the |  | 4 A Well, I mean, if that scenario exists. |
| 5 Reock scores, the Polsby-Popper scores, and the |  | 5 Sometimes that scenario would not exist. But if a |
| 6 Schwartzberg scores. |  | 6 court in a particular state has spoken to this |
| 7 Is that right? |  | 7 question, then yes, I think that's probative. |
| 8 A Correct. |  | $8 \quad$ Q And that's with respect to a state law |
| 9 Q And am I correct that Reock compares the |  | 9 requirement of compactness, so you'd look to that |
| 10 area of the district to the -- basically the |  | 10 state's courts to see what it had previously |
| 11 smallest circle that will encompass the district? |  | 11 approved, right? |
| 12 Is that a fair -- |  | 12 A Well, I mean, this particular case was a |
| 13 A Certainly, cliff note version, yeah. |  | 13 state case. |
| 14 That's fine. |  | 14 Q Right. |
| 15 Q And Polsby-Popper does the same thing |  | 15 A So yes. |
| 16 except it compares the length of the perimeter of |  | 16 Q And along a similar vein, if the -- if |
| 17 the district to the area of the circle that |  | 17 federal courts or if the U.S. Supreme Court has |
| 18 encompasses it? |  | 18 deemed a particular district to be reasonably |
| 19 A Yes. |  | 19 compact for purposes of the Voting Rights Act, |
| 20 Q And the Schwartzberg one, I'm not going |  | 20 then that would be a probative comparison to make |
| 21 to remember. |  | 21 in determining whether a proposed district, under |
| 22 What is that? |  | 22 the VRA, is reasonably compact? |
| 23 A It's a perimeter to perimeter, compares |  | 23 A Well, yes, I think, but with the caveat |
| 24 the perimeter of the district to the perimeter of |  | 24 that in this particular case, a court had spoken |
| 25 a circle with equal area. |  |  |
|  | 122 | 124 |
| $1 \quad$ Q Okay. With respect to the six districts |  | 1 being compact, but, you know, what is compactness. |
| 2 that were challenged in this case, the 2011 |  | 2 What's compact and what's not compact. |
| 3 versions, the Reock scores ranged from 0.15 to |  | 3 Again, I'm trying to remember what I did |
| $4 \quad 0.22$. |  | 4 here. This was a while ago. But Ithink there |
| 5 Is that correct? |  | 5 was some particular numbers that were actually |
| 6 A Looks like it, yes. |  | 6 laid out by a court. |
| $7 \quad$ Q And the Polsby-Popper scores ranged from |  | $7 \quad$ Q Okay. And the second sort of |
| $8 \quad 0.08$ to 0.14. |  | 8 methodology that you employed was to compare the |
| 9 Is that right? |  | 9 challenged districts to see whether there were |
| 10 A Yes. |  | 10 other districts in the plan that had similar or in |
| 11 Q And the Schwartzberg scores ranged from |  | 11 some cases lower compactness scores. |
| 120.1 to 0.16. |  | 12 Is that right? |
| 13 Is that right? |  | 13 A Yes, correct. |
| 14 A Yes. Yes. |  | 14 Q And then third methodology was to apply |
| 15 Q Now, one of the -- there were three |  | 15 a metric that was from the scholarship from |
| 16 basic methodologies that I gathered that you |  | 16 Profs. Pildes and is it Niemi? |
| 17 followed in reaching the conclusion that these |  | 17 A "Niemi." |
| 18 districts were compact. |  | 18 Q "Niemi." |
| 19 The first is that you compared the -- |  | 19 Do you recall that? |
| 20 each of the districts to previous districts that |  | 20 A Yes. |
| 21 courts had upheld as compact, and then compared |  | 21 Q And since it's kind of specific, I want |
| 22 their compactness scores. |  | 22 to just draw your attention to the Pildes and |
| 23 Do you recall that? |  | 23 Niemi method, and that's on page 13 of the |
| 24 A Yes. |  | 24 Vesilind report. And then so we can see the |
| 25 Q And that would be -- in your view, |  | 25 bottom paragraph, please. |


| 125 | 127 |
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| And I'll let you take a look at those. <br> A Okay. <br> Okay. <br> Q The methodology that you applied here <br> and that's written about in the Profs. Niemi and <br> Pildes report is in response to the racial <br> gerrymandering line of cases, right? <br> A Correct, correct. <br> Q And the methodology here is that if the <br> 10 Reock score is above 0.16 , or if the Polsby-Popper <br> score is above 0.06 , or if the sum of those two is above 0.22 , then the district is considered <br> compact. <br> Is that correct? <br> A Well, that's not how I would term it. I <br> would term it as what these two political <br> scientists are saying is that if it's below -- if <br> it's at this level or below, it's certainly <br> non-compact. I guess that's how I would phrase it. <br> Q The conclusion you reached -- an example <br> here is Senate District 28 from Virginia. You <br> 23 noted that it had a Reock score of 0.15 , which was <br> 24 below the cutoff for compactness for the Reock <br> 25 measure alone, but you concluded that it was, in | composite score, that that alone allowed you to opine, with respect to this methodology, that it was a compact district, because if you'd just looked at the Reock cutoff point, it would have been in the non-compact category, right? <br> A Yes, yes, yes. Using these various cutoff points that are provided for this particular methodology, yes. <br> MR. GABER: I'm going to introduce as <br> 10 Exhibit 8. Exhibit 8 will be the file Virginia <br> 2012 to 2020 Maps. <br> And David, I will send that to you now. <br> (Exhibit Hood-8 marked for <br> 4 identification and attached to the transcript.) <br> BY MR. GABER: <br> Q Dr. Hood, in the appendix to your <br> Vesilind report, you included sort of composite 8 maps that showed in that case the plaintiffs' 9 alternative plans overwritten over the enacted ones. And we can look at those, too, if it's 1 necessary. But I've pulled the 2011 enacted plan without that alternative map mapped onto it so we could see it better. <br> 24 <br> Do you recognize this as -- we can zoom <br> 25 in if you need to -- but as the 2011 Virginia |
| fact, compact because it satisfied the composite index that they propose. <br> Is that right? <br> A I'm reading. <br> Q Sure. <br> A Well, again, it's -- compactness is hard <br> to judge. We know it ranges on a lot of these <br> measures from 0 to 1. <br> So what's being said here is that this <br> particular district, at least under a composite <br> score, didn't reach a point to where these <br> researchers, Pildes and Niemi, would say that it <br> was not compact. So it was above that threshold. <br> It doesn't mean that it's compact, I <br> mean, because you can go quite further up the <br> scale, right. But it doesn't meet this threshold <br> that they're talking about here. <br> Q And you considered this threshold and <br> this article by these professors to be a reliable <br> methodology that you used in your -- as one of the <br> bases for your conclusion in the Vesilind case, <br> right? <br> A I did make use of it, yes. <br> Q And, in fact, with respect to that <br> 25 Senate District 28, it was only through the | state senate plan? <br> A From what I remember. I mean, again, it's not -- I haven't looked at this lately. <br> Q Okay. I assume you spent a fair bit of time with it at the time. <br> A Well, yeah, at the time. <br> Q Okay. <br> A There's been many maps drawn since then. <br> So... <br> Q Yeah. So the -- let's scroll down to <br> the second page of this, please. And Districts 19 <br> 12 and 21 were among the maps -- or among the <br> 3 districts that were challenged by the plaintiff in 14 the case. <br> Is that right? <br> A From what I remember, yes. <br> Q And your opinion was that Districts 19 8 and 21 were compact districts. <br> Is that correct? <br> A Well, I don't know exactly what I said about them without looking at the report. <br> Q We can come back to it, but -- give me one second. <br> MR. PHILLIPS: Just to be clear, my <br> standing objection relating to this prior case |


|  | 129 |  | 131 |
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| 1 applies to this exhibit as well as any others |  | 1 A Correct. |  |
| 2 related to this former case. |  | 2 Q And do you see District 30? |  |
| 3 Q For the moment -- we're going to come |  | 3 A Yes. |  |
| 4 back to this in a second, but can you go back to |  | $4 \quad$ Q And that one, you can see it swings |  |
| 5 the Vesilind report, which is the previous |  | 5 around -- what is that -- District 36. |  |
| 6 exhibit. And then if you can go to page 24 and |  | 6 That's a district that you also opined |  |
| 7 scroll down so the whole -- to the bottom part of |  | 7 was sufficiently compact? |  |
| 8 this page in the overall opinion, the last |  | $8 \quad$ A Yes. |  |
| 9 sentence there. |  | $9 \quad$ Q What word would you use to describe how |  |
| 10 So Dr. Hood, your ultimate opinion was |  | 10 the southernmost part of that district is |  |
| 11 that after conducting your own analysis, it was |  | 11 connected to its northernmost part? |  |
| 12 your opinion that the 2011 Senate plan creates |  | 12 A Possibly duck continuity. But I don't |  |
| 13 districts which are sufficiently compact and |  | 13 know, and I don't remember specifically. |  |
| 14 contiguous as required by the Virginia |  | 14 Q Would you characterize that as a narrow |  |
| 15 constitution. |  | 15 connecting point? |  |
| 16 Is that your opinion? |  | 16 A Yes, it is. |  |
| 17 A Okay. I'm not saying it wasn't; I |  | 17 Q And is the same true with respect to |  |
| 18 just -- I don't remember what I said. |  | 18 District 28 where it -- where 29 has a finger that |  |
| 19 Q Sure, sure. And this was 2017, it looks |  | 19 comes into it? |  |
| 20 like. |  | 20 A Yes. |  |
| 21 Does that sound right? |  | 21 Q Nevertheless, that wasn't too much of an |  |
| 22 A I know it was pre-pandemic. So... |  | 22 incursion or a thinness of connection for you to |  |
| 23 Q Yeah. The next page says it was |  | 23 conclude that the districts were sufficiently |  |
| 24 executed on January 12th, 2017. |  | 24 compact, right? |  |
| 25 Okay. So let's go back -- now that |  | 25 A Correct. I mean, that was my conclusion |  |
|  | 130 |  | 132 |
| 1 we've seen that, let's go back to the maps. |  | 1 in this case. |  |
| 2 So as part of your opinion, given that |  | 2 Q And then do you see District 37 here as |  |
| 3 Districts 19 and 21 were among the six that were |  | 3 well? |  |
| 4 being challenged, your opinion was that they were |  | $4 \quad$ A Yes. |  |
| 5 sufficiently compact? |  | 5 Q And your conclusion there was that |  |
| 6 A They would have had to have been, yes, |  | 6 District 37 was sufficiently compact as well, |  |
| 7 based on what we just read. |  | 7 correct? |  |
| 8 Q And if we could scroll down to the next |  | $8 \quad$ A Yes. |  |
| 9 page, please. This is getting close to where I am |  | 9 Q And I think there -- is this the last |  |
| 10 right now, to the D.C. area, and this view shows |  | 10 page? Yeah. So that's the four were on this |  |
| 11 Districts 28, 29, 30, and 37, among others, but |  | 11 page, and the two were on the previous page. |  |
| 12 all four of those were among the ones that were |  | 12 And all six of these districts were ones |  |
| 13 challenged by the plaintiffs in the district as |  | 13 that you opined to be sufficiently compact? |  |
| 14 non-compact. |  | 14 A Correct. |  |
| 15 Is that correct? |  | 15 Q And you haven't changed that opinion |  |
| 16 A Yes. |  | 16 since you testified to that in court at the time? |  |
| 17 Q And do you see District 28 there? |  | 17 A No. |  |
| 18 A Yes. |  | 18 MR. GABER: I'm going to mark as |  |
| 19 Q That is a district that you opined was |  | 19 Exhibit 9 the document titled Fargo Close Up |  |
| 20 sufficiently compact, correct? |  | 20 Enacted Plan. |  |
| 21 A Correct. |  | 21 And I will send that to you now, David. |  |
| 22 Q And do you see District 29? |  | 22 (Exhibit Hood-9 marked for |  |
| 23 A Yes, yes. |  | 23 identification and attached to the transcript.) |  |
| 24 Q That's also a district that you opined |  | 24 BYMR. GABER: |  |
| 25 was sufficiently compact, correct? |  | 25 Q Now, Dr. Hood, one of the North Dakota |  |





| 145 | 147 |
| :---: | :---: |
| MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, calls for a <br> legal conclusion, calls for speculation. <br> A Based on that Virginia comparison I did, yes. Again, that was in Virginia. So it was a state-specific comparison. <br> Q Although part of that was not <br> state-specific; it was looking at -- one of the <br> three methods you employed was to use the paper <br> that Prof. Pildes and Niemi had written, correct? <br> A That's correct. I did look at that. <br> Q And all of the North Dakota enacted <br> state legislative plans are reasonably compact under that metric, correct? <br> A Virginia? <br> Q All of the North Dakota -- <br> A All the North Dakota -- well, they're <br> all higher than that, yes. <br> Q And so employing that methodology, which you have in the past, would lead you to conclude that all of the enacted North Dakota state <br> legislative districts are reasonably compact? <br> MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, outside the <br> scope of his opinion. <br> 24 A Well, I think it was, quote, <br> 25 sufficiently compact, unquote, but... | all of the North Dakota enacted districts are sufficiently or reasonably compact? <br> MR. PHILLIPS: Object to the form. <br> A Well, again, comparing it to that <br> Virginia case, they're above those threshold levels, yes. <br> Q And so the same would hold true for plaintiffs' demonstrative districts; they are both above the Virginia level that you found to be 10 compact, but they're also above other districts within the North Dakota plan that you also find to be sufficiently compact. <br> Is that right? <br> A That's correct. None of the <br> demonstrative districts are at the -- are the 16 lowest -- literally the lowest in the state plan. <br> Q And with respect to your -- and they're higher than the Virginia plan as well, correct? <br> A Yes, that's correct. <br> Q Now, you spend a bit of time comparing <br> plaintiffs' demonstrative districts to the enacted version of District 9 in terms of compactness, correct? <br> A Yes. <br> Q And in terms of the other districting |
| Q Okay. Do you see a different between <br> sufficiently compact and reasonably compact? <br> A I don't know. I mean, for some reason, <br> I chose to use that qualifier, so I'll stick with it. <br> Q So in your expert report, when you were assessing District 9 -- or rather plaintiffs' demonstrative versions of District 9, you compared it to the other enacted legislative districts, and then you also narrowed and compared it to the enacted version of District 9 in terms of compactness. <br> Does that sound right to you? <br> A Yes, that's correct. That's fair. <br> Q And I take your point on the first score <br> 16 to be that when compared to other North Dakota <br> districts, the demonstrative districts were on the lower end of the statewide districts. <br> Is that fair? <br> A In terms of ranking, yes. <br> Q But they were not the lowest, right? <br> A I don't think -- I don't think any of <br> them were ever the lowest, no. <br> Q And we've established that, by your own <br> 25 methodology that you've employed in the past, that | principles that you looked at, that's your main <br> comparison is between the proposed District 9 by <br> the plaintiffs and the enacted version of <br> District 9, right? <br> A Yes. <br> Q The enacted version of District 9 is a rectangle, more or less, right? <br> A Fair, yes. <br> Q And do you understand the question, in 0 terms of compactness for Voting Rights Act 11 purposes, to be a comparison to a perfect 12 rectangle, or is it about whether or not the 3 district is reasonably compact standing alone? <br> MR. PHILLIPS: Object to form. <br> A My understanding is that it would be reasonably compact on its own. <br> Q And so the real comparison that we would 18 want to do is determine whether or not the 9 proposed district standing on its own is 0 reasonably compact? <br> A Well, and we can do that from my report. <br> Q Correct. <br> A It places the demonstrative districts <br> within the statewide plan as a whole. So... <br> Q Right. And I think we just established |


|  | 149 |  | 151 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 that compared -- given that the -- your conclusion |  | 1 in the Vesilind case -- or that's one of the types |  |
| 2 that all of the enacted districts are reasonably |  | 2 of analyses that you did in the Vesilind case, |  |
| 3 compact or sufficiently compact, whichever term we |  | 3 however, right? |  |
| 4 want to use, given that the demonstrative |  | 4 A Well, in that -- again, in that |  |
| 5 districts fall within that range, they too would |  | 5 particular case, there was a Virginia state court |  |
| 6 be characterized as sufficiently or reasonably |  | 6 that had made certain specific observations about |  |
| 7 compact? |  | 7 compactness in districts. So... |  |
| 8 A Again, with the caveat based on what I |  | 8 Q If the -- say the U.S. Supreme Court has |  |
| 9 said in the Virginia case, yes. |  | 9 determined a particular district to be reasonably |  |
| 10 Q On page 6 of your report -- and this is |  | 10 compact for VRA purposes, one thing that could be |  |
| 11 with respect to demonstrative District 1. In the |  | 11 done is to look at the compactness scores of that |  |
| 12 first paragraph under part A there, the last |  | 12 district and compare it to a proposed district to |  |
| 13 sentence, you note that the part of the boundary |  | 13 see whether it satisfies the test for reasonable |  |
| 14 for the Spirit Lake reservation is contiguous with |  | 14 compactness for VRA purposes, right? |  |
| 15 a portion of the demonstrative District 1 |  | 15 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, speculation, |  |
| 16 boundary. |  | 16 calls for a legal conclusion. |  |
| 17 Do you see that? |  | 17 A That comparison could be made, yes. |  |
| 18 A Yes. |  | 18 Q And that would be a similar type |  |
| 19 Q What is the salience of that |  | 19 comparison to what you did in Virginia except in |  |
| 20 observation? |  | 20 the context of the VRA rather than the state |  |
| 21 A I don't know that it's -- I don't know |  | 21 constitution, right? |  |
| 22 how important that is. That's just an |  | 22 A Yes. |  |
| 23 observation, which is the case, that part of the |  | 23 Q That's not something that you did here, |  |
| 24 reservation boundary is part of the boundary for |  | 24 right? |  |
| 25 the district. I'm just -- it's just a statement. |  | 25 A Correct. |  |
|  | 150 |  | 152 |
| 1 Q I just want to know what your -- I need |  | 1 Q Now, Dr. Collingwood noted in his report |  |
| 2 to know what your opinions are about it. So I |  | 2 that the overall compactness score for the plan as |  |
| 3 guess I didn't understand -- |  | 3 a whole in the enacted plan was the same as that |  |
| 4 A Right. I don't know that it means any |  | 4 in plaintiffs' demonstrative plans. |  |
| 5 more than literally what it says. |  | $5 \quad$ You don't dispute his report in that |  |
| 6 Q Okay. That actually -- one of the |  | 6 regard, correct? |  |
| 7 state's -- or one of the legislature's criteria |  | 7 A Yeah, I think he was just looking at |  |
| 8 from its report is respecting the boundaries of |  | 8 maybe the mean score for the state. |  |
| 9 the reservations in the state. |  | 9 Is that correct? |  |
| 10 Do you recall that? |  | 10 Q I think so. |  |
| 11 A Yes, that's correct. |  | 11 A Something like that. No, not |  |
| 12 Q And we'll bring up the map in a bit, or |  | 12 necessarily, no. |  |
| 13 we can do that now if you'd like. But the enacted |  | 13 Q And one of the things you noted in your |  |
| 14 plan, District 15 also follows the boundary of the |  | 14 Vesilind report -- and we can pull that back up, |  |
| 15 Spirit Lake reservation in the same manner that |  | 15 for you to see, page 22. |  |
| 16 plaintiffs' demonstrative plan does. |  | 16 MR. PHILLIPS: Same objection on this |  |
| 17 Does that seem right to you? |  | 17 exhibit, that it's outside the scope. |  |
| 18 A Yeah. I do recall that, yes. |  | 18 Mark, maybe a short bio break whenever |  |
| 19 Q In your analysis of the compactness of |  | 19 it makes the most sense. |  |
| 20 plaintiffs' proposed demonstrative districts, you |  | 20 MR. GABER: Yep. |  |
| 21 did not seek to compare the scores to other |  | 21 Q So in this part of your report, |  |
| 22 districts that courts have upheld under the VRA as |  | 22 Dr. Hood, for Vesilind, for the Virginia case, you |  |
| 23 reasonably compact, correct? |  | 23 were responding to Prof. McDonald's analysis where |  |
| 24 A That's correct, yes. |  | 24 he had reported the degradation in compactness |  |
| 25 Q That's the type of analysis that you did |  | 25 scores from alternative districts that the |  |


| 153 | 155 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 plaintiffs were proposing to those same numbered | 1 A Yes, from what I recall, yes. |
| 2 districts in the enacted plan. | 2 Q And if you look at District 9 in this |
| 3 Does that sound familiar? | 3 plan, in Benson County, do you see that it is -- |
| 4 A Alittle bit, yes. | 4 the northern border of Benson County is a very |
| $5 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And the point you make here is that, you | 5 squiggly line that is the Devils Lake boundary? |
| 6 know, sometimes it doesn't make sense to compare a | 6 A Okay. I mean, I see what you're talking |
| 7 numbered district in one plan to a numbered | 7 about, yes. |
| 8 district in another plan because those district | $8 \quad$ Q And then just below that, do you see |
| 9 boundaries are different, and it might make sense | 9 another river boundary that's the Sheyenne River |
| 10 to look more at the statewide results for the map | 10 in Eddy County? |
| 11 as a whole. | 11 A Well, I'm just going to take your word |
| 12 Does that fairly describe the point | 12 for it. |
| 13 you're making here? | 13 Q You didn't look -- |
| 14 A Let me look at this for a second. | 14 A I couldn't tell you where the Sheyenne |
| 15 Q Sure. | 15 River was necessarily. So... |
| 16 A Yeah, I do say that here. | 16 Q So in looking at the map, you didn't |
| 17 Q So it does make sense, in this context | 17 look to any of the -- well, when you were doing |
| 18 as well where the similar situation is happening, | 18 the compactness analysis, did you look at the |
| 19 to -- where there's a numbered district compared | 19 visual -- did you have a visual look at the map? |
| 20 to another numbered district in a different plan | 20 A Sure, sure. |
| 21 that covers different territory, that looking as | 21 Q And did you notice the river and lake |
| 22 well at the plan as a whole is a useful piece of | 22 boundaries? |
| 23 information to help disentangle those differences. | 23 A Yes, I did. |
| 24 Is that fair? | 24 Q Did you do anything to determine whether |
| 25 A Well, I think that's fair. | 25 those natural boundaries were affecting the |
| 154 | 156 |
| 1 Again, I'm responding to a particular | 1 compactness scores? |
| 2 measure that Prof. McDonald has been utilizing in | 2 A Well, those boundaries, if they are |
| 3 this particular -- in that case that we've been | 3 affecting the scores, are going to get picked up |
| 4 talking about in Virginia. | 4 in the scores that I ran. So... |
| $5 \quad$ Q And that's the degradation from -- | 5 Q Right. But the effect wouldn't, right; |
| 6 A Yes, yes. | 6 you would just get the score? |
| 7 Q -- from the alternative map to -- | 7 A Well, to compare -- yeah, to compare an |
| 8 A Degradation measure. | 8 effect, though, you'd have to have some |
| MR. GABER: Well, let's go ahead and | 9 hypothetical to compare against it, I guess is |
| 10 take a break now. | 10 what I would say. |
| 11 (Recess from 3:08 p.m. until 3:19 p.m.) | 11 Q So as we discussed earlier, I think you |
| 12 BY MR. GABER: | 12 said in particular the Polsby-Popper and maybe the |
| 13 Q Dr. Hood, welcome back from the break. | 13 Schwartzberg, because those are based on |
| 14 Now, I am going to mark as an exhibit -- | 14 perimeter, those scores decreased as a result of |
| 15 I think we are on 13 -- a document that's titled | 15 these types of squiggly river boundaries? |
| 16 Plaintiffs Demonstrative Plan 1 Map. | 16 A More so than Reock would, yes. |
| 17 (A discussion was held off the record.) | 17 Q So if this were a straight line, the |
| 18 (Exhibit Hood-13 marked for | 18 compactness score for proposed District 9 here |
| 19 identification and attached to the transcript.) | 19 would be higher? |
| 20 BY MR. GABER: | 20 A Well, most likely -- I mean, this map is |
| 21 Q Dr. Hood, do you recognize this as the | 21 not super detailed, but most likely, if this were |
| 22 enacted plan statewide view of -- I'm sorry. Let | 22 a straight line instead of following a river |
| 23 me start that over. | 23 boundary, then yes, the perimeter scores would |
| 24 Do you recognize this as Plaintiffs' | 24 probably be higher. |
| 25 Demonstrative Plan 1 for the entire state view? | 25 Q And this river -- sorry -- the Devils |


| 157 | 159 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Lake boundary, that is actually the county <br> boundary as well; the county itself has that -- <br> Benson County itself has that sort of squiggly <br> Devils Lake boundary. <br> Is that right? <br> A From what I recall, yes. <br> MR. GABER: Okay. We can take this down for now. <br> Q Now, looking back at your report, 0 page 4, this is the analysis of LD 15 section of your report? <br> A Okay. <br> Q It's correct, right, that in your <br> report, you don't contest that with respect to 5 just looking at District 15, that Gingles prongs 2 6 and 3 are established there. <br> Is that right? <br> A So say that one more time. <br> Q That Gingles prongs 2 and 3, you agree, are established with respect to District 15 in the enacted plan? <br> A Well, I state that, so yes. <br> Q Okay. <br> A Yeah, I mean, it's stated there in the 25 report. | that's currently included in enacted District 15, right? <br> A Correct. I guess I would say most of it. You know, I'd have to do, like, a detailed analysis to say everybody was included. But most people, yes, are included. <br> Q And so in that respect, the demonstrative districts are themselves Gingles prong 1 demonstrative districts that satisfy the 10 requirement there, right? <br> A Well, they're majority Native American districts, yes. <br> MR. GABER: I'll mark as Exhibit 14 the <br> 4 document titled Government Admin Committee Report. <br> (Exhibit Hood-14 marked for <br> 16 identification and attached to the transcript.) <br> BY MR. GABER: <br> Q Dr. Hood, do you recognize this as -- <br> it's a long report of the legislature, but it <br> 0 includes other things. But among what it includes <br> 1 is the joint redistricting committee's discussion <br> of the history of redistricting in North Dakota, <br> 23 the legal framework, and then a discussion of the <br> 24 priorities that guided this legislative <br> 25 redistricting process. |
| Q What you do say, though, is that Gingles <br> prong 1 is not established because District 15 is <br> not a majority Native American district. <br> Do I have that right? <br> A Yeah, that's correct. <br> Q Now, I think we talked a little bit <br> earlier at the beginning of our conversation today <br> about this, but you understand that Gingles <br> prong 1 is focused on whether or not an <br> alternative district to the enacted one that's <br> challenged can be drawn in which there would be a <br> majority Native population. <br> Is that correct? <br> A Yes. <br> Q And so this conclusion about Gingles <br> prong 1 here in your report isn't actually about <br> Gingles prong 1 ; it's just an observation that <br> enacted District 15 isn't itself a majority Native <br> voting age population district, correct? <br> A Correct. <br> Q And you don't dispute that the <br> plaintiffs' demonstrative plans are majority <br> Native voting population districts, correct? <br> A Correct. They are. <br> Q And they include the Native population | A Yes, from what I recall, that's correct. <br> Q And if we can turn to page 28 of the document, please. And maybe scroll down a bit, <br> please. Down to the Population Deviation section. <br> So you see the section here titled <br> Population Deviation? <br> A Yes. <br> Q And do you see that the legislature sets <br> as its goal that the overall range for the plan be 10 within 10 percent population deviation? <br> A Correct. <br> Q And they note that in the plan being <br> considered by the committee -- and I think you <br> 14 would agree that that's the plan that actually was <br> 15 adopted -- the overall deviation was 9.87 percent <br> 16 with the largest district being 4.88 percent over <br> 17 ideal and the smallest 4.99 below. <br> Do you see that? <br> A Yes. <br> Q Now, nowhere here does the legislature indicate that it has some preference for being close to zero as opposed to being within the 10 percent range, right? <br> A Correct. <br> Q If you could turn to your report on |



|  | 165 |  | 167 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 right? |  | 1 A Right. That's correct. |  |
| 2 A Right. |  | 2 Q So on this score of county splits, |  |
| 3 Q And that's to adhere to the boundaries |  | 3 plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 1 is |  |
| 4 of the Spirit Lake reservation, which is along the |  | 4 essentially the same on that score as the enacted |  |
| 5 Sheyenne River. |  | 5 Districts 9 and 15? |  |
| 6 Is that right? |  | 6 A Well, in 9, I guess if you go to the |  |
| 7 A Right. That's where the reservation |  | 7 house districts, if that's what we're talking |  |
| 8 boundary would be, yes. |  | 8 about, yes. |  |
| $9 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And that's one of the state's -- in its |  | $9 \quad$ Q And for the state senate, two-thirds of |  |
| 10 committee report, that's one of the criteria, |  | 10 the counties in District 9 are split, two of the |  |
| 11 adhering to the boundaries of reservations? |  | 11 three? |  |
| 12 A Yes, yes. |  | 12 A That's correct. |  |
| 13 Q So -- |  | 13 Q And it's the same entirely as |  |
| 14 (Cross-talk.) |  | 14 District 15, three split counties and one whole |  |
| 15 Q Sorry, go ahead. |  | 15 county, right? |  |
| 16 A I'm saying, that's correct, it was in |  | 16 A Correct. |  |
| 17 that report. |  | 17 Q And the plaintiffs' demonstrative |  |
| 18 Q So one of the four splits -- sorry. One |  | 18 District 1 puts Benson County back together whole, |  |
| 20 plaintiffs' demonstrative plan, plan 1 , is to |  | 20 A I believe so, yes. |  |
| 21 adhere to the requirement of the legislature to |  | 21 Q And we can take a look at that if you'd |  |
| 22 follow the reservation boundary, and that's why |  | 22 like to see it. |  |
| 23 Eddy County is split? |  | 23 A Okay. I mean, I think that's correct. |  |
| 24 A Well, it certainly keeps the reservation 25 within 9 , yes. |  | 24 MR. GABER: That's Exhibit 13. The 25 third to the last tab there, LaVar. Thank you. |  |
| 25 within 9, yes. |  | 25 third to the last tab there, LaVar. Thank you. |  |
|  | 166 |  | 168 |
| 1 Q And by comparison to enacted plan's |  | 1 Q So you see Benson county is whole there? |  |
| 2 state house map, the same number of counties are |  | 2 A Yes, yes. |  |
| 3 split in plaintiffs' demonstrative plan for the |  | 3 Q Your Communities of Interest discussion |  |
| 4 state house, which is the whole district, as in |  | 4 in your report focuses on county splits, right? |  |
| 5 the enacted plan, correct? |  | 5 A Yes. |  |
| 6 A Three and three, yes. |  | $6 \quad$ Q That term means more than split |  |
| 7 Q Let's switch back to the enacted map, |  | 7 counties, right? |  |
| 8 please, which was Exhibit 15. And take a look at |  | 8 A Well, communities of interest can be |  |
| 9 District 15 here. |  | 9 more than counties, certainly. |  |
| 10 District 15 includes all of Ramsey |  | 10 Q Did you analyze any communities of |  |
| 11 County, but then part of Towner County, part of |  | 11 interest in your report other than counties? |  |
| 12 Benson County, and part of Eddy County, right? |  | 12 A No. |  |
| 13 A Right. |  | 13 Q Did you -- we've talked about how |  |
| 14 Q So District 15 has three split counties |  | 14 respecting reservation boundaries is a priority of |  |
| 15 and one whole county? |  | 15 the legislature, right? |  |
| 16 A Yes. |  | 16 A Correct, yeah. |  |
| 17 Q And that's the exact same count as |  | 17 Q And did you look to see whether the |  |
| 18 Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1, correct, three |  | 18 enacted plan respected both the reservation |  |
| 19 counties that are split and one whole county? |  | 19 boundaries and the off-reservation trust land for |  |
| 20 A For demonstrative District 1, right? |  | 20 the Turtle Mountain tribe? |  |
| 21 Q Right. |  | 21 A Well, I believe it did. I'm not sure |  |
| 22 A Yes. |  | 22 about the trust land. But the reservation was |  |
| 23 Q And as we mentioned earlier, one of |  | 23 contained within the district. |  |
| 24 those boundaries is exactly the same. That's the |  | 24 Q And -- but you don't -- I guess earlier |  |
| 25 Eddy County split. |  | 25 we talked about how you don't have any particular |  |


|  | 169 |  | 171 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 knowledge or experience about Native American |  | 1 demonstrative plan, correct? |  |
| 2 issues generally or voting patterns or |  | 2 A Yes. |  |
| 3 sociological history or whatnot, right? |  | 3 Q One example is its neighboring district, |  |
| 4 A That's correct. |  | 4 I believe that's 8 . |  |
| $5 \quad$ Q Would it surprise you to know that the |  | 5 MR. GABER: Can you Zoom into the gray |  |
| 6 trust lands are important, you know, holdings for |  | 6 district for me, LaVar. |  |
| 7 the Turtle Mountain tribe? |  | $7 \quad$ Q I think it's actually not 8, I think |  |
| $8 \quad \mathrm{~A}$ No. |  | 8 it's 6. |  |
| $9 \quad$ Q But you didn't look to see whether the |  | 9 Do you see that? |  |
| 10 enacted plan keeps those in one district? |  | $10 \quad$ A 6. |  |
| 11 A Well, I used the reservation boundaries |  | 11 Q So 6 is larger in geographic size than |  |
| 12 as defined by the census bureau, and under that |  | 12 demonstrative District 9, right? |  |
| 13 definition, it is contained within the district. |  | 13 A Looks to be, yes. |  |
| 14 Q You would agree that -- |  | 14 Q It stretches further north to south than |  |
| 15 A I'm not sure -- you know, I'm honestly |  | 15 does District 9 in this map? |  |
| 16 not sure that -- whether that contained these |  | 16 A Yes. |  |
| 17 trust lands that we're talking about or not. I |  | 17 Q And let's zoom out again, please. |  |
| 18 just don't know the answer to that. So... |  | 18 District 14 stretches from Pierce |  |
| 19 Q Okay. Would you agree that that would |  | 19 County -- the northern boundary of Pierce County |  |
| 20 be a type of community of interest consideration |  | 20 all the way to the southern boundary of -- is that |  |
| 21 that could be taken into account, whether the |  | 21 Kidder County? |  |
| 22 reservation and the trust lands are included in a |  | 22 Do you see that? |  |
| 23 single district? |  | 23 A Yes. |  |
| 24 A Well, certainly, it could. |  | 24 Q And that's a larger geographic distance |  |
| 25 Q Now, looking -- |  | 25 than demonstrative District 9, correct? |  |
|  | 170 |  | 172 |
| 1 MR. GABER: Maybe, LaVar, if you don't |  | $1 \quad \mathrm{~A}$ Yes. |  |
| 2 mind zooming out a little bit here so we can see |  | 2 Q If you look at District 28, the |  |
| 3 the full map. |  | 3 teal-colored district in the southeastern part of |  |
| $4 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ Now, is it your understanding that aside |  | 4 the state, that district looks to be similar or |  |
| 5 from -- this is Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1. |  | 5 possibly slightly larger in its east-west span as |  |
| 6 Aside from the changes to District 9, 15, and then |  | 6 is demonstrative District 9 in its north to south |  |
| 7 some minor changes to 14 and 29, the rest of the |  | 7 span, right? |  |
| 8 plan reflects the plan that was enacted by the |  | 8 A Well, they certainly look on par. I |  |
| 9 legislature? |  | 9 mean, I don't know without measuring. So... |  |
| 10 A From what I recall, outside of those |  | 10 Q District -- the green district in the |  |
| 11 changes, that would be correct, yes. |  | 11 corner, I believe -- is that 39 ? |  |
| 12 Q Now, with respect to some of the other |  | 12 MR. GABER: Can you zoom to the |  |
| 13 districts in the plan, you understand that rural |  | 13 southwest corner for me, please, LaVar. Yeah, |  |
| 14 North Dakota is somewhat sparsely populated, |  | 14 District 39, north to south. Maybe scroll back |  |
| 15 right? |  | 15 out so we can see the whole state again. Sorry. |  |
| 16 A Certainly, yes. |  | 16 Q That looks to be slightly larger north |  |
| 17 Q So when that's the case, the |  | 17 to south than demonstrative District 9 in this |  |
| 18 geographical size of districts has to increase |  | 18 plan, right? |  |
| 19 because there's -- you have to go further to find |  | 19 A Potentially, yes. |  |
| 20 population to get an equally populated district. |  | 20 Q Do you see, in the western part of the |  |
| 21 Does that seem fair? |  | 21 state, District 23, the kind of grayish-blue |  |
| 22 A Yes. |  | 22 colored district? |  |
| 23 Q And there are other districts in the |  | 23 A Yes. |  |
| 24 state's enacted plan that span a larger geographic |  | 24 Q How would you describe the shape of that |  |
| 25 distance than does District 9 in plaintiffs' |  | 25 district? |  |


|  | 173 | 175 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 A I don't know. I think it would be -- |  | 1 principle. |
| 2 it's difficult to come up with an adjective. |  | 2 Is that fair |
| 3 Q I think it looks like a dinosaur. |  | 3 A It's one of the things that can be |
| 4 A Okay. Well -- I don't know. That's not |  | 4 looked at, yes. I mean, precincts aren't |
| 5 what was coming to my mind. |  | 5 necessarily communities of interest. But |
| $6 \quad$ Q Or maybe a baby dinosaur. |  | 6 sometimes courts have looked at whether precincts |
| $7 \quad$ What about the -- you see the sort of |  | 7 are split or not. That's true. |
| 8 neck that connects its body to its head? |  | 8 I say they're not communities of |
| 9 A Yes, I see that. |  | 9 interest because most people don't think about, |
| 10 Q How would you characterize that? |  | 10 you know, a precinct as a community -- as a local |
| 11 A Well, a neck. I mean, I think that's |  | 11 community necessarily. They could be, but not |
| 12 probably a pretty good way to describe it. A |  | 12 necessarily. So... |
| 13 bridge. |  | 13 Q It eases the burden on election |
| 14 Q Would you describe that as a narrow |  | 14 administrators to not change the precincts. |
| 15 bridge? |  | 15 Is that fair? |
| 16 A Well, it's fairly narrow. I mean, the |  | 16 A It probably makes that part of things |
| 17 district itself is not huge geographically. But |  | 17 easier, yes. |
| 18 that's certainly -- I mean, I guess I could fairly |  | 18 Q And so to the extent -- Dr. Collingwood |
| 19 say that's probably the narrowest part of the |  | 19 noted in his report that demonstrative plan 1 |
| 20 district. |  | 20 adheres to all of the precinct lines -- the new |
| 21 Q And you describe in your report |  | 21 precinct lines that it touches. |
| 22 plaintiffs' demonstrative District 9 as having a |  | 22 Do you recall that? |
| 23 land bridge. |  | 23 A Not precisely, but... |
| 24 Do you recall that? |  | 24 Q You don't have any reason to dispute |
| 25 A Yes. |  | 25 that? |
|  | 174 | 176 |
| 1 Q Can you tell me on the map what the land |  | 1 A Not necessarily, no. |
| 2 bridge is? |  | 2 Q And to the extent it does that, that's |
| 3 A Well, on this map, for instance, here, |  | 3 one of the criteria that is often followed as a |
| 4 it would be that area to the right or to the east |  | 4 traditional districting criteria? |
| 5 of where it literally says Pierce, North Dakota, |  | 5 A It is one of the things that is looked |
| 6 where that lettering is there. So that's sort of |  | 6 at sometimes, yes. |
| 7 the bridge at that point. So... |  | $7 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ The land bridge that you identify, that |
| $8 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And do you understand that that's a |  | 8 voting precinct in Pierce County, that is not |
| 9 complete voting precinct from Pierce County? |  | 9 narrower than -- in fact, it's wider than other |
| 10 A Well, I didn't -- I don't know that I |  | 10 land bridges you see in this map. |
| 11 would recall that, just sitting here. |  | 11 Is that fair? |
| 12 Q Did you look to see -- I notice that you |  | 12 A Well, it's wider than the one we were |
| 13 produced split reports for municipalities. |  | 13 talking about in 23, certainly. |
| 14 You didn't encounter any municipal |  | 14 Q Do you see District 8 down there in the |
| 15 splits in Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Plan 1? |  | 15 south central part of the state, the purplish-gray |
| 16 A Not that I recall. |  | 16 district? |
| 17 Q It wasn't in your report, but it was in |  | 17 A Yes. |
| 18 the data, I noticed. |  | 18 Q And do you see how that moves up in sort |
| 19 A Right, right. |  | 19 of a step pattern to the northwest? |
| 20 Q And did you analyze to see whether there |  | 20 A Yes. |
| 21 were precinct splits? I noticed that there were |  | 21 Q The bridge that you identify -- the land |
| 22 notes that you'd written about precinct splits. |  | 22 bridge you identify in Pierce County in |
| 23 A I don't think I ever got that far. |  | 23 demonstrative District 9 is larger in size than |
| 24 Q And so adhering to voting tabulation |  | 24 District 8's bridge. |
| 25 precincts is also a traditional districting |  | $25 \quad$ Is that fair? |




| 185 | 187 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 with him in the new district, but three out of | 1 to make comparisons. |
| 2 four voters in the new district are new to him. | 2 Q Did you look at any prior decade's |
| 3 A No, three out of four -- | 3 districting plans for North Dakota legislative |
| 4 Q Sorry, one out of four. | 4 seats to make any comparisons to district |
| 5 A Yes, I would -- okay. You really had me | 5 configurations? |
| 6 thrown there. I thought maybe I was -- | 6 A Idid not. |
| $7 \quad$ Q All right. No, no, that was my fault. | $7 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ To the extent that there -- is that |
| 8 But in any event, it wasn't sufficient | 8 something that is relevant, to see how the |
| 9 for him to be retained as an incumbent? | 9 legislature has in the past configured districts |
| 10 A Well, again, core constituencies are one | 10 to see whether -- to compare districts and see if |
| 11 part of incumbent protection or incumbent | 11 they're similar configurations? |
| 12 reelection, but they're not everything related to | 12 A It could be, but, you know, every |
| 13 incumbent reelection. So... | 13 redistricting cycle is new, and in this particular |
| 14 Q Did you look to -- beyond District 9 in | 14 case, the job was given over to an ad hoc |
| 15 assessing the enacted plan's performance in terms | 15 commission. And of course, the legislature had to |
| 16 of core retention? | 16 approve what the commission did, obviously. |
| 17 A It doesn't look like it. I mean, it | 17 But my point being, there are different |
| 18 looks like I'm making comparisons here between the | 18 people in charge of redistricting every time, and |
| 19 enacted plan in specific districts and the enacted | 19 so things are not necessarily going to look the |
| 20 plan, specifically LD 9, in the demonstrative | 20 same. |
| 21 districts. | 21 And they're not going to be the same, |
| 22 Q Do you think that the legislature | 22 period, when you take into account that populatio |
| 23 followed -- or satisfied its goal with respect to | 23 has shifted across the state, which it had, and |
| 24 core retention for the plan as a whole? | 24 certain -- certain things have to be rectified in |
| 25 A Well, probably so, I would say. You | 25 terms of making sure that the districts are within |
| 186 | 188 |
| 1 know, in the case of some districts being moved | 1 constitutional bounds in terms of population |
| 2 across the state -- and you have to do that. I | 2 deviations. |
| 3 mean, this doesn't trump other redistricting | 3 Q When you say "ad hoc commission," what |
| 4 factors, especially population equality. You're | 4 do you mean by that? |
| 5 not going to necessarily be able to maximize this | 5 A Well, I don't mean that in any kind of |
| 6 in every case. | 6 negative sense. I just mean there was a |
| $7 \quad$ Q And do you have, like, a threshold for | 7 commission put together charged by the legislature |
| 8 what you consider to be a strong core retention? | 8 with developing a redistricting plan. |
| 9 Is it 50 percent? | $9 \quad$ Q Who served on the commission? |
| 10 A I don't know -- honestly, I don't know | 10 A Well, I believe they were all |
| 11 that I've ever come up with a threshold. You | 11 legislators. |
| 12 know, it ranges -- it's pretty easy to grasp | 12 Q On page 9 and 10 of your report, in your |
| 13 because it ranges from zero to 100 , zero percent | 13 Summary and Conclusions, towards the end, you note |
| 14 to 100 percent. I mean, if you're at 50 percent, | 14 that there's been a degradation -- or that that -- |
| 15 it would mean that 50 percent of your new | 15 the demonstrative District 9 performs worse on |
| 16 constituents are new to you; they didn't follow | 16 some traditional redistricting criteria compared |
| 17 you across with the old district boundaries. | 17 to enacted version of District 9. |
| 18 So, you know, so every one of two new -- | 18 Do you see that? |
| 19 one of two voters in the new cycle are not your | 19 A Yes. |
| 20 prior constituents. | 20 Q And you would agree, we've gone through |
| 21 Q You did not, as part of your report, | 21 all of those different criteria? |
| 22 examine any of the prior -- other than maybe the | 22 A Correct. |
| 23 benchmark 2012 to 2020 plan -- did you look at the | 23 Q And plaintiffs' proposed District 9 |
| 242012 to 2020 plan as part of your analysis? | 24 satisfies the population deviation legislative |
| 25 A Just to the extent to which I needed it | 25 goal, correct? |


|  | 189 |  | 191 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 A Correct. |  | $1 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And demonstrative -- sorry -- enacted |  |
| 2 Q We talked about how, under your own |  | 2 District 9, in fact, from east to west is just |  |
| 3 metric from Virginia and applied here, that the |  | 3 about as long as plaintiffs' demonstrative |  |
| 4 district is sufficiently or reasonably compact, |  | 4 District 1 is from north to south, correct? |  |
| 5 correct? |  | 5 A From what I remember, yes. |  |
| 6 A Correct. |  | 6 Q And the two most populous counties |  |
| $7 \quad$ Q And with respect to county splits, we |  | 7 included in plaintiffs' demonstrative District 9 |  |
| 8 noted that there was an error in your report with |  | 8 are Benson County and Rolette County, correct? |  |
| 9 respect to the number of counties, right, that the |  | $9 \quad$ A I don't think we talked about that. I |  |
| 10 enacted plan splits? |  | 10 mean, I don't have -- I'm just being up front. I |  |
| 11 A Correct. That's correct. |  | 11 don't have the population figures in front of me. |  |
| 12 Q And demonstrative District 9 has the |  | 12 So... |  |
| 13 same number of county splits as does District 15, |  | 13 Q Well, it includes all of Benson County, |  |
| 14 which is also under challenge in this case, right? |  | 14 a precinct from Pierce County, and then Rolette |  |
| 15 A Correct. |  | 15 County, and then that small piece of Eddy County |  |
| 16 Q And it has the same number of county |  | 16 that's to adhere to the reservation boundary. |  |
| 17 splits as the state house map for District 9, |  | 17 So does it sound right to say that |  |
| 18 correct? |  | 18 Benson and Rolette are the most populous |  |
| 19 A Correct. |  | 19 components of the district? |  |
| 20 Q It splits Eddy County only to adhere to |  | 20 A Well, I would assume, but, you know, one |  |
| 21 the boundaries of the Spirit Lake Nation, correct? |  | 21 doesn't need to make assumptions. I mean, |  |
| 22 A Correct. |  | 22 geography doesn't necessarily equate to |  |
| 23 Q And that's the same split of Eddy County |  | 23 population, obviously. So... |  |
| 24 that the enacted District 15 makes, correct? |  | 24 Q Okay. We discussed how Benson County |  |
| 25 A Correct. |  | 25 and Rolette County are closer geographically than |  |
|  | 190 |  | 192 |
| 1 So I mean, it's two -- should be two |  | 1 Rolette County is to Cavalier County, right? |  |
| 2 county splits in the enacted plan versus three, |  | 2 A That's true, yes. |  |
| 3 right. So... |  | 3 Q And so on all of these measures, |  |
| $4 \quad$ Q For District 9 at the state senate |  | 4 demonstrative -- plaintiffs' demonstrative |  |
| 5 level, right? |  | 5 district is similar to or in some instances better |  |
| 6 A Yeah. |  | 6 in terms of traditional districting criteria than |  |
| $7 \quad$ Q And at the state house level, it splits |  | 7 either District 9 in the enacted plan, District 15 |  |
| 8 all three counties in the district? |  | 8 in the enacted plan, or other districts in the |  |
| 9 A If you go down to the subdistricts, yes. |  | 9 state. |  |
| 10 Q And we discussed how plaintiffs' |  | 10 Is that fair? |  |
| 11 demonstrative plan restores Towner County to its |  | 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, that's |  |
| 12 prior configuration in terms of core retention, |  | 12 ambiguous and compound. |  |
| 13 moving it to District 15 entirely. |  | 13 A Well, on some traditional redistricting |  |
| 14 A That is true. |  | 14 criteria, it might be; on some, it's certainly |  |
| 15 Q We've discussed how the enacted map has |  | 15 not. |  |
| 16 features in terms of land bridges or necks or |  | 16 Q Now, Dr. Hood, at the end of your |  |
| 17 connecting points in districts that are a fair bit |  | 17 report, you say that the use of a land bridge and |  |
| 18 smaller than what you termed the land bridge in |  | 18 some of the districting criteria we just discussed |  |
| 19 plaintiffs' demonstrative District 9, right? |  | 19 coupled with the fact that the demonstrative |  |
| 20 A Correct. |  | 20 District 9 joins two Native American reservations |  |
| 21 Q And a number of the enacted districts in |  | 21 raises the question of whether the creation of |  |
| 22 the map span much larger -- either similar or |  | 22 LD 9 under plaintiffs' demonstrative plan results |  |
| 23 larger geographic distances than does enacted -- |  | 23 in a racial gerrymander. |  |
| 24 than demonstrative District 9, correct? |  | 24 Can you explain to me what you mean by |  |
| 25 A That's correct, yes. |  | 25 "results in a racial gerrymander." |  |


| 193 |  | 195 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 A I guess the question is, why was LD 9 | 1 is it? |  |
| 2 drawn -- or why was demonstrative District 1 or 2 | 2 A I don't think I said that, no. |  |
| 3 drawn the way they were drawn. | 3 Q Okay. In the Supreme Court's racial |  |
| $4 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ What do you understand to be the test | 4 gerrymandering cases, one of the typical features |  |
| 5 for whether a district is a racial gerrymander? | 5 is split precincts where the census bloc level is |  |
| 6 A Typically, it's if race is the | 6 split along racial lines. So on one side of the |  |
| 7 predominant factor in drawing the district lines. | 7 line is a bloc that, say, has white folks, and on |  |
| $8 \quad$ Q And how do courts assess whether or not | 8 the other side of the line is a census bloc that |  |
| 9 that's occurred? | 9 has black or other minority folks. That's |  |
| 10 A Well, one of the things -- | 10 typically one of the fact patterns that we see in |  |
| 11 MR. PHILLIPS: I'll just state my | 11 those cases? |  |
| 12 objection. | 12 A That's one of the factors that's looked |  |
| 13 Calls for a legal conclusion. | 13 at, yes. |  |
| 14 Q What do you understand to be the | 14 Q That's not the case in plaintiffs' |  |
| 15 analysis there? | 15 demonstrative districts, right? In fact, |  |
| 16 A Well, one of the things that's typically | 16 demonstrative District 1 keeps all the precincts |  |
| 17 done is an analysis of traditional redistricting | 17 entirely whole, correct? |  |
| 18 criteria. | 18 A I believe so, yes. |  |
| 19 Q And those are all the ones that we've | 19 Q And so what is the basis for your |  |
| 20 talked about here today? | 20 conclusion that plaintiffs' demonstrative plans |  |
| 21 A Yes, certainly. I mean, there could be | 21 raise questions about whether they result in a |  |
| 22 some others. But yeah, those are -- the ones we | 22 racial gerrymander? |  |
| 23 talked about certainly are. | 23 A Well, again, my argument would be |  |
| 24 Q One of the hallmarks throughout the case | 24 looking at some traditional redistricting |  |
| 25 law -- and you've read racial gerrymandering case |  |  |
| 194 |  | 196 |
| 1 decisions, I gather, right? | 1 some of those factors with the demonstrative |  |
| 2 A Yes. | 2 districts compared to the original LD 9 or the |  |
| 3 Q You're familiar with the Shaw case from | 3 enacted LD 9. |  |
| 4 the Supreme Court? | $4 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ Anything else? |  |
| 5 A Right. | 5 A Well, that's primarily it. |  |
| 6 Q The Miller case from the Supreme Court? | $6 \quad$ Q But is there anything else? |  |
| 7 A Right. | 7 A No. That's my primary argument or |  |
| $8 \quad$ Q You're familiar with the Cooper versus | 8 thoughts on that. |  |
| 9 Harris and Bethune-Hill? | 9 MR. GABER: Okay. Let's go ahead and |  |
| 10 A Yes. | 10 take about a ten-minute break, and that will bring |  |
| 11 Q Have you seen the districts from those | 11 us back at 4:32. |  |
| 12 cases? | 12 (Recess from 4:22 p.m. until 4:33 p.m.) |  |
| 13 A Some of them, yes. I probably have seen | 13 MR. GABER: Dr. Hood, unless I have to |  |
| 14 all of them. I can remember some of them on the | 14 ask you any follow-up questions if Mr. Phillips |  |
| 15 top of my head, yes. | 15 has any, I don't have any further questions for |  |
| 16 Q I assume you're familiar -- I think | 16 you. Thank you so much for your time and for |  |
| 17 it's -- is it the Shaw case or the Miller case, | 17 appearing right after your class today. I |  |
| 18 the Georgia district? | 18 appreciate it. |  |
| 19 A The Miller case. | 19 THE WITNESS: Thank you. |  |
| 20 Q Are you familiar with the way that | 20 I guess I would like to add maybe one or |  |
| 21 district looked? | 21 clarification from that last discussion that we |  |
| 22 A Yes, I am. | 22 were having about, you know, what could or could |  |
| 23 Q It's not your testimony that the | 23 not be a racial gerrymander in terms of |  |
| 24 district from Miller looks anything like | 24 districting. |  |
| 25 plaintiffs' demonstrative districts in this case, | 25 And obviously, in the report, I included |  |


|  | 197 |  | 199 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 these maps. And so I think it's also important to |  | 1 wayside in service of that racial goal. That's |  |
| 2 look at how the district's configured and how it |  | 2 basically what a racial gerrymandering is. |  |
| 3 connects to concentrations of racial minorities |  | 3 Is that your understanding? |  |
| 4 across a distance. |  | 4 MR. PHILLIPS: I'll object that it calls |  |
| 5 So I guess that's -- you were asking |  | 5 for a legal conclusion. |  |
| 6 me -- I was thinking about this. You're asking me |  | 6 A Yes, that's my understanding. |  |
| 7 why I came to that conclusion or the possibility |  | $7 \quad$ Q Okay. And so what you're saying here in |  |
| 8 of that conclusion. So obviously, I included the |  | 8 your addendum is that the fact that there are two |  |
| 9 maps for a reason. So... |  | 9 Native American reservations within plaintiffs' |  |
| 10 BY MR. GABER: |  | 10 demonstrative District 9 is the additional reason, |  |
| 11 Q Did you talk to Mr. Phillips during the |  | 11 in addition to the comparison of some traditional |  |
| 12 break? |  | 12 criteria to the enacted version of 9, that is |  |
| 13 A Yes. |  | 13 leading you to make this statement about racial |  |
| 14 Q Now, you said "across a distance." We |  | 14 gerrymandering? |  |
| 15 talked about how the distance -- the length of |  | 15 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, misstates the |  |
| 16 District 9 in plaintiffs' demonstrative plan is |  | 16 prior testimony. |  |
| 17 the same, or in many instances, it's shorter than |  | 17 A Yes, I think that's correct. I mean, |  |
| 18 the distances of other districts in the state's |  | 18 I -- |  |
| 19 plan, right? |  | 19 Q But -- go ahead. |  |
| 20 A Correct. That's true. |  | 20 A Well, say -- sorry. Say that one more |  |
| 21 Q And it's about the same distance as the |  | 21 time. |  |
| 22 enacted version of District 9 is across from |  | 22 Q You've offered two reasons that are -- |  |
| 23 Rolette County to Cavalier County, right? |  | 23 would you say -- are you saying it's a racial |  |
| 24 A Correct. |  | 24 gerrymander? Your report says it raises questions |  |
| 25 Q And it can be a racial gerrymander to |  | 25 about whether or not it results. |  |
|  | 198 |  | 200 |
| 1 include white voters in a district instead of |  | 1 A No, I can't make that determination. |  |
| 2 other races of voters, right? |  | 2 Q And when you say -- |  |
| 3 A That is correct, certainly. |  | 3 A So no, I'm not saying that. |  |
| $4 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ And so to the extent that enacted |  | $4 \quad$ Q Okay. So it's not your testimony that |  |
| 5 District 9 stretches across to include rural white |  | 5 it is a racial gerrymander, plaintiffs' |  |
| 6 voters instead of Native American voters, under |  | 6 demonstrative District 9? |  |
| 7 your view, that too could be an indication of a |  | 7 A No, I can't make that -- I don't believe |  |
| 8 racial gerrymander? |  | 8 I can make that determination. |  |
| 9 A Potentially. |  | $9 \quad$ Q You don't have the evidentiary basis to |  |
| 10 Q Now, just the fact that there are two |  | 10 say that. |  |
| 11 Native American tribes in a district does not on |  | 11 Is that fair? |  |
| 12 its own mean that the district is a racial |  | 12 A I think that's fair, yes. |  |
| 13 gerrymander, right? |  | 13 Q And we've gone through the traditional |  |
| 14 A No. I'm not arguing that. |  | 14 districting criteria. It's not seriously your |  |
| 15 Q And in order for that to be the case, |  | 15 testimony that the plaintiffs' demonstrative |  |
| 16 race would have had to have been the predominant |  | 16 District 9 subverts traditional districting |  |
| 17 consideration across the entire district, right? |  | 17 principles, right? |  |
| 18 That's the test the Supreme Court applies? |  | 18 A Well, no. It was that they were |  |
| 19 A Yes. It has to -- that's my |  | 19 degraded to some degree. |  |
| 20 understanding, it has to be the predominant |  | 20 Q From one comparison district, enacted |  |
| 21 factor. |  | 21 District 9, right? |  |
| 22 Q And the traditional districting |  | 22 A Correct. That's correct. |  |
| 23 principles would each need to be subordinated to |  | 23 Q Not standing alone? |  |
| 24 race such that race was the inflexible goal, and |  | 24 A I'm sorry. What standing alone? |  |
| 25 traditional districting criteria fell by the |  | 25 Q Only in comparison -- we've gone through |  |


| 201 | 203 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 these at length, and it turns out some of them | 1 case -- it does that, yes. |
| 2 you've testified that plaintiffs' demonstrative | 2 Q And your testimony with respect to |
| 3 district does better or as good as the other | 3 traditional districting criteria is not that |
| 4 districts in the area, including 9 and 15? | 4 plaintiffs' demonstrative district subordinates |
| $5 \quad$ A Sometimes. | 5 those criteria in favor of a racial |
| $6 \quad$ Q And we talked about, with respect to | 6 classification, right? You don't have that |
| 7 compactness, that the proper framework is to look | 7 evidence? |
| 8 standing alone whether the district is reasonably | 8 A No, I didn't say that. |
| 9 compact? | $9 \quad \mathrm{Q}$ It does not subordinate traditional |
| 10 A Well, we talked about a lot in terms of | 10 redistricting criteria? |
| 11 compactness and fairness. And that was one | 11 MR. PHILLIPS: I'll object that it |
| 12 comparison. But that's not the only comparison to | 12 misstates his testimony. And his report says that |
| 13 be made. | 13 it raises a question. He's testified that he's |
| 14 Q And your conclusion, based on the types | 14 not opining on that specifically, and I believe |
| 15 of analysis you've done in this case and in other | 15 that it would be for the Court to decide. |
| 16 cases, is that plaintiffs' demonstrative | 16 Q So the question was, the demonstrative |
| 17 District 9 is, in fact, reasonably compact? | 17 District 9 does not subordinate traditional |
| 18 A Well, again, based on what I said in | 18 districting criteria; you don't believe it does, |
| 19 that Virginia case, it has a higher level of -- or | 19 correct? |
| 20 the compactness scores are higher than in that | 20 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection, outside the |
| 21 Virginia case. | 21 scope of his opinion, calls for a legal |
| 22 Q Did you have pause as to whether any of | 22 conclusion. |
| 23 the districts in the Virginia case were racial | 23 A Again, I guess I think my testimony was |
| 24 gerrymanders? I didn't see that in your report | 24 that certain traditional redistricting criteria |
| 25 there. | 25 have been degraded compared to the enacted LD |
| 202 | 204 |
| 1 A No. No. That was -- let me be clear. | 1 I mean, I think that's what I've said. |
| 2 That was not an issue in that case. It was | 2 Q And certain redistricting criteria are |
| 3 literally just compactness. | 3 better in the demonstrative plan. |
| 4 Q Do you understand that Native American | 4 That's fair? |
| 5 reservations are more than just racial groups; | 5 A Or the same, essentially. |
| 6 that they are sovereign nations? | 6 MR. GABER: Okay. I have no further |
| $7 \quad$ A Yes, yes. | 7 questions. |
| $8 \quad \mathrm{Q} \quad$ And do you understand that they have | 8 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you. |
| 9 interests that are different than purely racial | 9 I don't have any follow-ups myself. |
| 10 interests? | 10 COURT REPORTER: Anything else for the |
| 11 A Yes. | 11 record? |
| 12 Q And do you understand that Native | 12 MR. GABER: I do not believe so. |
| 13 American tribes might have shared interests that | 13 (Transcript orders discussed.) |
| 14 relate to issues with respect to representation in | 14 COURT REPORTER: I think that's all we |
| 15 the state legislature? | 15 need. Thank you. |
| 16 MR. PHILLIPS: Objection. | 16 (Off the record at 4:44 p.m.) |
| 17 A Certainly. | 17 |
| 18 Q You said "certainly," right? | 18 |
| 19 A Yes. | 19 |
| 20 Q And so to the extent that a district | 20 |
| 21 respects the boundaries of Native American | 21 |
| 22 reservations, it's not merely making racial | 22 |
| 23 classifications, but rather, it's accounting for a | 23 |
| 24 sovereign political boundary, correct? | 24 |
| 25 A Well, to the extent to which that's the | 25 |

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## EXHIBIT 4

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS

MICHAEL HOWE, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of North Dakota,

Defendant.

## DECLARATION OF JAMIE AZURE

I, Jamie Azure, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, based on my personal knowledge, declare that:

1. I am an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians ("Turtle Mountain Band"). I currently serve as the Turtle Mountain Band's Chairman and live on the Turtle Mountain Reservation.
2. The Turtle Mountain Band is a federally recognized tribe and located on the Turtle Mountain Reservation. The Tribal Headquarters are located at 4180 Highway 281, Belcourt, ND 58316.
3. The Turtle Mountain Band has over 30,000 enrolled members, a substantial portion of whom vote or are eligible to vote in federal, state, and local elections on and near the Turtle Mountain Reservation and off-reservation trust lands.
4. The Turtle Mountain Reservation covers 72 square-miles in Rolette County. Its population is 5,113 according to the 2020 United States Census. This includes a sizeable population of eligible voters. Substantial populations of tribal citizens also live in the areas
surrounding the Reservation, including St. John, Dunseith, and Rolette, as well as the Turtle Mountain trust lands.
5. The Turtle Mountain Reservation is in Legislative Senate District 9 and Legislative House District 9A under the 2021 enacted redistricting plan, which is comprised of one single-member state senate district and one single-member state house district. Offreservation lands held in trust for the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians are located in House District 9B under the 2021 enacted redistricting plan. A substantial population of Turtle Mountain citizens live in House Districts 9A and 9B.
6. The Turtle Mountain Reservation is geographically close to the reservation of the Spirit Lake Tribe, being less than 60 miles apart.
7. Although each tribe is a separate sovereign government, the Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain reservations are a community of interest, with many shared values between our tribes. The State of North Dakota recognizes as much on its website, explaining that "North Dakota's tribal communities have shaped our state's history. Though individual tribes have distinct and different origins, histories and languages, Plains Indians are united by core beliefs and values including respect for the earth and humankind's relationship with nature."1
8. In addition to shared values and beliefs, the residents of the Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake reservations share the experience of living in rural North Dakota tribal communities. As such, we share similar representational needs from our state legislature related to economic investment, state-sponsored services, and legislative appropriations that differ from other North Dakota rural communities, where agricultural and energy interests predominate, and from the state's urban areas. The members of Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain share similar socio-

[^13]economic statuses, which make the need for dedicated and cohesive representation in the legislature important.
9. The Spirit Lake Tribe and Turtle Mountain Band partner together in many political, economic, educational, and public safety organizations, including with the United Tribes of North Dakota, United Tribes Technical College, National Congress of American Indians, First Nations Women's Alliance, North Dakota Tribal College System, North Dakota Native Tourism Alliance, and the National Indian Gaming Association.
10. Both tribes interact with the North Dakota government and legislature on many similar levels, including through the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission and the legislature's Tribal and State Relations Committee. ${ }^{2}$
11. Both tribes frequently join together to pursue similar policy objectives, including working with the State of North Dakota and the North Dakota Legislature on the following issues, to just name a few: funding for tribal colleges, negotiating the tribal-state gaming compact, taxation on tribal lands, hunting and fishing regulation, tribal and state law enforcement, and funding for education, foster care, health care, etc.
12. Both tribes are often similarly affected by legislation that is considered or enacted by the State Legislature. For example, House Bill 1536 would adopt a state Indian Child Welfare Act, which was introduced this year in the State Legislature by Representative Jayme Davis, who is a Turtle Mountain Band member. Both tribes also joined in an amicus brief last year in the United States Supreme Court to defend the Indian Child Welfare Act.

[^14]13. I serve on the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission, along with the Governor and the Chairs of the other North Dakota Tribes, including Chairman Yankton of the Spirit Lake Tribe. As the Commission explains on its website, "[o]ne of the roles of the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission is to keep the public informed about current laws and legislative issues that impact Indian country."3
14. The Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain Tribes chartered the United Tribes Technical College along with the other North Dakota Tribes and I serve on its Board along with Chairman Yankton from the Spirit Lake Tribe and the other North Dakota tribal chairmen and a delegate from each Tribe.
15. Our joint efforts at ensuring quality educational opportunities for members and non-members of North Dakota tribes illustrate the type of shared representational interests Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain have with respect to the legislature. Over the past decade the Tribes and the tribal colleges have sought and secured state funding from the legislature for workforce development grants for the state's tribal colleges to help address the high unemployment and poverty rates among American Indians living on North Dakota's reservations.
16. Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain also work together with the other North Dakota Tribes to ensure legislative funding for the state's tribal colleges to support non-beneficiary students who attend the colleges.
17. These representational needs are unique and illustrate the type of shared representational interests between Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain.

[^15]18. Native American candidates of choice in northeastern North Dakota tend to support legislative policies and priorities supported by voters from both the Turtle Mountain Band and the Spirit Lake Tribe.
19. On November 8, 2021, I testified before the North Dakota Legislative Council Redistricting Committee to express the desire for the Turtle Mountain Band to be drawn into the same legislative district as the Spirit Lake Tribe. I testified that the two tribes have similar economic interests, as well as cultural and political values; and that both tribes being in the same district would improve the government-to-government relationships with the state. The Redistricting Committee disregarded my testimony and approved a redistricting plan that separates our two tribes into different legislative districts and dilutes the voting strength of the Turtle Mountain Band tribal members.
20. The Turtle Mountain Band sued the North Dakota Secretary of State on its own behalf and on behalf of its members because the Legislature's redistricting plan violates the Voting Rights Act by unlawfully diluting the voting strength of Native American voters living on and near the Turtle Mountain reservation.
21. The 2018 midterm election in North Dakota featured a tightly contested race for the United States Senate.
22. Then-incumbent Senator Heidi Heitkamp had received substantial support from Native American Voters when she was first elected in 2012.
23. After Senator Heitkamp won election to the U.S. Senate in 2012, the North Dakota legislature enacted a new voter ID law that required voters to provide ID listing their residential street address in order to vote.
24. This law disproportionately affected Native American voters in North Dakota, particularly those living on or near reservations, where the state's residential addressing system did not adequately reach.
25. After the law was initially put on hold due to legal challenges, the Eighth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court allowed the law to go into effect just weeks before the 2018 election.
26. The impact of these decisions created a number of unique circumstances that impacted the 2018 election.
27. As a result, there were substantial amounts of money spent by national, local, and regional organizations focused on educating and turning out Native voters in the weeks leading up to the 2018 election.
28. National celebrities like Mark Ruffalo and the Dave Matthews Band came to North Dakota and toured between several Native American reservations as part of these effort to turn out Native voters for the 2018 election.
29. This sort of national focus and sustained spending on electoral education and advocacy among Native American voters was not typical for North Dakota elections. It had not occurred in prior elections and has not occurred since.
30. There was substantial outrage among Native American voters at what seemed clearly to us to be a blatant effort to suppress our voting power. A huge backlash was created that lead to historic voter participation.
31. I have never seen voter such attention to Native American voter engagement or the resulting Native American turnout in any other election. The circumstances surrounding the

2018 election were extraordinarily unusual and unlike any other election with respect to Native American inclusion in the political process that I have ever observed.
32. I am competent to testify on the matters stated in this declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.


Jamie Azure

## EXHIBIT 5

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS

MICHAEL HOWE, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of North Dakota, Defendant.

## DECLARATION OF DOUGLAS YANKTON

I, Douglas Yankton, Sr., pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, based on my personal knowledge, declare that:

1. I am an enrolled member of the Spirit Lake Tribe. I currently serve as the Spirit Lake Tribe's Chairman and live on the Spirit Lake Reservation.
2. The Spirit Lake Tribe is a federally recognized tribe and located on the Spirit Lake Reservation. The Tribal Headquarters are located at 816 3rd Ave. North, Fort Totten, ND 58335.
3. The Spirit Lake Tribe has approximately 7,559 enrolled members, a substantial portion of whom vote or are eligible to vote in federal, state, and local elections on and near the Spirit Lake Reservation.
4. The Spirit Lake Reservation covers approximately 405 square miles, primarily in Benson County and Eddy County.
5. The Spirit Lake Reservation was established in 1867 through a treaty between the Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux Bands and the United States. The Treaty forced the relocation of the Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux Bands from a more expansive territory in present-day Minnesota and the

Northern Plains onto the Reservation with the Sisseton, Wahpeton and the Cuthead Bands of the Yanktonais, who had already been forced onto the Reservation. These Bands make up the presentday Spirit Lake Tribe.
6. The Spirit Lake Reservation is in Legislative District 15 under the 2021 enacted redistricting plan, which is comprised of one single-member state senate district and a two-member at-large state house district.
7. The Spirit Lake Reservation is geographically close to the reservation of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians ("Turtle Mountain Band"), being less than 60 miles apart.
8. Although each tribe is a separate sovereign government, the Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain reservations are a community of interest, with many shared values between our tribes. The State of North Dakota recognizes as much on its website, explaining that "North Dakota's tribal communities have shaped our state's history. Though individual tribes have distinct and different origins, histories and languages, Plains Indians are united by core beliefs and values including respect for the earth and humankind's relationship with nature."1
9. In addition to shared values and beliefs, the residents of the Turtle Mountain and Spirit Lake reservations share the experience of living in rural North Dakota tribal communities. As such, we share similar representational needs from our state legislature related to economic investment, state-sponsored services, and legislative appropriations that differ from other North Dakota rural communities, where agricultural and energy interests predominate, and from the state's urban areas. The members of Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain share similar socioeconomic statuses, which make the need for dedicated and cohesive representation in the legislature important.

[^16]10. The Spirit Lake Tribe and Turtle Mountain Band partner together in many political, economic, educational, and public safety organizations, including with, the United Tribes of North Dakota, United Tribes Technical College, National Congress of American Indians, First Nations Women's Alliance, North Dakota Tribal College System, North Dakota Native Tourism Alliance, and the National Indian Gaming Association.
11. Both tribes interact with the North Dakota government and legislature on many similar levels, including through the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission and the legislature's Tribal and State Relations Committee. ${ }^{2}$
12. Both tribes frequently join together to pursue similar policy objectives, including working with the State of North Dakota and the North Dakota Legislature on the following issues, to just name a few: funding for tribal colleges, negotiating the tribal-state gaming compact, taxation on tribal lands, hunting and fishing regulation, tribal and state law enforcement, and funding for education, foster care, health care, etc.
13. Both tribes are often similarly affected by legislation that is considered or enacted by the State Legislature. For example, House Bill 1536 would adopt a state Indian Child Welfare Act, which was introduced this year in the State Legislature by Representative Jayme Davis, who is a Turtle Mountain Band member. Both tribes also joined in an amicus brief last year in the United States Supreme Court to defend the Indian Child Welfare Act.
14. I serve on the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission, along with the Governor and the Chairs of the other North Dakota Tribes, including Chairman Azure of the Turtle

[^17]Mountain Band. As the Commission explains on its website, "[o]ne of the roles of the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission is to keep the public informed about current laws and legislature issues that impact Indian country." ${ }^{3}$
15. The Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain Tribes chartered the United Tribes Technical College along with the other North Dakota Tribes and I serve on its Board along with Chairman Azure from Turtle Mountain and the other North Dakota tribal chairmen and a delegate from each Tribe.
16. Our joint efforts at ensuring quality educational opportunities for members and non-members of North Dakota tribes illustrate the type of shared representational interests Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain have with respect to the legislature. Over the past decade the Tribes and the tribal colleges have sought and secured state funding from the legislature for workforce development grants for the state's tribal colleges to help address the high unemployment and poverty rates among American Indians living on North Dakota's reservations.
17. Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain also work together with the other North Dakota Tribes to ensure legislative funding for the state's tribal colleges to support non-beneficiary students who attend the colleges.
18. These representational needs are unique and illustrate the type of shared representational interests between Spirit Lake and Turtle Mountain.
19. Native American candidates of choice in northeastern North Dakota tend to support legislative policies and priorities supported by voters from both the Turtle Mountain Band and the Spirit Lake Tribe.

[^18]20. On November 8, 2021, I testified before the North Dakota Legislative Council Redistricting Committee to express the desire for the Spirit Lake Nation to be drawn into the same legislative district as the Turtle Mountain Band. I testified that the two Tribes have similar economic interests, as well as cultural and political values; and that both tribes being in the same district would improve the government-to-government relationships with the state. The Redistricting Committee disregarded my testimony and approved a redistricting plan that separates our two tribes into different legislative districts and dilutes the voting strength of Spirit Lake tribal members.
21. The Spirit Lake Tribe sued the North Dakota Secretary of State on its own behalf and on behalf of its members because the Legislature's redistricting plan violates the Voting Rights Act by unlawfully diluting the voting strength of Native American voters living on and near the Spirit Lake reservation.
22. The 2018 midterm election in North Dakota featured a tightly contested race for the United States Senate.
23. Then-incumbent Senator Heidi Heitkamp had received substantial support from Native American Voters when she was first elected in 2012.
24. After Senator Heitkamp won election to the U.S. Senate in 2012, the North Dakota legislature enacted a new voter ID law that required voters to provide ID listing their residential street address in order to vote.
25. This law disproportionately affected Native American voters in North Dakota, particularly those living on or near reservations, where the state's residential addressing system did not adequately reach.
26. After the law was initially put on hold due to legal challenges, the Eighth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court allowed the law to go into effect just weeks before the 2018 election.
27. The impact of these decisions created a number of unique circumstances that impacted the 2018 election.
28. First, the Spirit Lake Tribe became concerned that our membership would not have the physical addresses necessary to comply with the requirement to show ID listing a residential street address.
29. As a result, Spirit Lake spent substantial resources in the weeks leading up to the 2018 election to ensure its members had the IDs necessary to vote. The Tribe put out public service announcements online, on social media, and on the radio to inform members of the new ID requirements.
30. The Tribe expanded their office hours for issuing tribal IDs, waived the $\$ 11$ cost of issuing a Tribal IDs to ensure that tribal members could obtain an ID, and assisted members in determining their residential address.
31. The Tribe spent far more resources on the 2018 election and assisting their members than they had in previous or subsequent elections because of the unique barriers to voting imposed by the court decisions allowing the residential ID requirement to go into effect just weeks before the election.
32. In addition to the substantial resources the Spirit Lake Tribe dedicated to ensuring its members would not be denied the right to vote due to the residential address requirement, the 2018 election in North Dakota also drew substantial resources from out of state.
33. The high-profile court decisions combined with the tight Senate race brought national attention both to the barriers to Native voting in North Dakota and the impact of Native turnout in competitive elections in North Dakota.
34. As a result, there were substantial amounts of money spent by national, local, and regional organizations focused on educating and turning out Native voters in the weeks leading up to the 2018 election.
35. National celebrities like Mark Ruffalo and the Dave Matthews Band came to North Dakota and toured between several Native American reservations as part of these effort to turn out Native voters for the 2018 election.
36. This sort of national focus and sustained spending on electoral education and advocacy among Native American voters was not typical for North Dakota elections. It had not occurred in prior elections and has not occurred since.
37. There was substantial outrage among Native American voters at what seemed clearly to us to be a blatant effort to suppress our voting power. A huge backlash was created that lead to historic voter participation.
38. I have never seen voter such attention to Native American voter engagement or the resulting Native American turnout in any other election. The circumstances surrounding the 2018 election were extraordinarily unusual and unlike any other election with respect to Native American inclusion in the political process that I have ever observed.
39. I am competent to testify on the matters stated in this declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 22, 2023,


Douglas Yankton, Sr.

## EXHIBIT 6

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.

Michael Howe, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of North Dakota,

Defendant.

## DECLARATION OF COLLETTE BROWN

I, Collette Brown, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, based on my personal knowledge, declare that:

1. I am an enrolled member of the Spirit Lake Tribe.
2. I live on the Spirit Lake Reservation. I have lived at my current residence for 20 years and on the Spirit Lake Reservation for 44 years.
3. I am eligible to vote in federal, state, and local elections in North Dakota at my residence on the Spirit Lake Reservation and do so regularly. I voted in the 2022 Election and plan to continue to vote in federal, state, and local elections in North Dakota in the future, including elections for the North Dakota State Legislature. My current state legislative district is District 15.
4. In District 15, I am unable to elect any of my candidates of choice to the State Senate or the State House.
5. I ran in District 15 for the State Senate seat in 2022. Despite winning in the portion of District 15 on the Spirit Lake Reservation, I ultimately lost. During my campaign, I had strong
support from other Members of the Spirit Lake Tribe, but my candidacy was not as well received by non-Native voters.
6. I am competent to testify on the matters stated in this declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 23, 2023,


Collette Brown

## EXHIBIT 7

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.

Michael Howe, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of North Dakota,

Defendant.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS

## DECLARATION OF WESLEY DAVIS

I, Wesley Davis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, based on my personal knowledge, declare that:

1. I am an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians.
2. I live on the Turtle Mountain Reservation. I have lived at my current residence for 11 years and on the Spirit Lake Reservation for 31 years.
3. I am eligible to vote in federal, state, and local elections in North Dakota at my residence on the Turtle Mountain Reservation and do so regularly. I voted in the 2022 Election and plan to continue to vote in federal, state, and local elections in North Dakota in the future, including elections for the North Dakota State Legislature. My current state legislative districts are Senate District 9 and State House Subdistrict 9A.
4. The creation of Senate District 9 and Subdistrict 9A deprives me of the opportunity to elect my candidate of choice to the North Dakota State Senate, and to elect two candidates of my choice for the North Dakota State House.
5. I am competent to testify on the matters stated in this declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 28, 2023,

Wesley Davis

## EXHIBIT 8

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.

Michael Howe, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of North Dakota,

Defendant.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS

## DECLARATION OF ZACHERY S. KING

I, Zachery S. King, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, based on my personal knowledge, declare that:

1. I am an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians.
2. I live on the Turtle Mountain Reservation, and have so for the past 36 years.
3. I am eligible to vote in federal, state, and local elections in North Dakota at my residence on the Turtle Mountain Reservation and do so regularly. I voted in the 2022 Election and plan to continue to vote in federal, state, and local elections in North Dakota in the future, including elections for the North Dakota State Legislature. My current state legislative districts are Senate District 9 and State House Subdistrict 9A.
4. The creation of Senate District 9 and Subdistrict 9A deprives me of the opportunity to elect my candidate of choice to the North Dakota State Senate, and to elect two candidates of my choice for the North Dakota State House.
5. I am competent to testify on the matters stated in this declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 24, 2023,

DocuSigned by:
Eaduery king
Zachery S. King

## EXHIBIT 9



## 2020 CENSUS - POPULATION CHANGE SUMMARY

On August 12, 2021, the United States Census Bureau released the results of the 2020 Census. The data indicated North Dakota experienced the fourth largest percentage increase in population nationwide with a population increase of 15.8 percent over the state's 2010 population. The state also is home to the county with the largest population increase in the nation with McKenzie County increasing in population by 131 percent over the county's 2010 population. However, in regard to rural counties, North Dakota's population trends tracked with the nationwide trend of less populous counties further losing population. This memorandum provides a summary of the change in the population of North Dakota's legislative districts, counties, and cities when comparing the results of the 2010 Census to the results of the 2020 Census.

## LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS

When comparing the 2010 Census results to the 2020 Census results, the five legislative districts with the largest percentage increase in population are Districts 2, 27, 16, 7, and 39; with a population increase of 102 percent, 94 percent, 81 percent, 61 percent, and 54 percent, respectively. The five legislative districts with the largest percentage decrease in population are Districts $9,42,23,10$, and 14 ; with a population decrease of 13 percent, 9 percent, 7 percent, 6 percent, and 6 percent, respectively. The following table summarizes the population change in legislative districts when comparing the 2010 Census results to the 2020 Census results, including the resulting deviation from the newly calculated ideal district size of 16,576 when using 47 legislative districts. The attached appendix provides a visual representation of the percentage deviation from the ideal district size in each legislative district.

| Legislative District | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  | Change Needed to Match Ideal District Size Based on 2020 Population |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $2010{ }^{1}$ | $2020{ }^{2}$ | Amount | Percent | Amount | Percent |
| 1 | 14,395 | 19,120 | 4,725 | 32.82\% | $(2,544)$ | (15.35\%) |
| 2 | 14,657 | 29,622 | 14,965 | 102.10\% | $(13,046)$ | (78.70\%) |
| 3 | 14,626 | 16,692 | 2,066 | 14.13\% | (116) | (0.70\%) |
| 4 | 14,081 | 16,794 | 2,713 | 19.27\% | (218) | (1.32\%) |
| 5 | 14,129 | 14,638 | 509 | 3.60\% | 1,938 | 11.69\% |
| 6 | 14,294 | 14,006 | (288) | (2.01\%) | 2,570 | 15.50\% |
| 7 | 13,919 | 22,437 | 8,518 | 61.20\% | $(5,861)$ | (35.36\%) |
| 8 | 14,175 | 15,951 | 1,776 | 12.53\% | 625 | 3.77\% |
| 9 | 13,937 | 12,187 | $(1,750)$ | (12.56\%) | 4,389 | 26.48\% |
| 10 | 14,393 | 13,483 | (910) | (6.32\%) | 3,093 | 18.66\% |
| 11 | 14,781 | 14,646 | (135) | (0.91\%) | 1,930 | 11.64\% |
| 12 | 13,768 | 14,144 | 376 | 2.73\% | 2,432 | 14.67\% |
| 13 | 14,862 | 14,959 | 97 | 0.65\% | 1,617 | 9.76\% |
| 14 | 14,431 | 13,594 | (837) | (5.80\%) | 2,982 | 17.99\% |
| 15 | 13,697 | 13,767 | 70 | 0.51\% | 2,809 | 16.95\% |
| 16 | 14,897 | 26,960 | 12,063 | 80.98\% | $(10,384)$ | (62.64\%) |
| 17 | 13,894 | 20,408 | 6,514 | 46.88\% | $(3,832)$ | (23.12\%) |
| 18 | 13,929 | 13,783 | (146) | (1.05\%) | 2,793 | 16.85\% |
| 19 | 13,812 | 13,255 | (557) | (4.03\%) | 3,321 | 20.04\% |
| 20 | 14,314 | 14,354 | 40 | 0.28\% | 2,222 | 13.40\% |
| 21 | 14,728 | 15,294 | 566 | 3.84\% | 1,282 | 7.73\% |
| 22 | 14,838 | 21,995 | 7,157 | 48.23\% | $(5,419)$ | (32.69\%) |
| 23 | 14,455 | 13,467 | (988) | (6.84\%) | 3,109 | 18.76\% |
| 24 | 13,818 | 13,943 | 125 | 0.90\% | 2,633 | 15.88\% |
| 25 | 14,469 | 14,891 | 422 | 2.92\% | 1,685 | 10.17\% |
| 26 | 14,021 | 14,352 | 331 | 2.36\% | 2,224 | 13.42\% |
| 27 | 14,014 | 27,246 | 13,232 | 94.42\% | $(10,670)$ | (64.37\%) |
| 28 | 13,729 | 13,969 | 240 | 1.75\% | 2,607 | 15.73\% |
| 29 | 13,905 | 13,655 | (250) | (1.80\%) | 2,921 | 17.62\% |
| 30 | 14,689 | 16,836 | 2,147 | 14.62\% | (260) | (1.57\%) |
| 31 | 14,844 | 16,002 | 1,158 | 7.80\% | 574 | 3.46\% |


| Legislative District | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  | Change Needed to Match Ideal District Size Based on 2020 Population |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $2010{ }^{1}$ | 2020² | Amount | Percent | Amount | Percent |
| 32 | 14,541 | 15,128 | 587 | 4.04\% | 1,448 | 8.74\% |
| 33 | 14,279 | 14,910 | 631 | 4.42\% | 1,666 | 10.05\% |
| 34 | 14,439 | 18,046 | 3,607 | 24.98\% | $(1,470)$ | (8.87\%) |
| 35 | 14,787 | 14,645 | (142) | (0.96\%) | 1,931 | 11.65\% |
| 36 | 14,084 | 19,064 | 4,980 | 35.36\% | $(2,488)$ | (15.01\%) |
| 37 | 14,301 | 18,817 | 4,516 | 31.58\% | $(2,241)$ | (13.52\%) |
| 38 | 14,093 | 17,275 | 3,182 | 22.58\% | (699) | (4.22\%) |
| 39 | 14,806 | 22,755 | 7,949 | 53.69\% | $(6,179)$ | (37.28\%) |
| 40 | 14,257 | 16,604 | 2,347 | 16.46\% | (28) | (0.17\%) |
| 41 | 14,668 | 15,096 | 428 | 2.92\% | 1,480 | 8.93\% |
| 42 | 14,001 | 12,677 | $(1,324)$ | (9.46\%) | 3,899 | 23.52\% |
| 43 | 13,906 | 15,157 | 1,251 | 9.00\% | 1,419 | 8.56\% |
| 44 | 14,213 | 13,519 | (694) | (4.88\%) | 3,057 | 18.44\% |
| 45 | 14,575 | 15,590 | 1,015 | 6.96\% | 986 | 5.95\% |
| 46 | 14,630 | 15,332 | 702 | 4.80\% | 1,244 | 7.50\% |
| 47 | 14,510 | 18,029 | 3,519 | 24.25\% | $(1,453)$ | (8.77\%) |
| Total | 672,591 | 779,094 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

${ }^{1}$ For the 2010 population data, the ideal district size was 14,310 based on 47 legislative districts.
${ }^{2}$ For the 2020 population data, the ideal district size is 16,576 based on 47 legislative districts.
If the committee elected to modify the number of legislative districts, within the constitutionally permissible range of 40 to 54 districts, the ideal district size would be as follows:

| Number of Districts | Ideal District Size |
| :---: | :---: |
| 40 | 19,477 |
| 41 | 19,002 |
| 42 | 18,550 |
| 43 | 18,118 |
| 44 | 17,707 |
| 45 | 17,313 |
| 46 | 16,937 |
| 47 | 16,576 |
| 48 | 16,231 |
| 49 | 15,900 |
| 50 | 15,582 |
| 51 | 15,276 |
| 52 | 14,983 |
| 53 | 14,700 |
| 54 | 14,428 |

## COUNTIES

When comparing the 2010 Census results to the 2020 Census results, the five counties with the largest percentage increase in population are McKenzie, Williams, Stark, Mountrail, and Cass; with a population increase of 131 percent, 83 percent, 39 percent, 28 percent, and 23 percent, respectively. The five counties with the largest percentage decrease in population are Rolette, Benson, McIntosh, Steele, and Pierce; with a population decrease of 13 percent, 10 percent, 10 percent, 9 percent, and 8 percent, respectively. The following table summarizes the population changes in counties when comparing the 2010 Census results to the 2020 Census results:

| County | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Adams | 2,343 | 2,200 | (143) | (6.10\%) |
| Barnes | 11,066 | 10,853 | (213) | (1.92\%) |
| Benson | 6,660 | 5,964 | (696) | (10.45\%) |
| Billings | 783 | 945 | 162 | 20.69\% |
| Bottineau | 6,429 | 6,379 | (50) | (0.78\%) |
| Bowman | 3,151 | 2,993 | (158) | (5.01\%) |
| Burke | 1,968 | 2,201 | 233 | 11.84\% |
| Burleigh | 81,308 | 98,458 | 17,150 | 21.09\% |
| Cass | 149,778 | 184,525 | 34,747 | 23.20\% |
| Cavalier | 3,993 | 3,704 | (289) | (7.24\%) |
| Dickey | 5,289 | 4,999 | (290) | (5.48\%) |


| County | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Divide | 2,071 | 2,195 | 124 | 5.99\% |
| Dunn | 3,536 | 4,095 | 559 | 15.81\% |
| Eddy | 2,385 | 2,347 | (38) | (1.59\%) |
| Emmons | 3,550 | 3,301 | (249) | (7.01\%) |
| Foster | 3,343 | 3,397 | 54 | 1.62\% |
| Golden Valley | 1,680 | 1,736 | 56 | 3.33\% |
| Grand Forks | 66,861 | 73,170 | 6,309 | 9.44\% |
| Grant | 2,394 | 2,301 | (93) | (3.88\%) |
| Griggs | 2,420 | 2,306 | (114) | (4.71\%) |
| Hettinger | 2,477 | 2,489 | 12 | 0.48\% |
| Kidder | 2,435 | 2,394 | (41) | (1.68\%) |
| LaMoure | 4,139 | 4,093 | (46) | (1.11\%) |
| Logan | 1,990 | 1,876 | (114) | (5.73\%) |
| McHenry | 5,395 | 5,345 | (50) | (0.93\%) |
| McIntosh | 2,809 | 2,530 | (279) | (9.93\%) |
| McKenzie | 6,360 | 14,704 | 8,344 | 131.20\% |
| McLean | 8,962 | 9,771 | 809 | 9.03\% |
| Mercer | 8,424 | 8,350 | (74) | (0.88\%) |
| Morton | 27,471 | 33,291 | 5,820 | 21.19\% |
| Mountrail | 7,673 | 9,809 | 2,136 | 27.84\% |
| Nelson | 3,126 | 3,015 | (111) | (3.55\%) |
| Oliver | 1,846 | 1,877 | 31 | 1.68\% |
| Pembina | 7,413 | 6,844 | (569) | (7.68\%) |
| Pierce | 4,357 | 3,990 | (367) | (8.42\%) |
| Ramsey | 11,451 | 11,605 | 154 | 1.34\% |
| Ransom | 5,457 | 5,703 | 246 | 4.51\% |
| Renville | 2,470 | 2,282 | (188) | (7.61\%) |
| Richland | 16,321 | 16,529 | 208 | 1.27\% |
| Rolette | 13,937 | 12,187 | $(1,750)$ | (12.56\%) |
| Sargent | 3,829 | 3,862 | 33 | 0.86\% |
| Sheridan | 1,321 | 1,265 | (56) | (4.24\%) |
| Sioux | 4,153 | 3,898 | (255) | (6.14\%) |
| Slope | 727 | 706 | (21) | (2.89\%) |
| Stark | 24,199 | 33,646 | 9,447 | 39.04\% |
| Steele | 1,975 | 1,798 | (177) | (8.96\%) |
| Stutsman | 21,100 | 21,593 | 493 | 2.34\% |
| Towner | 2,246 | 2,162 | (84) | (3.74\%) |
| Traill | 8,121 | 7,997 | (124) | (1.53\%) |
| Walsh | 11,119 | 10,563 | (556) | (5.00\%) |
| Ward | 61,675 | 69,919 | 8,244 | 13.37\% |
| Wells | 4,207 | 3,892 | (315) | (7.49\%) |
| Williams | 22,398 | 40,950 | 18,552 | 82.83\% |
| Total | 672,591 | 779,094 | N/A | N/A |

## CITIES

When comparing the 2010 Census results to the 2020 Census results, the five cities with the largest percentage increase in population are Watford City, Arnegard, Venturia, Williston, and Tioga; with a population increase of 256 percent, 145 percent, 110 percent, 98 percent, and 79 percent, respectively. The five cities with the largest percentage decrease in population are Ruso, Wales, Calio, Bantry, and Ardoch; with a population decrease of 75 percent, 68 percent, 64 percent, 57 percent, and 54 percent, respectively. The following table summarizes the population changes in cities and census designated places (CDPs) when comparing the 2010 Census results to the 2020 Census results:

| City/CDP | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Abercrombie | 263 | 244 | (19) | (7.22\%) |
| Adams | 127 | 127 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Alamo | 57 | 53 | (4) | (7.02\%) |
| Alexander | 223 | 319 | 96 | 43.05\% |
| Alice | 40 | 41 | 1 | 2.50\% |
| Almont | 122 | 100 | (22) | (18.03\%) |
| Alsen | 35 | 32 | (3) | (8.57\%) |
| Ambrose | 26 | 24 | (2) | (7.69\%) |


|  | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | City/CDP | 2010 |  |  |

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| City/CDP | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Columbus | 133 | 139 | 6 | 4.51\% |
| Conway | 23 | 15 | (8) | (34.78\%) |
| Cooperstown | 984 | 983 | (1) | (0.10\%) |
| Courtenay | 45 | 36 | (9) | (20.00\%) |
| Crary | 142 | 113 | (29) | (20.42\%) |
| Crosby | 1,070 | 1,065 | (5) | (0.47\%) |
| Crystal | 138 | 116 | (22) | (15.94\%) |
| Dahlen CDP | 18 | 17 | (1) | (5.56\%) |
| Davenport | 252 | 256 | 4 | 1.59\% |
| Dawson | 61 | 74 | 13 | 21.31\% |
| Dazey | 104 | 78 | (26) | (25.00\%) |
| Deering | 98 | 94 | (4) | (4.08\%) |
| De Lamere CDP | 30 | 25 | (5) | (16.67\%) |
| Denhoff CDP | 20 | 13 | (7) | (35.00\%) |
| Des Lacs | 204 | 185 | (19) | (9.31\%) |
| Devils Lake | 7,141 | 7,192 | 51 | 0.71\% |
| Dickey | 42 | 42 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Dickinson | 17,787 | 25,679 | 7,892 | 44.37\% |
| Dodge | 87 | 89 | 2 | 2.30\% |
| Donnybrook | 59 | 75 | 16 | 27.12\% |
| Douglas | 64 | 93 | 29 | 45.31\% |
| Drake | 275 | 292 | 17 | 6.18\% |
| Drayton | 824 | 757 | (67) | (8.13\%) |
| Driscoll CDP | 82 | 68 | (14) | (17.07\%) |
| Dunn Center | 146 | 227 | 81 | 55.48\% |
| Dunseith | 773 | 632 | (141) | (18.24\%) |
| Dwight | 82 | 80 | (2) | (2.44\%) |
| East Dunseith CDP | 500 | 500 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| East Fairview CDP | 76 | 73 | (3) | (3.95\%) |
| Edgeley | 563 | 585 | 22 | 3.91\% |
| Edinburg | 196 | 199 | 3 | 1.53\% |
| Edmore | 182 | 139 | (43) | (23.63\%) |
| Egeland | 28 | 32 | 4 | 14.29\% |
| Elgin | 642 | 543 | (99) | (15.42\%) |
| Ellendale | 1,394 | 1,125 | (269) | (19.30\%) |
| Elliott | 25 | 24 | (1) | (4.00\%) |
| Embden CDP | 59 | 41 | (18) | (30.51\%) |
| Emerado | 414 | 443 | 29 | 7.00\% |
| Enderlin | 886 | 881 | (5) | (0.56\%) |
| Englevale CDP | 40 | 36 | (4) | (10.00\%) |
| Epping | 100 | 84 | (16) | (16.00\%) |
| Erie CDP | 50 | 54 | 4 | 8.00\% |
| Esmond | 100 | 91 | (9) | (9.00\%) |
| Fairdale | 38 | 30 | (8) | (21.05\%) |
| Fairmount | 367 | 343 | (24) | (6.54\%) |
| Fargo | 105,549 | 125,990 | 20,441 | 19.37\% |
| Fessenden | 479 | 462 | (17) | (3.55\%) |
| Fingal | 97 | 92 | (5) | (5.15\%) |
| Finley | 445 | 401 | (44) | (9.89\%) |
| Flasher | 232 | 217 | (15) | (6.47\%) |
| Flaxton | 66 | 60 | (6) | (9.09\%) |
| Forbes | 53 | 36 | (17) | (32.08\%) |
| Fordville | 212 | 207 | (5) | (2.36\%) |
| Forest River | 125 | 109 | (16) | (12.80\%) |
| Forman | 504 | 509 | 5 | 0.99\% |
| Fort Ransom | 77 | 91 | 14 | 18.18\% |
| Fort Totten CDP | 1,243 | 1,160 | (83) | (6.68\%) |
| Fortuna | 22 | 30 | 8 | 36.36\% |
| Fort Yates | 184 | 176 | (8) | (4.35\%) |
| Four Bears Village CDP | 517 | 500 | (17) | (3.29\%) |
| Foxholm CDP | 75 | 56 | (19) | (25.33\%) |
| Fredonia | 46 | 38 | (8) | (17.39\%) |
| Frontier | 214 | 195 | (19) | (8.88\%) |
| Fullerton | 54 | 62 | 8 | 14.81\% |
| Gackle | 310 | 281 | (29) | (9.35\%) |


| City/CDP | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Galesburg | 108 | 118 | 10 | 9.26\% |
| Gardena | 29 | 24 | (5) | (17.24\%) |
| Gardner | 74 | 129 | 55 | 74.32\% |
| Garrison | 1,453 | 1,462 | 9 | 0.62\% |
| Gascoyne | 16 | 21 | 5 | 31.25\% |
| Gilby | 237 | 243 | 6 | 2.53\% |
| Gladstone | 239 | 271 | 32 | 13.39\% |
| Glenburn | 380 | 404 | 24 | 6.32\% |
| Glenfield | 91 | 94 | 3 | 3.30\% |
| Glen Ullin | 807 | 732 | (75) | (9.29\%) |
| Golden Valley | 182 | 191 | 9 | 4.95\% |
| Golva | 61 | 84 | 23 | 37.70\% |
| Goodrich | 98 | 106 | 8 | 8.16\% |
| Grace City | 63 | 53 | (10) | (15.87\%) |
| Grafton | 4,284 | 4,170 | (114) | (2.66\%) |
| Grand Forks | 52,838 | 59,166 | 6,328 | 11.98\% |
| Grand Forks AFB CDP | 2,367 | 2,002 | (365) | (15.42\%) |
| Grandin | 173 | 186 | 13 | 7.51\% |
| Grano | 7 | 9 | 2 | 28.57\% |
| Granville | 241 | 240 | (1) | (0.41\%) |
| Great Bend | 60 | 49 | (11) | (18.33\%) |
| Green Acres CDP | 575 | 605 | 30 | 5.22\% |
| Grenora | 244 | 221 | (23) | (9.43\%) |
| Gwinner | 753 | 924 | 171 | 22.71\% |
| Hague | 71 | 70 | (1) | (1.41\%) |
| Halliday | 188 | 241 | 53 | 28.19\% |
| Hamberg | 21 | 11 | (10) | (47.62\%) |
| Hamilton | 61 | 46 | (15) | (24.59\%) |
| Hampden | 48 | 29 | (19) | (39.58\%) |
| Hankinson | 919 | 921 | 2 | 0.22\% |
| Hannaford | 131 | 126 | (5) | (3.82\%) |
| Hannah | 15 | 8 | (7) | (46.67\%) |
| Hansboro | 12 | 15 | 3 | 25.00\% |
| Harmon CDP | 145 | 259 | 114 | 78.62\% |
| Harvey | 1,783 | 1,650 | (133) | (7.46\%) |
| Harwood | 718 | 794 | 76 | 10.59\% |
| Hatton | 777 | 712 | (65) | (8.37\%) |
| Havana | 71 | 67 | (4) | (5.63\%) |
| Haynes | 23 | 15 | (8) | (34.78\%) |
| Hazelton | 235 | 223 | (12) | (5.11\%) |
| Hazen | 2,411 | 2,281 | (130) | (5.39\%) |
| Hebron | 747 | 794 | 47 | 6.29\% |
| Heil CDP | 15 | 15 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Heimdal CDP | 27 | 16 | (11) | (40.74\%) |
| Hettinger | 1,226 | 1,074 | (152) | (12.40\%) |
| Hillsboro | 1,603 | 1,649 | 46 | 2.87\% |
| Hoople | 242 | 247 | 5 | 2.07\% |
| Hope | 258 | 272 | 14 | 5.43\% |
| Horace | 2,430 | 3,085 | 655 | 26.95\% |
| Hunter | 261 | 332 | 71 | 27.20\% |
| Hurdsfield | 84 | 64 | (20) | (23.81\%) |
| Inkster | 50 | 38 | (12) | (24.00\%) |
| Jamestown | 15,427 | 15,849 | 422 | 2.74\% |
| Jessie CDP | 25 | 22 | (3) | (12.00\%) |
| Jud | 72 | 65 | (7) | (9.72\%) |
| Karlsruhe | 82 | 87 | 5 | 6.10\% |
| Kathryn | 52 | 66 | 14 | 26.92\% |
| Kenmare | 1,096 | 961 | (135) | (12.32\%) |
| Kensal | 163 | 146 | (17) | (10.43\%) |
| Kief | 13 | 8 | (5) | (38.46\%) |
| Killdeer | 751 | 939 | 188 | 25.03\% |
| Kindred | 692 | 889 | 197 | 28.47\% |
| Knox | 25 | 22 | (3) | (12.00\%) |
| Kramer | 29 | 24 | (5) | (17.24\%) |
| Kulm | 354 | 368 | 14 | 3.95\% |

North Dakota Legislative Council

| City/CDP | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Lakota | 672 | 683 | 11 | 1.64\% |
| LaMoure | 889 | 764 | (125) | (14.06\%) |
| Landa | 38 | 41 | 3 | 7.89\% |
| Langdon | 1,878 | 1,909 | 31 | 1.65\% |
| Lankin | 98 | 102 | 4 | 4.08\% |
| Lansford | 245 | 238 | (7) | (2.86\%) |
| Larimore | 1,346 | 1,260 | (86) | (6.39\%) |
| Larson CDP | 12 | 9 | (3) | (25.00\%) |
| Lawton | 30 | 15 | (15) | (50.00\%) |
| Leal | 20 | 27 | 7 | 35.00\% |
| Leeds | 427 | 442 | 15 | 3.51\% |
| Lehr | 80 | 81 | 1 | 1.25\% |
| Leith | 16 | 28 | 12 | 75.00\% |
| Leonard | 223 | 248 | 25 | 11.21\% |
| Lidgerwood | 652 | 600 | (52) | (7.98\%) |
| Lignite | 155 | 141 | (14) | (9.03\%) |
| Lincoln | 2,406 | 4,257 | 1,851 | 76.93\% |
| Linton | 1,097 | 1,071 | (26) | (2.37\%) |
| Lisbon | 2,154 | 2,204 | 50 | 2.32\% |
| Litchville | 172 | 169 | (3) | (1.74\%) |
| Logan CDP | 194 | 247 | 53 | 27.32\% |
| Loma | 16 | 10 | (6) | (37.50\%) |
| Loraine | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Ludden | 23 | 15 | (8) | (34.78\%) |
| Luverne | 31 | 28 | (3) | (9.68\%) |
| McClusky | 380 | 322 | (58) | (15.26\%) |
| McHenry | 56 | 64 | 8 | 14.29\% |
| McLeod CDP | 27 | 22 | (5) | (18.52\%) |
| McVille | 349 | 392 | 43 | 12.32\% |
| Maddock | 382 | 402 | 20 | 5.24\% |
| Makoti | 154 | 148 | (6) | (3.90\%) |
| Mandan | 18,331 | 24,206 | 5,875 | 32.05\% |
| Mandaree CDP | 596 | 691 | 95 | 15.94\% |
| Manning CDP | 74 | 47 | (27) | (36.49\%) |
| Mantador | 64 | 67 | 3 | 4.69\% |
| Manvel | 360 | 377 | 17 | 4.72\% |
| Mapleton | 762 | 1,320 | 558 | 73.23\% |
| Marion | 133 | 125 | (8) | (6.02\%) |
| Marmarth | 136 | 101 | (35) | (25.74\%) |
| Martin | 78 | 63 | (15) | (19.23\%) |
| Max | 334 | 331 | (3) | (0.90\%) |
| Maxbass | 84 | 89 | 5 | 5.95\% |
| Mayville | 1,858 | 1,854 | (4) | (0.22\%) |
| Medina | 308 | 264 | (44) | (14.29\%) |
| Medora | 112 | 121 | 9 | 8.04\% |
| Menoken CDP | 70 | 78 | 8 | 11.43\% |
| Mercer | 94 | 88 | (6) | (6.38\%) |
| Michigan City | 294 | 263 | (31) | (10.54\%) |
| Milnor | 653 | 624 | (29) | (4.44\%) |
| Milton | 58 | 39 | (19) | (32.76\%) |
| Minnewaukan | 224 | 199 | (25) | (11.16\%) |
| Minot | 40,888 | 48,377 | 7,489 | 18.32\% |
| Minot AFB CDP | 5,521 | 5,017 | (504) | (9.13\%) |
| Minto | 604 | 616 | 12 | 1.99\% |
| Mohall | 783 | 694 | (89) | (11.37\%) |
| Monango | 36 | 30 | (6) | (16.67\%) |
| Montpelier | 87 | 85 | (2) | (2.30\%) |
| Mooreton | 197 | 177 | (20) | (10.15\%) |
| Mott | 721 | 653 | (68) | (9.43\%) |
| Mountain | 92 | 80 | (12) | (13.04\%) |
| Munich | 210 | 190 | (20) | (9.52\%) |
| Mylo | 20 | 21 | 1 | 5.00\% |
| Napoleon | 792 | 749 | (43) | (5.43\%) |
| Nash CDP | 32 | 13 | (19) | (59.38\%) |
| Neche | 371 | 344 | (27) | (7.28\%) |


| City/CDP | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Nekoma | 50 | 31 | (19) | (38.00\%) |
| Newburg | 110 | 96 | (14) | (12.73\%) |
| New England | 600 | 683 | 83 | 13.83\% |
| New Leipzig | 221 | 218 | (3) | (1.36\%) |
| New Rockford | 1,391 | 1,361 | (30) | (2.16\%) |
| New Salem | 946 | 973 | 27 | 2.85\% |
| New Town | 1,925 | 2,764 | 839 | 43.58\% |
| Niagara | 53 | 46 | (7) | (13.21\%) |
| Nome | 62 | 51 | (11) | (17.74\%) |
| Noonan | 121 | 137 | 16 | 13.22\% |
| North River | 56 | 55 | (1) | (1.79\%) |
| Northwood | 945 | 982 | 37 | 3.92\% |
| Oakes | 1,856 | 1,798 | (58) | (3.13\%) |
| Oberon | 105 | 101 | (4) | (3.81\%) |
| Oriska | 118 | 114 | (4) | (3.39\%) |
| Orrin CDP | 22 | 7 | (15) | (68.18\%) |
| Osnabrock | 134 | 105 | (29) | (21.64\%) |
| Overly | 18 | 10 | (8) | (44.44\%) |
| Oxbow | 305 | 381 | 76 | 24.92\% |
| Page | 232 | 190 | (42) | (18.10\%) |
| Palermo | 74 | 125 | 51 | 68.92\% |
| Park River | 1,403 | 1,424 | 21 | 1.50\% |
| Parshall | 903 | 949 | 46 | 5.09\% |
| Pekin | 70 | 75 | 5 | 7.14\% |
| Pembina | 592 | 512 | (80) | (13.51\%) |
| Perth | 9 | 6 | (3) | (33.33\%) |
| Petersburg | 192 | 162 | (30) | (15.63\%) |
| Pettibone | 70 | 60 | (10) | (14.29\%) |
| Pick City | 123 | 123 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Pillsbury | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Pingree | 60 | 41 | (19) | (31.67\%) |
| Pisek | 106 | 89 | (17) | (16.04\%) |
| Plaza | 171 | 211 | 40 | 23.39\% |
| Porcupine CDP | 146 | 197 | 51 | 34.93\% |
| Portal | 126 | 125 | (1) | (0.79\%) |
| Portland | 606 | 578 | (28) | (4.62\%) |
| Powers Lake | 280 | 385 | 105 | 37.50\% |
| Prairie Rose | 73 | 56 | (17) | (23.29\%) |
| Raleigh CDP | 12 | 14 | 2 | 16.67\% |
| Ray | 592 | 740 | 148 | 25.00\% |
| Reeder | 162 | 125 | (37) | (22.84\%) |
| Regan | 43 | 35 | (8) | (18.60\%) |
| Regent | 160 | 170 | 10 | 6.25\% |
| Reile's Acres | 513 | 703 | 190 | 37.04\% |
| Reynolds | 301 | 277 | (24) | (7.97\%) |
| Rhame | 169 | 158 | (11) | (6.51\%) |
| Richardton | 529 | 692 | 163 | 30.81\% |
| Riverdale | 205 | 223 | 18 | 8.78\% |
| Robinson | 37 | 36 | (1) | (2.70\%) |
| Rocklake | 101 | 94 | (7) | (6.93\%) |
| Rogers | 46 | 49 | 3 | 6.52\% |
| Rolette | 594 | 484 | (110) | (18.52\%) |
| Rolla | 1,280 | 1,223 | (57) | (4.45\%) |
| Ross | 97 | 95 | (2) | (2.06\%) |
| Rugby | 2,876 | 2,509 | (367) | (12.76\%) |
| Ruso | 4 | 1 | (3) | (75.00\%) |
| Ruthville CDP | 191 | 151 | (40) | (20.94\%) |
| Rutland | 163 | 163 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Ryder | 85 | 108 | 23 | 27.06\% |
| St. John | 341 | 322 | (19) | (5.57\%) |
| St. Thomas | 331 | 323 | (8) | (2.42\%) |
| Sanborn | 192 | 161 | (31) | (16.15\%) |
| Sarles | 28 | 16 | (12) | (42.86\%) |
| Sawyer | 357 | 319 | (38) | (10.64\%) |
| Scranton | 281 | 258 | (23) | (8.19\%) |


| City/CDP | Population |  | Increase (Decrease) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2020 | Amount | Percent |
| Selfridge | 160 | 127 | (33) | (20.63\%) |
| Selz CDP | 46 | 40 | (6) | (13.04\%) |
| Sentinel Butte | 56 | 61 | 5 | 8.93\% |
| Sharon | 96 | 86 | (10) | (10.42\%) |
| Sheldon | 116 | 95 | (21) | (18.10\%) |
| Shell Valley CDP | 1,197 | 1,146 | (51) | (4.26\%) |
| Sherwood | 242 | 194 | (48) | (19.83\%) |
| Sheyenne | 204 | 186 | (18) | (8.82\%) |
| Sibley | 30 | 19 | (11) | (36.67\%) |
| Solen | 83 | 70 | (13) | (15.66\%) |
| Souris | 58 | 37 | (21) | (36.21\%) |
| South Heart | 301 | 394 | 93 | 30.90\% |
| Spiritwood CDP | 18 | 29 | 11 | 61.11\% |
| Spiritwood Lake | 90 | 97 | 7 | 7.78\% |
| Springbrook | 27 | 37 | 10 | 37.04\% |
| Stanley | 1,458 | 2,321 | 863 | 59.19\% |
| Stanton | 366 | 368 | 2 | 0.55\% |
| Starkweather | 117 | 100 | (17) | (14.53\%) |
| Steele | 715 | 665 | (50) | (6.99\%) |
| Strasburg | 409 | 379 | (30) | (7.34\%) |
| Streeter | 170 | 149 | (21) | (12.35\%) |
| Surrey | 934 | 1,357 | 423 | 45.29\% |
| Sutton CDP | 17 | 17 | 0 | 0.00\% |
| Sykeston | 117 | 105 | (12) | (10.26\%) |
| Tappen | 197 | 217 | 20 | 10.15\% |
| Taylor | 148 | 230 | 82 | 55.41\% |
| Thompson | 986 | 1,101 | 115 | 11.66\% |
| Tioga | 1,230 | 2,202 | 972 | 79.02\% |
| Tolley | 47 | 41 | (6) | (12.77\%) |
| Tolna | 166 | 136 | (30) | (18.07\%) |
| Tower City | 253 | 268 | 15 | 5.93\% |
| Towner | 533 | 479 | (54) | (10.13\%) |
| Turtle Lake | 581 | 542 | (39) | (6.71\%) |
| Tuttle | 80 | 60 | (20) | (25.00\%) |
| Underwood | 778 | 784 | 6 | 0.77\% |
| Upham | 130 | 135 | 5 | 3.85\% |
| Valley City | 6,585 | 6,575 | (10) | (0.15\%) |
| Velva | 1,084 | 1,086 | 2 | 0.18\% |
| Venturia | 10 | 21 | 11 | 110.00\% |
| Verona | 85 | 59 | (26) | (30.59\%) |
| Voltaire | 40 | 46 | 6 | 15.00\% |
| Wahpeton | 7,766 | 8,007 | 241 | 3.10\% |
| Walcott | 235 | 262 | 27 | 11.49\% |
| Wales | 31 | 10 | (21) | (67.74\%) |
| Walhalla | 996 | 893 | (103) | (10.34\%) |
| Warwick | 65 | 55 | (10) | (15.38\%) |
| Washburn | 1,246 | 1,300 | 54 | 4.33\% |
| Watford City | 1,744 | 6,207 | 4,463 | 255.91\% |
| West Fargo | 25,830 | 38,626 | 12,796 | 49.54\% |
| Westhope | 429 | 374 | (55) | (12.82\%) |
| Wheatland CDP | 68 | 92 | 24 | 35.29\% |
| White Earth | 80 | 100 | 20 | 25.00\% |
| White Shield CDP | 336 | 363 | 27 | 8.04\% |
| Wildrose | 110 | 115 | 5 | 4.55\% |
| Williston | 14,716 | 29,160 | 14,444 | 98.15\% |
| Willow City | 163 | 149 | (14) | (8.59\%) |
| Wilton | 711 | 718 | 7 | 0.98\% |
| Wimbledon | 216 | 178 | (38) | (17.59\%) |
| Wing | 152 | 132 | (20) | (13.16\%) |
| Wishek | 1,002 | 864 | (138) | (13.77\%) |
| Wolford | 36 | 43 | 7 | 19.44\% |
| Woodworth | 50 | 44 | (6) | (12.00\%) |
| Wyndmere | 429 | 454 | 25 | 5.83\% |
| York | 23 | 17 | (6) | (26.09\%) |
| Ypsilanti CDP | 104 | 109 | 5 | 4.81\% |


|  | Population | Increase (Decrease) |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | Amount | Percent |
| Zap |  | 237 | 221 | $(16)$ | $(6.75 \%)$ |
| Zeeland | 86 |  | 82 | $(4)$ | $(4.65 \%)$ |

## ATTACH:1

Case 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS Document 65-10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 12 of 12


## EXHIBIT 10



## Legislative District Results

[^19]State Senator District 9
Precincts Fully: 8 / 8
Partially: 0 / 8
Track this Contest
Vote For 1

| Kent Weston |
| :--- |
| Republican |


| Richard Marcellais |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Democratic-NPL |
| ( Write-in |

TOTAL VOTES

## Cavalier County

State Senator District 9
Vote For 1

| Kent Weston <br> Republican | $\mathbf{1 , 0 5 1}$ | $\mathbf{7 9 . 9 2 \%}$ |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Richard Marcellais <br> Democratic-NPL | 260 | $19.77 \%$ |  |
| $\boxplus$ write-in | 4 | $0.30 \%$ |  |
|  | TOTAL VOTES | $\mathbf{1 , 3 1 5}$ |  |

total votes
1,315
Precincts Fully: 1 / 1
Partially: 0 / 1


PRECINCT


## Rolette County

## State Senator District 9

Precincts Fully: 5 / 5
Vote For 1
Partially: $0 / 5$

| Richard Marcellais Democratic-NPL | 1,637 | 60.12\% | Bar Graph \| Map |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kent Weston <br> Republican | 1,082 | 39.74\% |  |
| ( write-in | 4 | 0.15\% |  |
| TOTAL VOTES | 2,723 |  |  |

PRECINCT

## Towner County

## State Senator District 9

Vote For 1

| Kent Weston $\boldsymbol{V}$ <br> Republican | 202 | $\mathbf{6 4 . 9 5 \%}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:35AM

| State Senator District 9 | County Cavalier | Number of Precincts | Kent Weston Republican |  | Richard Marcellais Democratic-NPL | write-in |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | Democratic-NPL 260 |  |
|  | Rolette |  | 5 | 1,082 | 1,637 | 4 |
|  | Towner |  | 2 | 202 | 108 | 1 |
|  | TOTALS |  | 8 | 2,335 | 2,005 | 9 |

## Cavalier

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:01AM

| State Senator | Precinct | Kent Weston | Richard Marcellais | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| District 9 | 100901 | 1,051 | 260 | 4 |
|  | TOTALS | 1,051 | 260 | 4 |

## Rolette

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:01AM

| State Senator | Precinct | Kent Weston | Richard Marcellais | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | :--- | :--- |
| District 9 | 400901 | 285 | 185 | 2 |
|  | 400902 | 316 | 402 | 0 |
|  | 400903 | 106 | 733 | 1 |
|  | 400904 | 61 | 182 | 0 |
|  | 400905 | 314 | 135 | 1 |
|  | TOTALS | 1,082 | 1,637 | 4 |

Towner
2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:01AM

| State Senator | Precinct | Kent Weston | Richard Marcellais | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| District 9 | 480902 | 107 | 39 | 0 |
|  | 480903 | 95 | 69 | 1 |
|  | TOTALS | 202 | 108 | 1 |

## EXHIBIT 11

| OFFICIAL 2022 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS | STATEWIDE TURNOUT |  | PRECINCTS REPORTED |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| November 8, 2022 <br> Results last updated: 11/29/2022 2:43:07 PM | Voter Turnout Eligible Voters | $\begin{aligned} & 242,526 \\ & 564,935 \end{aligned}$ | Precincts Partially <br> Precincts Fully <br> Total Precincts | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 398 \\ 398 \end{array}$ |
| StATEWIDE LEGISLATIVE MAP |  |  |  |  |

Legislative District Results
EXPORT PAGE

## District 09a

State Representative District 09a
Vote For 1
Partially: 0 / 3
EXPORT

| Jayme M Davis <br> Democratic-NPL | $\mathbf{1 , 0 4 9}$ | $\mathbf{6 8 . 6 1 \%}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Brenda Malo <br> Republican | 476 | $31.13 \%$ |
| ¥write-in | 4 | $0.26 \%$ |

## Rolette County

State Representative District a
Precincts Fully: 3 / 3
Vote For 1
Partially: 0 / 3


## Rolette County



## ELECTION RESOURCES

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:12AM


## Rolette

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:12AM

State Representative
District 09a

| Precinct | Brenda Malo | Jayme M Davis | write-in |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 400903 | 80 | 754 | 1 |
| 400904 | 72 | 175 | 0 |
| 400905 | 324 | 120 | 3 |
| TOTALS | 476 | 1,049 | 4 |

## EXHIBIT 12

| OFFICIAL 2022 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS | STATEWIDE TURNOUT |  | PRECINCTS REPORTED |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| November 8, 2022 <br> Results last updated: 11/29/2022 2:43:07 PM | Voter Turnout Eligible Voter | $\begin{aligned} & 242,526 \\ & 564,935 \end{aligned}$ | Precincts Partially Precincts Fully Total Precincts | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 398 \\ 398 \end{array}$ |
| Statewide legislative map |  |  |  |  |

Legislative District Results
EXPORT PAGE

## District 09b

State Representative District 09b
Precincts Fully: $5 / 5$
Partially: 0 / 5


COUNTY

## Cavalier County

State Representative District b
Vote For 1

| Donna Henderson <br> Republican | $\mathbf{9 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{6 8 . 7 5 \%}$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Marvin E Nelson <br> Democratic-NPL | 270 | $20.38 \%$ |  |
| Write-in | 144 | $10.87 \%$ |  |
|  | TOTAL VOTES | $\mathbf{1 , 3 2 5}$ |  |



PRECINCT


## Rolette County

State Representative District b Vote For 1

| Marvin E Nelson <br> Democratic-NPL | 650 | 54.62\% | Bar Graph \| Map |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Donna Henderson Republican | 526 | 44.20\% |  |
| \# write-in | 14 | 1.18\% |  |
| total votes | 1,190 |  |  |

## Towner County

State Representative District b Vote For 1


## ELECTION RESOURCES

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:14AM

| State Representative <br> District 09b |  | Number of Precincts | Donna Henderson Republican |  | Marvin E Nelson |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | County |  |  |  | Democratic-NPL | write-in |
|  | Cavalier |  | 1 | 911 | 270 | 144 |
|  | Rolette |  | 2 | 526 | 650 | 14 |
|  | Towner |  | 2 | 158 | 141 | 7 |
|  | TOTALS |  | 5 | 1,595 | 1,061 | 165 |

## Cavalier

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:14AM

State Representative
District 09b

| Precinct | Donna Henderson | Marvin E Nelson | write-in |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | ---: |
| 100901 | 911 | 270 | 144 |
| TOTALS | 911 | 270 | 144 |

## Rolette

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:14AM

| State Representative | Precinct | Donna Henderson | Marvin E Nelson | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| District 09b | 400901 | 234 | 234 | 7 |
|  | 400902 | 292 | 416 | 7 |
|  | TOTALS | 526 | 650 | 14 |

## Towner

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:14AM

| State Representative | Precinct | Donna Henderson | Marvin E Nelson |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| write-in |  |  |  |  |
| District 09b | 480902 | 93 | 50 | 4 |
|  | 480903 | 65 | 91 | 3 |
|  | TOTALS | 158 | 141 | 7 |

## EXHIBIT 13

| OFFICIAL 2022 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS | STATEWIDE TURNOUT |  | PRECINCTS REPORTED |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| November 8， 2022 <br> Results last updated：11／29／2022 2：43：07 PM | Voter Turnout Eligible Voters | $\begin{aligned} & 242,526 \\ & 564,935 \end{aligned}$ | Precincts Partially Precincts Fully Total Precincts | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 398 \\ 398 \end{array}$ |
| STATEWIDE LEGISLATIVE MAP |  |  |  |  |

## Legislative District Results

## District 15

State Senator District 15
Vote For 1

| Vote For 1 |  | ｜Partially |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Judy Estenson <br> Republican | $\mathbf{3 , 4 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 5 . 4 8 \%}$ |
| Collette Brown <br> Democratic－NPL | 1,768 | $33.88 \%$ |
| $⿴ 囗 十$ write－in | 33 | $0.63 \%$ |
|  | TOTAL votes | $\mathbf{5 , 2 1 8}$ |

Track this Contest
EXPORT

State Representative District 15

| Kathy Frelich $\boldsymbol{\checkmark}$ <br> Republican | $\mathbf{3 , 4 0 5}$ | $\mathbf{4 1 . 5 6 \%}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |, Bar Graph｜Map

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:20AM

| State Senator | County | Number of Precincts |  | son | Collette Brown Democratic-NPL | write-in |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District 15 | Benson |  | 3 | 246 | 433 | 4 |
|  | Eddy |  | 1 | 41 | 22 | 0 |
|  | Ramsey |  | 4 | 2,718 | 1,192 | 28 |
|  | Towner |  | 1 | 412 | 121 | 1 |
|  | TOTALS |  | 9 | 3,417 | 1,768 | 33 |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:20AM

| State Senator | Precinct | Judy Estenson | Collette Brown | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| District 15 | 031502 | 121 | 53 | 1 |
|  | 031503 | 60 | 296 | 1 |
|  | 031504 | 65 | 84 | 2 |
|  | TOTALS | 246 | 433 | 4 |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:20AM

| State Senator | Precinct | Judy Estenson | Collette Brown | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| District 15 | 141503 | 41 | 22 | 0 |
|  | TOTALS | 41 | 22 | 0 |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:20AM

| State Senator | Precinct | Judy Estenson | Collette Brown | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| District 15 | 361501 | 1,337 | 723 | 8 |
|  | 361502 | 408 | 149 | 7 |
|  | 361503 | 716 | 240 | 10 |
|  | 361504 | 257 | 80 | 3 |
|  | TOTALS | 2,718 | 1,192 | 28 |

Towner
2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:20AM

| State Senator | Precinct | Judy Estenson | Collette Brown | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District 15 | 481501 | 412 | 121 | 1 |
|  | TOTALS | 412 | 121 | 1 |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:27AM

| State Representativ | County | Number of Precincts |  | lich | Dennis Johnson Republican | Heather Lawrence-Skadsem Democratic-NPL | write-in |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District 15 | Benson |  | 3 | 225 | 260 | 416 | 4 |
|  | Eddy |  | 1 | 37 | 39 | 19 | 0 |
|  | Ramsey |  | 4 | 2,771 | 2,493 | 1,061 | 8 |
|  | Towner |  | 1 | 372 | 368 | 119 | 0 |
|  | TOTALS |  | 9 | 3,405 | 3,160 | 1,615 | 12 |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:27AM

| State Representative | Precinct | Kathy Frelich | Dennis Johnson | Heather Lawrence-Skadsem | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| District 15 | 031502 | 90 | 125 | 52 | 1 |
|  | 031503 | 71 | 73 | 287 | 3 |
|  | 031504 | 64 | 62 | 77 | 0 |
|  | TOTALS | 225 | 260 | 416 | 4 |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:27AM
Eddy

2022 Official General Election Results

Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:27AM

| State Representative | Precinct | Kathy Frelich | Dennis Johnson | Heather Lawrence-Skadsem | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| District 15 | 141503 | 37 | 39 | 19 | 0 |
|  | TOTALS | 37 | 39 | 19 | 0 |

2022 Official General Election Results
State of North Dakota
Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:27AM

| State Representative | Precinct | Kathy Frelich | Dennis Johnson | Heather Lawrence-Skadsem | write-in |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| District 15 | 361501 | 1,398 | 1,237 | 632 | 2 |
|  | 361502 | 403 | 396 | 132 | 0 |
|  | 361503 | 728 | 627 | 215 | 4 |
|  | 361504 | 242 | 233 | 82 | 2 |
|  | TOTALS | 2,771 | 2,493 | 1,061 | 8 |

2022 Official General Election Results<br>State of North Dakota<br>Downloaded at Mar 012023 11:27AM

| State Representative | Precinct | Kathy Frelich | Dennis Johnson | Heather Lawrence-Skadsem | write-in |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| District 15 | 481501 | 372 | 368 | 119 | 0 |
|  | TOTALS | 372 | 368 | 119 | 0 |

## EXHIBIT 14

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

CHARLES WALEN, an individual; and PAUL HENDERSON, an individual.

## Plaintiffs,

v.

DOUG BURGUM, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Dakota;
ALVIN JAEGER in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of North Dakota,

## Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-0031-CRH

## EXPERT REPORT OF M.V. HOOD III

I, M.V. Hood III, affirm the conclusions I express in this report are provided to a reasonable degree of professional certainty. In addition, I do hereby declare the following:


## I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

My name is M.V. (Trey) Hood III, and I am a tenured professor at the University of Georgia with an appointment in the Department of Political Science. I have been a faculty member at the University of Georgia since 1999. I also serve as the Director of the School of Public and International Affairs Survey Research Center. I am an expert in American politics, specifically in the areas of electoral politics, racial politics, election administration, and Southern politics. I teach courses on American politics, Southern politics, and research methods and have taught graduate seminars on the topics of election administration and Southern politics.

I have received research grants to study election administration issues from the National Science Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trust, the Center for Election Innovation and Research, and the MIT Election Data and Science Lab. I have also published peer-reviewed journal articles specifically in the area of election administration, including redistricting. My academic publications are detailed in a copy of my vita that is attached to the end of this report. Currently, I serve on the editorial boards for Social Science Quarterly and Election Law Journal. The latter is a peer-reviewed academic journal focused on the area of election administration.

During the preceding five years, I have offered expert testimony (through deposition or at trial) in ten cases around the United States: Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Ryan Smith, 1:18-cv357 (S.D. Ohio), Libertarian Party of Arkansas v. Thurston, 4:19-cv-00214 (E.D. Ark.); Chestnut v. Merrill, 2:18-cv-907 (N.D. Ala.), Common Cause v. Lewis, 18-CVS-014001 (Wake County Superior Court); Nielsen v. DeSantis, 4:20-cv-236 (N.D. Fla.); Western Native Voice v. Stapleton, DV-56-2020-377 (Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court); Driscoll v. Stapleton, DV-20-0408 (Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court); North Carolina v. Holmes, 18-CVS15292 (Wake County Superior Court); Caster v. Merrill, 2:21-cv-1536 (S.D. Ala); and Robinson v. Ardoin, 3:22-cv-00211 (M.D. La.).

I am receiving $\$ 400$ an hour for my work on this case and $\$ 400$ an hour for any testimony associated with this work. In reaching my conclusions, I have drawn on my training, experience, and knowledge as a social scientist who has specifically conducted research in the area of redistricting. My compensation in this case is not dependent upon the outcome of the litigation or the substance of my opinions.

## II. SCOPE AND OVERVIEW

I have been asked by counsel for the defendant to provide a functional analysis for LD 9 and LD 4 in the North Dakota legislative districting plan as enacted following the 2020 apportionment.

## III. FUNCTIONALITY ANAYSIS

In Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, in relation to the use of race in redistricting, the pertinent question was to be found in Section 2, not Section 5, of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, the issue is not how to maintain the present minority percentages in majority-minority districts, instead the issue is the extent to which [the State] must preserve existing minority percentages in order to maintain the minority's present ability to elect the candidate of its choice. ${ }^{1}$ With this guidance I have undertaken an analysis using the three prongs of the standard Gingles ${ }^{2}$ test in order to answer the following question: if said district is not constituted as a majority-minority district, would the preferred candidate of the Native American community in an open seat scenario most likely be defeated? In order to answer this question, I rely on what is known as a district functionality analysis. Such an analysis can be used to gain insight into how a proposed or enacted district would perform electorally.

The functionality analyses presented in this expert report consist of several components which are then combined in a final step. First, one needs to estimate the manner in which various racial groups are voting. Here, I rely on precinct-level vote returns and racial voting age population data to estimate how various groups are casting ballots. The next step in the process involves producing turnout estimates by race. The final piece of requisite information concerns the racial population (VAP) breakdown of the district to be analyzed. One can then take these voting age population figures and combine them with the aforementioned turnout estimates to create an estimate of the number of white, Native American, and other minority voters participating in a given election. Finally, one can combine these turnout numbers with the estimated vote percentages by race to obtain vote share estimates. Aggregating these estimates, one can then determine the estimated vote share for each candidate in a given race. In the case of a general election, the process would terminate with a vote estimate for each political party in the race being analyzed. For example, a calculation of the overall estimated Democratic (Republican) vote share in said district.

## IV. ANALYSIS OF LD 9

## A. Can a Majority-Minority District Be Created?

Prong 1 of the Gingles test reads as follows: The minority group must be of sufficient size and geographically compact enough to allow for the creation of a single-member district for the group in question.

[^20]LD 9 in the enacted legislative plan ${ }^{3}$ is comprised of $51.7 \%$ Native American voting age population. ${ }^{4}$ As such, under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act it would be described as a minority, opportunity-to-elect district. ${ }^{5}$ LD 9 is also subdivided into LD 9A and LD 9B, where each subdistrict serves as a single-member district for the purpose of electing members to the North Dakota House. Subdistrict 9A is $77.0 \%$ Native American VAP and LD 9B is $29.4 \%$ Native American VAP. Given LD 9 is majority Native American in terms of voting age, per prong 1 it is certainly possible to create a district where the minority group in question to comprises a majority of the district's population. Figure 1 below displays enacted LD 9 along with its subdistricts. The Native American population at the Census block-level is also presented for reference.

Figure 1. Enacted LD 9 (with subdistricts) and Block-Level Native American Population


[^21]
## B. Is racially polarized voting present in the geographic area under study?

Prong 2 of the Gingles test seeks to determine if racially polarized voting is present in the geographic area under study. In order to determine if this is the case, one needs to estimate the manner in which various racial groups are voting. Here, I rely on precinct-level vote returns and racial voting age population data to estimate how whites, Native Americans, and other minorities are casting ballots. More specifically, I analyze six recent state-level contests: the 2020 presential election, the 2020 U.S. House election, the 2020 gubernatorial election, the 2018 U.S. Senate election, the 2018 U.S. House election, and the 2018 Attorney General election.

For each election analyzed, precinct vote returns are collected for the precincts that that make up enacted LD 9. In the case where a precinct is split between LD 9 and another legislative district, the precinct was retained for purposes of estimating vote shares by race. ${ }^{6}$ Block-level racial data from the 2020 Census was then aggregated to the precinct-level to be used for analysis. The three demographic groups analyzed are non-Hispanic whites, Native Americans, and other minorities. ${ }^{7}$

Ecological Inference is a statistical method that allows one to use aggregate-level data (precincts in this case) to make extrapolations concerning individual-level behavior. Using this technique one can estimate the percentages of each racial group that voted for a particular candidate. ${ }^{8}$ Sometimes this step is referred to as a racially polarized voting (or racial bloc voting) analysis.

Table 1 details racial voting estimates for enacted LD 9 along with $95 \%$ confidence intervals. For all six elections analyzed, there is a clear candidate of choice for Native American voters in LD 9 , with the candidate of choice being the Democratic candidate in each of these contests. On the other side, white voters consistently support the Republican candidate in all six races. Racially polarized voting would then appear to be the norm in LD 9.

[^22]Table 1. Racial Voting Estimates, LD 9

|  | White |  | Native American |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Election | Republican | Democrat | Republican | Democrat |
| 2020 Presidential | 71.9 | 27.0 | 10.1 | 89.3 |
|  | $[66.0,77.4]$ | $[21.5,32.8]$ | $[2.0,20.1]$ | $[79.3,97.4]$ |
| 2020 U.S. House | 75.7 |  |  |  |
|  | $[69.8,81.1]$ | $[17.7,29.0]$ | $[3.5,23.1]$ | $[75.3,94.9]$ |
| 2020 Governor | 78.0 | 20.4 | 18.9 | 80.0 |
|  | $[72.0,83.4]$ | $[15.0,26.4]$ | $[8.9,29.1]$ | $[69.8,90.0]$ |
| 2018 U.S. Senate | 56.3 | 43.7 | 5.0 | 95.0 |
|  | $[50.2,62.2]$ | $[37.8,49.8]$ | $[0.6,11.0]$ | $[89.0,99.4]$ |
| 2018 U.S. House | 67.7 | 35.6 | 11.2 | 83.8 |
|  | $[55.7,67.4]$ | $[30.0,41.6]$ | $[4.7,17.9]$ | $[77.1,90.2]$ |
| 2018 Attorney General | 71.2 | 28.8 | 12.6 | 87.3 |
|  | $[64.6,77.3]$ | $[22.7,35.4]$ | $[5.4,20.1]$ | $[79.9,94.6]$ |

Notes: Entries are estimates of vote share by race and party with $95 \%$ confidence estimates in parentheses.

## C. Is the Native American Candidate of Choice Typically Defeated?

For each of the six elections analyzed there is a clear candidate of choice for Native American voters in LD 9. In each of these case that candidate of choice is the Democrat. The question now becomes is the Native American candidate of choice typically defeated by the white voting bloc.

In order to answer this question, I produce turnout estimates for whites, Native Americans, and others. Because racial turnout data are not available in North Dakota, I again rely on ecological inference to estimate turnout by race using precinct-level data. In this case I use voting age counts by racial group and turnout measured as the number of ballots cast in a specific election (with the number of nonvoters calculated as ballots cast subtracted from the total voting age population).

The estimated turnout rates by race are then used to partition the voting age population into the electorate for a given race. For example, if there are 1,000 whites of voting age and the estimated turnout rate for this group is $45 \%$, then it would be estimated that there would be 450 whites in the electorate. This process is repeated for Native Americans and the other minority category.

The next step would be to decompose these voters by candidate choice. To continue the present hypothetical example, one would divide these 450 white voters into categories based on vote choice. If the white vote was estimated to have split 60\% Republican and 40\% Democratic, there would be 270 white votes for the Republican candidate and 180 white votes for the Democratic candidate. The same process would then be repeated for the other two racial categories under analysis. Finally, votes by party across racial groups would be summed and then divided by the
total number of estimated votes. The end product would then be an estimate of the Democratic and Republican vote in enacted LD 9 for the election contest under study. ${ }^{9}$ With this accomplished, it is then possible to determine which party would have won the election within the geographic boundaries of enacted LD 9 (and LD 9A and LD 9B).

The predicted vote share by party for the six election contests analyzed for LD 9 is presented in Table 2 below. The table also contains an analysis of the predicted vote for LD 9A and LD 9B. Looking at Table 2, the estimates produced indicate that the Native American preferred candidate of choice, the Democratic candidate in each case, would have prevailed in LD 9 in four of the six elections analyzed, or $67 \%$ of the time. In LD 9A, the Native American preferred candidate would win six of six elections analyzed, or $100 \%$ of the time. In LD 9B, the Native American preferred candidate would win two of six races, or $33 \%$ of the time.

Table 2. LD 9-Predicted Vote by Party

|  | LD 9 |  | LD 9A |  | LD 9B |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Election | Dem. | Rep. | Dem. | Rep. | Dem. | Rep. |
| 2020 Presidential | 51.2 | 47.2 | 68.8 | 29.8 | 39.6 | 58.8 |
| 2020 U.S. House | 47.2 | 50.6 | 64.8 | 32.8 | 35.6 | 62.3 |
| 2020 Governor | 44.1 | 53.7 | 60.9 | 37.0 | 32.9 | 64.9 |
| 2018 U.S. Senate | 69.1 | 30.9 | 82.6 | 17.4 | 58.0 | 42.0 |
| 2018 U.S. House | 58.9 | 36.3 | 71.7 | 23.0 | 48.5 | 47.2 |
| 2018 Attorney General | 58.1 | 41.9 | 73.5 | 26.5 | 45.5 | 54.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average | 54.8 | 43.4 | 70.4 | 27.8 | 43.4 | 55.0 |

Note: Democratic and Republican vote percentages may not sum to $100 \%$ due to the presence of a third-party candidate.

## D. Summary and Conclusion

Racially polarized voting is present within the boundaries of enacted LD 9 and, in fact, appears to be the prevailing pattern. At present, LD 9 contains a majority of Native American voting age population, as does LD 9A. LD 9, therefore, is a Section 2 minority opportunity-to-elect district for Native Americans. Under its present configuration, LD 9 and LD 9A demonstrate an ability to consistently elect a Native American candidate of choice. Given the presence of racially polarized voting in the district, it is unlikely that the Native American candidate of choice would be regularly elected if the district did not contain a majority Native American voting age population.

[^23]
## V. ANALYSIS OF LD 4

In this section, I repeat the same process utilized for the functional analysis carried out on LD 9 in Section IV.

## A. Can a Majority-Minority District Be Created?

LD 4 in the enacted legislative plan contains a $31.0 \%$ Native American voting age population. ${ }^{10}$ LD 4 is also subdivided into LD 4A and LD 4B where each subdistrict serves as a singlemember district for the purpose of electing members to the North Dakota House. Subdistrict 4A is $62.1 \%$ Native American VAP and LD 4B is $2.3 \%$ Native American VAP. LD 4 is not majority Native American in terms of voting age population. LD 4A is, however, majority Native American and for the purposes of electing a member to the North Dakota State House can serve as a minority opportunity-to-elect district. In the case of LD 4A, the first prong of the Gingles test is met. Figure 2 below displays enacted LD 4 along with its subdistricts. The Native American population at the Census block-level is also presented for reference.

Figure 1. Enacted LD 4 (with subdistricts) and Block-Level Native American Population


[^24]
## B. Is racially polarized voting present in the geographic area under study?

Table 3 details racial voting estimates for enacted LD 4 along with $95 \%$ confidence intervals for the same six elections used for the analysis of LD 9. For all six elections analyzed, there is a clear candidate of choice for Native American voters in LD 4, with the candidate of choice being the Democratic candidate in each of these contests. On the other side, white voters consistently support the Republican candidate in all six races. For the six elections analyzed, racially polarized voting is present $100 \%$ of the time.

Table 3. Racial Voting Estimates, LD 4

|  | White |  | Native American |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Election | Republican | Democrat | Republican | Democrat |
| 2020 Presidential | 82.8 | 16.4 | 9.7 | 88.7 |
|  | $[80.3,85.2]$ | $[14.0,18.7]$ | $[2.6,21.5]$ | $[77.0,96.1]$ |
| 2020 U.S. House | 83.7 | 15.2 | 12.3 | 84.2 |
|  | $[81.3,86.1]$ | $[12.7,17.4]$ | $[3.7,25.3]$ | $[71.5,93.3]$ |
| 2020 Governor | 79.5 | 15.9 | 17.6 | 79.7 |
|  | $[76.8,82.2]$ | $[13.1,18.4]$ | $[7.0,31.1]$ | $[66.3,90.4]$ |
| 2018 U.S. Senate | 71.9 | 28.1 |  |  |
|  | $[68.9,75.0]$ | $[25.0,31.1]$ | $[1.1,18.0]$ | $[82.0,98.9]$ |
| 2018 U.S. House | 77.1 | 20.9 | 9.9 | 88.0 |
|  | $[74.4,79.7]$ | $[18.2,23.4]$ | $[2.5,21.6]$ | $[76.4,95.8]$ |
|  | 81.2 | 18.8 | 9.7 | 90.3 |
| 2018 Attorney General | $[78.2,84.3]$ | $[15.7,21.8]$ | $[2.0,22.5]$ | $[77.5,98.0]$ |

Notes: Entries are estimates of vote share by race and party with $95 \%$ confidence estimates in parentheses.

## C. Is the Native American Candidate of Choice Typically Defeated?

The predicted vote share by party for the six election contests analyzed for LD 4 is presented in Table 4 below. The table also contains an analysis of the predicted vote for LD 4A and LD 4B. Looking at Table 4, the estimates produced indicate that the Native American preferred candidate of choice, the Democratic candidate in each case, would be defeated in LD 4 six out of the six elections analyzed, or $100 \%$ of the time. In LD 4A, the Native American preferred candidate would win five of six elections analyzed, or $83 \%$ of the time. In LD 4B, the Native American preferred candidate would lose all six races, or $100 \%$ of the time.

Table 4. LD 4-Predicted Vote by Party

|  | LD 4 |  | LD 4A |  | LD 4B |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Election | Dem. | Rep. | Dem. | Rep. | Dem. | Rep. |
| 2020 Presidential | 29.8 | 68.4 | 51.3 | 46.0 | 18.1 | 80.7 |
| 2020 U.S. House | 27.7 | 69.5 | 48.1 | 47.4 | 16.7 | 81.6 |
| 2020 Governor | 27.5 | 67.4 | 46.3 | 48.4 | 17.3 | 77.7 |
| 2018 U.S. Senate | 40.8 | 59.2 | 60.8 | 39.2 | 30.0 | 70.1 |
| 2018 U.S. House | 32.9 | 63.5 | 52.4 | 42.5 | 22.2 | 75.0 |
| 2018 Attorney General | 32.7 | 67.3 | 54.6 | 45.4 | 20.8 | 79.2 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average | 31.9 | 65.9 | 52.3 | 44.8 | 20.9 | 77.4 |

Note: Democratic and Republican vote percentages may not sum to $100 \%$ due to the presence of a third-party candidate.

## D. Summary and Conclusion

LD 4 in the enacted plan is, without exception, characterized by the presence of racially polarized voting. The Native American candidate of choice in LD 4 and LD 4B would be defeated $100 \%$ of the time. Again, LD 4 and LD 4B are majority white voting age population. LD 4A on the other hand contains a majority Native American voting age population. In the case of LD 4A, the Native American candidate of choice would be elected more than a majority of the time ( $83 \%$ ). With the exception of LD 4A, it is highly unlikely that a Native American preferred candidate of choice would be elected within the geographic boundaries of LD 4 as a whole.

## VI. DECLARATION

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on January 17, 2023.

## M.V. Axad II

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## Appendix: Reliance Materials

North Dakota 2022 Enacted Legislative Plan Shapefile (https://www.ndlegis.gov/assembly/67-2021/special/approved-legislative-redistricting-maps).

North Dakota 2022 Enacted Legislative Plan Statistics (https://www.ndlegis.gov/assembly/67-2021/session-interim/2021-legislative-redistricting-maps).

North Dakota Precinct Shapefiles. North Dakota Secretary of State.
Precinct Election Returns. North Dakota Secretary of State. (https://sos.nd.gov/elections.html).
U.S. Census Bureau. 2020 P.L. 94-171 Data for North Dakota (https://data.census.gov/table).
U.S. Census Tiger/Line Shapefiles (https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files/time-series/geo/tiger-line-file.html).

## Curriculum Vitae

(January 2023)

M.V. (Trey) Hood III

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## Academic Positions:

University of Georgia
Director, SPIA Survey Research Center, 2016-present
Director of Graduate Studies, 2011-2016
Professor, 2013-present
Associate Professor, 2005-2013
Assistant Professor, 1999-2005
Texas Tech University
Visiting Assistant Professor, 1997-1999

## Education:

| Ph.D. | Political Science | Texas Tech University | 1997 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| M.A. | Political Science | Baylor University | 1993 |
| B.S. | Political Science | Texas A\&M University | 1991 |

## Peer-Reviewed Books:

Rural Republican Realignment in the Modern South: The Untold Story. 2022.
Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
The Rational Southerner: Black Mobilization, Republican Growth, and the Partisan
Transformation of the American South. 2012. New York: Oxford University Press.
(Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris, co-authors).
[Softcover version in 2014 with new Epilogue]

## Peer-Reviewed Publications:

"The Hardest Path to Reelection: Dueling Incumbent House Primaries in 2022." 2022 (Online First). The Forum. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Postal Voting in the 2020 Election." 2022. Journal of Election Administration, Research, and Practice 1(1): 19-29. (Lonna Rae Atkeson, Colin Jones, Mason Reece, and Robert M. Stein, co-authors).
"Partisan Schism in America’s Newest Swing State." 2022 (Online First). Party Politics. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Getting the Message: Opinion Polarization over Election Law." 2022. Election Law Journal 21(2): 124-134. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Tracking Hispanic Political Emergence in Georgia: An Update." 2021. Social Science Quarterly 102(1): 259-268. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"Switching Sides but Still Fighting the Civil War in Southern Politics." 2020. Politics, Groups, and Identities 10(1): 100-116. (Christopher Cooper, Scott H. Huffmon, Quentin Kidd, Gibbs Knotts, Seth C. McKee, co-authors).
"The Election of African American State Legislators in the Modern South." 2020.
Legislative Studies Quarterly 45(4): 581-608. (Charles S. Bullock, III, William Hicks, Seth C. McKee, Adam S. Myers, and Daniel A. Smith, co-authors).
"What's in a Name? Gauging the Effect of Labels on Third Party Vote Shares." 2022. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion \& Parties 32(3): 542-555. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Why Georgia, Why? Peach State Residents' Perceptions of Voting-Related Improprieties and their Impact on the 2018 Gubernatorial Election." 2019. Social Science Quarterly 100(5): 1828-1847. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Palmetto Postmortem: Examining the Effects of the South Carolina Voter Identification Statute." 2019. Political Research Quarterly 73(2): 492-505. (Scott E. Buchanan, co-author).
"Contagious Republicanism in Louisiana, 1966-2008." 2018. Political Geography 66(Sept): 113. (Jamie Monogan, co-author).
"The Comeback Kid: Donald Trump on Election Day in 2016." 2019. PS: Political Science and Politics 52(2): 239-242. (Seth C. McKee and Daniel A. Smith, co-authors).
"Election Daze: Mode of Voting and Voter Preferences in the 2016 Presidential Election." 2017-2018. Florida Political Chronicle 25(2): 123-141. (Seth C. McKee and Daniel A. Smith, co-authors).
"Out of Step and Out of Touch: The Matter with Kansas in the 2014 Midterm." 2017. The Forum 15(2): 291-312. (Seth C. McKee and Ian Ostrander, co-authors).
"From Legal Theory to Practical Application: A How-To for Performing Vote Dilution Analyses." 2018. Social Science Quarterly 99(2): 536-552. (Peter A. Morrison and Thomas M. Bryan, co-authors).
"Race, Class, Religion and the Southern Party System: A Field Report from Dixie." 2016. The Forum 14(1): 83-96.
"Black Votes Count: The 2014 Republican Senate Nomination in Mississippi." 2017. Social Science Quarterly 98(1): 89-106. (Seth C. McKee, coauthor).
"Sunshine State Dilemma: Voting for the 2014 Governor of Florida." 2015. Electoral Studies 40: 293-299. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Tea Leaves and Southern Politics: Explaining Tea Party Support Among Southern Republicans." 2015. Social Science Quarterly 96(4): 923-940. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris, co-authors).
"True Colors: White Conservative Support for Minority Republican Candidates." 2015. Public Opinion Quarterly 79(1): 28-52. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Race and the Tea Party in the Old Dominion: Split-Ticket Voting in the 2013 Virginia Elections." 2015. PS: Political Science and Politics 48(1):107-114. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris, co-authors).
"The Damnedest Mess: An Empirical Evaluation of the 1966 Georgia Gubernatorial Election." 2014. Social Science Quarterly 96(1):104-118. (Charles S. Bullock, III, coauthor).
"Candidates, Competition, and the Partisan Press: Congressional Elections in the Early Antebellum Era." 2014. American Politics Research 42(5):670-783. (Jamie L. Carson, coauthor).
[Winner of the 2014 Hahn-Sigelman Prize]
"Strategic Voting in a U.S. Senate Election." 2013. Political Behavior 35(4):729-751. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Unwelcome Constituents: Redistricting and Countervailing Partisan Tides." 2013. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 13(2):203-224. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"The Tea Party, Sarah Palin, and the 2010 Congressional Elections: The Aftermath of the Election of Barack Obama." 2012. Social Science Quarterly 93(5):1424-1435. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"Much Ado About Nothing?: An Empirical Assessment of the Georgia Voter Identification Statute." 2012. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 12(4):394-314. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"Achieving Validation: Barack Obama and Black Turnout in 2008." 2012. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 12:3-22. (Seth C. McKee and David Hill, co-authors).
"They Just Don’t Vote Like They Used To: A Methodology to Empirically Assess Election Fraud." 2012. Social Science Quarterly 93:76-94. (William Gillespie, co-author).
"An Examination of Efforts to Encourage the Incidence of Early In-Person Voting in Georgia, 2008." 2011. Election Law Journal 10:103-113. (Charles S. Bullock, III, coauthor).
"What Made Carolina Blue? In-migration and the 2008 North Carolina Presidential Vote." 2010. American Politics Research 38:266-302. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Stranger Danger: Redistricting, Incumbent Recognition, and Vote Choice." 2010. Social Science Quarterly 91:344-358. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Trying to Thread the Needle: The Effects of Redistricting in a Georgia Congressional District." 2009. PS: Political Science and Politics 42:679-687. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Citizen, Defend Thyself: An Individual-Level Analysis of Concealed-Weapon Permit Holders." 2009. Criminal Justice Studies 22:73-89. (Grant W. Neeley, co-author).
"Two Sides of the Same Coin?: Employing Granger Causality Tests in a Time Series CrossSection Framework." 2008. Political Analysis 16:324-344. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris, co-authors).
"Worth a Thousand Words? : An Analysis of Georgia's Voter Identification Statute." 2008. American Politics Research 36:555-579. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"Gerrymandering on Georgia's Mind: The Effects of Redistricting on Vote Choice in the 2006 Midterm Election." 2008. Social Science Quarterly 89:60-77 (Seth C. McKee, coauthor).
"Examining Methods for Identifying Latino Voters." 2007. Election Law Journal 6:202-208. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"A Mile-Wide Gap: The Evolution of Hispanic Political Emergence in the Deep South." 2006. Social Science Quarterly 87:1117-1135. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"Punch Cards, Jim Crow, and Al Gore: Explaining Voter Trust in the Electoral System in Georgia, 2000." 2005. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5:283-294. (Charles S. Bullock, III and Richard Clark, co-authors).
"When Southern Symbolism Meets the Pork Barrel: Opportunity for Executive Leadership." 2005. Social Science Quarterly 86:69-86. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"Race and the Ideological Transformation of the Democratic Party: Evidence from the Bayou State." 2005. American Review of Politics 25:67-78.
"The Reintroduction of the Elephas maximus to the Southern United States: The Rise of Republican State Parties, 1960-2000." 2004. American Politics Research 31:68-101. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris, co-authors).
"One Person, [No Vote; One Vote; Two Votes...]: Voting Methods, Ballot Types, and Undervote Frequency in the 2000 Presidential Election." 2002. Social Science Quarterly 83:981-993. (Charles S. Bullock, III, co-author).
"On the Prospect of Linking Religious Right Identification with Political Behavior: Panacea or Snipe Hunt?" 2002. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41:697-710. (Mark C. Smith, co-author).
"The Key Issue: Constituency Effects and Southern Senators' Roll-Call Voting on Civil Rights." 2001. Legislative Studies Quarterly 26: 599-621. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris, coauthors).
"Packin' in the Hood?: Examining Assumptions Underlying Concealed-Handgun Research." 2000. Social Science Quarterly 81:523-537. (Grant Neeley, co-author).
"Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Racial/Ethnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187." 2000. Social Science Quarterly 81:194-206. (Irwin Morris, co-author).
"Penny Pinching or Politics? The Line-Item Veto and Military Construction Appropriations." 1999. Political Research Quarterly 52:753-766. (Irwin Morris and Grant Neeley, coauthors).
"Of Byrds[s] and Bumpers: Using Democratic Senators to Analyze Political Change in the South, 1960-1995." 1999. American Journal of Political Science 43:465-487. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris, co-authors).
"Bugs in the NRC's Doctoral Program Evaluation Data: From Mites to Hissing Cockroaches." 1998. PS 31:829-835. (Nelson Dometrius, Quentin Kidd, and Kurt Shirkey, co-authors).
"Boll Weevils and Roll-Call Voting: A Study in Time and Space." 1998. Legislative Studies Quarterly 23:245-269. (Irwin Morris, co-author).
"Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor,...But Make Sure They Have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion Towards Immigration." 1998. Political Behavior 20:1-16. (Irwin Morris, co-author).
" $i$ Quedate o Vente!: Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion Towards Immigration." 1997. Political Research Quarterly 50:627-647. (Irwin Morris and Kurt Shirkey, co-authors).
"¿Amigo o Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, and Anglo Public Opinion toward Immigration." 1997. Social Science Quarterly 78: 309-323. (Irwin Morris, co-author).

## Book Chapters:

"The 2020 Presidential Nomination Process." 2021. In The 2020 Presidential Election in the South, eds. Branwell DuBose Kapeluck and Scott E. Buchanan. Lanham, MD: Rowman \& Littlefield. (Aaron A. Hitefield, co-author).
"Texas: A Shifting Republican Terrain." 2021. In The New Politics of the Old South, $7^{\text {th }}$ ed., Charles S. Bullock, III and Mark J. Rozell, editors. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"Texas: Big Red Rides On." 2018. In The New Politics of the Old South, $6^{\text {th }}$ ed., Charles S. Bullock, III and Mark J. Rozell, editors. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"The Participatory Consequences of Florida Redistricting." 2015. In Jigsaw Puzzle Politics in the Sunshine State, Seth C. McKee, editor. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press. (Danny Hayes and Seth C. McKee, co-authors).
"Texas: Political Change by the Numbers." 2014. In The New Politics of the Old South, $5^{\text {th }}$ ed., Charles S. Bullock, III and Mark J. Rozell, editors. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (Seth C. McKee, co-author).
"The Republican Party in the South." 2012. In Oxford Handbook of Southern Politics, Charles S. Bullock, III and Mark J. Rozell, editors. New York: Oxford University Press. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris, co-authors).
"The Reintroduction of the Elephas maximus to the Southern United States: The Rise of Republican State Parties, 1960-2000." 2010. In Controversies in Voting Behavior, $5^{\text {th }}$ ed., David Kimball, Richard G. Niemi, and Herbert F. Weisberg, editors. Washington, DC: CQ Press. (Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris, co-authors).
[Reprint of 2004 APR article with Epilogue containing updated analysis and other original material.]
"The Texas Governors." 1997. In Texas Policy and Politics, Mark Somma, editor. Needham Heights, MA: Simon \& Schuster.

## Book Reviews:

The Resilience of Southern Identity: Why the South Still Matters in the Minds of Its People. 2018. Reviewed for The Journal of Southern History.

## Other Publications:

"Provisionally Admitted College Students: Do They Belong in a Research University?" 1998. In Developmental Education: Preparing Successful College Students, Jeanne Higbee and Patricia L. Dwinell, editors. Columbia, SC: National Resource Center for the First-Year Experience \& Students in Transition (Don Garnett, co-author).

NES Technical Report No. 52. 1994. "The Reliability, Validity, and Scalability of the Indicators of Gender Role Beliefs and Feminism in the 1992 American National Election Study: A Report to the ANES Board of Overseers." (Sue Tolleson-Rinehart, Douglas R. Davenport, Terry L. Gilmour, William R. Moore, Kurt Shirkey, co-authors).

## Grant-funded Research (UGA):

Co-Principal Investigator. "Georgia Absentee Ballot Signature Verfication Study." Budget: $\$ 36,950$. 2021. (with Audrey Haynes and Charles Stewart III). Funded by the Georgia Secretary of State.

Co-Principal Investigator. "The Integrity of Mail Voting in the 2020 Election." Budget:
$\$ 177,080$. (with Lonna Atkeson and Robert Stein). Funded by the National Science Foundation.
Co-Principal Investigator. "Georgia Voter Verification Study." Budget: \$52,060. 2020. (with Audrey Haynes). Funded by Center for Election Innovation and Research.

Co-Principal Investigator. "An Examination of Non-Precinct Voting in the State of Georgia." Budget: $\$ 47,000$. October 2008-July 2009. (with Charles S. Bullock, III). Funded by the Pew Charitable Trust.

Co-Principal Investigator. "The Best Judges Money Can Buy?: Campaign Contributions and the Texas Supreme Court." (SES-0615838) Total Budget: \$166,576; UGA Share: \$69,974.
September 2006-August 2008. (with Craig F. Emmert). Funded by the National Science Foundation. REU Supplemental Award (2008-2009): \$6,300.

Principal Investigator. "Payola Justice or Just Plain ‘Ole Politics Texas-Style?: Campaign Finance and the Texas Supreme Court." $\$ 5,175$. January 2000-Januray 2001. Funded by the University of Georgia Research Foundation, Inc.

## Curriculum Grants (UGA):

Learning Technology Grant: "Converting Ideas Into Effective Action: An Interactive Computer and Classroom Simulation for the Teaching of American Politics." \$40,000. January-December 2004. (with Loch Johnson). Funded by the Office of Instructional Support and Technology, University of Georgia.

## Dissertation:

"Capturing Bubba's Heart and Mind: Group Consciousness and the Political Identification of Southern White Males, 1972-1994."

Chair: Professor Sue Tolleson-Rinehart

## Papers and Activities at Professional Meetings:

"Rural Voters in Southern U.S. House Elections." 2021. (with Seth C. McKee). Presented at the Virtual American Political History Conference. University of Georgia. Athens, GA.
"Mail It In: An Analysis of the Peach State's Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic." 2020. (with Audrey Haynes). Presented at the Election Science, Reform, and Administrative Conference. Gainesville, FL. [Virtually Presented].
"Presidential Republicanism and Democratic Darn Near Everything Else." 2020. (with Seth C. McKee). Presented at the Citadel Southern Politics Symposium. Charleston, SC.
"Why Georgia, Why? Peach State Residents' Perceptions of Voting-Related Improprieties and their Impact on the 2018 Gubernatorial Election." 2019. (with Seth C. McKee). Presented at the Election Science, Reform, and Administrative Conference. Philadelphia, PA.
"The Demise of White Class Polarization and the Newest American Politics." 2019. (with Seth C. McKee). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Austin, TX.
"The Geography of Latino Growth in the American South." 2018. (with Seth C. McKee). State Politics and Policy Conference. State College, PA.
"A History and Analysis of Black Representation in Southern State Legislatures." 2018. (with Charles S. Bullock, III, William D. Hicks, Seth C. McKee, Adam S. Myers, and Daniel A. Smith). Presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.

Discussant. Panel titled "Southern Distinctiveness?" 2018. The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.

Roundtable Participant. Panel titled "The 2018 Elections." 2018. The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Still Fighting the Civil War?: Southern Opinions on the Confederate Legacy." 2018. (with Christopher A. Cooper, Scott H. Huffmon, Quentin Kidd, H. Gibbs Knotts, and Seth C. McKee). The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Tracking Hispanic Growth in the American South." 2018. (with Seth C. McKee). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA.
"An Assessment of Online Voter Registration in Georgia." 2017. (with Greg Hawrelak and Colin Phillips). Presented at the Annual Meeting of Election Sciences, Reform, and Administration. Portland, Oregon.

Moderator. Panel titled "What Happens Next." 2017. The Annual Meeting of Election Sciences, Reform, and Administration. Portland, Oregon.
"Election Daze: Time of Vote, Mode of Voting, and Voter Preferences in the 2016 Presidential Election." 2017. (with Seth C. McKee and Dan Smith). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the State Politics and Policy Conference. St. Louis, MO.
"Palmetto Postmortem: Examining the Effects of the South Carolina Voter Identification Statute." 2017. (with Scott E. Buchanan). Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA.

Panel Chair and Presenter. Panel titled "Assessing the 2016 Presidential Election." 2017. UGA Elections Conference. Athens, GA.

Roundtable Discussant. Panel titled "Author Meets Critics: Robert Mickey's Paths Out of Dixie." 2017. The Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA.
"Out of Step and Out of Touch: The Matter with Kansas in the 2014 Midterm Election." (with Seth C. McKee and Ian Ostrander). 2016. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
"Contagious Republicanism in North Carolina and Louisiana, 1966-2008."(with Jamie Monogan). 2016. Presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"The Behavioral Implications of Racial Resentment in the South: The Intervening Influence of Party." (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2016. Presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.

Discussant. Panel titled "Partisan Realignment in the South." 2016. The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Electoral Implications of Racial Resentment in the South: The Influence of Party." (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2016. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Philadelphia, PA.
"Racial Resentment and the Tea Party: Taking Regional Differences Seriously." (with Quentin Kidd an Irwin L. Morris). 2015. Poster presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. San Francisco, CA.
"Race and the Tea Party in the Palmetto State: Tim Scott, Nikki Haley, Bakari Sellers and the 2014 Elections in South Carolina." (with Quentin Kidd an Irwin L. Morris). 2015. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA.

Participant. Roundtable on the 2014 Midterm Elections in the Deep South. Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA.
"Race and the Tea Party in the Old Dominion: Split-Ticket Voting in the 2013 Virginia Elections." (with Irwin L. Morris and Quentin Kidd). 2014. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Race and the Tea Party in the Old Dominion: Down-Ticket Voting and Roll-Off in the 2013 Virginia Elections." (with Irwin L. Morris and Quentin Kidd). 2014. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA.
"Tea Leaves and Southern Politics: Explaining Tea Party Support Among Southern Republicans." (with Irwin L. Morris and Quentin Kidd). 2013. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Orlando, FL.
"The Tea Party and the Southern GOP." (with Irwin L. Morris and Quentin Kidd). 2012. Research presented at the Effects of the 2012 Elections Conference. Athens, GA.
"Black Mobilization in the Modern South: When Does Empowerment Matter?" (with Irwin L. Morris and Quentin Kidd). 2012. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"The Legislature Chooses a Governor: Georgia's 1966 Gubernatorial Election." (with Charles S. Bullock, III). 2012. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"One-Stop to Victory? North Carolina, Obama, and the 2008 General Election." (with Justin Bullock, Paul Carlsen, Perry Joiner, and Mark Owens). 2011. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans.
"Redistricting and Turnout in Black and White." (with Seth C. McKee and Danny Hayes). 2011. Paper presented the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL.
"One-Stop to Victory? North Carolina, Obama, and the 2008 General Election." (with Justin Bullock, Paul Carlsen, Perry Joiner, Jeni McDermott, and Mark Owens). 2011. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting. Chicago, IL.
"Strategic Voting in the 2010 Florida Senate Election." (with Seth C. McKee). 2011. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Florida Political Science Association. Jupiter, FL.
"The Republican Bottleneck: Congressional Emergence Patterns in a Changing South." (with Christian R. Grose and Seth C. McKee). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA.
"Capturing the Obama Effect: Black Turnout in Presidential Elections." (with David Hill and Seth C. McKee) 2010. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Florida Political Science Association. Jacksonville, FL.
"The Republican Bottleneck: Congressional Emergence Patterns in a Changing South." (with Seth C. McKee and Christian R. Grose). 2010. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Black Mobilization and Republican Growth in the American South: The More Things

Change the More They Stay the Same?" (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2010. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Unwelcome Constituents: Redistricting and Incumbent Vote Shares." (with Seth C. McKee). 2010. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta, GA.
"Black Mobilization and Republican Growth in the American South: The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same?" (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2010. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta, GA.
"The Impact of Efforts to Increase Early Voting in Georgia, 2008." (With Charles S. Bullock, III). 2009. Presentation made at the Annual Meeting of the Georgia Political Science Association. Callaway Gardens, GA.
"Encouraging Non-Precinct Voting in Georgia, 2008." (With Charles S. Bullock, III). 2009. Presentation made at the Time-Shifting The Vote Conference. Reed College, Portland, OR.
"What Made Carolina Blue? In-migration and the 2008 North Carolina Presidential Vote." (with Seth C. McKee). 2009. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Florida Political Science Association. Orlando, FL.
"Swimming with the Tide: Redistricting and Voter Choice in the 2006 Midterm." (with Seth C. McKee). 2009. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"The Effect of the Partisan Press on U.S. House Elections, 1800-1820." (with Jamie Carson). 2008. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the History of Congress Conference. Washington, D.C.
"Backward Mapping: Exploring Questions of Representation via Spatial Analysis of Historical Congressional Districts." (Michael Crespin). 2008. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the History of Congress Conference. Washington, D.C.
"The Effect of the Partisan Press on U.S. House Elections, 1800-1820." (with Jamie Carson). 2008. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"The Rational Southerner: The Local Logic of Partisan Transformation in the South." (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2008. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Stranger Danger: The Influence of Redistricting on Candidate Recognition and Vote Choice." (with Seth C. McKee). 2008. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans.
"Backward Mapping: Exploring Questions of Representation via Spatial Analysis of Historical Congressional Districts." (with Michael Crespin). 2007. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago.
"Worth a Thousand Words? : An Analysis of Georgia's Voter Identification Statute." (with Charles S. Bullock, III). 2007. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association. Albuquerque.
"Gerrymandering on Georgia's Mind: The Effects of Redistricting on Vote Choice in the 2006 Midterm Election." (with Seth C. McKee). 2007. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of The Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans.
"Personalismo Politics: Partisanship, Presidential Popularity and 21st Century Southern Politics." (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2006. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Philadelphia.
"Explaining Soft Money Transfers in State Gubernatorial Elections." (with William Gillespie and Troy Gibson). 2006. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"Two Sides of the Same Coin?: A Panel Granger Analysis of Black Electoral Mobilization and GOP Growth in the South, 1960-2004." (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2006. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston, SC.
"Hispanic Political Emergence in the Deep South, 2000-2004." (With Charles S. Bullock, III). 2006. Paper presented at the Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. Charleston.
"Black Mobilization and the Growth of Southern Republicanism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" (with Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). 2006. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"Exploring the Linkage Between Black Turnout and Down-Ticket Challenges to Black Incumbents." (With Troy M. Gibson). 2006. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"Race and the Ideological Transformation of the Democratic Party: Evidence from the Bayou State." 2004. Paper presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Citadel Southern Politics Symposium. Charleston.
"Tracing the Evolution of Hispanic Political Emergence in the Deep South." 2004. (Charles S. Bullock, III). Paper presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Citadel Southern Politics Symposium. Charleston.
"Much Ado about Something? Religious Right Status in American Politics." 2003. (With Mark C. Smith). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"Tracking the Flow of Non-Federal Dollars in U. S. Senate Campaigns, 1992-2000." 2003. (With Janna Deitz and William Gillespie). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"PAC Cash and Votes: Can Money Rent a Vote?" 2002. (With William Gillespie). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Savannah.
"What Can Gubernatorial Elections Teach Us About American Politics?: Exploiting and Underutilized Resource." 2002. (With Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Boston.
"I Know I Voted, But I’m Not Sure It Got Counted." 2002. (With Charles S. Bullock, III and Richard Clark). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association. New Orleans.
"Race and Southern Gubernatorial Elections: A 50-Year Assessment." 2002. (With Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris). Paper presented at the Biennial Southern Politics Symposium. Charleston, SC.
"Top-Down or Bottom-Up?: An Integrated Explanation of Two-Party Development in the South, 1960-2000." 2001. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"Cash, Congress, and Trade: Did Campaign Contributions Influence Congressional Support for Most Favored Nation Status in China?" 2001. (With William Gillespie). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association. Fort Worth.
"Key 50 Years Later: Understanding the Racial Dynamics of $21{ }^{\text {st }}$ Century Southern Politics" 2001. (With Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"The VRA and Beyond: The Political Mobilization of African Americans in the Modern South." 2001. (With Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. San Francisco.
"Payola Justice or Just Plain 'Ole Politics Texas Style?: Campaign Finance and the Texas Supreme Court." 2001. (With Craig Emmert). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"The VRA and Beyond: The Political Mobilization of African Americans in the Modern South." 2000. (With Irwin Morris and Quentin Kidd). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"Where Have All the Republicans Gone? A State-Level Study of Southern Republicanism." 1999. (With Irwin Morris and Quentin Kidd). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Savannah.
"Elephants in Dixie: A State-Level Analysis of the Rise of the Republican Party in the Modern South." 1999. (With Irwin Morris and Quentin Kidd). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"Stimulant to Turnout or Merely a Convenience?: Developing an Early Voter Profile." 1998. (With Quentin Kidd and Grant Neeley). Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"The Impact of the Texas Concealed Weapons Law on Crime Rates: A Policy Analysis for the City of Dallas, 1992-1997." 1998. (With Grant W. Neeley). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"Analyzing Anglo Voting on Proposition 187: Does Racial/Ethnic Context Really Matter?" 1997. (With Irwin Morris). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Norfolk.
"Capturing Bubba's Heart and Mind: Group Consciousness and the Political Identification of Southern White Males, 1972-1994." 1997. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"Of Byrds[s] and Bumpers: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Study of the Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Democratic Senators from the South, 1960-1995." 1996. (With Quentin Kidd and Irwin Morris). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.
"Pest Control: Southern Politics and the Eradication of the Boll Weevil." 1996. (With Irwin Morris). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. San Francisco.
"Fit for the Greater Functions of Politics: Gender, Participation, and Political Knowledge." 1996. (With Terry Gilmour, Kurt Shirkey, and Sue Tolleson-Rinehart). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"¿Amigo o Enemigo?: Racial Context, Attitudes, and White Public Opinion on Immigration." 1996. (With Irwin Morris). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
"iQuedate o Vente!: Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion Towards Immigration." 1996. (With Irwin Morris and Kurt Shirkey). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association. Houston.
"Downs Meets the Boll Weevil: When Southern Democrats Turn Left." 1995. (With Irwin Morris). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Tampa.
"¿Amigo o Enemigo?: Ideological Dispositions of Whites Residing in Heavily Hispanic Areas." 1995. (With Irwin Morris). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Tampa.

Chair. Panel titled "Congress and Interest Groups in Institutional Settings." 1995. Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association. Dallas.
"Death of the Boll Weevil?: The Decline of Conservative Democrats in the House." 1995. (With Kurt Shirkey). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association. Dallas.
"Capturing Bubba's Heart and Mind: The Political Identification of Southern White Males." 1994. (With Sue Tolleson-Rinehart). Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta.

## Areas of Teaching Competence:

American Politics: Behavior and Institutions
Public Policy
Scope, Methods, Techniques

## Teaching Experience:

University of Georgia, 1999-present.
Graduate Faculty, 2003-present.
Provisional Graduate Faculty, 2000-2003.
Distance Education Faculty, 2000-present.
Texas Tech University, 1993-1999.
Visiting Faculty, 1997-1999.
Graduate Faculty, 1998-1999.
Extended Studies Faculty, 1997-1999.
Teaching Assistant, 1993-1997.

Courses Taught:
Undergraduate:
American Government and Politics, American Government and Politics (Honors), Legislative Process, Introduction to Political Analysis, American Public Policy, Political Psychology, Advanced Simulations in American Politics (Honors), Southern Politics, Southern Politics (Honors), Survey Research Internship

## Graduate:

Election Administration and Related Issues (Election Sciences), Political Parties and Interest Groups, Legislative Process, Seminar in American Politics, Southern Politics; Publishing for Political Science

## Editorial Boards:

Social Science Quarterly. Member. 2011-present.
Election Law Journal. Member. 2013-present.

## Other Professional Service:

Listed expert. MIT Election Data and Science Lab.
Keynote Address. 2020 Symposium on Southern Politics. The Citadel. Charleston, SC.

## Institutional Service (University-Level):

University Information Technology Committee, 2022-present.
University Promotion and Tenure Committee, 2019-2022.
University Program Review Committee, 2009-2011.
Chair, 2010-2011
Vice-Chair, 2009-2010.

Graduate Council, 2005-2008.
Program Committee, 2005-2008.
Chair, Program Committee, 2007-2008.
University Libraries Committee, 2004-2014.
Search Committee for University Librarian and Associate Provost, 2014.

## EXHIBIT 15



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## EXHIBIT 16



## VBM (Vote By Mail)

| Barton | East <br> Barton | Spring <br> Lake | Juniata | Wolford <br> \# | Union |
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| Dewey | Walsh | Torgerson | Tofte | Rush <br> Lake | Hurricane <br> Lake |

Townships: Juniata, Wolford, Union, Rush Lake, Hurricane Lake and City of Wolford

Courthouse

## Precinct \#2

Townships: Hillside, Alexanter, White, Antelope Lake, Truman, Hagel

Courthouse

## Precinct \#3

Townships: Sandale, Elling, Girard, Rosedale, Ness, Jefferson, Tuscarora, Reno Valley, Balta, Elverum and City of Balta

Courthouse


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## BENSON COUNTY VOTING PRECINCTS MAP ISSUED FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL

## EXHIBIT 17

## Proposed Statewide Plan



District: 4A

Map layers
Indian ReservationCity/Town
County
County Subdivision

©2021 CALIPER; ©2020 HERE

## EXHIBIT 18

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## EXHIBIT 19

| 1 | NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING |
| 3 | DATE OF RECORDING: November 9, 2021 |
| 4 |  |
| 5 | PERSONS RECORDED: |
| 6 | Rep. Bill Devlin, Chairman |
| 7 | Unknown Female |
| 8 | Sen. Ray Holmberg, Vice Chairman |
| 9 | Rep. Larry Bellew |
| 10 | Rep. Joshua Boschee |
| 11 | Rep. Craig Headland |
| 12 | Rep. Mike Lefor |
| 13 | Rep. David Monson |
| 14 | Rep. Mike Nathe |
| 15 | Rep. Austen Schauer |
| 16 | Sen. Brad Bekkedahl |
| 17 | Sen. Randy Burckhard |
| 18 | Sen. Robert Erbele |
| 19 | Sen. Jerry Klein |
| 20 | Sen. Erin Oban |
| 21 | Sen. Nicole Poolman |
| 22 | Sen. Ronald Sorvaag |
| 23 | Emily Thompson, Legal Division Director |
| 24 |  |
| 25 |  |


| 1 | REP. DEVLIN: (bangs gavel) We'll call the |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Redistricting Committee back to order. |
| 3 | I see Representative Monson isn't here yet, but we |
| 4 | -- I know he'll be here soon, so. |
| 5 | I suppose you better take the roll. |
| 6 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. |
| 7 | REP. DEVLIN: Oh, there he is. |
| 8 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Chairman Devlin? |
| 9 | REP. DEVLIN: Here. |
| 10 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Vice Chairman Holmberg? |
| 11 | SEN. HOLMBERG: Here. |
| 12 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Bellew? |
| 13 | REP. BELLEW: Here. |
| 14 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Boschee? |
| 15 | REP. BOSCHEE: Here. |
| 16 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Headland? |
| 17 | REP. HEADLAND: Here. |
| 18 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Lefor? |
| 19 | REP. LEFOR: Here. |
| 20 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Monson? |
| 21 | REP. MONSON: Here. |
| 22 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Nathe? |
| 23 | REP. NATHE: Here. |
| 24 | UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Schauer? |
| 25 | REP. SCHAUER: Here. |

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Bekkedahl?
SEN. BEKKEDAHL: Here.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Burckhard?
SEN. BURCKHARD: Here.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Erbele?
SEN. ERBELE: Here.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Klein?
SEN. KLEIN: Here.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Oban?
SEN. OBAN: Here.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Poolman?
SEN. POOLMAN: Here.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Sorvaag?
SEN. SORVAAG: Here.
REP. DEVLIN: Thank you.
WE have -- Emily, we have a map one that we have to look at first that we held over from yesterday. Is that correct?

MS. THOMPSON: Yes, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, we have the metes and bounds language for that Judson amendment that we made some small tweaks to whenever you would like me to (inaudible) --

REP. DEVLIN: Yes.
(background)
REP. DEVLIN: So, this -- this doesn't look right.
(background)
(laughter)
REP. DEVLIN: I'll make sure that's recorded.
(background)
(laughter)
REP. DEVLIN: Emily, you may proceed.
MS. THOMPSON: So, the amendment that you all received, numbered 21.113 .02009 , this is the amendment from Representative Kreidt from yesterday regarding the Judson change. That small city of Judson that was split between two districts.

Senator Bekkedahl had mentioned possibly extending that up to the southern border of District 33 so that change was made. What you have on the amendment now is the formal metes and bounds language.

Again, yesterday I mentioned that there are some kind of odd shape census blocks in that area, so you can see that red highlighting, that kind of squiggly shaped pattern in the middle of your second page, that image you're looking at. The only part that is described by metes and bounds is the highlighted area.

So, when we call Census to have that census block adjusted, since that follows more of roads and rivers and identifiable boundaries, that is what the red shaded area of District 36 will encompass.

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    REP. DEVLIN: Senator Bekkedahl.
    SEN. BEKKEDAHL: Mr. Chairman, I would move
    Committee approval of the amendment as presented by Staff.
    REP. DEVLIN: So second?
    REP. NATHE: Second.
    REP. DEVLIN: Seconded by Representative Nathe.
    Any discussion? Questions?
    Seeing none, all those in favor, signify by saying
    "aye."
    ALL IN UNISON: Aye.
    REP. DEVLIN: Oppose, "nay." Motion carried.
    Representative Bellew has another correction that
    he would like us to make. It's just a street name, so we
    can do it as an amendment and that way we will -- Staff will
    do it and it will go forward in the bill as presented.
    So, Representative Bellew, do you want to explain
    what it is?
    REP. BELLEW: I will try, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    This concerns District 40. It's on page 26 of the
    bill. It starts on line 24. The way the bill reads now, it
    says, "until its intersection with the centerline of Fourth
    Avenue Northwest." That should be "Third Avenue Northwest."
    And the next statement says, "also identified as
    Third Avenue Northwest" -- that can be eliminated -- "then
    west on Third Avenue Northwest until its intersection with
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the centerline of Fourth Avenue Northwest," and "then west on Fourth Avenue Northwest until its intersection with the centerline on Sixteenth Street Northwest."

We had that problem yesterday in District 5 where if you go to the west end of that district, it said it was Third Avenue Northwest, but it was actually Fourth Avenue Northwest. Now, if you go to the east end of the district, it's Third Avenue Northwest and not Fourth Avenue Northwest. So, I did give it to Council and they said they would write it up. The map does not change. It's just the language in the bill.

And that's my proposal.
REP. DEVLIN: Is there any questions?
Representative Bellew, do you want to make that in the form of a motion?

REP. BELLEW: I would move that, Mr. Chairman.
REP. DEVLIN: Move that change.
SEN. BURCKHARD: Second.
REP. DEVLIN: Second Senator Burckhard.
Any questions? Discussion?
Senator Klein?
SEN. KLEIN: Mr. Chairman, and that's something Staff is working out. That's -- you know, it's not a big deal. They've looked at it. Everything is -- it's just a language change.

MS. THOMPSON: Yes. Mr. Chairman, Senator Klein, that is, again, another kind of a technical correction just with how some of those roads appeared on our software. So, we can go ahead and include that as simply a technical change, as well.

We'll incorporate both of those technical changes into the amendment you just passed this morning, as well as the amendments to Washburn that you passed yesterday. So, that will be the sum total of the merged Committee's amendment that you will see applied to the final bill.

REP. DEVLIN: Good. Any further questions?
All those in favor, signify by saying "aye."
ALL IN UNISON: Aye.
REP. DEVLIN: Oppose, "nay." Motion carried.
The Assistant Deputy Secretary of State raised a couple questions yesterday. We had reviewed it earlier and it was just a question of whether they had the authority to do a certain thing.

Emily, do you want to touch briefly on that? And we saw no problem with it after discussing it, so.

MS. THOMPSON: Yes. The Secretary of State reached out just for a few clarifications.

They just wanted to clarify the intent of the legislature regarding how House members of subdistricts would be elected. It seems, you know, fairly apparent to

Staff and several members of the Committee that, you know, the intent is to run by subdistrict and be elected by subdistrict.

The Secretary of State was wondering if that needed to be specified explicitly in the bill, but it seems fairly apparent. If the Committee is comfortable expressing it's intent on the record so the Secretary of State has that information, $I$ don't know that an actual language amendment would necessarily be needed.

REP. DEVLIN: Yeah, it's fully workable in the language we have now, so we don't see that we have to make any change.

So, if there isn't any other questions, we're just going to move on.

MS. THOMPSON: There's one other item --
REP. DEVLIN: Okay.
MS. THOMPSON: -- that the Secretary of State mentioned as far as townships.

Right now, it says, "Any number of townships or parts of townships may be joined into a single precinct provided that no precinct encompasses more than one legislative district." This is in a separate section of Code that's not in the bill.

Again, it seems fairly apparent that it would not encompass more than one subdistrict, either, also in the
district. But that was another item that the Committee might want to express it's intent just so that's on the record to clarify.

REP. DEVLIN: So, do you want the Committee to say that after careful review, we see no changes that have to be made after reviewing --

MS. THOMPSON: If that's the Committee's wishes that the intent is for township precincts not to encompass more than one subdistrict.

REP. DEVLIN: Any problems? That is certainly the intent of the Committee.

So, are we done with the changes now?
MS. THOMPSON: I believe so.
REP. DEVLIN: Any other Committee members have any changes?

Seeing none -- sorry, Representative Boschee, when you started reaching for your notepad and pen, I got a little nervous there. I'm sorry.

I think we're at the point to move this bill
forward to the legislature. Somebody want to make --
SEN. HOLMBERG: I move that we approve the bill as
drafted and forward to the House for their consideration.
SEN. BURCKHARD: Second.
REP. DEVLIN: Second by Senator Burckhard.
Any discussion?

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    Representative Monson.
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    Representative Monson.
    REP. MONSON: The motion is for it as drafted. Are
    REP. MONSON: The motion is for it as drafted. Are
    you referring to it as amended now, right?
    you referring to it as amended now, right?
    SEN. HOLMBERG: It's what we have.
    SEN. HOLMBERG: It's what we have.
    REP. DEVLIN: Yeah, as amended. Yeah.
    REP. DEVLIN: Yeah, as amended. Yeah.
    REP. MONSON: Yeah.
    REP. MONSON: Yeah.
    REP. DEVLIN: Seeing no one else, I think we better
    REP. DEVLIN: Seeing no one else, I think we better
    poll the Committee on this one.
    poll the Committee on this one.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Chairman Devlin?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Chairman Devlin?
    REP. DEVLIN: Yes.
    REP. DEVLIN: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Vice Chairman Holmberg?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Vice Chairman Holmberg?
    SEN. HOLMBERG: Yes.
    SEN. HOLMBERG: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Bellew?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Bellew?
    REP. BELLEW: Yes.
    REP. BELLEW: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Boschee?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Boschee?
    REP. BOSCHEE: Yes.
    REP. BOSCHEE: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Headland?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Headland?
    REP. HEADLAND: Yes.
    REP. HEADLAND: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Lefor?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Lefor?
    REP. LEFOR: Yes.
    REP. LEFOR: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Monson?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Monson?
    REP. MONSON: Yes.
    REP. MONSON: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Nathe?
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Nathe?
    REP. NATHE: Yes.
    REP. NATHE: Yes.
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Schauer?
    ```
    UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Schauer?
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REP. SCHAUER: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Bekkedahl?
SEN. BEKKEDAHL: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Burckhard?
SEN. BURCKHARD: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Erbele?
SEN. ERBELE: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Klein?
SEN. KLEIN: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Oban?
SEN. OBAN: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Poolman?
SEN. POOLMAN: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Sorvaag?
SEN. SORVAAG: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: (whispers) Sixteen zero.
REP. DEVLIN: Sixteen zero. All right, thank you very much.

We got one other bill before us, but before I do
that, I want to thank all of you for all your hard work on the Redistricting Committee. You know, like I've said before, we normally would start in March, early April doing all this, and when you don't get the numbers until August, it took a lot of hard work by everyone of you, and particularly the Legislative Council Staff. I mean, I
cannot believe what they went through. I sent one of them -- I won't mention which one because they would've all done it immediately -- a notice at 10:00 Sunday evening because I thought the next morning I'd like them to look at it. By 11:00 Sunday evening, I had a complete answer. So, I don't know if they ever slept during this whole process. And, again, I want to thank all of you.

We were assigned one other bill. Representative Lefor will explain 1513.

REP. LEFOR: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If you recall earlier, when we -- one of our last meetings we talked about some of the things that aren't specifically addressed in Code. And, so, if you look at House Bill 1513, starting line 8 through 13, that section allows the state party chair to appoint a temporary district party chair to organize a new district.

As you know, we have three new districts that have absolutely no district committees, so -- and Code is silent in that area. So, that's what this does. It allows the state party chair to appoint someone to get the ball rolling, so to speak, in the new district.

And then if you go to lines 22 and 23, it also refers to, quote, "A district that does not share any geographical area with the pre-redistricting district having the same number," end quote. Again, addressing the same new
committee.
And then you'll notice that the version that I handed out is Version 1001. So, if you look at the Christmas tree that I'm asking for the amended bill to be acted upon.

So, if you look at the second page, you'll see that, quote, "A new geographic area has a 2020 population which is more than 25 percent of the district's population as determined by the 2020 Census." So, the idea behind this is to reduce the number of district reorganizations that need to take place.

As I looked into this, that would take the reorganizations down from 47 reorganizations down to approximately 14. And, so, less than 25 percent is the threshold that we used in the other provisions that we had in our bill so that's why I took the 25 percent and kept it here.

In figuring that less than 25 percent, you have a pretty large population that stayed the same. Therefore, since these district chairs and committees were just elected a few months ago, that we would keep that going forward until their term is up in 2023, I believe.

So, that's basically what this bill does. It allows the state party chair to appoint temporary chairs and also lowers the amount of reorganizations that need to take
place.
And with that, I would submit House Bill 1513,
Version 1001, Mr. Chairman.
REP. DEVLIN: Questions? Senator Poolman.
SEN. POOLMAN: Move it to pass.
REP. DEVLIN: Is there a second?
SEN. POOLMAN: Are we doing that?
REP. DEVLIN: We can take it up for discussion.
Somebody want to second? Senator Bekkedahl.
Questions? Representative Nathe.
REP. NATHE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, on page 2, line 3, you know, we have, "as
determined in 2020." So, 10 years from now when a committee like this meets again, will they have to revisit this Code. REP. DEVLIN: Yes.

REP. NATHE: Okay. And that would be by design rather than just putting it in there so they wouldn't have to?

REP. LEFOR: Correct.
REP. NATHE: Okay. All right.
REP. DEVLIN: Further questions?
SEN. ERBELE: I do.
REP. DEVLIN: Senator Erbele.
SEN. ERBELE: Thank you, Chairman.
I can read the words, but I don't always understand
them. So, in a case of a district growing by more than 25 percent, mine grew by almost 60. Does the same rule apply, then, that the state chair appoints a temporary district for that? Because in my case, most of the Executive Committee is no longer in the District 28.

REP. LEFOR: Mr. Chairman, Senator Erbele, I don't believe this bill addresses that provision. It just addresses the new districts, as far as the state party chairs involvement.

SEN. ERBELE: So, then, in my case, how do we reorganize our district when our district committee is largely not in my district anymore? We only have the secretary remaining and a couple at-large members, but we have no president, vice president, treasurer, all of that.

REP. LEFOR: Mr. Chairman, Senator Erbele, again, this bill doesn't address that. If we wanted to make some changes for that, we can certainly take a look at that. But if we want to expand it to giving a state party chair more authority --

SEN. ERBELE: I think in my case I need it because I don't know how else we'd organize our district.

REP. DEVLIN: Representative --
(background)
REP. DEVLIN: Is there any other provisions in that chapter that would address Senator Erbele's issue?

MS. THOMPSON: Mr. Chair, members of the Committee, I'm just looking now.
(background)
SEN. ERBELE: And, Mr. Chairman, it may affect some of the other districts, too, that grew by more than 25 percent, if they've lost -- if their Executive Committee is no longer living within the district that was drawn.

REP. DEVLIN: Representative Boschee.
REP. BOSCHEE: Mr. Chairman, I guess I go back and forth on this. These are private, non-profit organizations and we, as the State, are telling them how to operate. And, so, I'd rather we spend less time figuring out what we put in statute and tell an organization how they run themselves.

I can understand the concern about a completely new district, where you're shifting an existing District 23 to a new part of the state and the identities change and we're setting up some precedent there, but in terms of -- you know, I'm in the same situation where our district will have to reorganize. It's growing by 40 percent. But that's the work of the political parties and the local activists and folks to figure that out and to find people who live within those new boundaries for these positions. I don't think it should be the role of the legislature or state government telling these private organizations what -- how to do their business.

REP. LEFOR: Mr. Chairman?
REP. DEVLIN: Who went first?
(background)
REP. LEFOR: Thank you.
REP. DEVLIN: Go ahead.
REP. LEFOR: Mr. Chairman, Representative Boschee, the only thing that $I$ would say to that is that when I did research on the Code, it gives a lot of power -- or, excuse me, a lot of responsibility to the district, and so it doesn't give the state committee the authority to do much of anything when it comes to districts. So, that's why it says the state party chair "may," and as far as that's concerned, otherwise I just think we leave it the way it is, but that's just me.

REP. DEVLIN: Senator Bekkedahl first and then Representative Monson.

SEN. BEKKEDAHL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, I understand Senator Erbele's concern with this as I read it. The issue is the words "newly established district that lacks a district committee." He has a newly revised district that lacks a district committee, so I understand what he's trying to do here. He has a great concern that makes sense to me, so I hope we can address it somehow.

REP. DEVLIN: Okay, Representative Monson first and

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then Senator Poolman.
REP. MONSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My district number has changed and the District 10
is now someplace else, so District 19 is the new district
which is encompassing an area that 7,000 people were in 19,
but, as far as I know, none of the Executive Committee from
19 was there. And, so, is the District 19, where I now
reside, considered a new district or one that would fall
into this category? Because District 10 is, what, Fargo or
Willis in there? Fargo?
(background)
REP. DEVLIN: Senator Poolman first and then we'll get back to this.
SEN. POOLMAN: Mr. Chairman, \(I\) just have a recommendation.
I appreciate very much the May (phonetic) point because I also agree with Representative Boschee and his concerns about telling state parties what to do, but I'd like the May to provide some direction.
In terms of an amendment to address the Erbele concern, you could simply say that "the district party organization chair in any newly established district or one"
-- if you added the words "or one" -- "that lacks a district committee able to carry," you would address his concern, you would keep the intent pretty much the same, but
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it does address any concerns whether it's a new district or it's one where the entire Executive Committee has been wiped out that in either one of those cases that the state party chair could appoint a temporary person.

REP. LEFOR: Mr. Chairman? REP. DEVLIN: Representative Lefor. REP. LEFOR: Senator Poolman, could you tell -- say again what your change would be?

SEN. POOLMAN: I would just -- line 10, I would simply -- I'm looking at the 1001 version. On line 10, I would just add the words, after "district," I would say, "or one that lacks a district committee." So, it would read, "After redistricting of the legislative assembly becomes effective, the state party chair may appoint a temporary district party organization chair in any newly established district or one that lacks a district committee able to carry out the responsibilities."

REP. LEFOR: Mr. Chairman -REP. DEVLIN: Good catch. REP. LEFOR: -- I like that. The other idea that I had, but I'd kind of leave it to Council what wording is best, but on line 9, after "in any new established or revised district," but when I think about it, I like Senator Poolman's verbiage better. But what makes more sense to you, Emily?

MS. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I would agree with the language proposed by Representative -- or, excuse me, Senator Poolman. Possibly just a small revision, instead of "or one," "or a district," just to be more specific.

So, it would read in the new subsection 5, "After redistricting of the legislative assembly becomes effective, the state party chair may appoint a temporary district party organization chair in any newly established district or a district that lacks a district committee able to carry out the responsibilities of this chapter."

REP. LEFOR: I'll second Senator Poolman's motion.
(background)
SEN. POOLMAN: I was just about to move that language, Mr. Chairman.

REP. DEVLIN: Discussions or questions?
REP. SCHAUER: Yes. Representative Lefor, on line 9, when you talk about "may" appoint a temporary district party organization chair, had you considered "will" appoint? I'm concerned that "may" may be, yeah, well, stay out of our business, as opposed to, you know, at least get the ball going and then it's up to that chair to move it forward. Had you thought about that at all?

REP. LEFOR: Mr. Chairman, Representative Schauer, I had. And I go back to what Representative Boschee said is
it's a fine line between giving them the opportunity and then telling them what to do, so I kept it at giving the state party chair the opportunity if that's what they decide to do.
(background)
SEN. OBAN: Mr. Chairman?
(background)
REP. LEFOR: It's "or one."
REP. DEVLIN: Senator Oban, I'm sorry.
SEN. OBAN: Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if section 1 conflicts with -- I'm sorry -- yes, the creation of subsection 5 of section 1 conflicts with any of the language in subsections 3 and 4 of the existing section. Where it says, "If the office of chairman becomes vacant, the vacancy may be filled as provided by the district party bylaws." That tells me there's two, sort of, different rules here.

REP. HEADLAND: Mr. Chair, just for clarification -

REP. DEVLIN: Representative Nathe.
REP. HEADLAND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. DEVLIN: Representative Headland. I apologize again.

REP. HEADLAND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the case of District 28, you know, I believe legislators that are elected within those districts are
already part of an Executive Committee. I think they already have the ability to move forward. Now, I'm not sure why they're unwilling to do that.

I don't think we need to make this move and this change. I think, you know, Senator Oban just eluded to it. You know, there's language that allows a district that's existing to move forward. They've got Executive Committee members there. I think this muddies up this bill.

SEN. OBAN: Well, Mr. Chairman, I also don't understand why we would put language about redistricting in Section 16.1-03-07, when that's just about organization of districts, when there is a specific section dedicated to what happens after redistricting. So, one would think that language in section 1 would be placed in that section.

Can of worms. Sorry.
REP. DEVLIN: The motion was to adopt Senator Poolman's amendment, but can you answer Senator Oban's question.

MS. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, Senator Oban, could you repeat that, please?

SEN. OBAN: It's okay, Emily, you were busy with something else.

So, I'm wondering if section 1 of the bill, the creation of new language in subsection 5 conflicts with anything in subsections 3 and 4 of that section, and why
language about redistricting would be placed in that section, when there is a separate section dedicated to reorganization after redistricting.

MS. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I'm just going to have Mary pull up that relevant statute so we can all kind of see what those other subdivisions are here.

So, Senator Oban, you're wondering if 1, 2, 3, or 4 conflict with 5.

SEN. OBAN: (in background) Mostly 3 and 4. But, sure --

MS. THOMPSON: 3 and 4?
SEN. OBAN: -- (inaudible)
MS. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I don't see that there's any direct conflict with the language.

SEN. OBAN: Okay. And, Emily, my second question was why would we put language about redistricting in that section, when there is a different -- let's see, it's on 16.1-03-17, specifically, about redistricting.

MS. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman --
SEN. OBAN: (inaudible) I'm sorry. Go ahead.
MS. THOMPSON: Pardon me. Mr. Chairman, Senator Oban, I think that was drafted to keep the organization provisions together, but that could be moved to the other section if the Committee so desires.

REP. DEVLIN: I'm sorry. Representative Monson. REP. MONSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I look at the section -- subsection 3 up here, I see that there could be another issue, and that is that if you have, in my case, District 10 had bylaws. District 19, which has now added, I mean, 7,000 of those people from 19 are now in -- actually, 19 is the existing number. Whose bylaws do you go by? And are there any bylaws -- they're going to have to be reassessed by a new committee. So, I mean, we've got an issue with are there bylaws even in effect?

REP. DEVLIN: Senator Bekkedahl.
SEN. BEKKEDAHL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, it's been my take that this offers the opportunity if a district needs the assistance to reorganize, they can use this bill to do that. I don't think it forces anybody to do anything. If there's a way to do it within your district, I think we all prefer that.

I agree with Representative Boschee that we stay out of the business of the parties and statute as much as we can. This is just another tool that could facilitate, especially when we look at organization, new districts, I think this is more helpful than hurtful.

REP. DEVLIN: I know the Senate Appropriations people started meeting three minutes ago, so what is the

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Committee's wishes?
(background)
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REP. DEVLIN: Okay, so we've got the motion from Senator Poolman.

All those in favor, signify by saying "aye."
ALL IN UNISON: Aye.
REP. DEVLIN: All right. Opposed, "nay."
Okay, so that went fast. Now, we need a motion to pass the amended bill.

SEN. BEKKEDAHL: So moved, Mr. Chairman.
REP. NATHE: Second.
REP. DEVLIN: Any discussion? All those in -- oh, no, I suppose you'd like us to poll the Committee, wouldn't you? That's fine. Then we poll the Committee.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Chairman Devlin?
REP. DEVLIN: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Vice Chairman Holmberg?
SEN. HOLMBERG: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Bellew?
REP. BELLEW: No.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Boschee?
REP. BOSCHEE: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Headland?
REP. HEADLAND: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Lefor?

REP. LEFOR: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Monson?
REP. MONSON: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Nathe?
REP. NATHE: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative Schauer?
REP. SCHAUER: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Representative -- or Senator
Bekkedahl?
SEN. BEKKEDAHL: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Burckhard?
SEN. BURCKHARD: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Erbele?
SEN. ERBELE: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Klein?
SEN. KLEIN: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Oban?
SEN. OBAN: Yes.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Poolman?
SEN. POOLMAN: Aye.
UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Sorvaag?
SEN. SORVAAG: Aye.
REP. DEVLIN: That motion carried.
That should conclude the work of this Committee unless Delayed Bills does something else with us or
whatever.
So, Representative Lefor, I assume you'll carry 1513 on the House floor, or $I$ will assign you to do that.

Unless there's other volunteers, I will assign -or I will carry House Bill 1504, the Redistricting Bill, on the House floor.
(to someone in background) No, I'm not going to ask you do to it.
(background)
(laughter)
REP. DEVLIN: I assume that's pretty much unanimous, but.

I'm sorry, Senator Bekkedahl?
SEN. BEKKEDAHL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we'd be remiss if, as a Committee, we didn't thank you for your leadership and your -- and getting this process through for us. You have been stellar. (applause)

REP. DEVLIN: Well, I thank you. And, like I sincerely said earlier, I appreciate all your hard work, and I've also said more than once that the Legislative Council Staff had a huge job, not only with this, but carrying the Chairman, you know, so I greatly appreciate everything you did, so.
(applause)
gavel)
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    1 C E R T I F I C A T E P A G E
    2
    3 I, Angela P. Ferreire, Transcriptionist,
    4 \text { do hereby certify that this transcript}
    5 is a true and accurate record of the
    6 electronically recorded proceedings,
    7 \text { transcribed under my direction}
    8 this 9th day of March, 2022.
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NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING
Meeting on 11/09/2021
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\hline 1 & 21.113 .02009
\(4: 8\) & \[
\begin{array}{ll}
21: 12 & \\
22: 24 & 23: 9
\end{array}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 18: 20,24 \\
& 19: 1
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline \(121: 11,12\) & 22 12:22 & & addressed \\
\hline 22:14,23 & 23 12:22 & 6 & 12:13 \\
\hline 23:8 & 16:15 & 60 15:2 & addresses \\
\hline 10 14:13 & 24 5:20 & & 15:7,8 \\
\hline 18:3, 9 & 25 13:8,14, & 7 & addressing \\
\hline \(19: 9,10\)
\(24: 5\) & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 16,18 \quad 15: 1 \\
& 16: 5
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
7,000 \quad 18: 5
\] & \(12: 25\)
adjourned \\
\hline 1001 13:3 & 26 5:19 & 24:6 & 28:1 \\
\hline & 28 15:5 & 8 & adjusted \\
\hline 10:00 12:3 & \[
21: 24
\] & & 4:23 \\
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\hline 13 12:14 & 3 & 9 & affect 16:4 \\
\hline 14 13:14 & \(314: 12\) & & agree 18:17 \\
\hline 1504 27:5 & 21:13 & \[
\begin{gathered}
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20: 18
\end{gathered}
\] & 20:2 24:19 \\
\hline 1513 12:9, & 22:25 & & ahead 7:4 \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& 14 \quad 14: 2 \\
& 27: 3
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
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& 24: 3
\end{aligned}
\] & A & 17:5 23:21 \\
\hline 16.1-03-07 & 33 4:13 & ability 22:2 & 10:3, 5 \\
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\hline 19 18:4,5,7 & 4 21:13 & activists & \[
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NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING

Meeting on 11/09/2021
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\hline applause & 7:15 & bangs 2:1 & border 4.13 \\
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NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING
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\hline \(4: 22^{\text {a }}\) & \[
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& 7: 1 \quad 10: 9,
\end{aligned}
\] & clarifications & 12:5 \\
\hline careful 9:5 & 11 12:10 & 7:22 & completely \\
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NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING Meeting on 11/09/2021

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NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING Meeting on 11/09/2021

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NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING
Meeting on 11/09/2021
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& 2421: 8
\end{aligned}
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NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING
Meeting on 11/09/2021
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\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{16:23} & meetings & 26:2 & 7,8 \\
\hline & 12:12 & move 5:2 & 17 \\
\hline let's 23:18 & meets 14:14 & 6:16,17 & notepad 9:17 \\
\hline lines 12:22 & members 3:19 & 8:14 9:19, & notice 12:3 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{live 16:21} & \(7: 248: 1\) & 21 14:5 & 13:2 \\
\hline & 9:14 15:13 & 20:14, 22 & number 8:19 \\
\hline living & \[
16: 1 \quad 20: 1
\] & 22:2,4,7 & 12:25 \\
\hline local 16:20 & 22:8 23:4 & moved 23:24 & 13:10 18:3 \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
longer \\
16:7
\end{tabular} & mention 12:2 & 25:10 & 24:7 \\
\hline \[
16: 7
\] & mentioned & muddies 22:8 & numbered 4:8 \\
\hline looked 6:24 & 4:12,16 & & numbers \\
\hline 13:12 & 8:18 & N & 11:23 \\
\hline lost 16:6 & merged 7:9 & Nathe 2:22, & 0 \\
\hline lot 11:24 & metes 3:20 & 23 5:5,6 & \\
\hline 17:8,9 & 4:15, 20 & 10:23, 24 & Oban 3:9,10 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{lowers 13:25} & middle & 14:10,11, & 11:10,11 \\
\hline & middle & 16,20 & 21:6, 9, 10 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{M} & mine 15:2 & 21:19 & 22:5,9,19, \\
\hline & minutes & 25:11 & 21 23:8, \\
\hline made 3:21 & 24:25 & 26:4, 5 & 10,13,16, \\
\hline 4:14 9:6 & Monson 2:3, & nay 5:11 & 21,23 \\
\hline make 4:3 & \[
20,21
\] & 7:14 25:7 & 26:17,18 \\
\hline 5:13 6:14 & 10:1, 2, 6, & necessarily & Oban's 22:17 \\
\hline 8:11 9:20 & 21,22 & 8:9 & odd 4:17 \\
\hline 15:16 22:4 & 17:16,25 & needed 8:4,9 & offers 24:14 \\
\hline makes 1 & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 18: 2 \quad 24: 1, \\
& 2 \quad 26: 2,3
\end{aligned}
\] & nervous 9:18 & office 21:14 \\
\hline 19:24 & 2 26.2,3 & & \\
\hline map 3: & months 13:21 & newly 17:19, & operate \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{6:10} & mo & 20 18:22 & 16:11 \\
\hline & 12:4 & & opportunity \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING
Meeting on 11/09/2021
Index: Oppose..question
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline 21:1,3 & 17:12 & 19:7,9 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{16:10,24} \\
\hline 24:15 & 18:21 & 20:3,14 & problem & \(6: 4\) \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Oppose 5:11} & 19:3,14,15 & 25:4 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{7:20} \\
\hline & 20:8,19 & 26:19,20 & & \\
\hline \[
7: 14
\] & 21:3,15 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Poolman's} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{problems} \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{opposed} & & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{9:10} \\
\hline & pass 14:5 & 19:24 & & \\
\hline 20.21 25.7 & 25:9 & 20:12 & proceed & 4:6 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
order 2:2 \\
organization
\end{tabular}} & passed 7:7,8 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{process 12:6} \\
\hline & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{pattern 4:18} & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{27:17} \\
\hline 16:13 & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{13:7,8,19} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{proposal} \\
\hline 18:22 & pen 9:17 & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{6:12} \\
\hline 19:15 & \multirow[b]{2}{*}{people 16:21} & positions & & \\
\hline 20:9,19 & & 16:22 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{proposed} \\
\hline 22:11 & 18:5 24:6, & possibly & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{20:2} \\
\hline 23:23 & & 4:12 20:3 & provide & \\
\hline 24:22 & percent & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{power 17:8} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{18:19}} \\
\hline & 13:8,14, & & & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{organizations
\[
16: 10,24
\]} & 16,18 15:2 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
pre- \\
redistricting
\end{tabular}} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{provided} \\
\hline & 16:6,19 & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{8:21 21:15} \\
\hline organize & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{person 19:4} & 12:24 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{provision} \\
\hline 12:16 & & precedent & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{15:7} \\
\hline 15:21 & phonetic & 16:17 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{provisions} \\
\hline & \multirow[b]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { place } \\
& 14: 1
\end{aligned}
\]} & precinct & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{13:15} \\
\hline P & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{8:20, 21} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{15:24} \\
\hline \multirow[b]{2}{*}{Pardon 23:22} & & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{23:24} \\
\hline & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{point 9:19
\[
18: 16
\]} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
9: 8
\]} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{pull 23:5}} \\
\hline \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { part } 4: 20 \\
& 16: 1622: 1
\end{aligned}
\]} & & & & \\
\hline & political & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{prefer 24:18} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{put 16:12} \\
\hline & political & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{22:10} \\
\hline parties & 16:20 & presented & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{23:17}} \\
\hline 16:20 & \multirow[b]{3}{*}{\[
\begin{array}{r}
\text { poll } 10: 8 \\
25: 13,14
\end{array}
\]} & 5:3,15 & & \\
\hline 18:18 & & \multirow[b]{2}{*}{president} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{putting} \\
\hline 24:20 & & & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{14:17} \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Poolman} & & \\
\hline p & 3:11,12 & pretty 13:19 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Q} \\
\hline party 12:15, & 11:12,13 & 18:25 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline 16,20 & 14: 4, 5, 7 & 27:11 & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{question} \\
\hline 13:24 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{18:1,12,14} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{private} & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{7:17 22:18}} \\
\hline 15:8,18 & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline 23:16 & redistricting & 9:4,10,14, & 6:14 9:16 \\
\hline questions & 2:2 11:21 & 24 10:2,5, & 10:1,13, \\
\hline 5:7 6:13, & 19:13 20:7 & 6,7,10,14, & 15,17,19, \\
\hline 20 7:11,16 & 22:10,13 & 16,18,20, & 21,23,25 \\
\hline 8:13 14:4, & 23:1, 3, 17, & 22,24 & 12:8 14:10 \\
\hline 10,21 & 19 27:5 & 11:1,17 & 15:22 16:8 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{5}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& 20: 16 \\
& \text { quote } 12: 23, \\
& 2513: 7
\end{aligned}
\]} & reduce 13:10 & 12:10 & 17:6,16,25 \\
\hline & reduce 13.10 & 14:4,6,8, & 18:17 19:6 \\
\hline & referring & 11,15,16, & 20:3,17, \\
\hline & 10:3 & 19,20,21, & 24,25 \\
\hline & refers 12:23 & 23 15:6, & 21:19,21 \\
\hline R & & 15,22,24 & 24:1,19 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
raised 7:15 \\
reached 7:21
\end{tabular}} & 23:5 & \[
16: 8,9
\] & 25:19,21, \\
\hline & remaining & \(17: 1,2,4\),
\(5,6,15,25\) & 23,25
\(26: 2,4,6,8\) \\
\hline reaching & 15:13 & 18:2,12 & 27:2 \\
\hline 9:17 & remiss 27:15 & 19:5,6,7, & research \\
\hline read 14:25 & reorganization & 18,19,20 & 17:8 \\
\hline \[
17: 19
\] & 23:3 & \[
17,24
\] & reside 18:8 \\
\hline \(19: 12 \quad 20: 6\)
reads \(5: 20\) & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { reorganization } \\
& \text { s 13:10,13, }
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 21: 8,9,17, \\
& 19,20,21,
\end{aligned}
\] & \begin{tabular}{l}
responsibiliti \\
es 19:17
\end{tabular} \\
\hline reads 5:20 & 25 & 23 22:16 & 20:11 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{24:9} & reorganize & 24:1,2,12, & responsibility \\
\hline & 15:11 & 24 25:3,7, & 17:9 \\
\hline recall 12:11 & 16:19 & 11,12,16, & \\
\hline received 4:8 & 24:16 & 20,22,24 & review 9:5 \\
\hline recommendation & REP 2:1,7, & 26:1,3,5, & reviewed \\
\hline 18:15 & 9,13,15, & 7,23 & 7:16 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { record } 8: 7 \\
& 9: 3
\end{aligned}
\]} & 17,19,21, & 27:11,19 & reviewing \\
\hline & 23,25 & 28: & 9:6 \\
\hline \multirow[b]{2}{*}{recorded 4:3} & 3:15,23,25 & repeat 22:20 & revised \\
\hline & 4:3,6 5:1, & Representative & 17:21 \\
\hline RECORDING & 4,5,6,11, & 2:3,12,14, & 19:23 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{28:3} & 18 6:13, & 16,18,20, & \\
\hline & 16,17,19 & 22,24 4:9 &  \\
\hline \multirow{2}{*}{red 4:18,24} & 7:11,14 & \[
5: 6,12,16
\] & 20:4 \\
\hline & 8:10,16 & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline revisit & 3:2,4,6,8, & 20:3,12 & Sixteen \\
\hline 14:14 & 10,12,14 & 21:9 22:5, & 11:16,17 \\
\hline rivers 4:23 & 5:2 6:18, & 16,17,19 & Sixteenth \\
\hline & 22 9:21,23 & 23:8,22 & 6:3 \\
\hline roads 4:23 & 10:4,12 & 24:12 25:4 & 6. \\
\hline 7:3 & 11:3,5,7, & 26:8,11, & slept 12:6 \\
\hline role 16:23 & 9,11,13,15 & 13,15,17, & small 3:21 \\
\hline roll 2:5 & 14:5,7,22, & 19,21 & 4:10 20:4 \\
\hline & 24 15:10, & 27:13 & software 7:3 \\
\hline rolling & 20 16:4 & sense 17: & software 7:3 \\
\hline 12:21 & 17:17 & \[
19: 24
\] & someplace \\
\hline rule 15:2 & 18:14 19:9 & & 18:4 \\
\hline es 21.16 & 20:14 & separate & sort 21:16 \\
\hline rules 21:1 & 21:6,10 & 8:22 23:2 & \\
\hline run 8:2 & 22:9,21 & setting & Sorvaag \\
\hline 16:13 & 23:10,13, & 16:17 & \[
11: 14,15
\] \\
\hline & 16,21 & shaded 4:24 & 26:21,22 \\
\hline S & 24:13 & shaded 4.24 & : \\
\hline & 25:10,18 & shape 4:17 & southern \\
\hline Schauer & 26:10,12, & shaped 4:18 & 4:13 \\
\hline 2:24,25 & 14,16,18, & share 12:23 & speak 12:21 \\
\hline 10:25 11:1 & 20,22 & share 12:23 & speak 12.21 \\
\hline 20:17, 24 & 27:14 & shifting & specific \\
\hline 26:6,7 & & 16:15 & 20:5 22:12 \\
\hline Seconded 5:6 & Senate 24:2 & signify 5:8 & specifically \\
\hline & Senator 3:1, & 7:12 25:5 & 12:13 \\
\hline secretary & 3,5,7,9, & 7.12 25.5 & 23:19 \\
\hline 7:15, 21 & 11,13 4:12 & silent 12:18 & \\
\hline 8: 4,7,17 & 5:1 6:19, & & spend 16:12 \\
\hline 15:13 & 21 7:1 & 18:21 & split 4:10 \\
\hline section 8:22 & 9:24 11:2, & 19:10 & squiggly \\
\hline 12:14 & \(4,6,8,10\), & & 4:18 \\
\hline 21:10,12, & 12,14 & sincerely & \\
\hline 13 22:11, & 14: 4, 9, 23 & 27:20 & Staff 5:3,14 \\
\hline 12,14,23, & 15:6,15,25 & single 8:20 & 6:23 8:1 \\
\hline 25 23:2, & 17:15,18 & situation & 11:25 \\
\hline 18,25 24:3 & 18:1,12 & 16.18 & 27:22 \\
\hline SEN 2:11 & 19:7,23 & & start 11:22 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING
Meeting on 11/09/2021
Index: started..UNKNOWN


NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE MEETING
Meeting on 11/09/2021
Index: unwilling..you're
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 6,8,10,12, & we'd 15:21 & wouldn't \\
\hline 14,16 & 27:15 & 14:17 \\
\hline 25:15,17, & we'll 2:1 & 25:13 \\
\hline \[
19,21,23,
\] & 7:6 18:12 & would' ve \\
\hline \[
6,8,11,13,
\] & we're 8:13 & 12:2 \\
\hline 15,17,19, & 9:19 16:16 & write 6:9 \\
\hline 21 & we've \(24: 10\) & \(\square\) \\
\hline unwilling & 25:3 & Y \\
\hline 22:3 & whispers & years 14:13 \\
\hline & 11:16 & yesterday \\
\hline V & Willis 18:10 & yesterday
\(3: 17 \mathrm{4}: 9\), \\
\hline vacancy & wiped 19:2 & 16 6:4 \\
\hline 21:14 & wishes 9:7 & 7:8,16 \\
\hline vacant 21:14 & 25:1 & you'd 25:13 \\
\hline verbiage & wondering & you'll 13:2, \\
\hline 19:24 & 8:4 21:10 & 6 27:2 \\
\hline version & 22:23 23:8 & you're 4:19 \\
\hline 13:2,3 & won't 12:2 & 16:15 23:8 \\
\hline 14:3 19:10 & wording & \\
\hline vice 2:10 & 19:21 & \\
\hline 10:11 & words 14:25 & \\
\hline 15:14 & 17:19 & \\
\hline 25:17 & 18:23 & \\
\hline volunteers & 19:11 & \\
\hline 27: 4 & work 11:20, & \\
\hline & 24 16:20 & \\
\hline W & 26:24 & \\
\hline wanted 7:23 & 27:20 & \\
\hline 15:16 & workable & \\
\hline & 8:10 & \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
Washburn 7:8 \\
west 5:25
\end{tabular} & working 6:23 & \\
\hline 6:1,5 & worms 22:15 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{EXHIBIT 20}

\section*{IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA}

\section*{TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, et al.,}

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 3:22-cv-00022-PDW-ARS
ALVIN JAEGER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Dakota, et al.,

Defendant.

\section*{DECLARATION TO ACCOMPANY THE EXPERT REPORT OF WESTON MCCOOL}

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Weston McCool, declare that:
My name is Weston McCool. I am an expert witness designated by Plaintiffs in the above referenced case now pending in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.

A true and correct copy of my curriculum vitae is attached hereto as a part of my report. The following report, a true and correct copy of which is attached and incorporated herein for all purposes, is a summary of my opinions and conclusions. The materials I relied upon to develop my analyses and opinions are cited therein and/or produced herewith for all counsel.

The court testimony and publications I am required to disclose are described in my attached report and/or curriculum vitae.

My reasonable and necessary hourly rate for my time in this case is \(\$ \underline{200}\).
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this 30th day of November, 2022


Weston McCool, Ph.D

\author{
Expert Witness Report \\ In the case of \\ Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Jaeger \\ U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota, Eastern Division \\ prepared by: \\ Weston C. McCool, Ph.D. \\ Department of Anthropology \\ University of Utah \\ November 2022
}

\section*{OUTLINE OF THE REPORT}

\section*{Summary of Findings}
I. Introduction
1. Qualifications
2. Quantitative Socioeconomic Methods
II. The Senate Factors Applied to North Dakota
3. The extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as income, education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.
a. Income
b. Poverty
c. Education
d. Health Insurance Coverage
e. Computer Ownership and Internet Access
f. Housing
g. Employment
III. Conclusion

\section*{Summary of Findings:}

Seven socioeconomic variables were selected for this analysis: income, poverty, education, health insurance coverage, computer ownership and internet access, home ownership, and employment (see results in Table 1). The data for these variables were compared for: (1) AIAN residents of Rolette County versus White residents of Rolette County, (2) AIAN residents of Benson County versus White residents of Benson County, and (3) AIAN residents of Ramsey County versus White residents of Ramsey County, for a total 21 separate quantitative socioeconomic tests. In all cases
where statistics were compiled, the AIAN population is statistically significantly at a disadvantage when compared to Whites. AIAN residents earn substantially less household income compared to Whites, AIAN residents are significantly more likely to earn an income under the poverty line compared to Whites, they are overrepresented in lower levels of educational attainment, and underrepresented in higher levels of educational attainment, AIAN households are significantly less likely to own a computer or have access to broadband internet compared to Whites, they are less likely to own their home, less likely to have health insurance coverage, and more likely to be unemployed. These race-based disparities are, in a word, systemic. For every socioeconomic variable used, AIAN populations are systemically and significantly at a socioeconomic disadvantage compared to their White neighbors, which hinders their ability to participate in the political process (Senate Report 1982).

\section*{I. INTRODUCTION}

\section*{1. Qualifications}

I am a National Science Foundation Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Anthropology Department at the University of Utah. My formal education includes a BS (2009) in Anthropology from the University of Utah, two MAs \((2013,2015)\) in Archaeology from the University of Utah and University of California, Santa Barbara, respectively, and a Ph.D. (2020) in Archaeology from the University of California, Santa Barbara.

I have extensive experience in quantitative methods, including spatial, environmental, socioeconomic, demographic, and statistical modeling including the use of geospatial (GIS) methods. My formal research program focuses on investigating the relationship between changing social and environmental conditions and human decision making, particularly as it relates to
human conflict and migration. My research has produced a dozen published articles in major peerreviewed scientific journals such as Nature, Nature Communications, Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences, Nature Scientific Reports, PLOS ONE, The Journal of Biological Anthropology, and more, all of which involve social, demographic, and/or spatial modeling. I have been hired by the plaintiffs for this case and I am compensated at the rate of \(\$ 200 /\) hour. The results and conclusions I reach in this report are mine alone, are not related to or endorsed by the University where I have an appointment and were reached through an independent process of research and inquiry.

\section*{2. Quantitative Socioeconomic Methods}

All data used for the quantitative socioeconomic analysis were derived from (1) the 20152019 five-year American Community Survey (ACS) for North Dakota, and (2) the Kaiser Family Foundation's State Health Facts Report (for the healthcare avoidance due to cost variable). ACS racial variables in the socioeconomic analysis are American Indian and Alaskan Native-alone (henceforth, AIAN) and non-Hispanic White-alone (henceforth, White). These demographic variables are preferable to the "race in combination with one or more other races" variable as it includes White and AIAN individuals that would either have to be dropped from the analysis or would be counted twice as they would be lumped into both racial categories for the socioeconomic analyses. Estimates in this analysis incorporate the margin of errors (MOE) given in the ACS detailed tables. All variable estimates include the MOE by listing the upper and lower estimates, the MOE range, and the differences in the MOE ranges between AIAN and White estimates. This "MOE difference" variable compares errors between AIAN and White estimates to determine whether the comparative errors wash out. All statistical analyses were conducted in the R
programming environment ( R Core Team 2020), which is an open-source programming language used as a statistical software and data analysis tool.

The quantitative methods in this report rely on descriptive and inferential statistics to present data findings and assess whether observed differences in socioeconomic factors are statistically significant and not due to the vagaries of data sampling or random error. The descriptive and inferential statistics used here are standard practice in quantitative analysis and common in every introductory statistics course.

Statistical tests are warranted for the socioeconomic analysis because they evaluate whether the census survey data (samples) are representative of the population at large - the demographic we are interested in evaluating. Without statistical tests we cannot determine whether the observed differences or similarities between the sampled data are representative of some characteristic of the population as a whole and not due to sampling error. Statistical significance is defined here using the established social science alpha parameter of alpha \(<0.05\) (McKillup 2006). In other words, for a test to be considered statistically significant it must have less than a \(5 \%\) probability that the observed effect is the result of sampling error. When a statistical test used in this report yields a p-value (the probability of attaining the observed results) of \(<0.05\), we can conclude that the observed effect is representative of the population as a whole and reject the nullhypothesis. For each of the tests in this report, the null hypothesis is that there are no differences in the socioeconomic variables based on race.

We rely on one type of inferential statistical test: The Chi Squared Test of Independence, which produces a statistic that measures the difference between the observed and expected frequencies of an outcome for a set of variables to determine whether they are independent of one another. For example, if a county consists of 50 White residents and 50 AIAN residents, and
unemployment is \(50 \%\), we expect 25 White residents (50\%) and 25 AIAN residents (50\%) to be unemployed, these are our "expected" values. If in fact only 10 White residents (10\%) are unemployed while 40 AIAN residents ( \(80 \%\) ) are unemployed (or vice-versa), we can see that the "observed" values do not match our expected values. The Chi Square Test of Independence tests whether the differences between expected and observed values are statistically significantly different, and what the probability is that the difference is due to sampling error.

\section*{II. THE SENATE FACTORS APPLIED TO NORTH DAKOTA}

\section*{3. Socioeconomic Analysis}

\section*{1. Rolette County}

Seven variables are evaluated in this socioeconomic analysis. As the MOE difference between AIAN population and the Rolette County White population is small for each of the seven analyses (Table 1), we conduct statistical tests only on the primary variable estimates, rather than the lower and upper estimates.

\section*{1a. Rolette County and the Turtle Mountain Reservation Demography}

The total estimated population for the Turtle Mountain Reservation is 9,247 , while the total population estimate for the broader Rolette County is 14,511, with 11,325 AIAN residents and 2,633 White residents (Figure 1).


Figure 1. A Census Tract map of the 2019 5-year ACS racial distribution of AIAN and White population in Rolette County, North Dakota. The map includes the Turtle Mountain Reservation population.

\section*{1b. Median Household Income}

The median income for AIAN households in Rolette County is \(\$ 37,750\), while median household income for Whites is \(\$ 60,556\). These data show a large race-based discrepancy in income, with White households earning substantially more than AIAN households.

\section*{1c. Poverty}

In Rolette County, \(31.5 \%\) of AIAN households are below the poverty line compared to \(6.0 \%\) of White households. This difference is statistically significant ( \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=694.37\), p -value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN households significantly overrepresented below the poverty line compared to Whites. Put another way, we have greater than \(99.9 \%\) confidence that that the sample of income data is representative of the population as a whole and that the null hypothesis (no relationship between race and poverty) can be rejected. A similar degree of confidence is present in all subsequent statistical tests.

\section*{1d. Educational Attainment}

For the AIAN population 37.3\% of adults 25-years and older have a high school diploma or did not complete high school, compared to \(40 \%\) of Whites. \(17.3 \%\) of the AIAN population earned a
college degree, compared to \(26.5 \%\) of Whites. There are statistically significant differences in educational attainment by race, with the AIAN population significantly \(\left(\mathrm{X}^{2}=165.85, \mathrm{p}\right.\)-value \(<0.001)\) overrepresented in lower educational attainment categories and underrepresented in higher educational attainment categories when compared to Whites.

\section*{1e. Computer Ownership and Broadband Internet Access}

In the AIAN community, \(86.5 \%\) of households own a computer, while \(72.2 \%\) of households have access to broadband internet. For Rolette White households, \(89.2 \%\) own a computer and \(76.1 \%\) have access to broadband internet. Both differences are statistically significant (computer ownership \(X^{2}=13.339\), p-value \(=0.0003\); Internet Access \(X^{2}=16.172\), p-value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN households having reduced access to computers and the internet compared to Whites.

\section*{1f. Home Ownership, Value and Rent Payments}

Home ownership also shows substantial bias, as \(69.3 \%\) of the AIAN population owns a home compared to \(78.4 \%\) of the Rolette White population. This difference is statistically significant ( \(\mathrm{X}^{2}\) \(=33.734\), p-value \(<0.001\) ), with the AIAN population significantly underrepresented in home ownership compared to Rolette Whites.

\section*{1g. Health Insurance Coverage}

In Rolette County, \(29.2 \%\) of AIAN residents do not have health insurance coverage, compared to \(7.7 \%\) of Whites in Rolette County. This difference is statistically significant \(\left(X^{2}=510.01\right.\), p -value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN residents significantly less likely to have health insurance coverage relative to Whites. Native Americans can also access free or reduced cost healthcare without health insurance through Indian Health Service (IHS) programs. But statewide data from North Dakota suggest that IHS is not making up for disparate access to health insurance coverage among Native Americans and Whites. Despite access to IHS services, AIAN in North Dakota, who are over
nearly four times more likely than whites to be uninsured, are also over three times more likely than whites to report that they avoided care due to cost, with \(3.9 \%\) of Whites reporting not seeing a doctor because of cost, compared to \(13.9 \%\) of AIAN according to the Kaiser Family Foundation's State Health Facts report. While these are state-wide data, they are the best available data on health care avoidance due to cost.

\section*{1h. Employment}

Of those in the labor pool, \(10.3 \%\) of AIAN population is unemployed compared to \(2.5 \%\) of the Rolette White population. This difference is statistically significant \(\left(\mathrm{X}^{2}=80.742\right.\), p -value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN residents more likely to be unemployed relative to the White population.

\section*{2. Benson County}

As with section one of the socioeconomic analysis, I evaluate seven variables.

\section*{2a. Benson County Demography}

According to the 2019 5-year ACS survey, the total population of Benson County, North Dakota is 6,860 . Of those, 2,794 are White and 3,696 are AIAN (Figure 2).


Figure 2. A Census Tract map of the 2019 ACS racial distribution of AIAN and White population in Benson County, North Dakota.

2b. Median Household Income

Median income for AIAN households in \(\$ 28,795\), compared to \(\$ 68,785\) for Benson County White households. The MOE difference is negligible, showing a marked income disparity that disadvantages the AIAN community.

\section*{2c. Poverty}
\(49.8 \%\) of the AIAN population income is below the poverty line, compared to \(8.9 \%\) of Whites. This difference is statistically significant \(\left(\mathrm{X}^{2}=1219.2\right.\), p -value \(\left.<0.001\right)\), showing the AIAN population is overrepresented below the poverty line compared to Whites.

\section*{2d. Educational Attainment}
\(54.7 \%\) of AIAN adults 25 -years and older have attained a high school degree or less, compared to \(34.6 \%\) of Whites. Only \(6 \%\) of AIAN adults 25 -years and older have earned a college degree, compared to \(24.7 \%\) of Whites. These differences are statistically significant \(\left(X^{2}=365.36\right.\), p -value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN adults significantly underrepresented in higher levels of educational attainment and overrepresented in lower levels of educational attainment compared to Whites.

\section*{2e. Computer Ownership and Broadband Internet Access}
\(71.3 \%\) of AIAN household own a computer compared to \(90.5 \%\) of White households. \(41.3 \%\) of AIAN households have access to broadband internet compared to \(78.2 \%\) of White households. Both differences are statistically significant (computer ownership \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=360.55\), p -value \(<0.001\); internet access \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=889.28\), p -value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN households having significantly reduced computer ownership and internet access compared to Whites.

\section*{2f. Home Ownership}
\(45.3 \%\) of AIAN households own their home compared to \(82.4 \%\) of White households. This difference is statistically significant ( \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=327.23\), p -value \(<0.001\) ), with the AIAN population
significantly less likely to own their home and significantly more likely to rent their home compared to Whites.

\section*{2g. Health Insurance Coverage}
\(15.9 \%\) of the AIAN population has no health insurance coverage, compared to \(4.4 \%\) of Whites. This difference is statistically significant ( \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=215.73\), p -value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN individuals significantly less likely to have health insurance coverage compared to Whites. Native Americans can also access free or reduced cost healthcare without health insurance through Indian Health Service (IHS) programs. However, statewide data from North Dakota suggest that IHS is not making up for disparate access to health insurance coverage among Native Americans and Whites. Despite access to IHS services, AIAN in North Dakota, who are over nearly four times more likely than whites to be uninsured, are also over three times more likely than whites to report that they avoided care due to cost, with \(3.9 \%\) of Whites reporting not seeing a doctor because of cost, compared to \(13.9 \%\) of AIAN according to the Kaiser Family Foundation's State Health Facts report. While these are state-wide data, they are the best available data on health care avoidance due to cost.

\section*{2h. Employment}

Of those in the labor pool, \(11.3 \%\) of the AIAN population in unemployed, compared to \(2.9 \%\) of Whites. This difference is statistically significant \(\left(\mathrm{X}^{2}=71.001\right.\), p-value \(<0.001\) ), with unemployment significantly higher among the AIAN population compared to Whites.

\section*{3. Ramsey County}

\section*{3a. Ramsey County Demography}

According to the 5-year ACS survey, the population of Ramsey County, North Dakota is 11,521. Of these, 9,640 are White-alone and 1,108 are AIAN (Figure 3).


Figure 3. A Census Tract map of the 2019 ACS racial distribution of AIAN and White population in Ramsey County, North Dakota.

\section*{3b. Median Household Income}

Medina income for AIAN households in Ramsey County is \(\$ 37,000\) compared to \(\$ 62,252\) for Whites. While the MOE is quite large for these estimates, the lower and upper estimates are not overlapping, meaning that White median household income is substantial higher than AIAN income regardless of the margin of error in the estimates.

\section*{3c. Poverty}
\(27.5 \%\) of the AIAN household income is under the poverty line, compared to \(9 \%\) for White households. This difference is statistically significant ( \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=362.95\), p -value \(<0.001\) ). White MOE is substantial, it is largely non-overlapping indicating that regardless of the margin of error, poverty is greater among AIAN household compared to White households.

\section*{3d. Educational Attainment}
\(55.5 \%\) of AIAN adults 25 -years and older have attained a high school degree or less, compared to \(35 \%\) of Whites. Only \(6.8 \%\) of AIAN adults have attained a college degree compared to \(27.6 \%\) for Whites. These differences are statistically significant ( \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=171.88\), p -value \(<0.001\) ) although the large MOEs for the less than high school and high school degree educational attainment categories render this result somewhat tentative. The much lower MOE for the college-level attainment category strongly indicates AIAN adults 25-years and older are significantly less likely to earn a college degree compared to Whites.

\section*{3e. Computer Ownership and Broadband Internet Access}
\(84.6 \%\) of AIAN households own a computer compared to \(91.5 \%\) of White households. \(65.4 \%\) of AIAN households have access to broadband internet compared to \(85.9 \%\) of White households. Both differences are statistically significant (Computer Ownership \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=58.201\), p-value \(<0.001\); Internet Access \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=319.71\), p-value \(<0.001\) ), showing AIAN households have significantly reduced access to computers and the internet. High MOEs however render these results somewhat tentative.

\section*{3f. Home Ownership}
\(16.6 \%\) of AIAN residents own their home compared to \(65.7 \%\) of White residents. This difference is statistically significant \(\left(\mathrm{X}^{2}=324.36\right.\), p -value \(\left.<0.001\right)\), with AIAN residents significantly more likely to rent their home and less likely to own comparted to Whites. While the MOEs are large, they are non-overlapping, indicating these results are valid.

\section*{3g. Health Insurance Coverage}
\(20.5 \%\) of AIAN residents have no health insurance coverage, compared to \(4.0 \%\) of White residents. This difference is statistically significant ( \(\mathrm{X}^{2}=522.69\), p-value \(<0.001\) ), with AIAN residents significantly less likely to have health insurance. Large MOEs render this result
somewhat tentative. Native Americans can also access free or reduced cost healthcare without health insurance through Indian Health Service (IHS) programs. But statewide data from North Dakota suggest that IHS is not making up for disparate access to health insurance coverage among Native Americans and Whites. Despite access to IHS services, AIAN in North Dakota, who are over nearly four times more likely than whites to be uninsured, are also over three times more likely than whites to report that they avoided health care due to cost, with \(3.9 \%\) of Whites reporting not seeing a doctor because of cost, compared to \(13.9 \%\) of AIAN according to the Kaiser Family Foundation's State Health Facts report. While these are state-wide data, they are the best available data on care avoidance due to cost.

\section*{3h. Employment}
\(2.3 \%\) of AIAN residents are unemployed, compared to \(0.43 \%\) of White residents. This difference is statistically significant \(\left(\mathrm{X}^{2}=21.744\right.\), p -value \(\left.<0.001\right)\), with AIAN residents significantly more likely to be unemployed compared to White residents. While large MOEs show the lower estimates for AIAN and White residents are the same, the upper estimates deviate substantially, suggesting the bias towards greater AIAN unemployment may be higher than the primary estimate suggests.

\section*{III. CONCLUSION}

For all analyses, there is race-based bias that disadvantages the AIAN population when compared to Whites. These differences are statistically significant across the board, and systemic in nature. Table one provides a complete overview of the descriptive and inferential statistics for more quantitative context. These systemic disparities hinder the ability of AIAN tribal members to participate effectively in the North Dakota political process (Senate Report 1982).

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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Variable & Rolette AIAN & lower estimate & upper estiamte & MOE range & Rolette White & lower estimate & upper estiamte & MOE range & MOE difference & p -value \\
\hline Median household income & \$37,750 & \$33,669 & \$41,831 & \$8,162 & \$60,556 & \$53,870 & \$67,242 & \$13,372 & \$5,210 & NA \\
\hline Below poverty Level & 31.50\% & 27.00\% & 36.10\% & 9.10\% & 6.00\% & 4.60\% & 7.60\% & 3.00\% & -6.10\% & <0.001 \\
\hline EDU: High School or lower & 37.30\% & 26.50\% & 43.30\% & 16.80\% & 40.0\% & 30.60\% & 49.40\% & 18.80\% & 2.00\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline EDU: College degree & 17.30\% & 13.60\% & 21.30\% & 7.70\% & 26.50\% & 21.70\% & 31.30\% & 9.60\% & 1.90\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline Owns a computer & 86.50\% & 83.40\% & 89.60\% & 6.20\% & 89.20\% & 86.00\% & 92.40\% & 6.40\% & 0.20\% & 0.0003 \\
\hline Broadband internet & 72.20\% & 67.4\% & 76.90\% & 9.50\% & 76.10\% & 71.50\% & 80.80\% & 9.30\% & -0.20\% & 0.0003 \\
\hline Owns a home & 69.30\% & 65.10\% & 73.60\% & 8.50\% & 78.40\% & 71.70\% & 85.20\% & 13.50\% & 5.00\% & <0.001 \\
\hline No health insurance & 29.20\% & 25.2\% & 35.30\% & 10.10\% & 7.70\% & 4.50\% & 11.0\% & 6.50\% & -3.60\% & <0.001 \\
\hline Unemployed & 10.30\% & 6.1\% & 15.00\% & 8.90\% & 2.50\% & 0.0\% & 3.70\% & 3.70\% & -5.20\% & <0.001 \\
\hline & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Variable & Benson AIAN & lower estimate & upper estiamte & MOE range & Benson White & lower estimate & upper estiamte & MOE range & MOE difference & p-value \\
\hline Median household income & \$28,795 & \$24,711 & \$32,879 & \$8,168.00 & \$61,445 & \$57,856 & \$65,034 & \$7,178 & -\$990.00 & NA \\
\hline Below poverty level & 49.80\% & 44.10\% & 55.60\% & 11.50\% & 8.90\% & 6.60\% & 11.20\% & 4.60\% & -6.90\% & <0.001 \\
\hline EDU: High School or lower & 54.70\% & 44.40\% & 65\% & 20.60\% & 34.60\% & 28.90\% & 40.40\% & 11.50\% & -9.10\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline EDU: College degree & 6\% & 3.40\% & 8.60\% & 5.20\% & 24.70\% & 20.80\% & 28.60\% & 7.80\% & 2.60\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline Owns a computer & 71.30\% & 66.60\% & 76\% & 9.40\% & 90.50\% & 88.70\% & 92.30\% & 3.60\% & -5.80\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline Broadband internet & 41.30\% & 36.50\% & 46.10\% & 9.60\% & 78.20\% & 74.80\% & 81.60\% & 6.80\% & -2.80\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline Owns a home & 45.30\% & 39.80\% & 50.70\% & 10.90\% & 82.40\% & 78.90\% & 85.90\% & 7.00\% & -3.90\% & <0.001 \\
\hline No health insurance & 15.90\% & 11.70\% & 20.00\% & 8.30\% & 4.40\% & 2.90\% & 6.30\% & 3.40\% & -4.90\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline Unemployed & 11.30\% & 6.20\% & 19.10\% & 12.90\% & 2.90\% & 1.40\% & 6.10\% & 4.70\% & -8.20\% & <0.001 \\
\hline & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline Variable & Ramsey AIAN & lower estimate & upper estiamte & MOE range & Ramsey White & lower estimate & upper estiamte & MOE range & MOE difference & p -value \\
\hline Median household income & \$37,000 & \$29,992 & \$44,008 & \$14,016 & \$62,252 & \$56,890 & \$67,614 & \$10,724 & -\$3,292 & NA \\
\hline Below poverty level & 27.50\% & 15.20\% & 39.80\% & 24.60\% & 9\% & 6.30\% & 11.70\% & 5.40\% & -19.20\% & <0.001 \\
\hline EDU: High School or lower & 55.50\% & 14.90\% & 87.30\% & 72.40\% & 35.00\% & 27.30\% & 42.60\% & 15.30\% & -57.10\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline EDU: College degree & 6.80\% & 0\% & 17.20\% & 17.20\% & 27.80\% & 23\% & 32.60\% & 9.60\% & -7.60\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline Owns a computer & 84.60\% & 66.4\% & 100\% & 33.60\% & 91.50\% & 89.20\% & 93.80\% & 4.60\% & -29.00\% & <0.001 \\
\hline Broadband internet & 65.40\% & 43.50\% & 87.30\% & 43.80\% & 85.90\% & 83.00\% & 88.90\% & 5.90\% & -37.90\% & <0.001 \\
\hline Owns a home & 16.60\% & 2.90\% & 30.20\% & 27.30\% & 65.70\% & 61.40\% & 70.10\% & 8.70\% & -18.60\% & <0.001 \\
\hline No health insurance & 20.50\% & 2.00\% & 40.30\% & 38.30\% & 4.0\% & 2.10\% & 6\% & 3.80\% & -34.50\% & \(<0.001\) \\
\hline Unemployed & 2.30\% & 0\% & 17\% & 17.10\% & 0.43\% & 0\% & 1.40\% & 1.40\% & -15.70\% & <0.001 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Table 1. Descriptive and inferential statistics for all seven socioeconomic variables including primary estimates and margin of errors (MOE) for the three counties.

\section*{Weston Craig McCool}

Curriculum Vitae

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\section*{Appointments}

2021-present Postdoctoral Fellow, National Science Foundation SPRF program. Sponsoring Scientist: Dr. Brian Codding. Affiliated institution: University of Utah, Dept. of Anthropology.

2020-2021 Postdoctoral Researcher, University of California at Santa Barbara, Dept. of Anthropology. Sponsoring Scientist: Dr. Douglas J. Kennett.

\section*{Education}

Ph.D. Anthropology, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2020
M.A. Anthropology, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2015
M.A. Anthropology, University of Utah, 2013
B.S. Anthropology, University of Utah, 2009

\section*{Research Expertise}

Environmental archaeology

Bioarchaeology
Climate change
Inequality
Conflict
Settlement patterns and demography
Dietary reconstructions

Geospatial modeling
Statistical modeling
Big data
Isotope chemistry
Peruvian Andes
North American Southwest

\section*{Publications}

In-Press Wilson, Kurt M., Weston C. McCool. The Environmental Null: Documenting the changing influence of physical and social environments on prehistoric Andean diets. In: Foodways of the Ancient Andes: Transforming Diet, Cuisine, and Society (Eds., Alfonso-Durruty, M.P., Blom, D.E.), University of Arizona Press.

2022 McCool, Weston C., Kurt M. Wilson, Kenneth B. Vernon. Ecological constrains on violence avoidance tactics: An explanation for high rates of lethal and sublethal
violence in the Prehispanic Andean highlands. Environmental Archaeology DOI: 10.1080/14614103.2022.2137652.

2022 Kennett, Douglas J., Marilyn Masson, Carlos Peraza Lope, Stanley Serafin, Richard George, Thomas Spencer, Julie Hoggarth, Brendan J. Culleton, Thomas Harper, Keith M. Prufer, Susan Milbrath, Stanley Russell, Eunice Uc González, Weston C. McCool, Valorie V. Aquino, Jason H. Curtis, Victor Polyak, Norbert Marwan, Mingua Zhang, Andrew Mason, Gideon Henderson, Gerald H. Haug, Mark Brenner, Yemane Asmerom, James U.L. Baldini, Sebastian F. M. Breitenbach, David A. Hodell. Drought induced civil conflict among the Maya. Nature Communications 13: 3911.

2022 McCool, Weston C., Kenneth B. Vernon, Peter M. Yaworsky, Brian F. Codding. Subsistence strategy mediates ecological drivers of human violence. PLoS One 17(5): e0268257.

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2020 McCool, Weston C., Daniel C. McCool. We must either protect him or destroy him. In: Vision and Place: John Wesley Powell and reimagining the Colorado River Basin (Eds., Robison, McCool, Minckley). University of California Press.

2019 McCool, Weston C., Aldo Accinelli, Joan Brenner-Coltrain. Patrones osteológicos de guerra endémica en la Sierra de Nasca durante el Intermedio Tardío (1000-

1450 d.C.). In: Actas del VI Congreso Nacional de Arqueología. Lima, Perú: Ministerio de Cultura.

2019 McCool, Weston C., Peter J. Yaworsky. Fight or Flight: Assessing Fremont territoriality in Nine Mile Canyon, Utah. Quaternary International 518: 111-121.

2018 McCool, Weston C., Joan Brenner-Coltrain. A potential oxygen isotope signature of maize beer consumption: An experimental pilot study. Journal of Ethnoarchaeology 10(1): 56-67.

2017 McCool, Weston C. Coping with Conflict: Defensive strategies and chronic warfare in the Prehispanic Nasca region. Latin American Antiquity 28(3): 373-393.

2015 Parker, Bradley J., Weston C. McCool. Indices of household maize beer production in the Andes: An ethnoarchaeological investigation. Journal of Anthropological Research 71(3): 359-400.

\section*{In Progress}

In-Review McCool, Weston C. Migration, settlement, and warfare in the Nasca highlands of Peru. Edited volume to be named.

In-Review McCool, Weston C., Brian F. Codding. Homicide rates in the United States increase when and where resources are scarce and unequally distributed. Evolution and Human Behavior.

In-Prep McCool, Weston C., Kurt M. Wilson, Brian F. Codding, Amy Anderson, Alexis J. Baide. Divergent climatic and demographic stressors predict high rates of morbidity in the Prehispanic central Andes. In: The Dynamic Influences of Climate Change on Prehistoric Lifeways in the Americas (Eds., Wilson, K.M., McCool, W.C.), Quaternary International Special Issue.

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The Dynamic Influences of Climate Change on Prehistoric Lifeways in the Americas (Eds., Wilson, K.M., McCool, W.C.), Quaternary International Special Issue.

In-Prep Arkush, Elizabeth, Weston C. McCool, Ryan Smith. The Late Intermediate period in the south-central highlands: Key problems in timing. In: Leveraging Radiocarbon in the Central Andes: From Chronologies to Research Agendas (Eds., Contreras, D., Marsh, E., Rademaker, K.), Quaternary International Special Issue.

In-Prep McCool, Weston C., Kenneth B. Vernon, Peter M. Yaworsky, Brian F. Codding. The archaeology of warfare needs a general theory of behavior. Target journal: Evolutionary Anthropology.

\section*{Technical reports}

2022 Bruce M. Pavlik, Lisbeth A. Louderback, Brian F. Codding, Kenneth Blake Vernon, Heidi M. Simper, Weston C. McCool, and Stefania Wilks. Archaeo-ecosystems of the four corners: Ethnobotanical surveys of Puebloan sites, San Juan County, Utah, project year 3. Report submitted to the Bureau of Land Management, Monticello, UT.

\section*{Popular press and University press releases}

2022 Violence of abundance, by Jim Logan. The Current. https://www.news.ucsb.edu/2022/020634/violence-abundance

2022 Climate change induced refugee crisis, chronic war, in ancient Peru, by Lisa Potter. The \(U\). https://attheu.utah.edu/facultystaff/climate-change-nasca-highlands/

2022 Violenza sociale e conflitto: figli soltanto dei cambiamenti climatici?, By Sofia Belardinelli. Universita DiPadova. https://ilbolive.unipd.it/it/news/violenza-sociale-conflitto-figli-soltanto

2022 Climate drove 7000 years of dietary changes, by Lisa Potter. The \(U\). https://attheu.utah.edu/facultystaff/climate-drove-dietary-changes/

2021 Google maps for time travelers, By David Malakoff. American Archaeology Magazine, 25(2). Magazine article about McCool and Yaworsky 2019.

2021 A history of violence, By Jim Logan. The Current. https://www.news.ucsb.edu/2021/020225/history-violence

\section*{Field and Lab Experience}

2021-present PI: Climate and Conflict in the Ancient Southwest Project.
2018-present PI: Nasca Highlands Life History Project.

2018-present PI: Nasca Highlands Warfare Project.
2017-present Collaborator: Fremont Agriculture and Risk Project (Dr. Peter Yaworsky).
2014-2017 PI: The Upper Southern Nasca Region Hillforts Project.
2017 Training program in osteological methods. Forensic Anthropology Center, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

2015-2016 PI: The Upper Southern Nasca Region Hillforts Project.
2014 Crew member for the Yamobamba Excavation Project. Supervisor: Patricia Chirinos.

2014 GIS database editor, Central California Information Center. Supervisor: Lynn Gamble, PhD.

2013 Co-PI: Household Maize Beer Production in the Andes: An Ethnoarchaeological Investigation.

2013 Field-technician for the Wari Road Survey Project. Supervisor: Matt Edwards, PhD.

2012 Co-PI: Household Maize Beer Production in the Andes: An Ethnoarchaeological Investigation. Preliminary scouting trip.

\section*{Grants and Awards Received}

2023-in-prep PI: National Science Foundation (SAR): "An Archaeological investigation of the resiliency of coupled human-environmental systems in Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument." \$252,000.

2023-pending PI: National Science Foundation (SAR): "Evaluating the deep time relationships between climate change, population dynamics, and warfare in the Prehispanic central Andes." \$258,117.

2021 PI: National Science Foundation (SPRF-FR) Social Behavioral and Economic Postdoctoral Research Fellowship (\# 2104456): "Evaluating the Climatological, Political, and Demographic Drivers of Conflict: An Archaeological Case Study." \$138,000.

2019 The Brian Fagan Fund: \$500.

2019 Co-PI: National Science Foundation (DDRIG) Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (\# 1934521): "Evaluating the impacts of warfare on a Late Intermediate period population in the southern Nasca region." \$20,000.

2019 Broom Graduate Student Research and Travel Grant: \$1,850.
2019 Department of Anthropology Graduate Student Research Grant: \$1,800.
2018 Charles J. Erasmus Fund: \$1,175.

2018 Department of Anthropology Graduate Student Research Grant: \$800.
2017 Charles J. Erasmus Fund: \$1,000.

2017 Department of Anthropology Graduate Student Research Grant: \$1,021.
2016 Humanities and Social Sciences Research Grant: \$3,000.
2016 Department of Anthropology Graduate Student Research Grant: \$1,000.
2015 Department of Anthropology Graduate Student Research Grant: \$4,300.
2013 Co-PI: University of Utah Research Committee grant: \$5,000.

\section*{Federal Research Grants}

2022 Bureau of Land Management, "Archaeological Survey of Cottonwood Wash, San Rafael Desert, Emery County, Utah." Cooperative Agreement L20AC00267, Grant Number 13090284. Brian F. Codding (PI), Jerry D. Spangler (Co-PI), Kate E. Magargal and Weston C. McCool (Senior Personnel), Kenneth B. Vernon, Kasey Cole, Kurt M. Wilson, and Ishmael Medina (graduate researchers) (12/1/20-6/30/22; \$18,698).

\section*{Internal Fellowships}

2019 One-quarter fellowship from the dean's discretionary block grant for 2019-2020: \$7,425 (Fall Quarter)

2018 UCSB Anthropology Graduate Fellowship: \$6,425 (Fall Quarter)
2017 UCSB Anthropology Graduate Fellowship: \$6,425 (Winter Quarter)

\section*{Teaching}

\section*{Teaching Experience}

Teaching Associate

Human Osteology (ANTH 180B), Spring 2019. University of California, Santa Barbara Human Evolution (ANTH 121), Winter 2018. University of California, Santa Barbara
Human Evolution (ANTH 121), Spring 2017. University of California, Santa Barbara
Human Evolution (ANTH 121), Spring 2016. University of California, Santa Barbara

\section*{Teaching Assistant}

Introduction to Biological Anthropology (ANTH 5), University of California, Santa Barbara
- Spring 2020 (head TA)
- Winter 2020 (head TA)
- Fall 2017
- Fall 2016
- Fall 2015
- Fall 201

Intro to Biocultural Anthropology (ANTH 7), University of California, Santa Barbara
- Winter 2014

Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (ANTH 2), University of California, Santa Barbara
- Winter 2016
- Winter 2019
- Spring 2014
- Fall 2013

Introduction to Archaeology (ANTH 3), University of California, Santa Barbara
- Spring 2015

Introduction to World Prehistory, University of Utah
- Spring 2013
- Fall 2012

\section*{Teaching Interests}

Introduction to Anthropology, Introduction to Archaeology, World Prehistory, Statistical Analysis, The Archaeology of Warfare, Spatial Analysis and GIS, Latin American Prehistory, North American Prehistory, Climate Change and Human History, Bioarchaeology, Osteology, Human Evolution, Human-Environment Interactions, Human Ecology in Anthropology.

\section*{Conference Presentations}

2022 Richard George, Weston C. McCool, Douglas J. Kennett, SAA organized session: Archaeology with altitude: Papers in honor of Mark Aldenderfer. Presentation: Modeling climate-population-conflict relationships in the Maya and Nasca regions.

2022 Elizabeth Arkush, Weston C. McCool, Ryan Smith, SAA organized session: Leveraging radiocarbon in the central Andes: From chronologies to research agendas. Presentation: The Late Intermediate period in the south-central Highlands: Key problems in timing.

2022 Kenneth B. Vernon, Jerry Spangler, Brian F. Codding, Weston C. McCool, Peter M. Yaworsky, SAA organized session: The influence of climate change on diet, demography,
and climate. Presentation: Resilience to climate change among Farmers in the BasinPlateau region.

2022 Kurt M. Wilson, Brian F. Codding, Weston C. McCool, Daniel Contreras, Joan Brenner Coltrain, SAA organized session: The influence of climate change on diet, demography, and climate. Presentation: Climate change drives 7,000 years of dietary variation in the central Andes.

2022 Weston C. McCool, Brian F. Codding, Kenneth, B. Vernon, Kurt M. Wilson, Peter M. Yaworsky, Norbert Marwan, Douglas J. Kennett, SAA organized session: The influence of climate change on diet, demography, and climate. Presentation: Divergent climactic and demographic stressors predict high rates of morbidity in the Prehispanic central Andes.

2022 Weston C. McCool and Kurt M. Wilson, Co-Chair of SAA organized session: The influence of climate change on diet, demography, and conflict.

2021 Beth Scaffidi and Weston C. McCool. EAA organized session: Earth, water and fire: approaching living habitat and community landscape management. Presentation: Violence-related trauma and social conflict at pre-Hispanic Andean cities vs. the outlands: insights from bioarchaeological big data.

2021 Weston C. McCool, Amy Anderson, Joan Brenner-Coltrain, and Douglas J. Kennett. Recent archaeological research in Nasca, invited talk: Patterns and Process: mapping out conflict, complexity, diet, disease, and demography in the Nasca highlands during the Late Intermediate period (1000-1450 C.E.).

2021 Weston C. McCool and Kate Magargal, Co-chair of SAA organized session: Life is risky: human behavioral ecology approaches to variable outcomes.

2021 Weston C. McCool. SAA organized session: Life is Risky: human behavioral ecology approaches to variable outcomes. Presentation: Examining trade-offs between food acquisition and violence avoidance: population-level effects and variability in riskpreference.

2019 Weston C. McCool. Sesquicentennial of the Colorado River Exploration Expedition Conference. Presentation: The deep history of the Colorado River Basin.

2019 Weston C. McCool. SAA annual conference. Poster: Inferring the Character of Conflict using Victim Profiles and Trauma Distributions: A case study from the Late Intermediate period Nasca highlands.

2018 Weston C. McCool. SAA organized session: Comparative perspective on warfare. Paper: Regional defensive strategies and chronic warfare in the Nasca highlands.

2017 Weston C. McCool. SAA annual conference. Poster: Coping with Conflict: Defensive strategies and chronic warfare in the Prehispanic Nasca region.

2017 Weston C. McCool, 2017. UCSB Anthropology Graduate Colloquium. Coping with Conflict: Defensive strategies and chronic warfare in the Prehispanic Nasca region.

2017 Weston C. McCool. Institute of Andean Studies annual conference. Poster: Optimizing defense: Assessing the relationship between fortification investment and settlement accessibility.

2016 Weston C. McCool and Peter M. Yaworsky. California Workshop on Evolutionary Social Sciences. Poster: Fremont defensive strategies in Nine Mile Canyon, Utah.

2016 Peter M. Yaworsky and Weston C. McCool. Utah Professional Archaeological Council Annual Conference. Poster: Functionality of Fremont tower structures in Nine Mile Canyon, Utah.

2015 Weston C. McCool. SAA annual conference. Poster: A potential oxygen isotope signature of maize beer consumption: An experimental pilot study.

2014 Weston C. McCool. SAA annual conference. Paper: Household maize beer production in the Andes: An ethnoarchaeological investigation.

2014 Matthew Edwards and Weston C. McCool. Institute of Andean Studies Annual Meeting. Poster: Wari and Inca roads of the Pampas Galeras.

2013 Weston C. McCool and Bradley J. Parker. University of Utah History Conference. Paper: Alcohol and Society: An ethnoarchaeological investigation.

\section*{Service}

Society for American Archaeology Program Committee Volunteer, 2022.
Undergraduate intern coordinator, Kennett Biogeochemistry Isotope Lab, Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Brown Bag Colloquium coordinator, Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Social Chair, Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.
Volunteer, graduate student preview weekend, Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Invited Speaker: University of Utah Anthropology Colloquium Speaker Series. The relationship between resource availability and human violence: An evolutionary perspective.

Invited Discussant: 15th Biennial Conference of Science and Management for the Colorado Plateau and Southwest Region: John Wesley Powell and reimagining the Colorado River Basin: Sesquicentennial perspectives: Native American Panel.

Guest Lecturer, Introduction to Environmental Studies and Sustainability, 2022. Environmental Studies Program, University of Utah.

Guest Lecturer, Archaeological Methods, 2018, 2019, 2020. Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Guest Lecturer, Archaeological Theory, 2019, 2020. Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Guest Lecturer, California and Great Basin Indians, 2021. Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

\section*{References}

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ This includes people who identify as exclusively or part Native American. The legislature's reports and Defendant's expert Dr. Hood use only the exclusively Native American data; by that measure District 9 is now just $51.7 \%$ Native American. ECF No. 60-35 at 2 (Hood Report). Although the proper metric in VRA cases is to include all people who identify with the minority group as Dr. Collingwood has done, see Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 473 n. 1 (2003), the distinction does not make a material difference here, see Ex. 2 at 3 n. 1 (Collingwood Rebuttal).

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Plaintiffs focus their discussion on Demonstrative Plan 1 for simplicity, but the same arguments largely apply to both demonstrative plans.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ De Grandy articulated this standard in the context of single-member districts. Here, given the comparison of subdistricts to multimember districts, it is more useful to consider the number of seats where Native voters have an opportunity to elect.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ Reock and Polsby-Popper are different mathematical measures of compactness frequently used by political scientists. See, e.g., Ex. 2 at 9-10 (Collingwood Rebuttal Report). As noted supra at 11, the water boundaries in Demonstrative District 9 have a distortive lowering effect these mathematical scores, which is more pronounced with respect to the Polsby-Popper score. See Ex. 2 at 10 (Collingwood Rebuttal Report).

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ Moreover, Dr. Hood likewise agreed that comparing Plaintiffs' Demonstrative District 9 to the enacted District 9, which he did in his report, was not the correct approach. See Ex. 3 at 148:6-16 (Hood Dep.) ("Q: The enacted version of District 9 is a rectangle, more or less, right? A: Fair, yes. Q: And do you understand the question, in terms of compactness for Voting Rights Act purposes, to be a comparison to a perfect rectangle, or is it about whether or not the district is reasonably compact standing alone? A: My understanding is that it would be reasonably compact standing on its own.").

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ Dr. Hood reports the "[c]entroid to centroid" measurement, which has the effect of making the reservations appear over 20 miles further apart than they are. ECF No. 59 at 18.

[^6]:    ${ }^{1}$ I did not analyze 2014 contests in Demonstrative 2 because of complications surrounding precinct joins, as Benson County went from eight precincts to four between 2014 and 2016.

[^7]:    ${ }^{2}$ https://redistrictingdatahub.org/state/north-dakota/
    ${ }^{3}$ See https://results.sos.nd.gov/ResultsSW.aspx?text=All\&type=SW\&map=CTY\&eid=292 for 2016 example.

[^8]:    ${ }^{4}$ https://results.sos.nd.gov/ResultsSW.aspx?text=All\&type=SW\&map=CTY\&eid=292
    ${ }^{5}$ https://results.sos.nd.gov/ResultsSW.aspx?text=All\&type=SW\&map=CTY\&mode=0

[^9]:    ${ }^{2}$ I use the more conservative NVAP estimate of 51.7 \% proffered in Dr. Hood's report and relied on by the state legislature.

[^10]:    ${ }^{3}$ M.V. Hood III, Peter A. Morrison, \& Thomas M. Bryan, From Legal Theory to Practical Application: A How-To for Performing Vote Dilution Analysis, Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 2 (2018).
    ${ }^{4}$ N.D. Legislature, http://www.ndlegis.gov/files/resource/library/dakota-lawmakers.pdf; https://ndlegis.gov/biography/dennis-bercier; https://www.ndlegis.gov/biography/les-jlafountain; https://www.metismuseum.ca/resource.php/14232.

[^11]:    ${ }^{5}$ Roey Hadar, North Dakota reservations see record voter turnout amid fears of suppression, ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/north-dakota-reservations-record-voter-turnout-amid-fears/story?id=59038845 (Nov. 7, 2018).

[^12]:    ${ }^{6}$ N.D. Legislature, Historical Districts, https://www.ndlegis.gov/districts/1993-2002.

[^13]:    ${ }^{1}$ State of North Dakota, https://www.nd.gov/government/tribal-governments.

[^14]:    ${ }^{2}$ The Tribal and State Relations Committee Background Memorandum, which provides more detail into the relationship between the State and the Tribes, including a summary of the legislation and State laws that directly affect the Spirit Lake Tribe and the Turtle Mountain band, can be found at, https://www.ndlegis.gov/sites/default/files/resource/committeememorandum/23.9069.01000.pdf.

[^15]:    ${ }^{3}$ N.D. Indian Affairs Comm'n, https://www.indianaffairs.nd.gov/state-government.

[^16]:    ${ }^{1}$ State of North Dakota, https://www.nd.gov/government/tribal-governments.

[^17]:    ${ }^{2}$ The Tribal and State Relations Committee Background Memorandum, which provides more detail into the relationship between the State and the Tribes, including a summary of the legislation and State laws that directly affect the Spirit Lake Tribe and the Turtle Mountain band, can be found at, https://www.ndlegis.gov/sites/default/files/resource/committeememorandum/23.9069.01000.pdf.

[^18]:    ${ }^{3}$ N.D. Indian Affairs Comm'n, https://www.indianaffairs.nd.gov/state-government.

[^19]:    District 9

[^20]:    ${ }^{1}$ See Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S.__ (2015). Page 4. Alabama was a Section 5 covered jurisdiction prior to Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). The quoted passage relating to Section 2 and its applicability to redistricting, however, pertains to any jurisdiction engaged in drawing new districts as Section 2 has nationwide coverage.
    ${ }^{2}$ See M.V. Hood III, Peter A. Morrison, and Thomas M. Bryan. 2017. "From Legal Theory to Practical Application: A How-To for Performing Vote Dilution Analyses." Social Science Quarterly for a discussion of how to conduct a Section 2 vote dilution analysis.

[^21]:    ${ }^{3}$ Throughout this report the enacted plan refers to the legislative districting plan passed by the North Dakota Legislature following the 2020 Census that was in place for the 2022 election-cycle.
    ${ }^{4}$ Measured as single-race Native Americans of voting age population from the 2020 decennial Census. North Dakota 2022 Legislative Plan Statistics (https://www.ndlegis.gov/assembly/67-2021/session-interim/2021-legislative-redistricting-maps).
    ${ }^{5}$ See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009).

[^22]:    ${ }^{6}$ There were not enough precincts to produce estimates for the two subdistricts: LD 9A and LD 9B.
    ${ }^{7}$ Outside of Native Americans, all other minorities are grouped into a category labeled Other.
    ${ }^{8}$ For more information on EI see: Gary King. 1997. A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. For more information on the specific variant of EI I use in this report see: Ori Rosen, Wenxin Jiang, Gary King, and Martin A. Tanner. 2001. "Bayesian and Frequentist Inference for Ecological Inference: The R x C Case." Statistica Neerlandica 55: 134-156. EI estimates for this report are estimated using the eiPack procedure in the statistical program R.

[^23]:    ${ }^{9}$ If a third-party candidate were present in the race the estimated vote share for this individual would also be calculated.

[^24]:    ${ }^{10}$ Measured as single-race Native Americans of voting age population from the 2020 decennial Census. North Dakota 2022 Legislative Plan Statistics (https://www.ndlegis.gov/assembly/67-2021/session-interim/2021-legislative-redistricting-maps).

