

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

Case No.
22-30333

PRESS ROBINSON; EDGAR CAGE; DOROTHY NAIKNE; EDWIN RENE SOULE; ALICE WASHINGTON; CLEE EARNEST LOWE; DAVANTE LEWIS; MARTHA DAVIS; AMBROSE SIMS; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE LOUISIANA STATE CONFERENCE, also known as NAACP; POWER COALITION FOR EQUITY AND JUSTICE, Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus KYLE ARDOIN, in his official capacity as SECRETARY OF STATE FOR LOUISIANA, Defendant—Appellant, CLAY SCHEXNAYDER; PATRICK PAGE CORTEZ; LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF LANDRY, Intervenor Defendants—Appellants, EDWARD GALMON, SR.; CIARA HART; NORRIS HENDERSON; TRAMELLE HOWARD, Plaintiffs—Appellees, versus KYLE ARDOIN, in his official capacity as SECRETARY OF STATE FOR LOUISIANA, Defendant—Appellant, CLAY SCHEXNAYDER; PATRICK PAGE CORTEZ; LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF LANDRY, Movants—Appellants.



**MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE STATEMENT AS
AMICUS CURIAE**

My name is James F. Blumstein, and I move this Court for leave to file the attached Statement in this appeal as a friend of the Court.¹ I serve as University Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law and Health Law and Policy at Vanderbilt University and Vanderbilt Law School.

I have had considerable experience in the voting rights area and believe that I have something of value for this Court's consideration as it hears the appeal in this matter.

My voting rights experience began when I published a student note in the Yale Law Journal on delegate selection to Presidential nominating conventions. James F. Blumstein, *Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nominating Conventions*, 78 YALE L. J. 1228 (1969). As a *pro se* litigant, I successfully brought and argued the case of *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), which held invalid Tennessee's durational residency requirements for registering to vote – one year in the state and three months in the county. From census data at the time, I estimated that about 6.5% of the population moves from

¹ In this filing, I speak for myself individually and not on behalf of anyone else, including my institutional affiliations.

state to state and county to county each year; based on those data, I believe that that case enfranchised more persons than any single case.

As directly relevant to this appeal, I presented testimony as part of the Senate’s deliberations regarding the amendment of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). That testimony was critical of the “results” test as adopted by the House of Representatives and contributed significantly to the addition of limiting and clarifying language in the Senate – the so-called Dole Compromise contained in Section 2(b) of the amended Section 2 of the VRA. 1 Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1332 (testimony of Prof. James F. Blumstein).

In the immediate aftermath of the enactment of amended Section 2 of the VRA, I published a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the newly amended Section 2. James F. Blumstein, *Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act*, 69 VA. L. REV. 633 (1983). In that article, I suggested a number of examples of how the “results” approach might be implemented, so as to avoid the race-based entitlements that Senator Dole and others who supported the “results” test disavowed. The argument in support of the “results” test rested largely on evidentiary concerns that proving intent to discriminate on the basis of race – the

constitutional standard adopted for original Section 2 of the VRA in *City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) – was difficult in the voting context.² See Blumstein testimony at 1332-33 (opposition to the “purpose” or “intent” standard derived not from a commitment to race-based entitlements but “really comes on the basis of pragmatism, that is, the problem of proof”). In her dissent in *Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee*, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021), a very recent VRA Section 2 case, Justice Kagan gave an example of “a law limiting ‘voter registration [to] only three hours one day a week.’” *Id.* at 2358. Justice Kagan drew the example from a dissent by Justice Scalia in *Chisom v. Roemer*, 501 U.S. 380, 408 (1991). The source for Justice Scalia’s example, as he acknowledged, *id.*, was my Virginia Law Review article, at pages 706-07. This background is referenced for the point that that article has been a part of the conversation about interpreting amended Section 2 and suggests that I might have something useful to contribute to the Court’s deliberations on this appeal.

A final credential for the Court’s consideration is an article I published on *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), the racial gerrymander case, and that includes

² Sen. Mathias, a leading (Republican) sponsor of amended Section 2 (along with Sen. Kennedy, a Democrat), made the point that the underlying concern was evidentiary – that the imposition of an intent standard was a “crippling blow to the overall effectiveness of the Act” and that “illegal” “voting discrimination” was the critical target of amended Section 2. Quoted in Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, *The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History*, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1390 (1983).

a section on VRA section 2. See James F. Blumstein, *Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in Doctrinal Context*, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 564 - 75 (1995). The Rutgers article is perhaps the most significant contribution for this Court's consideration on this appeal, since it discusses the Supreme Court's decision in *Chisom* and the impact of that decision on the interpretation of VRA Section 2(b).

None of the recent cases involving interpretation of amended Section 2 – including the Supreme Court in *Allen v. Milligan* -- the Alabama VRA Section 2 case --, the district court opinions in the Alabama case, or either of the decisions in the Louisiana case -- has discussed *Chisom* and its pivotal implications in limiting *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and shaping the interpretation of the Dole

Compromise. *Chisom* and its implications were ignored or disregarded in those cases, and, in particular, *Chisom* apparently was not cited at all in this Court's decision regarding a stay in this matter. Yet, nothing in those cases precludes the appropriate consideration of *Chisom* and its implications.

The attached Statement, for which I seek leave to file, is in actuality an Introduction to an article I have been working on. So, it is not in the conventional form of a brief; I am calling it a Statement. But the Statement reflects much thought about and experience with the Dole Compromise and interpretation of the “results” test in amended Section 2. I would like to think that the points made in the attached Statement would be of assistance to the Court and to the parties on this appeal.

In the Alabama VRA case (*Allen v. Milligan*) the Supreme Court purports to rely on *stare decisis* (relying on *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)) but actually ignores critical caselaw that explains and clarifies *Gingles* (*Chisom v. Roemer*, 504 U.S. at 396-98).

Under *Gingles*, there are the now-familiar three prerequisites or thresholds that a plaintiff must establish in order to make out a claim (*e.g.*, a large, compact, and politically cohesive Black community, racially polarized voting). Once the threshold is established, the analysis turns to the actual application of amended Section 2 of the VRA, which was derived from *White v. Regester*, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), a case in which minority communities, Blacks and Hispanics, were foreclosed from participation in the political process and were thereby deprived of an opportunity to elect their representatives of choice. The Court in *Gingles* treated this “totality of circumstances” analysis as a factual matter and affirmed the trial court under typical “clear error” deference to trial court factfinding. Beyond the preconditions, there is very little substantive analysis of the underlying substantive doctrine in *Gingles*.

In 1976, *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, established that a facially neutral law would be deemed a racial classification if there were an intent to disadvantage or classify on the basis of race. In 1980 (*City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)), the Court applied the purposeful discrimination paradigm of

Washington v. Davis to the voting and VRA context. That triggered hot debate about whether the foreclosure of opportunity of *White v. Regester* required a showing of intent, whether *Mobile v. Bolden* was wrongly decided. Voting rights advocates typically condemned the intent standard on the ground that intent is difficult to prove. See note 2, *supra*, and accompanying text. They sought to substitute a “results” standard for the *Mobile* “intent” standard.

In the 1982 debates (as noted, I presented testimony to the Senate on the matter), advocates for the proposed “results” standard downplayed emphasis on any significant substantive (as distinct from an evidentiary) effect. In the absence of an “intent” requirement, what is the “core” value? This was a point that I stressed in my testimony and a concern that Sen. Hatch (chair of the subcommittee) voiced strongly. The concern was that some form of race-based entitlement -- proportional representation or maximization of black political influence (called “Max Black”) -- would become the “core” value. Advocates for the “results” approach disagreed that a results approach would lead to a substantive, race-based standard; the “results” test was, instead, a way around the problems of proof of an “intent” standard. See note 2, *supra*, and accompanying text. The focus was on process, as in *Regester*, not to establish a race-based core value or claim of a race-based representational entitlement..

The so-called “Dole Compromise” specifically disavowed a proportional

representation requirement, and proponents emphasized “fair and just access to the electoral process.” (per Sen. Mathias, a key sponsor of the amended Section 2, quoted in Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, *The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History*, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1390 (1983). The Dole Compromise established a “totality of circumstances” test to define what constitutes a violation of amended Section 2. It retained the political process focus of *Regester* on access to the political process. Specifically, to establish a violation of Section 2, it must be “shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election... are not equally open” to members of a protected group **“in that its members have less opportunity to participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice.” (emphasis added)**

After *Gingles*, it was unclear whether “opportunity to participate” and ability to “elect representatives of choice” were separate and distinct (freestanding) claims. Some lower courts held them to be separate and distinct elements/requirements. That view, in essence, would hold that the ability to elect, typically called a form of vote dilution, would be a freestanding and distinct requirement. It ran the risk of pushing amended Section 2 into a standardless substantive doctrine, without a “core” value. The alternative interpretation was that use of the conjunctive term “and” meant that the “participate in the electoral process” provision was linked to the “ability to elect” provision. That is, as in *Regester*, it is

a process-focused concern with the “intent” requirement stripped out by legislating amended Section 2. There must be a showing of lack of participation in the political process and that lack of participation results in an inability to elect representatives of choice. This cause-and-effect relationship would be a “core” value and would provide some coherence to the “results” test, short of proportional representation (PR) or maximization of black influence (Max Black). PR was specifically eschewed in the text of amended Section 2; Max Black was rejected by the Supreme Court in the *Johnson v. DeGrandy* case, 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994) (per Justice Souter).

The relationship between (i) lack of evenhanded participation in the political process and (ii) the ability to elect representatives of choice was expressly considered and resolved in *Chisom v Roemer*, 501 U.S. 380, 396-98 (1991) (per Justice Stevens).

Chisom involved the applicability of amended Section 2 to judicial elections. Proponents of the separate-and-distinct-category view contended that judges were not “representatives.” Accordingly, the vote dilution component of amended Section 2 should not apply to judicial elections. Justice Stevens for the majority disagreed. There are not “two distinct types of protection for minority voters” – an “opportunity ‘to participate in the political process’” and an “opportunity ‘to elect representatives of their choice.’” *Id.* at 396. Instead, there is a


“unitary claim” under amended Section 2. *Id.* at 398. It is insufficient to show an “inability to elect” “unless” a plaintiff can also show a lack of participation in the political process. *Id.* at 397. That is, the rationale of amended Section 2 is that an “abridgment of the opportunity ... to participate in the political process inevitably impairs” the ability of members of a protected group “to influence the outcome of an election.” *Id.* In sum, “all” claims under amended Section 2 “must allege an abridgment of the opportunity to participate in the political process *and* to elect representatives of one’s choice.” *Id.* (emphasis in *Chisom* but not in statute)

The Supreme Court never addresses or deals with this issue in *Allen*. *Chisom* would require as a prerequisite to a successful Section 2 claim evidence of a discriminatory lack of participation of Blacks in the political process – a lack of access that causes an inability to elect representatives of choice; an exclusive analytical focus on the ability of Blacks to elect sufficient representatives of their choice is not enough to succeed in a Section 2 claim. That is not what amended Section 2 allows, and it is in tension (or even direct conflict) with *Chisom*. Under the banner of statutory *stare decisis*, the Court in *Allen* purports to uphold the analysis under *Gingles*, but *Gingles* was clarified in *Chisom*; ignoring a clarifying precedent is not honoring *stare decisis*. *Allen* called for a clarification of the doctrine of Section 2, especially under *Chisom*, not an undoing or redoing of existing doctrine under *Gingles*.

Allen arose in the context of affirming a preliminary injunction, concluding that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits. Alabama will have an opportunity to pursue the matter on the merits, to right the analytical/doctrinal ship. The same is true for the appeal in this case. Where the Supreme Court does not address an issue, courts can appropriately conform to controlling Supreme Court precedent that was not addressed in a recent case. Nothing in *Allen* or any other case precludes consideration of *Chisom* and its impact by the lower courts. Especially since this matter involves a matter of statutory interpretation, an appellate court may pursue clarification in accordance with the analytical framework of *Chisom*, thereby restoring the appropriate relationship between the critical components of amended Section 2. *Cf. Groff v. DeJoy*, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023)(clarifying an interpretation of a statute to reestablish its meaning).

In the context of this appeal, what this means is that the Court should allow for the filing of the attached Statement and, upon review, vacate the District Court's decision, and remand for consideration of the implications of *Chisom* on the analytical framework for vote dilution claims under Section 2. This would allow for further factual development linked to evenhanded, nondiscriminatory participation in the political process. Nothing in *Allen* or any other case precludes the consideration and application by a Court of Appeals or a District Court of *Chisom* in the context of a vote dilution claim under VRA Section 2,

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "James F. Blumstein". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'J' and a long, sweeping underline.

James F. Blumstein

James F. Blumstein
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE
LOUISIANA STATE
CONFERENCE, also known as
NAACP; POWER
COALITION FOR EQUITY
AND
JUSTICE, Plaintiffs—
Appellees, versus KYLE
ARDOIN, in his official
capacity as SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR LOUISIANA,
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SCHEXNAYDER; PATRICK
PAGE CORTEZ; LOUISIANA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEFF LANDRY,
Intervenor Defendants—
Appellants, EDWARD
GALMON, SR.; CIARA
HART; NORRIS
HENDERSON;
TRAMELLE
HOWARD, Plaintiffs—
Appellees, versus KYLE
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PAGE CORTEZ; LOUISIANA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEFF LANDRY, Movants—Appellants.

Case No. 22-
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DECLARATION OF SYDNEY SATTERWHITE

I am Sydney Satterwhite, faculty assistant to Professor James F. Blumstein at Vanderbilt University Law School. I have contacted the following attorneys asking for their consent to file Professor Blumstein's statement as Amicus Curiae: Stuart Naifeh, Abha Khanna, Phillip Strach, and Richard Raile. Attorneys Naifeh, Khanna, Strach, and Raile gave their consent. Professor Blumstein has notified me that he heard back from Shae McPhee on behalf of Elizabeth Murrill, and he gave consent to file on behalf of Ms. Murrill and the state of Louisiana.


Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Sydney Satterwhite". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned below the typed name.

Sydney Satterwhite

Certificate of Compliance

1. This document complies with the word limit of FRAP 29(a)(5) because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by FRAP 32(f), this document contains 2462 words.
2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of FRAP 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of FRAP 32(a)(6) because this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word Version 2305 in font size 14 of Times New Roman.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James F. Blumstein".

James F. Blumstein

8/2/2023

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on August 2, 2023, a copy of the foregoing Motion for Leave to file as *Amicus Curiae* was mailed by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the following:

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Respectfully submitted,



James F. Blumstein

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
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SR.; CIARA



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**STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN AS *AMICUS
CURIAE***

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Cases:

Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).....	8
Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487 (2023).....	1,2,4,12
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2333 (2021) 5,5,6,14	
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 407- 08 (1991).....	6,4,5,12,13,14
Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 301-02 (2017).....	6
Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023).....	18
Grove v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993).....	8
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994).....	10,17
Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 425 (1991) 16	
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994).....	13,16,17
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 427 (2006).....	4,5,11
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S, 471, 480 (1997).....	10
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982).....	18
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).....	19
Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp.3d 924, 953 (N.D. Ala. 2022).....	8
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).....	5,3,4
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971).....	4,16,16

White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 768-69 (1973).....4,16

Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1248 (2022)...7

Statutes:

52 U.S.C. §10301(a)5
 52 U.S.C. §10301(b)..... 6,10,15

Other Authorities:

128 Cong. Rec. 14,133 (1982).....9
 128 Cong. Rec. 14, 316 (1982)(statement of Sen. Dole)..... 8
 128 Cong. Rec. 14,317 (statement of Sen. Dole)9
 Blumstein Testimony, 1 Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13328,10
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 Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 567 (1995) 11,9,14
 Boyd & Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1418 (1983)..... 4,10,8
 Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution to the Committee on the Judiciary on the Voting Rights Act, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print, April 1982) 10

**STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR JAMES F.
BLUMSTEIN AS *AMICUS CURIAE***

**Does Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Support a
Freestanding Claim of Vote Dilution?**

James F. Blumstein

**University Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law and
Health Policy and Law**

Vanderbilt University and Vanderbilt Law School

July 2023

In its recent decision involving Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), *Allen v. Milligan*¹, the Supreme Court upheld a district court preliminary injunction that invalidated Alabama’s Congressional districting plan. The Supreme Court held that the district court “faithfully applied our precedents and correctly determined that, under existing law, [the Alabama Congressional districting plan] violated §2.”² An additional majority-minority district was ordered, based on a theory of vote dilution.

¹ 143 S. Ct. 1487 (2023) [pinpoint page cites to Slip Opinion].

² Slip Op. at 15.

In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the litigation was “not about the law as it exists,” but “about Alabama’s attempt to remake our §2 jurisprudence anew.”³ And, relying on “statutory *stare decisis*,”⁴ the Court “decline[d] to recast... §2 case law.”⁵ The Court labeled its decision “a faithful application of our precedents” and discounted concerns that its decision “impermissibly elevate[d] race in the allocation of political power.”⁶

The case to which the Court in *Allen* pledged allegiance was *Thornburg v. Gingles*,⁷ the first Supreme Court case to interpret the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the VRA.⁸ Amended section 2(a) bars the imposition of any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right ... to vote.”⁹ Although the term “vote dilution” does not appear in amended section 2, the Court in *Gingles* held that amended section 2 applied to substantive claims of vote dilution.

³ Id.

⁴ Id. at 31.

⁵ Id. at 16.

⁶ Id. at 34. For an explanation that *Allen* did not require the remaking of Voting Rights Act, section 2, jurisprudence, see *infra* at note 71.

⁷ 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

⁸ *Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee*, 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2333 (2021) (“This Court first construed the amended §2 in *Thornburg v. Gingles*,” a “vote dilution case.”) For an extensive discussion of amended Section 2 of the VRA, see James F. Blumstein, *Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act*, 69 VA. L. REV. 633 (1983) [hereinafter *Defining and Proving Race Discrimination*].

⁹ 52 U.S.C. §10301(a).

Amended section 2(b) explains when a “denial or abridgement has occurred”¹⁰ – “when, ‘based on the totality of circumstances,’ a State’s electoral system is ‘not equally open’ to members of a racial group.”¹¹ And, under section 2(b), a system is not equally open if members of one race “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”¹² Plaintiffs must demonstrate that electoral “devices result in unequal access to the electoral process.”¹³ *Gingles* relied on the “elect representatives of choice” provision of section 2(b) to hold that section 2 is violated under a vote dilution theory¹⁴ where an “electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out” minority voters’ “ability to elect their preferred candidates.”¹⁵

Under *Gingles*, there are three prerequisites or thresholds that a plaintiff must establish in order to make out a claim (*e.g.*, a large, compact, politically cohesive minority community, racially polarized voting).¹⁶ Once the threshold prerequisites are established, the analysis turns to the actual application of amended Section 2 –

¹⁰ *Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee*, 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2358 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting)

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² 52 U.S.C. §10301(b).

¹³ *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 46.

¹⁴ *Chisom v. Roemer*, 501 U.S. 380, 407- 08 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹⁵ *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 48.

¹⁶ *Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285, 301-02 (2017).

to determine, under the totality of circumstances, “whether the political process is equally open to minority voters.”¹⁷

VRA Section 2(b) was derived from *White v. Regester*.¹⁸ *Regester* was a case in which minority communities, Blacks and Hispanics, were foreclosed from participation in the political process and were thereby deprived of an opportunity to elect their representatives of choice. The Court in *Gingles* treated this “totality of circumstances” analysis as a factual matter and affirmed the trial court under typical “clear error” deference to trial court factfinding.¹⁹ There is very little substantive analysis of the underlying “totality of circumstances” doctrine in *Gingles*.²⁰ And much of the caselaw post-*Gingles*, including in the recent Alabama case (*Allen*),²¹ has focused on the *Gingles* threshold preconditions and whether or how they apply

¹⁷ Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1248 (2022)(*per curiam*)(internal cite omitted).

¹⁸ 412 U.S. 755 (1973). See Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, *The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History*, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1418 (1983)(section 2(b) “carried forward the *White v. Regester* test”); see also *Chisom v. Roemer*, 504 U.S. 380, 397 (1991)(amended section 2(b) is “patterned after the language used ... in *White v. Regester*... and *Whitcomb v. Chavis*”); *Allen v. Milligan*, Slip Op. at 5 (section 2(b) “borrowed language from ... *White v. Regester*”).

¹⁹ *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 79. See also *LULAC v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 427 (2006)(“The District Court’s determination whether the §2 requirements are satisfied must be upheld unless clearly erroneous”).

²⁰ *Cf. Allen v. Milligan*, (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Dissent Slip Op. at 35)(noting that the Court has “never succeeded in translating the *Gingles* framework into an objective and workable method of identifying the undiluted benchmark”).

²¹ Slip Op. at 10-15.

in certain circumstances – e.g., whether they apply to single-member districts, not just multi-member districts.²²

But *Gingles* does not address or answer the critical question – whether a claim of substantive vote dilution is freestanding, or whether it is contingent on or linked to other process-based values as set out in amended section 2(b).²³

As explained in section 2(b), the critical focus of section 2 is that a prerequisite (a “key requirement”)²⁴ for finding a violation of VRA section 2 is that “the political processes leading to nomination and election ... must be ‘equally open’ to minority

²² See *Grove v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25 (1993)(holding that the *Gingles* prerequisites apply to vote dilution challenges to single-member districts). See also *Abbott v. Perez*, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018)(focusing on the *Gingles* pre-conditions).

²³ In the recent Alabama case (*Allen*), for example, plaintiffs’ claims were expressed in what appears to be a freestanding form: “Black voters ‘have less opportunity’ than other Alabamians ‘to elect representatives of their choice to Congress.’” *Singleton v. Merrill*, 582 F. Supp.3d 924, 953 (N.D. Ala. 2022). That formulation does not address the pivotal question and even camouflages it by suggesting that section 2 looks to substantive outcomes instead of lack of equal access to the political process that can cause adverse substantive outcomes such as vote dilution. The plaintiffs’ formulation derives from *Abbott v. Perez*, 138 S. Ct. at 2315. The formulation in *Abbott* derives from *LULAC v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), which stated the issue under the totality of circumstances analysis as “whether members of a racial group have less opportunity than do other members of the electorate.” *Id.* at 425-26. Section 2(b) links opportunity to participate in the political process and ability to elect representatives of choice; inability to elect is actionable but only upon a finding of unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. These claims are not freestanding but are “inextricably linked” and form a “unitary” claim under section 2(b). See *Chisom v. Roemer*, 501 U.S. 380, 396-98 (1991).

²⁴ *Brnovich*, 141 S. Ct. at 2237.

and non-minority groups alike.”²⁵ As the Court held in *Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee*, the term “open” means that the political process must be “without restrictions as to who may participate.”²⁶ In dissent in *Brnovich*, Justice Kagan echoed the importance of – even the centrality of – “the right to an equal opportunity to vote.”²⁷

This raises the question of the relationship between the two critical provisions in section 2(b) and the twin requirements for establishing a violation of section 2: (i) that members of a racial minority “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process” “and”²⁸ (ii) that members of a racial minority have less ability “to elect representatives of their choice.” Is each provision and requirement separate and distinct? Or are they linked and therefore interdependent?

If the ability “to elect representatives of choice” provision, which undergirds the vote dilution claim, is freestanding, then some core value (otherwise

²⁵ Id.

²⁶ Id. (internal cite omitted).

²⁷ Id. at 2351.

²⁸ In her *Brnovich* dissent, Justice Kagan erroneously uses the term “or” instead of “and,” which is the statutory term, in relating the two pivotal provisions. Id. at 2358. See *Chisom*, 501 U.S. at 397 (“It would distort the plain meaning of the sentence to substitute the word “or” for the word “and”).

undefined) must inform the meaning of the vote dilution concept.²⁹ After all, one cannot sensibly think about whether something is “diluted” unless one has a benchmark of what an undiluted outcome would be.³⁰ In every-day terms, one cannot sensibly think about what it means to serve “watered down” (or diluted) beer without having an understanding (a benchmark) of what non-watered-down beer would be.³¹

This set of concerns was the core criticism by critics of the “results” test as initially proposed and, as revised, adopted in amended section 2³² – what was the

²⁹See Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution to the Committee on the Judiciary on the Voting Rights Act, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print, April 1982)(the problem with a results test, as in the House version of amended section 2, is that “there is no core value... except for the value of equal electoral results for defined minority groups, or proportional representation. There is no other ultimate or threshold criterion by which a fact-finder can evaluate the evidence before it”),

³⁰ See, e.g., *Holder v. Hall*, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994)(plurality)(recognizing the need for a “benchmark against which to measure the existing voting practice” and that “where there is no objective and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by which to evaluate a challenged voting practice, it follows that the voting practice cannot be challenged as dilutive under §2.”)

³¹ See *Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.*, 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997)(“Because the very concept of vote dilution implies – and, indeed, necessitates – the existence of an ‘undiluted’ practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured, a §2 plaintiff must also postulate a reasonable alternative voting practice to serve as the benchmark ‘undiluted’ voting practice”).

³² See *Boyd & Markman* at 1399, n.255 (“In the view of most critics of the proposed ‘results’ test, no alternative standard – except for proportional representation – made sense in the context of §2.... In their view, no alternative standard exists short of comparing actual representation of minorities to the representation that they would be ideally ‘entitled’ under a structure of proportional representation”). The Dole Compromise (section 2(b)) was developed and adopted to respond to these criticisms

core value or benchmark, deviation from which could be established by a showing of effects alone?³³ “Did the ‘ability to elect’ component assure racial minorities, as a group, a right to group representation defined by race?”³⁴ Senator Dole, author of section 2(b) (called the Dole Compromise),³⁵ addressed the issue directly: “By the expression of an entitlement to ‘elect representative their choice,’ the amendment provides ... that members of minority groups have a right to register, vote, and to have their vote fairly counted. There is no guarantee of success; Just an equal opportunity to participate.”³⁶ In a public mark-up session, Senator Dole reassured

and concerns. See Boyd & Markman at 1414-20. I had expressed this set of concerns in testimony that I presented to the Subcommittee: “A substantive effects standard must imply either no theory at all or an underlying theory of some affirmative, race-based entitlements.” The opposition to the “purpose” or “intent” standard derived not from a commitment to race-based entitlements but “really comes on the basis of pragmatism, that is, the problem of proof.” 1 Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1332, 1332-33 (testimony of Prof. James F. Blumstein)[hereinafter Blumstein testimony].

³³ Blumstein testimony at 1336 (the problem with the House’s proposed substantive results or effects test “is that it does not make any theoretical sense unless you assume affirmative entitlements based upon race....”)

³⁴ James F. Blumstein, *Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in Doctrinal Context*, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 567 (1995) [hereinafter Blumstein, *Racial Gerrymandering*]. See *LULAC v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 437 (2006) (“[T]he right to an undiluted vote does not belong to the ‘minority as a group’ but rather to ‘its individual members’”).

³⁵ Blumstein, *Racial Gerrymandering*, at 566 and note 294.

³⁶ 128 Cong. Rec. 14,316 (1982)(statement of Sen. Dole).

“results” skeptics “that revised Section 2 retained the Voting Rights Act’s focus on discrimination against the rights of individuals to vote.”³⁷

In debate on the Senate floor, Senator Dole was “asked if revised Section 2 dealt with equal access to the voting process or with election results.”³⁸ Senator Dole’s response was definitive: “The focus in section 2 is on equal access, as it should be.... It is not a right to elect someone of their race but it is equal access and having their vote counted.”³⁹ As Senator Dole stated, “the essence of the Dole compromise was to draw a basic distinction between the issue of access to the political process and election results.”⁴⁰

That is, revised section 2 retained the focus on nondiscrimination against individuals, “on access to the process not on group entitlements to representation based on race.”⁴¹ The issue under revised section 2 is “whether minorities have ‘equal access’ to the political process,” and “[e]qual access’ does not imply any right among minority groups to be elected in particular proportions: It does not imply a right to proportional representation of any kind.”⁴²

³⁷ Blumstein. Racial Gerrymandering at 568.

³⁸ Id.

³⁹ 128 Cong. Rec. 14,133 (1982).

⁴⁰ 128 Cong. Rec. 14,317 (statement of Sen. Dole).

⁴¹ Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering at 568.

⁴² 128 Cong. Rec. at 14,317 (statement of Sen. Dole).

As part of the Dole Compromise, Section 2(b) itself specifically stated that a natural benchmark, racial proportionality, would be disavowed: “[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”⁴³ Subsequently, in *Johnson v. DeGrandy*,⁴⁴ the Supreme Court nixed another possible substantive benchmark – maximization of the political influence of Black voters (so-called Max Black).

“Purpose” or “intent” provided such a core value,⁴⁵ but revised section 2 relied on a “results” test. In the absence of some benchmark as a core value, a results test

⁴³ 52 U.S.C. §10301(b). In my testimony, I was skeptical that a statutory disclaimer, such as a proposed anti-proportional representation provision “could get the job done when a willful court has its mind set to do something else.” Blumstein Testimony at 1338.

⁴⁴ 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994). *DeGrandy* reinforces the point that the Dole Compromise “confirms what is otherwise clear from the text of the statute, namely that the ultimate right of §2 is equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race.” *Id.* at 1014, n.11. *DeGrandy* also rejected a proposed “safe harbor” against a claim of racial vote dilution for states that achieved racial proportionality. In rejecting that proposal, the Court noted that such a safe harbor “would be in derogation of the statutory text and its considered purpose,” which focus on “whether the political processes are ‘equally open.’” *Id.* at 1018 (internal cite omitted). Amended section 2 focused on the openness of the political process; racially proportional electoral outcomes did not and could not insulate a state from a substantive vote dilution claim in the face of putative process-based claims, which relied on challenges to such “reprehensible practices as ballot box stuffing, outright violence, discretionary registration, property requirements, the poll tax, and the white primary” and other forms of race discrimination. *Id.*

⁴⁵ See Blumstein Testimony at 1333, noting the distinction between “discrimination” and “disadvantage” and the centrality of “purpose” in drawing that distinction.

is analytically at sea. It “draws no bottom line. It requires the consideration of a laundry list of factors, but it never orients the inquiry. It demands a balance but it provides no scale.”⁴⁶ A freestanding vote dilution claim, standardless statutorily, would run the risk of developing a substantive benchmark that smacked of racial proportionality or some form of race-based representational entitlement.⁴⁷ A contingent, process-based core value – equal access to the political process – would provide an alternative as a core value or a benchmark.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Blumstein, *Defining and Proving Race Discrimination*, at 644-45. There is a distinction between a “substantive” effects test and an “evidentiary” effects test. A substantive effects test suggests “an affirmative duty to consider race explicitly in effectuating an aliquot matching of a particular benefit to racial criteria.” *Id.* at 650. In the voting context, a substantive effects test “would reflect adoption of an affirmative, race-based entitlement to representation; otherwise, notions such as ... vote dilution are not understandable.” *Id.* at 654. An “evidentiary effects analysis... offers an attractive alternative that accommodates legitimate concerns about problems of proof with the basic commitment to the principle of nondiscrimination.” *Id.* at 658. There is an analogy to the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*. “Under *res ipsa*, the underlying theory of liability – negligence – remains the same; a plaintiff, however, can create an inference of negligence without directly showing that the defendant committed the negligent act.” *Id.* at 659.

⁴⁷ *Cf.* LULAC, 548 U.S. at 437 (“The role of proportionality” is not to establish an affirmative, race-based claim to proportional representation but to “provide[] some evidence of whether ‘the political processes leading to nomination or election ... are ...equally open to participation’”)(internal cite omitted). That is, the focus of analysis under amended section 2 remains on nondiscriminatory access to the political or “electoral” process and the vote dilution that can result from that lack of access. *Id.* at 439-40.

⁴⁸ See Blumstein, *Defining and Proving Race Discrimination* at 702-03 (addressing “whether courts can resist the impetus towards a [substantive] result-based analysis – whether some analytically sensible way can be found to avoid the Scylla of a pure-

As it turns out, the Supreme Court has already confronted these issues, but the Court in *Allen* ignored or disregarded the critical case, *Chisom v. Roemer*,⁴⁹ that rejected a freestanding vote dilution approach, *contra* to the most far-reaching implications of *Gingles*. What was called for in *Allen* was a clarification of the relationship between *Chisom* and *Gingles*, not an exclusive focus on *Gingles*.⁵⁰

Chisom concerned the question whether VRA section 2 applied to judicial elections. The lower court construed section 2 as providing “two distinct types of protection for minority voters – it protects their opportunity ‘to participate in the political process’ and their opportunity ‘to elect representatives of their choice.’”⁵¹ Since judges were not “representatives,” VRA section 2 did not apply to a freestanding vote dilution claim.

The Supreme Court rejected the position of the lower court. Section 2 embraces a “unitary claim,”⁵² not “two separate and distinct rights.”⁵³ The “opportunity to participate” and the “ability to elect” are “inextricably linked;”⁵⁴ they

race-based results approach and the Charybdis of intrusive and standardless judicial oversight of state and local political practices and institutions.”)

⁴⁹ 501 U.S. 380, 396-98 (1991)

⁵⁰ *Cf. Allen*, slip op at 11 (“[T]he District Court concluded that plaintiffs’ §2 claim was likely to succeed under *Gingles*” but did not analyze or even consider the impact of *Chisom* on the *Gingles* framework).

⁵¹ *Chisom*, 501 U.S. at 396.

⁵² *Id.* at 398

⁵³ *Id.* at 397.

⁵⁴ *Id.*

cannot “be bifurcated into two kinds of claims.”⁵⁵ The “inability to elect” component, upon which vote dilution claims rest, “is not sufficient to establish a violation [of section 2] unless, under the totality of circumstances, it can also be said that the members of the protected class have less opportunity to participate in the political process.”⁵⁶ Equal access to and equal participation in the political process are critical components to any claim under amended section 2, which “does not separate vote dilution challenges from other challenges brought under the amended §2.”⁵⁷

In sum, *Chisom* holds that there is no freestanding, independent claim to vote dilution under revised VRA section 2. “Any abridgement of the opportunity of members of a protected class to participate in the political process inevitably impairs their ability to influence the outcome of an election.”⁵⁸ So, where there is an abridgement of the opportunity to participate – where members of a minority group are fenced out of the political process⁵⁹–, that can trigger an adverse effect on the

⁵⁵ *Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney General of Texas*, 501 U.S. 419, 425 (1991).

⁵⁶ *Chisom*, 501 U.S. at 397. See also *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971)(focusing on opportunity to participate in the political process not on substantive outcomes).

⁵⁷ *Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n*, 501 U.S. at 427.

⁵⁸ *Chisom*, 501 U.S. at 397.

⁵⁹ *White v. Register*, 412 U.S. 755, 768-69 (1973)(members of minority group were effectively denied “access to the political process” and “effectively excluded from political life”)

ability of minority voters to elect their choice of candidates in an election. But an essential part of a plaintiff's showing must be an access-based or process-based impairment of the opportunity to participate in the process, with that process-based impairment having an adverse effect on the ability of members of a minority group to elect representatives of choice. Abridgement of an opportunity for equal access to the political process is a necessary precondition or pre-requisite for a successful claim under section 2. Under *Chisom*, Section 2 is violated only if there is "racial inequality in terms of opportunity to participate in the political process and that foreclosure of opportunity results in (proximately causes) an inability to elect representatives of one's choice."⁶⁰

This type of causal interrelationship between, on the one hand, equal access to and participation in the political process and, on the other hand, electoral outcomes (vote dilution) must be present for "all [section 2] claims."⁶¹ Abridgement of the opportunity to participate in the political process is a prerequisite showing for all successful section 2 claims. This point was recently reinforced by the Court in the *Brnovich* case, by both the majority opinion and by Justice Kagan's dissent.⁶²

⁶⁰ Blumstein, *Racial Gerrymandering*, at 575.

⁶¹ *Chisom*, 501 U.S. at 398; *Houston Lawyers' Ass'n*, 501 U.S. at 427 (section 2 "does not separate vote dilution challenges from other challenges brought under the amended §2").

⁶² *Brnovich*, 141 S. Ct. at 2337-38 (emphasizing section 2 "is violated only" when the "key requirement" of an "open" political process is breached); *id.* at 2357-58

The *Allen* decision does not consider the effect of *Chisom* in channeling *Gingles*' analysis. Under *Chisom*, the problem of identifying a core value and the risk of developing a substantive, race-based entitlement – widely disavowed in the debates surrounding amended section 2 – are largely obviated. The vote dilution inquiry remains, but not as a freestanding, substantive principle. Vote dilution that results from racially discriminatory lack of access to the political process is actionable; but, reinforcing the principle that VRA section 2 targets race discrimination,⁶³ vote dilution is not a freestanding, standardless claim. A violation of section 2(b) depends upon a process-focused core value – a successful claimant must establish that members of a racial minority “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process.”⁶⁴ That was the “deal” contained in the Dole Compromise.

Interpreting section 2 in that way, as *Chisom* does, reduces the impetus for developing a substantive, race-based benchmark. Instead, the benchmark is process-oriented or access-oriented, focusing on opportunity, not outcomes unrelated to

(Kagan, J., dissenting) (courts under section 2 “are to strike down voting rules that contribute to a racial disparity in the opportunity to vote” and that “a violation is established when, ‘based on the totality of circumstances,’ a State’s electoral system is ‘not equally open’ to members of a racial group”).

⁶³ *Rogers v. Lodge*, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982)(holding unconstitutional an at-large system that was “being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population”).

⁶⁴ 52 U.S.C. §10301(b).

defects in process or access. Presaging the approach adopted in *Chisom*, this is how the analysis works:⁶⁵ “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate a causal relationship between specific ‘objective’ factors that evidence a faulty political process and the disadvantageous outcome.”⁶⁶ That is, “to make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff should have to demonstrate foreclosure of the opportunity to participate in the political process, not merely an inability to influence or win an election or an inability to elect black officials.”⁶⁷ If there is a nondiscriminatory and “open” process, then racial minorities can be expected to participate on an equal footing in the rough-and-tumble political process, winning sometimes but not always as is the case for other groups and as recognized by the Supreme Court in the constitutional⁶⁸ and VRA contexts.⁶⁹ As the Supreme Court has stated,⁷⁰ in the absence of a race-

⁶⁵ The approach adopted in *Chisom* was essentially proposed in the immediate aftermath of the enactment of Dole Compromise. See Blumstein, *Defining and Proving Race Discrimination* at 704.

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971)(where there is equal opportunity to participate in the political process, there is no unconstitutional vote dilution).

⁶⁹ *Johnson v. DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994)(failure to maximize Black voters’ political influence is not actionable as a violation of VRA section 2).

⁷⁰ The Supreme Court has recognized that, as a constitutional matter, claims of qualitative vote dilution are nonjusticiable because of a lack of standards. *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). The concerns that undergird *Rucho* correspond to the concerns about core values or benchmarks that surround claims under VRA section 2(b). The approach adopted in *Chisom* responds to these concerns by riveting attention on nondiscriminatory access to the political process and limiting vote dilution claims to circumstances where a plaintiff can demonstrate

based lack of opportunity to participate in the political process, “minority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground.”⁷¹

a lack of evenhanded access to the political process as in *Regester* and *Whitcomb*. An inability to elect representatives of choice is actionable, but only when linked to or traceable to an access-based deficiency. That reduces the impetus toward developing a theory of race-based representational entitlements, something that advocates of amended section 2, such as Sen. Dole, disavowed.


⁷¹ *Johnson v. DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1020. Eight years after *Gingles*, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) sought to limit the scope of coverage of section 2. He would have interpreted the terms in section 2(a) – “standard, practice, or procedure” – so as to exclude from coverage “challenges to allegedly dilutive election methods that we have considered within the scope of the Act in the past.” *Holder v. Hall*, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994)(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Thomas called for “a systematic reassessment of our interpretation of §2” because of the “gloss” that caselaw had placed on the statutory text, which was “at odds with the terms of the statute and has proved utterly unworkable in practice.” *Id.* As Justice O’Connor pointed out, “*stare decisis* concerns weigh heavily here,” and she declined to accept Justice Thomas’ “suggestion that we overhaul our established reading of §2.” *Id.* at 885-86 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also *id.* at 963-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg and agreeing with Justice O’Connor on the statutory *stare decisis* point). Justice Thomas’ position would have resulted in a categorical exclusion of vote dilution cases from coverage under section 2 – as not a “standard, practice, or procedure” covered under section 2(a). In this approach, Justice Thomas’ categorical exclusion of coverage of vote dilution cases under section 2 extended beyond the restraints on *Gingles* applied in *Chisom*. Under *Chisom*, section 2 applies to vote dilution considerations, but not in a freestanding manner – only (i) when there is race discrimination that creates a lack of evenhanded opportunity for members of a racial minority group to participate in the political process and (ii) that lack of equal access results in a form of cognizable vote dilution. In *Allen*, the Court declined to engage in the type of “systematic reassessment” that Justice Thomas had called for in his *Holder* dissent. But in *Allen*, there was no need to engage in that type of broad-based reassessment – only to clarify the interrelationship of *Gingles* and *Chisom*, an issue that the Court in *Allen* did not recognize or address. Therefore,

In the Louisiana case, the Court of Appeals should vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for analysis under *Chisom*, requiring the parties to address whether there has been a lack of evenhanded opportunity to participate in the political process – a process-based question. Only if plaintiffs can carry this burden should the District Court examine the question of vote dilution, whether the race-based deficiencies in the opportunity to participate in the political process brought about an inability to elect representatives of choice, under the totality of circumstances.⁷²

that issue is still open for consideration by lower courts in pending cases, such as in Alabama on remand or in Louisiana on appeal. What is called for is a clarification of the doctrine under amended VRA section 2 – the relationship between *Gingles* and *Chisom* --, not an undoing or redoing of existing doctrine. Ignoring or disregarding a clarifying precedent such as *Chisom* is not honoring *stare decisis*. Cf. *Groff v. DeJoy*, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023)(clarifying a statutory term that had long been mis-interpreted by lower courts based on imprecise language in a Supreme Court decision).

⁷² The proposed article will proceed as follows: Section II will draw the constitutional distinction between vote dilution and race discrimination, recognizing that they are “analytically distinct.” See *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 6t52 (1993) (acknowledging that a claim of race discrimination in the context of voting/districting is “analytically distinct” from a vote dilution claim). It will conclude that the VRA has evolved from the intellectual tradition of the race discrimination cases. Section III will review the vote dilution concept from its intellectual roots in the one person, one vote concept. One person, one vote is a form of quantitative vote dilution; the question to demonstrate what has happened, in the constitutional context, to the offspring development of a “qualitative” vote dilution doctrine and its ultimate demise in *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). Section IV will turn to the Voting Rights Act and establish that it is a hybrid of the race discrimination and vote dilution paradigms, albeit rooted in the race discrimination analytical tradition. Section V will conclude with a doctrinal

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James F. Blumstein".

James F. Blumstein

analysis, highlighted in this Introduction, that shows the incomplete analysis in the recent Alabama VRA section 2 case and the lack of consideration of *Chisom* in shaping the proper analysis of VRA section 2 claims, with a recognition that, given the procedural posture (requiring consideration of likelihood of success on the

merits, not the merits themselves), the Supreme Court's decision in *Allen* is unlikely to be the final word on these issues. There is considerable space for lower courts to demand consideration of *Chisom* and its relationship to *Gingles*.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT


PRESS ROBINSON; EDGAR
CAGE; DOROTHY NAIRNE;
EDWIN RENE SOULE;
ALICE WASHINGTON;
CLEE EARNEST LOWE;
DAVANTE LEWIS;
MARTHA DAVIS;
AMBROSE SIMS;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE
LOUISIANA STATE
CONFERENCE, also known as
NAACP; POWER
COALITION FOR EQUITY
AND
JUSTICE, Plaintiffs—
Appellees, versus KYLE
ARDOIN, in his official
capacity as SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR LOUISIANA,
Defendant—Appellant, CLAY
SCHEXNAYDER; PATRICK
PAGE CORTEZ; LOUISIANA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEFF LANDRY,
Intervenor Defendants—
Appellants, EDWARD
GALMON, SR.; CIARA
HART; NORRIS
HENDERSON;
TRAMELLE
HOWARD, Plaintiffs—
Appellees, versus KYLE
ARDOIN, in his official
capacity as SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR LOUISIANA,
Defendant—Appellant, CLAY
SCHEXNAYDER; PATRICK
PAGE CORTEZ; LOUISIANA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEFF LANDRY, Movants—Appellants.

Case No. 22-
30333

DECLARATION OF SYDNEY SATTERWHITE

I am Sydney Satterwhite, faculty assistant to Professor James F. Blumstein at Vanderbilt University Law School. I have contacted the following attorneys asking for their consent to file Professor Blumstein's statement as Amicus Curiae: Stuart Naifeh, Abha Khanna, Phillip Strach, and Richard Raile. Attorneys Naifeh, Khanna, Strach, and Raile gave their consent. Professor Blumstein has notified me that he heard back from Shae McPhee on behalf of Elizabeth Murrill, and he gave consent to file on behalf of Ms. Murrill and the state of Louisiana.


Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Sydney Satterwhite". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned below the typed name.

Sydney Satterwhite

Certificate of Compliance

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A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James F. Blumstein".

James F. Blumstein

8/2/2023

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on August 2, 2023, a copy of the foregoing Statement of Professor James F. Blumstein as *Amicus Curiae* was mailed by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the following:

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
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Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Esq., Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005

Respectfully submitted,



James F. Blumstein

8/2/2023

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK

TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,
Suite 115
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

July 28, 2023

Mr. James F. Blumstein
2113 Hampton Avenue*
Nashville, TN 37215

No. 22-30333 Robinson v. Ardoin
USDC No. 3:22-CV-211
USDC No. 3:22-CV-214

Dear Mr. Blumstein,

Your motion to file amicus brief has been filed but requires the following corrections:

Your motion does not contain a certificate of conference, pursuant to **5TH CIR. R. 27.4**.

You have not served your motion for leave to file amicus brief on opposing counsel in accordance with **FED. R. APP. P. 25**. Please comply with this rule and attach a certificate of service to the motion. **FED. R. APP. P. 25(d)** provides that the proof of service of documents must include the date and manner of service, the names of the persons served, and their mail or electronic addresses, facsimile numbers or physical delivery addresses, as appropriate for the manner of service. A copy is being forwarded to all counsel.

The proposed amicus brief requires the following corrections:

The brief must include a signature.


A certificate of service is required. (See above)

A certificate of compliance is required. See **FED. R. APP. P. 32(g)(1)** and **27(d)(2)(A)**.

You must e-mail your sufficient motion and brief to: allison_lopez@ca5.uscourts.gov within 10 days from the date of this letter. Failure to comply will result in the deficient documents being stricken for non-compliance.

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk



By: Allison G. Lopez, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7702

cc: Mr. John Nelson Adcock
Ms. Leah Camille Aden
Ms. Nora Ahmed
Mr. E. Mark Braden
Ms. Morgan Brungard
Mr. Amitav Chakraborty
Mr. Thomas A. Farr
Mrs. Angelique Duhon Freel
Mr. Phillip Michael Gordon
Mr. Jonathan Patrick Hawley
Mr. Jonathan Hurwitz
Ms. Abha Khanna
Ms. Renee Marie Knudsen
Mr. Edmund Gerard LaCour Jr.
Mr. Patrick T. Lewis
Ms. Lalitha Madduri
Ms. Katherine McKnight
Mr. Shae Gary McPhee Jr.
Mr. Michael Warren Mengis
Mr. Christopher Ernest Mills
Ms. Jennifer Wise Moroux
Ms. Elizabeth Baker Murrill
Mr. Stuart Naifeh
Ms. Erika Prouty
Mr. Richard Bryan Raile
Mrs. Alyssa Riggins
Ms. Kathryn C. Sadasivan
Mr. Adam Savitt
Ms. Olivia Nicole Sedwick
Mr. Jacob D. Shelly
Mr. Phillip Strach
Mr. Jason Brett Torchinsky
Mr. Jeffrey M. Wale
Mr. John Carroll Walsh
Ms. Victoria Wenger