

No. \_\_\_\_\_

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

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MICHIGAN INDEPENDENT CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, et al.  
APPLICANT,

v.

DONALD AGEE, JR., et al.

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**Appendix to Emergency Application for Stay**

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To the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh  
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and  
Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit

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## APPENDIX

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONALD AGEE, JR. <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	No. 1:22-cv-272
v.	)	
	)	Three-Judge Court
JOCELYN BENSON, in her official	)	
capacity as the Secretary of State	)	
of Michigan, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
Defendants.	)	
_____	)	

KETHLEDGE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MALONEY, J., joined, and NEFF, J., joined in the result. NEFF, J., delivered a separate concurring opinion.

**OPINION AND ORDER**

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. “Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race are by their very nature odious.” *Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission*, 595 U.S. 398, 401 (2022) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs here are nineteen African-American Detroiters who live in thirteen different Michigan House and Senate districts that each include a portion of Detroit. They contend that—in Michigan’s 2021 redistricting of its state legislative districts—the boundaries of their districts were drawn predominantly on the basis of race. Those district lines were drawn by the newly created Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission—a body of 13 citizens, chosen at random, who came to their task with no experience in redistricting and no knowledge of election law. But they hired experts to guide them—notably their “voting rights act legal counsel,” Bruce Adelson, and a political scientist, Dr. Lisa Handley, along with their general counsel, Julianne Pastula.

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Legislative redistricting is usually performed by state legislatures, which usually do not create a contemporary record of their every move during that process. But here the Commission did create such a record: every decision they made, every word they spoke, was recorded in real time in a body of transcripts that runs some 10,000 pages. In that respect the record here is unique among redistricting cases litigated in federal court. That record makes clear that the commissioners relied heavily on their experts' advice, particularly with regard to compliance with the federal Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301. And the record shows, overwhelmingly, that those experts—Adelson, especially—expressly told the commissioners, scores if not hundreds of times, to sort Detroit-area voters into different districts on the basis of race.

Specifically, Adelson and Pastula told the commissioners that, to comply with the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), they must limit the “black voting age population”—known as “BVAP” in redistricting jargon—to approximately 35-45%. That proposition is without support in the Supreme Court’s VRA caselaw. Yet the record further shows that the commissioners did as their experts said—with great difficulty, and misgivings throughout, and over the vociferous objections of Detroit residents at the time—so that, in the end, the Commission limited the percentages of black voters, in the districts at issue here, to the racial targets their experts had given them. And so—in a city whose African-American population is almost 80%—the BVAPs of every Detroit-area district here, with one exception, fell within 35-45%. The exception was Senate District 11, which has a BVAP of 19.19%; but the record shows that most of the African-American voters in that district were put there to lower the BVAP of an adjacent district to the target range.

The record here shows overwhelmingly—indeed, inescapably—that the Commission drew the boundaries of plaintiffs’ districts predominantly on the basis of race. We hold that those districts were drawn in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.



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I.

A.

1.

Every ten years, after a federal census mandated by the Constitution, the states redraw their electoral districts “to account for any changes or shifts in population.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. 461, 489 n.2 (2003). State legislatures usually draw the new district lines. *See Rucho v. Common Cause*, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019). Until recently, Michigan was no exception. Following the 2010 decennial census, for instance, the legislature drafted and adopted maps for the state senate and house. In Detroit, where 77.9% of residents are black, these maps included two senate and ten house districts with black-voter populations greater than 50%.

In November 2018, however, Michigan voters approved a state constitutional amendment that vested the power to redraw legislative-district lines in an “Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission” of citizen laypersons. Mich. Const. art. IV, § 6. As amended, the Michigan Constitution required the Commission to “abide by the following criteria in proposing and adopting” new redistricting plans, “in order of priority:”

- (a) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.
- (b) Districts shall be geographically contiguous. Island areas are considered to be contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part.
- (c) Districts shall reflect the state’s diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.
- (d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.
- (e) Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.

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(f) Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries.

(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact.

Mich. Const. art. IV, § 6(13). (We will refer to these criteria as the “Michigan criteria.”)

In 2020, Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson formed the new Commission by randomly selecting 13 candidates—four Democrats, four Republicans, and five independents—out of a group of more than 9,000 applicants who had expressed an interest in serving on it. Redrawing legislative-district lines (*i.e.*, “redistricting”) is complicated business, both legally and factually. So the Commission began to hire staff, including specialists in mapping software, an executive director, and a general counsel, Julianne Pastula. In September 2020, the Commission began holding meetings; all of them (save one toward the end of the process) were open to the public—and all of them were transcribed.

2.

The Michigan constitution makes compliance with federal law—including the Voting Rights Act and the federal constitution—a categorical imperative in Michigan redistricting. Mich. Const. art. IV, § 6(13)(a). And the federal constitution’s Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, itself would invalidate any district lines drawn in violation of federal law. *See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015). The Commission, for its part, recognized early on that Michigan’s demographics—particularly Detroit’s heavily concentrated African-American population—would require close attention to the VRA in the redistricting process. As the Supreme Court has put it, § 2 of the VRA requires that—when a minority group is large and compact enough to elect its preferred candidates, as black voters obviously are in Detroit—those voters cannot be broken up and “submerged in a larger white voting population” that usually defeats the minority group’s preferred candidates. *Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285, 301-02 (2017)

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(cleaned up). Separately, the federal Equal Protection Clause bars a state—absent an extremely good reason—from “separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.”

*Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections*, 580 U.S. 178, 187 (2017) (cleaned up).

In February 2021, the Commission held a hearing in which it heard from practitioners of federal election law. Among them was Leah Aden of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, who warned that partisan justifications might be used to break up majority-black legislative districts:

[Y]ou’re going to hear people say vote dilution is not happening. This is about party. This is not about race . . . . You’re also going to hear we can’t create this geographically compact minority community. . . . And I want it to be in your head that if minority voters are harmed to achieve partisan power or partisan power is an excuse to harm minority voters, each of those can run afoul of the Constitution and the voting rights act.

MICRC Tr. at 2102.

The Commission also heard from David Becker, formerly of the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division. By way of background, as a practical matter, in “safe” Democratic districts—like districts in and around Detroit—the dispositive election is the Democratic primary, not the general election; for whoever wins the primary will win the general. (The same dynamic holds, of course, for safe Republican seats.) Whether black voters in Democratic districts can elect their preferred candidates, therefore, depends on whether those candidates can win the Democratic primary elections. Becker therefore urged the Commission as follows:

Another thing I really want to stress to you it’s really going to be important to look at primary election results. It’s not just going to be about general elections. As we know there are places in every state, certainly Michigan, where the outcome of the primary is determinative of the general election. . . . And in those places, you have to look at primary elections.

*Id.* at 2106.

Later, the Commission retained Dr. Lisa Handley, an expert in analyzing voting data for purposes of compliance with the VRA. The Commission also retained Bruce Adelson as its

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“voting rights act legal counsel.” Adelson began practicing law in 1984, worked in the Department of Justice from 2000 to 2006, and was counsel to the Arizona redistricting commission in 2011.


B.

The Michigan constitution required the Commission to draft and approve legislative maps no later than November 1, 2021. Mich. Const. art. IV, § 6(7). But the COVID-19 pandemic delayed the Census Bureau’s release of its 2020 census data; and so the Commission did not begin any drafting until August 2021, when that data arrived.


1.

*The Commission’s September 2, 2021 meeting.* This meeting set the course for a great deal of what followed in the next two months. During this meeting, Handley and Adelson alike sought to advise the Commission about the VRA’s requirements. Handley addressed the commissioners first, and went through a power-point presentation in which she said that “redistricting plans cannot crack or pack a geographically concentrated minority community across districts or within a district in a manner than dilutes their voting strength.” *See* Def.’s Ex. 48 at 3. Cracking occurs when a racial group’s members are dispersed “into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters.” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 292 (cleaned up). As an example of unlawful “cracking,” Handley cited (ironically enough, given what shortly followed) the example of a compact racial group that had been broken into five districts, in each of which the group’s members constituted only 35% of the district’s voters:

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See Def.’s Ex. 48 at 3. As an example of unlawful “packing,” Handley offered the example of the same compact racial group—this time packed into a district where it constitutes 100% of voters, thereby denying the group potential majorities in two other districts:



*Id.* Rather than crack or pack districts with large numbers of minority voters, Handley said, the Commission should draw districts that “provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.” MICRC Tr. at 5383-84. To do otherwise—in areas (like Detroit) where minority voters had previously succeeded in electing their preferred candidates—would likely

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violate the VRA. *Id.* at 5378-86. Handley therefore sought to identify the BVAP necessary for black voters to have that “opportunity.” *Id.* at 5384.

That number in part depended on the percentage of white voters, in particular districts, who vote as a “bloc”—meaning they usually prefer white-preferred candidates over black-preferred ones—as opposed to white voters who “cross over” to support black-preferred candidates. *Id.* at 5379, 5384. The greater the white-bloc voting, the higher the BVAP necessary for black voters to elect their preferred candidates; and the greater the “white crossover” voting, the lower the BVAP necessary to elect black-preferred candidates.

Handley’s role in advising the Commission was to analyze election data and then to determine, for different districts, what those necessary black-voter percentages might be. To that end, as relevant here, Handley said she had analyzed the election results in two counties—Wayne (which includes Detroit) and Oakland—for 14 statewide elections in Michigan since 2012 (e.g., the presidential elections in 2016 and 2020). (Handley did not analyze any election results for Macomb County because black voters are scarce there.) But only one of Handley’s 14 elections, the 2018 Democratic gubernatorial primary, was a primary election—which, as the DOJ’s David Becker had explained, is the election that determines the winning candidate for “safe” seats. *Id.* at 5381. And that primary election played no role in Handley’s analysis because black voters had not shown any clear preference in it. *See* R.108 at PageID 3287. Meanwhile, the other 13 elections that Handley analyzed were all general elections—in which voters (black or white) affiliated with the same party usually vote for the same candidate, regardless of what their preferences might have been in the primary. MICRC Tr. at 5381-82.

Based only on that general-election data, however, Handley told the Commission that it need not create majority-black districts in order to comply with the VRA. Instead—without any

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mention of the differences between primary and general elections in Detroit-area districts— Handley said that black voters in Oakland and Wayne counties could consistently elect their preferred candidate in districts with BVAPs as low as 35 and 40%:

In Oakland County, 35% is going to work. 40 percent looks like it might work. In Wayne County where we have a lot more white crossover vote 35% might well work. I'm not advocating that you draw the districts at this amount. I'm advocating that you keep in mind that the districts do not have to be majority-minority in composition[.]

*Id.* at 5386.

Bruce Adelson then addressed the Commission—and he did advocate, then and ever after, that the Commission “draw the districts” at the BVAPs that Handley had specified. Adelson said that Handley’s analysis would be “very crucial” and “very important” “going forward for the Commission[.]” *Id.* at 5389. He added:

But to the point about packing, remember that the [sic] if a district can be established through analysis to be able to elect candidates of choice of the minority community at, let’s say 40%, if you add on population to that, the courts constitute that as packing.

A commissioner asked, “how do we ensure that we don’t unpack it and then it becomes cracked? And therefore, we are not in compliance in the other direction? How do we ensure that?”

*Id.* at 5390. Handley responded:

you look at the recompiled election results to make sure that the districts you have drawn are effective minority districts. So those four contests I mentioned earlier as bellwether contests [namely, the 2012 U.S. presidential, the 2014 secretary of state, the 2018 gubernatorial, and 2020 U.S. presidential general elections] will be in the redistricting package and as you draw . . . you can hit the button that will tell you how those candidates are doing in the proposed district.

*Id.* The “recompiled election results” to which Handley referred, however, came from the general elections she had analyzed. The “button” for measuring how black-preferred candidates “are doing

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in the proposed districts,” therefore, would measure their success only in general elections, not Democratic primaries.

General Counsel Pastula added that “Dr. Handley’s analysis and her findings and Mr. Adelson’s conclusions he is able to draw from those findings will certainly impact the [Commission’s] critical work going forward in redistricting.” *Id.* at 5391. And software consultant Kim Brace told the Commission about another piece of information that would be available to them throughout the districting process: “when you draw you will have the racial percentages on the districts as they are being created so you will see what is the racial characteristics of the District.” *Id.* at 5393.

2.

*Map-drawing begins.* About a week later, the Commission began drawing Detroit-area senate districts. At first, the Commission focused on a variety of the Michigan criteria when mapping, including communities of interest (or “COIs”). For example, Commissioner Rebecca Szetela expressed concerns about the “complex demands of COIs” around Hamtramck including the “Latin X community” and the “environmental concerns” common to communities in southwest Detroit. *Id.* at 5672. And Commissioner Anthony Eid recommended keeping together several communities near where he had grown up. *Id.* at 5675. But the Commission was also worried about “packing” black voters—as its experts had recently defined that term—into districts. On September 9, Commissioner MC Rothhorn asked the mapping specialists to pull up the “layer with the dots that allow[] you to see the racial composition of the areas.” *Id.* at 5676. Adelson concurred, since they were then mapping in “one of the counties that Dr. Handley analyzed to say there is racially polarized voting, I think we need to have the dots.” *Id.* at 5677.



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The Commission soon began to wrestle with the tension between preserving communities of interest, on the one hand, and what they understood—again, based on what their experts had told them—as “VRA compliance,” on the other. On September 13, for example, Rothhorn asked the other commissioners to “watch those numbers [*i.e.*, racial percentages] as we add districts.” *Id.* at 5733. Eid acknowledged the difficulty of drawing districts in an area with a “very large minority population,” and said, “I don’t know a way to get around it unless we start drawing these districts into the suburbs.” *Id.* Likewise, Commissioner Douglas Clark said that “the only way to resolve that is to go into the suburbs but that is not what the people want. . . That is what I heard in the two town halls or public hearings we had in Detroit.” *Id.* General Counsel Pastula responded:

The districts . . . do not appear to be able to be unpacked unless you go in the suburbs. . . . And while I certainly acknowledge and respect the public comment received, the Voting Rights Act being the first criteria is going to need to be respected and adhered to.

*Id.* at 5734.

Later, Commissioner Szetela echoed this advice. Clark had emphasized that residents of some Detroit neighborhoods near Grosse Pointe—a wealthy, mostly white city next door—had said specifically “during the hearings that they don’t want to be associated with Grosse Pointe because all the money tends to or all the influence tends to flow to Grosse Pointe because they have more money.” *Id.* at 5747. Szetela responded that “I’m trying to balance the Voting Rights Act” against those concerns “because [the] Voting Rights Act is our number one” criterion and “I don’t want to have a super concentrated District.” *Id.* When she finished drawing, she told the Commission to look “at the percentages of African/Americans in District 8. It’s just below 50% so it’s still a minority majority District based on Dr. Handley’s reporting but it’s not packing people in which is exactly what I was trying to accomplish.” *Id.* at 5748.

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Later in the same meeting, Rothhorn told Clark to use the racial-dots tool while mapping because “this is another VRA area and we may want to be aware of the Black white” population. *Id.* at 5765. At the end of the day on September 13, the Commission saved a draft senate map (Draft Map 162) that included three majority-minority districts. As relevant here, the districts that became Senate Districts 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 11 had the following BVAPs:

District No.		1	3	6	8	10	11
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>Senate Map Plan 162</b>	9/13/2021	10.98	50.82	76.56	63.77	18.1	7.8

That evening, Pastula sent Szetela—who had just been elected Chair of the Commission—an email in which she expressed “Significant Concerns” that she and Adelson shared about that day’s mapping session. Specifically, Pastula told Szetela:

Bruce [Adelson] and I are very concerned and alarmed about the drafting of the packed districts that is occurring during today’s mapping session. While the work is preliminary and future steps can be taken to remediate—this will become much more difficult the more packed districts that are drawn. In addition to not being able to justify the numbers coming out of today to a court, these drafts also create expectations on behalf of the public that will also be difficult to address moving forward.

Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 45. Pastula added that it would be “critical” for the Commission to use the bellwether-elections tool in the “areas where the VRA was implicated,” and that the “Commission is running out of time and [has] an enormous amount of work to do.” *Id.*

The next morning, the mapping specialists installed the “bellwether-elections” tool and taught the Commission how to use it. *See* MICRC Tr. at 5803-05. Adelson then went into a long monologue in which he emphasized the following:

One of the things that I would strongly advise and something that we will be talking a lot about over the next couple of weeks is really study and internalize, Lisa

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Handley's, Dr. Handley's PowerPoint. . . . I have read her Power Point virtually every day for the last few weeks. . . .

Packing means adding or including additional minority voters [beyond] the ones needed to elect what we call candidates of choice. . . .

So look at the percentages here [in Handley's presentation]. Black VAP and percent of the vote and you kind of get a sense of [sic] to highlight in a real way and again going back to the vitality of Dr. Handley's PowerPoint how the districts are created and how many people from which backgrounds are included. . . .

And what I would suggest in moving forward in the areas where you are now, typically aim for Black populations in the 40-45% range. It's a rough estimate. . . . [A]nd remember that the aim, *the requirement of the law is to avoid packing minorities into districts above and beyond the percentage at which analysis [meaning Handley's analysis] is determined they need to elect candidates of choice.*

*Id.* at 5810-12 (emphasis added).

Over the next two days, the Commission tried to “unpack” Detroit's majority-black districts. For example, Commissioner Brittini Kellom—herself a Detroiter—said she was “thinking about utilizing Bruce to look at the Metro Detroit area and kind of unpack.” *Id.* at 5825. Adelson responded that she should “remember Dr. Handley's analysis” because “there is good general white cross over support in Wayne County.” *Id.* at 5826. He also said the 36% black-voter population in a draft district was “close to the line” and “I always like to be cautious and not do it exactly 35%, 36% right on the nose. I like to build in a little bit of a cushion.” *Id.* Clark advised Kellom to follow a road boundary while drafting, because that would help to “dilute the Black population.” *Id.* at 5842. Later, as Commissioner Cynthia Orton drafted districts in western Detroit, Adelson said that “District 13 is 71% over all minority and 62% Black population. So I would suggest that all will need to be looked at as well.” *Id.* at 5871. Chair Szetela suggested drawing in Detroit narrowly, “like a spoke coming out” from downtown, so that the Commission could “balance” and “get rid of the highly concentrated [African-American] districts.” *Id.* at 5872.

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On September 15, Rothhorn imitated the “spoke” concept and explained that he was trying to “decrease the minority percentage [] to have a more balanced Black-white ratio.” *Id.* at 5896-5902. The Commission also began to employ the bellwether-elections tool to see whether black-preferred candidates would prevail in the draft districts—which they always did, because the tool measured the success of Democratic candidates in general elections for Democratic safe seats. *See, e.g., id.* at 5876.

Yet some commissioners expressed concern with the way they were drawing maps. Commissioner Juanita Curry—who was herself from Detroit—said, “I’m just a little off on keeping some places whole and some places not . . . . For instance like Detroit we split it up some.” Szetela responded that Adelson had directed the Commission to split up the city to comply with the VRA:

[W]e specifically split up Detroit because our expert, Bruce Adelson had—was uncomfortable with the districts we originally came up with because they were highly concentrated African/American communities to the point where he said that it would likely violate the [VRA]. And so he had indicated that we should try to get those percentages down to maybe 40% African/American population.

*Id.* at 5937.

By September 15, the Commission had completed its first full senate map (Draft Map 165) which reduced the number of black-majority districts in Detroit from three to two:

District No.		1	3	6	8	10	11
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>Senate Map Plan 162</b>	9/13/2021	10.98	50.82	76.56	63.77	18.1	7.8
<b>Senate Map Plan 165</b>	9/15/2021	34.86	44.87	51.99	59.06	49.38	11.02

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*Mapping continues.* Beginning five days later, from September 20 to 28, the Commission drafted its initial Detroit-area house map. Adelson reiterated at the outset that “[a]ny district that has majority-minority VAP I think you should aim to let’s see what we can do to kind of potentially unpack that based on Dr. Handley’s analysis. . . . Because just as Dr. Handley said if you can elect [at] 35%, 40% then why would you add 40, 50% minority population?” *Id.* at 6204. Yet the Commission struggled to do what Adelson said. Commissioner Eid, for instance, said, “So I’m just trying to think about how we are going to do this because I mean the population density [of] African/Americans is so high in Detroit it’s probably going to cause a problem with packing unless we have some districts that people may view as oddly shaped[.]” *Id.* at 6205. Szetela agreed: “I don[’t] really know what to do because the Senate districts you saw we sort of stretched them out and I don’t know how to do it with House Districts and I don’t know how we can avoid having house [districts] that are going to be like 75, 85% African/American[.]” *Id.* at 6205-06.

Rothhorn—who had just been elected Vice Chair—then began mapping the area that became House District 1 in southwest Detroit. At first he drew boundaries based on communities of interest, such as “Greektown” and the “Latin X community[.]” *Id.* at 6210-12. But Rothhorn checked the draft district’s racial percentages continually as he drew. *Id.* at 6213. Then Szetela drew what became House District 2—which had a “Bengali community” that she did not “want to split[.]” *Id.* at 6219. But that made the district’s BVAP too high: “now the problem is it’s 77% African/American. I think that’s where the challenge is. So is there anything I can do about that?” *Id.* at 6219. Adelson responded, “I think that [] in exploring the other areas around this District and downtown and greater Detroit there may be other populations that either you could include, you could take some of two and add them to other parts of the City.” *Id.* at 6219. Rothhorn echoed Adelson, telling Szetela “that Hamtramck could be another spoke heading north” and that this

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“will dilute the Black population. I shouldn’t say dilute right. It would be more balanced.” *Id.* at 6220.

Szetela took that advice, and found that “making that change makes a difference. It brings [it] down [] to 54% African/American from where it was.” *Id.* at 6220. Adelson approved, saying the Commission had done:

a substantial job with [the] percentage of the Black population. It kind of shows you that there are ways to approach it. Wherever you find the population east, west or north because I mean you brought it down, I think almost 25% without doing too many adjustments. So I think that you’ll find other ways going forward so that [] with this concept of whether it’s going north or whatever direction I think you will be able to find population to balance the District.

*Id.* at 6221. Rothhorn noted the map’s new configuration: “Detroit has spokes.” *Id.* at 6222. Szetela finished drawing the district and explained that she tried to “draw a District that is compliant with the Voting Rights Act by not packing the African/American community.” *Id.* at 6223.

The Commission thereafter repeatedly used the racial-dots tool to identify high-density African-American communities and then to dilute them using the spoke method. For example, Szetela and Clark collaborated to draw what became House District 10. Clark feared that “[w]e are going to end up with an African/American population that is going to be pretty significant.” *Id.* at 6410. Szetela recommended “grabbing population” from “the Grosse Pointes[.]” *Id.* at 6411. Clark countered, “that eastern part of Detroit specifically said they don’t want to be part of Grosse Pointe.” *Id.* But Szetela said “we have to remember that VRA is first on our list. And so we have to look at accommodating VRA first. And if that requires Grosse Pointe to do it, I think that is where we need to look first.” *Id.* The Commission then added several Grosse Pointe communities to the map, with Adelson assuring them that “the west of Grosse Pointe park does elect [minority] candidates of choice[.]” *Id.* at 6411-16. But Adelson later said that the BVAP in an adjacent

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district—what became House District 11—was still too high, and that having a “minority population that is so in excess of [Dr. Handley’s] opportunity to elect percentage would be difficult to justify.” *Id.* at 6420, 6426, 6433. Clark adjusted the district lines and explained that “what I’m trying to do is reduce the Black population.” *Id.* at 6434.

Adelson frequently used the bellwether-elections tool to check the Commission’s draft districts for “VRA compliance.” *See, e.g.*, 6454-56, 6467-68, 6474. Vice Chair Rothhorn, for instance, finished drawing what became House District 15 and said that he had been “mostly concerned about vote dilution.” *Id.* at 6440. Adelson then used the bellwether-elections tool and reported that, in the district, “across the board the candidates of choice win.” *Id.* at 6441.

Later, Orton drafted what became House Districts 12 and 13. She initially focused on District 12 and tried to keep certain neighborhoods together, such as Eastpointe and Detroit. *Id.* at 6476. But soon she asked the mapping specialist: “Can we also put on the African/American theme,” i.e., the racial-dots tool. *Id.* Then Orton said, “I don’t think we are going to be able to get up into lower[-percentage] minority areas. So that might be a problem. So it looks to me like in order to try to balance it more racially, we would have to split this into two [districts] and do two spokes up.” *Id.* Commissioner Kellom agreed with that approach. *Id.* Orton then continued drafting. In what became District 12, she retained a precinct because it added “a little more white population in to balance it.” *Id.* at 6479. Adelson again used the bellwether-elections tool to confirm that the district elected African-American candidates of choice “across the board.” *Id.* at 6481.

Rothhorn summarized the Commission’s work—in what became House Districts 12, 13, and 14—as “trying to peel off pieces or create spokes, chutes and ladders to create a, yeah, a more racially balanced District.” *Id.* at 6515. Adelson said the Commission was trying “not to pack

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voters of color, Black voters beyond the point at which they can elect candidates of choice,” but urged the Commission to “please be aware of the terminology” it used to describe its work. *Id.* at 6515-16.

As mapping continued, some commissioners became concerned with how the Commission was breaking up communities of interest to create racially balanced districts. For example, Rothhorn said, “We are being challenged here in our House District and you know with sincere apologies to breaking up a COI but I think we had to do that with Grosse Pointes like we are going to have to make hard choices.” *Id.* at 6573. Orton added, “I’m really uncomfortable with all the communities of interest we are cutting up.” *Id.* Adelson acknowledged those concerns, but said “if you look at those districts that were created, I mean there were some hard choices that were made. And acute awareness of what the imperatives were but you created some districts that right now seem pretty strong. As far as Voting Rights Act issues and maintaining the ability to elect.” *Id.* at 6575. Orton remained concerned: “So my feeling is I’m uncomfortable with the amount of communities and communities of interest that were are splitting up [] from a Voting Rights Act perspective.” *Id.* at 6619. Adelson responded at length:

You know, just this discussion the last couple minutes really shows you know kind of being on the knife’s edge in the sense of that I understand is very clear that you’re weighing, competing considerations. And I think that the issues about communities of interest and keeping sort of communities together are I’ve read a lot of public comments in general and I understand that that is a significant consideration. . . . But I think it is very important from a compliance standpoint to look at the ranked criteria and the number one criteria is the U.S. Constitution and Federal law.

*Id.* at 6618-19.

On September 23, Commissioner Steven Lett drafted what became House District 26, west of downtown Detroit. He asked for the racial-dots “thematic,” drew the district boundaries, and ended with a black-voter population of 34.5%. *Id.* at 6724, 6726. Rothhorn said that percentage



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was “a little bit low,” but Lett responded that Handley’s report had said districts with those percentages “elected a candidate of choice.” *Id.* at 6727. Adelson interjected that in “Wayne County, the percentage of the vote where a Black candidate would win at 35% VAP. Yes. Wayne County performs in that respect . . . . So I think to your point, yes, according to Dr. Handley’s analysis that in Wayne County, Wayne County can elect candidates of choice at 35% VAP.” *Id.* at 6727.

Then came a dissonant note, as Adelson conceded the importance of data from party primaries. He said:

often in areas where there is a propensity to elect minority candidates of choice, the elections are often decided in the primary. Rather than the general. So having primary results to not compare with but to supplement general results is really important. In my experience it’s certainly something I’ve always been able to look at. We had a lot of primary results in Arizona for example. So I think that it is important to have.

*Id.* at 6729. Orton asked, “will we get that information?” *Id.* But the discussion meandered elsewhere and she did not get an answer.

That same day—September 23—General Counsel Pastula reminded the Commission that “partisan fairness” was another criterion to consider. She explained, though, that “partisan fairness is measured on a statewide plan.” *Id.* at 6712. That meant the Commission could measure partisan fairness only when it finished a statewide plan, rather than as it went along. Nor did the Commission yet have a software tool to evaluate partisan fairness. *See* R.112 at PageID 3675.

In that same meeting, Pastula gave the Commission some more specific BVAP numbers that it should strive to meet: “for Saginaw County looking at notes I have 40% to 45, Genesee was 35-40%. Saginaw is 40% so I wanted to make sure that I updated that from my prior statement. And Oakland County I wrote 42-43% just to be different there but for Saginaw County 40% would be the appropriate measure.” MICRC Tr. at 6768. Orton said that recently she “could not get to

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that threshold of the 35-40% or maybe it was 40% in that County”; Pastula responded that she “would encourage the Commission to do their best efforts at this time.” *Id.*

For the next several days, the Commission almost exclusively mapped outside of Detroit. On September 28, the Commission completed its draft house map and saved it as Draft Map 183. As relevant here, the districts that became House Districts 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14 had the following BVAPs:

<b>District No.</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>House Map Plan 183</b>	9/28/2021	28.62	79.04	54.09	42.74	65.66	43.74	38.33

4.

*September 29 to 30: Revisions to House map.* The Commission then revised its initial maps with the aim of what Pastula called “compliance analysis.” *Id.* at 7168. The Commission began with areas outside of Detroit, and discussed making changes based on the Michigan criteria of “communities of interest,” “partisan fairness,” and not favoring incumbents. *Id.* at 7162-63. Adelson then interjected: “I also wanted to make the point that as you recall . . . I believe these were the State House districts in the Wayne County area. That several of them are . . . have the appearance of being packed. And that is something that must be addressed. That is one of the changes I envision.” He added, “I don’t have a list of things . . . [an] inclusive list [that] must be addressed. But the [p]acked districts are [an] absolute.” *Id.* at 7164.

The discussion then returned to mapping outside of Detroit, to different ways of measuring partisan fairness, and to Dr. Handley’s upcoming visit to the Commission—her first since the

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outset of its map-drawing—to give a presentation on partisan fairness. But Adelson again steered the Commission back to “packing” and the VRA:

your legal team agrees that Friday is significant in that Dr. Handley will hopefully be able to present partisan fairness. But it is important and I’m sorry I’m going to speak for you. I will speak in one voice that the legal team strongly believes there are issues in addition of course to the partisan fairness. There are many voting rights issues and just in talking about the packed districts in Wayne County . . . So there are other considerations. Certainly we agree with the partisan fairness and that is significant. But there are other issues.

*Id.* at 7167.

At this point, the Commission began to revise house districts in the Detroit area, which Szetela called “bacon strip districts,” based on their shapes extending to the northern suburbs. *Id.* at 7194. She then made changes to draft House Districts 14, 15, and 17—west of downtown Detroit—and noted that she had lowered those districts’ BVAPs: “So you can see that [District 14] dropped from 74% African American to 61 . . . And then 15 dropped from 62.7 to 50.2. And 17 dropped from 69.29 to 56.4.” *Id.* at 7198. Adelson responded that the “percentages are still higher than Dr. Handley’s analysis but I think that is a good start to adjusting and to be more in line with her racially polarized voting analysis and the ability to elect. So while . . . the Black population is still higher than her analysis determined it is still significantly improved from what it had been previously.” *Id.* Rothhorn asked, “Do we need to look at the election results?” *Id.* at 7199. Adelson responded, “as far as the election results, as I recall these districts all proved out pretty well. I think that I would recommend focusing on percentages and comparing them to Dr. Handley’s [BVAP] percentages for Wayne County which as I recall is 35-40%[.]” *Id.* He added that the Wayne County districts required “additional tinkering” which “is going to impact commenters’ preferences on keeping communities whole.” *Id.* “But,” he reminded them, “the

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Voting Rights Act is the number one criterion together with the one person one vote in the U.S. Constitution.” *Id.*

The Commission followed Adelson’s guidance, concluding that the only way to reach the BVAPs in Handley’s report was to continue to stretch districts into predominately white suburbs. *Id.* at 7199-7200. For several Wayne County house districts Rothhorn suggested changes that would “better comply with [the] VRA bringing down the Black voting age population to a range that is closer to 40%.” *Id.* at 7201. Adelson approved, saying the Commission was “figuring out the percentages [corresponding] with Dr. Handley’s analysis.” *Id.* at 7202.

Again, however, some commissioners raised concerns about the lengths they had gone toward that end. For example, Commissioner Dustin Witjes asked, “Looking at the districts we have, how much thinner can they get and how much further can they exten[d] out before they are one precinct or one actual voting precinct wide?” *Id.* at 7219. Commissioner Orton then expressed that she thought the house map was already “VRA compliant” in Detroit and that they should “pay attention to communities of interest” going forward. *Id.* at 7222. Commissioner Janice Vallette agreed. *Id.* at 7222-23. But Adelson said that the district that became House District 11 had a “64% non-Hispanic Black voting age population” and that the BVAP for what became House District 7 was “almost 77% non-Hispanic Black voting age population . . . these numbers are well in [ex]cess of what Dr. Handley analyzed. And in [ex]cess of what I’ve advised the Commission.” *Id.* at 7223. Pastula agreed and “strongly encourage[d]” the Commission to “start fixing them.” *Id.* at 7224.

But Commissioner Rhonda Lange was still focused on communities of interest. Specifically, she said, “I understand VRA []comes above other criteria but we have a criteria of community of interest so if we receive input of community of interest that says they absolutely do

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not want to be split and that drives up the African/American population, then is there leeway in that VRA because we are accommodating for a community of interest which is also part of our state Constitution?” *Id.* at 7225. Adelson responded:

your question goes right to the core of one aspect of redistricting there are competing values and there will be people who may be satisfied or not satisfied. But the bottom line is that if keeping communities of interest, not splitting them, having them implicates the packing of minority voters, the dilution of minority voters then the number one criteria is the Federal criteria . . . the bottom line is the Federal criteria are the absolute priority. And there may be communities of interest that are not able to be included in certain districts because they implicate Voting Rights Act problems.

*Id.* at 7225.

Pastula then recommended that the Commission identify any district “that is higher than 40% for the Black voting age population[.]” so that “those quote unquote fixes can be dealt with and then this map can be ready for the partisan fairness analysis. . . . I would recommend that anything with higher than 40% Black voting age population be looked at.” *Id.* at 7226-27. Szetela said, “I think what she is suggesting [is] we just go down the districts one by one and anything that is over 40% look if we can rebalance it.” *Id.* at 7228. Orton said, “this is a densely populated minority population City so does that mean anything above 40% is not VRA compliant?” *Id.* at 7229. Szetela said, “Commissioner Lange, that is my understanding of what we are looking for is we are trying to bring things down to 35-40%[.]” *Id.* Pastula then referenced Dr. Handley’s report and again offered concrete guidance: “the range for Detroit was 35-40%, Oakland County was above 40%. So it’s based on the area you were in, that is why, that’s why . . . I flagged the 40%.” *Id.* at 7230. She recommended that the Commission could “just make a list and then go back and start fixing them.” *Id.*

The Commission then resumed mapping. It started by revising what later became House Districts 7 and 11 because they had the “highest” black-voter percentages at 76% and 64%,

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respectively. *Id.* at 7232. Commissioner Curry first revised what became District 7, and acknowledged that she needed to “reduce” the black-voter population there to “40, 45” percent. *Id.* at 7234. Curry made adjustments that “took out a lot of African/American population.” *Id.* at 7235. Yet the BVAPs remained high, so Curry determined that the “only way to go is up north” to reduce them. *Id.* at 7239. She did so and reduced the BVAP for that district from “over 75% to about 60%.” *Id.* at 7240. Commissioner Eid said that result was “not perfect but headed in the right direction.” *Id.*

Eid then revised what became House District 11, adding predominately white suburban areas, including Grosse Pointe Woods—which reduced the district’s BVAP from 64% to 53%. *Id.* at 7241. But several commissioners again complained that they had disregarded what the public had said about preserving communities of interest in that area. *Id.* at 7241-42. Commission Orton, for instance, said “I still think we should try and keep the communities of interest together . . . . I hate to split them up.” *Id.* at 7242. Eid responded, “I agree with you. And I hate to split them up but I think for this house map I don’t see another way to do it because that is where the white population is around Detroit . . . . we need to get [the map] to be compliant.” *Id.* Commissioner Clark echoed Orton’s critique saying, “that Section of Detroit at the public hearings [said] they did not want to be connected with Grosse Pointe.” *Id.* But General Counsel Pastula responded that they should continue to strive to reach their “goal” of reducing the districts’ BVAPs to the percentages listed Handley’s analysis. *Id.* at 7243. Eid responded that “I will just continue to finish fixing this.” *Id.*

Around this time, Adelson and Pastula had sidebar conversations with Chair Szetela and Vice Chair Rothhorn. According to Szetela, “the hammer came down on the Commission” and Adelson and Pastula said the Commission needed to “stop thinking about communities of interest,

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to stop thinking about keeping municipal boundaries together” and instead “solely focus on race because we needed to bring these districts down.” R.112 at PageID 3662-63.

Accordingly, Szetela then developed an alternative map that brought “percentages down in most districts below 40%.” MICRC Tr. at 7270-71. She presented this map to the Commission and said she “did what Mr. Adelson asked and tried to lower the numbers,” but acknowledged that, to do so, she had created “some crazy sho[e] string districts.” *Id.* at 7271.

The Commission thereafter continued working on what became House Districts 10 and 11. Some commissioners observed that the districts had not yet reached the “35-40%” goal for Wayne County. *Id.* at 7277. Adelson responded that the changes were an “improvement” and that the Commission was “moving in the right direction” but was not “finished.” *Id.* He encouraged the Commission to continue its “systematic approach” of “going down the list literally of the districts and looking at the voting age population.” *Id.* at 7279.

Later, Commissioner Kellom revised what became House District 8, reducing its black-voter percentage to 56. *Id.* at 7279-80. Adelson encouraged her: “Well look at what you’ve done in just a few minutes. You are diversifying the district and addressing [] the compliance concerns.” *Id.* He then told the Commission to “keep to that systematic approach.” *Id.* at 7281. But some commissioners sought further guidance. Commissioner Eid, for instance, asked, “What is the highest percentage [a district] can be to fend off legal challenges in the future?” *Id.* at 7283. Adelson, referring to what became House District 8, said “there is no like absolute magic bullet . . . but 53.85% yes, it’s an improvement.” He added, “my feeling is that there is more to be done here. Because I am [loth] to just say creating 54, 55, 56% majority minority districts in an area that analysis is determined, Black voters can elect at percentages lower. I’m not prepared to do that.” *Id.* at 7283.

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The Commission then reduced the black-voter population in several districts by connecting downtown African-American communities with still more suburban ones. That led Szetela to tell the Commission that “I think we can accomplish what Mr. Adelson is suggesting we do. It’s just going to require a little creativity.” *Id.* at 7343-44. Later, Commissioner Clark commented on the development of the map: “we took those spokes and went so far north and so far west. . . . But it’s a tradeoff. I mean we have to get compliant so we have to do something and we made the decision to go the route with the spokes.” *Id.* at 7348. By the end of the day on September 30, the Commission had produced Draft Map 193.

District No.		1	7	8	10	11	12	14
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>House Map Plan 183</b>	9/28/2021	28.62	79.04	54.09	42.74	65.66	43.74	38.33
<b>House Map Plan 193</b>	9/30/2021	36.58	66.54	50.37	58.44	49.23	43.74	39.21

The next day, the Commission paused mapping while Dr. Handley gave a presentation on partisan fairness. She provided several metrics to measure partisan fairness and presented “some political fairness scores for some of the plans” the Commission had already drawn. *Id.* at 7375. Handley said she was “surprised and pleased” to see that their efforts “to adjust the VRA numbers” were “producing better measures” for partisan fairness. *Id.* at 7410. She also explained that the mapping specialists were developing a partisan-fairness tool that “was almost ready” and which would allow it to “run political fairness reports whenever you have a plan that you want to run it on.” *Id.* at 7375.

Dr. Handley also reiterated Pastula’s point that this analysis “can only be done off of a complete plan.” *Id.* at 7380. And Handley, Adelson, and Szetela reminded the Commission that



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the state constitution elevated other criteria, including “compliance” with the Voting Rights Act, over partisan fairness. *Id.* at 7382, 7386-87.

5.

*October 4: Revisions to Senate map.* On October 4, the Commission began its “compliance analysis” of the senate map. At first some commissioners were confused, thinking they had already drawn a VRA-“compliant” senate map. Adelson was absent at this time, but General Counsel Pastula said that Adelson “didn’t sign off” on the senate plan and that it would be “an excellent use of time” to “get those Metro Detroit districts closer to the 30 to 40% [BVAP] range.” *Id.* at 7436, 7440. She reiterated her earlier guidance:

I wanted to also address again the narrative that 50% minority is the—that is not the courts have not supported that wholesale adoption of 50% or 51%. What Dr. Handley’s racial bloc voting analysis has given the Commission is the benchmarks and the guide rails for each of the Counties that need to be adjusted. [In] Wayne County [it] is 35-40%. Genessee is 35-40. Saginaw is 40-45%. And Oakland County is 42, 43%. Again that would provide the opportunity to elect. So you don’t need districts with 60% minority voting age population in any of those four Counties to achieve compliance.

*Id.* at 7440. Pastula referred to these percentages as “the goals identified [] by your racial bloc voting analysis. And the interpretation by your Voting Rights Act counsel,” meaning Adelson. *Id.* at 7441. Clark expressed frustration with this goal, responding: “Now [I] know they want it lower but sometimes you just can’t do that because of the distribution of the people.” *Id.* at 7439. Rothhorn replied: “I think what we can interpret from [our legal counsel’s] advice is if we don’t try to get to 35%, we have not done our due diligence and therefore we may be exposing ourselves to a legal risk we might be able to defend ourselves against but can’t guarant[ee] that.” *Id.*

The Commission duly started to revise its senate map. Commissioner Vallette worked on what became Senate District 10, employing the spoke technique to stretch the district “back up north” to reduce its black-voter population. *Id.* at 7441-42. Rothhorn approved: “Looks like [the

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district] has reduced from 47.3 to 45.8 so you are definitely heading in the right direction, Janice.”

*Id.* at 7442. Rothhorn also asked Vallette to consider communities of interest as she drew the district. *Id.* at 7444. But Witjes interjected: “Don’t worry” about the “community of interest . . . That should [] not [be] something we’re looking at. We should be going into looking at just complying with the Voting Rights Act.” *Id.* Commissioner Vallette soon finished working on the district, and Szetela said: “Brought your African/American [population] below 40%. So now you are perfectly in the sweet spot of 35-40.” *Id.* at 7446.

Next, Commissioner Richard Weiss adjusted what became Senate District 3. Rothhorn said “we are currently at 43.25 so you want to try to get it to 35-40” BVAP, and reminded him that “we are not focusing on COI.” *Id.* at 7446-47. Szetela also suggested that Weiss try and find “more white populations” and that his “best bet is going to look up along the border into Oakland County.” *Id.* at 7447. Weiss did so; as he reached into Oakland County, Commissioner Lett interjected, “What’s the target for Macomb? Oakland[.]” Rothhorn responded, “Oakland County the target is 42 to 43ish.” *Id.* at 7449. Weiss reduced the black-voter population, finished drafting, and again Szetela said, “you are in the sweet spot at this point.” *Id.* at 7450.

Commissioner Witjes then revised what became Senate Districts 6 and 8. *Id.* As with the other districts, he sought to dilute the black-voter population in each by “going north.” *Id.* In what became District 8, for instance, he drew the district north to include the entire the city of Birmingham—one of the wealthiest communities in Michigan, where the median household income is \$151,556—thereby uniting it with portions of Detroit, where the median household income is \$37,761. Birmingham city, Michigan, U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/birminghamcitymichigan/PST045222> (last visited Dec. 21, 2023); Detroit city, Michigan, U.S. Census Bureau,

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<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/detroitcitymichigan,MI/PST045222> (last visited Dec. 21, 2023).

Commissioner Clark was alarmed, saying, “When you go into Birmingham, we are stretching this thing all the way from mid-Detroit all the way up there.” *Id.* at 7451. Szetela replied, “What other way is [there] to get VRA [compliance]?” *Id.* Rothhorn observed: “Started [at] 57.32 now we are 44.13 nice work.” *Id.* at 7453. Witjes asked, “What does it need to go down to?” *Id.* Szetela answered, “Wayne is 40 ideally. 35-40%.” *Id.* Witjes then reduced what became District 8’s black-voter population to 41.77%, and began working on what became District 6. *Id.* at 7455. Szetela said he should “balance” the district by going north: “you’re going to bring it into Farmington and that will reduce your African/American population.” *Id.* Witjes managed to reduce the district’s black-voter population to 40.7%. *Id.* at 7464. He explained: the “rationale for these adjustment[s] this is taking into account the Voting Rights Act and looking at the voting age population and the Black voting age population to make them so that they . . . so the districts are able to elect candidates of choice.” *Id.*

At this point, as before, some commissioners aired concerns. Eid said, “I don’t like splitting up Canton and I don’t like splitting up Farmington . . . if we have to split both of them, we have to split it but I would rather them be whole.” *Id.* at 7468. Curry added that what became Senate District 1 looked “crazy” and “terrible,” and said, “I mean it just looks like somebody just said well we don’t care about Detroit.” *Id.* at 7469. Rothhorn responded, “I think the reason it’s drawn if my understanding is correct Commissioner Curry it’s related to the VRA. Right where the white and Black populations are balanced.” Curry retorted, “It may be balanced but it looks too crazy.” *Id.* Sarah Reinhardt, attending on behalf of the Michigan Secretary of State’s office,

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then reminded the Commission that compactness was the state constitution's "lowest ranked criteri[on]." *Id.* at 7470.

The Commission thereafter revised what became Senate Districts 5, 6, and 13. *Id.* at 7470. Because the districts bordered one another, the black-voter population fluctuated as commissioners made changes. *See e.g., id.* at 7470-76. Ultimately, though, the Commission continued to lower the percentages towards the goals provided by Adelson and Pastula. As this process went on, Commissioner Curry continued to express concern about splitting up communities of interest. But Rothhorn responded that, "the reason I think we are trying to split it is we are trying to get the numbers that we were given from Dr. Handley at 35% with the Black voting age population that is 35%[.]" *Id.* at 7480. Adelson agreed, saying "as you know it's very important if not essential that Dr. Handley's analysis be followed for compliance." *Id.* at 7481. He added, "the Supreme Court has made it very clear that if you pack voters, if voters are put in a District in [ex]cess of what racial bloc voting analysis shows, that's an issue. And I know we have talked about that. And we are going to continue to adhere to it." *Id.*

Adelson later said the Commission should not try to adhere to single number of "35%, 45%"; instead, he said, "having a range, 35-40%, 40-45%, yeah, I think that's more advisable." *Id.* at 7482. Eid then responded with his own doubts about the premises of Handley's analysis:

I'm becoming increasingly uncomfortable with this direction that we're going under. Because while it is unpacking the districts you know we don't have any District that is close to 90%, 70% or even 60%. But you know the numbers that we are hitting it just makes me question how is that going to work with actually electing a candidate of choice. And I think part of the problem I have with this understanding is the analysis did not include primary election results. So like if we look at District 17 here. We have it at 35.14% Black voting age population. If you have a primary election where there is two Black candidates and a white candidate how is it that you know the candidate of choice is actually going to get elected? I understand that in the general election, yes. All of these districts that we draw are going to be democratic districts. But that's not where the choice actually happens in these areas.

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*Id.* at 7483. Adelson acknowledged that the Commission had data for only one statewide primary election—“the 2018 gubernatorial primary,” which Handley had said was not probative in her analysis—but Adelson said “we have to work with what we have.” *Id.* at 7485. He added that this circumstance “is something that is a little different for me. I really have not been in a situation where so few contested primary elections are on the table.” *Id.*

Later, Adelson used the bellwether-elections tool (which one could fairly call a “general-elections tool”) to check the Commission’s work. Again he found that African-American “candidates of choice prevail” in what became Senate District 10. And again he said that “it’s important to remember the U.S. Supreme Court has been absolutely clear that if you put additional minority voters into a District beyond what is needed to elect candidates of choice that’s an issue.” *Id.* at 7489. (Adelson never provided any legal support for that assertion.)

During this process, Adelson approved the “42-43%” goal for Oakland County, calling it a “good kind of benchmark guidepost.” *Id.* at 7495. He also told the Commission that—unlike Congressional plans, for which the Supreme Court requires the population of each district to be very nearly the same—the Commission had “a lot more leeway” to deviate from that rule in drawing state legislative districts. *Id.* at 7500. Adelson also said he approved of changes the Commission had recently made. *See, e.g., id.* at 7509. Eid said the opposite: “I don’t like the changes at all,” adding, “while it’s better for or might be better for VRA reasons it’s really much worse for community of interest reasons.” *Id.* at 7510. But Rothhorn reminded him that the “VRA” was “criteria number one,” adding, “I know it hurts believe me.” *Id.*

The Commission then determined that it had achieved its VRA compliance goals. Only then did it turn to partisan fairness and “compactness” considerations. In doing so, however, the Commission focused almost exclusively on districts outside of the Detroit area.

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The Commission accordingly made no further changes to the Detroit-area districts and saved its new draft as Draft Map 199. The number of districts with black-voter population percentages above 50% now stood at zero—making Draft Map 199 “an almost final map.” R.112 at PageID 3677.

District No.		1	3	6	8	10	11
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
Senate Map Plan 162	9/13/2021	10.98	50.82	76.56	63.77	18.1	7.8
Senate Map Plan 165	9/15/2021	34.86	44.87	51.99	59.06	49.38	11.02
Senate Map Plan 199	10/04/2021	36.73	43.35	40.03	42.45	41.20	18.42

6.

*More house revisions.* The House map still had some districts with BVAPs above 50%, however, and on October 5, the Commission returned to revising it. The Commission decided to use the “same process” it did in the senate, “going District by District looking at VRA[.]” MICRC Tr. at 7639. As before, the commissioners used the “African/American dots” tool to help them see black-voter populations as they mapped. *Id.* at 7640. The first to draft that day, Commissioner Weiss, told the mapping specialist he did not want to use the software’s neighborhoods overlay—a tool for keeping neighborhoods whole if the Commission so chose—because “we are looking at VRA.” *Id.* at 7642. He then adjusted the district based primarily on its black-voter population percentage. *Id.*

Next up, Commissioner Witjes worked on what became House District 10. *Id.* He too focused on bringing the black-voter population in line with Adelson’s prior guidance. *Id.* Szetela

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commented on his adjustments: “Brought it down quite a bit,” and “we have room to go north.” *Id.* at 7463. Witjes brought the percentage “below 40%” and asked whether the “40% sweet spot still appl[ies].” *Id.* at 7644. Adelson replied, “I think providing leeway, a little cushion here . . . is important.” *Id.* In what became District 11, however, Witjes’ changes had increased the black-voter population above 50%. *Id.* at 7646. Clark asked, “Would it be acceptable to keep it that way?” *Id.* Adelson responded, “Looking at [what] the law says and what Dr. Handley analyzed and Dr. Handley’s analysis is in Wayne County BVAP and Black voters can elect candidates of choice at 35% . . . . if you make a District a majority minority District . . . you get into more involved attempts at justification.” *Id.* Clark replied, “But you can’t change the places where these people are living. I mean it’s so concentrated.” *Id.* Adelson answered, “there are some limitations about what you can do. But having a population that is more than 20 points above what Dr. Handley analyzed [] raises my eyebrow. So to the extent it can be done absolutely. And if it’s impossible or unreasonabl[e] then that is [a] justification [we] have to deal with but until that point, I think making reasonable efforts at what the Voting Rights Act and the courts say and what Dr. Handley analyzed I think that that’s important.” *Id.* Witjes then continued mapping, sought to bring the percentages in both districts into line with Adelson’s directives, and succeeded. *See id.* at 7647-48. Adelson then checked the districts using the bellwether-elections tool and (as in every other instance) confirmed that “they all performed.” *Id.* at 7650-51.

As commissioners continued to revise the other Detroit-area districts, Adelson and Pastula repeatedly reminded them of their targeted black-voter population percentages. *See e.g., id.* at 7652. Adelson, for example, said, “remember it’s 35-40% in Wayne County. 40-45% in Oakland.” *Id.* at 7653. The commissioners commented along the same lines as they worked. For example, Szetela told Clark that “when you add African/American population” to a district “you

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have to take some off somewhere else.” *Id.* at 7655. Clark followed her advice and Szetela observed, “you are down to 48 now 47” percent black-voter population. *Id.* at 7656. Adelson applauded the effort: “Commissioner Clark, I think your adjustments have really made a lot of— have a lot of positive effect.” *Id.* The Commission then worked further to “dilute,” as Commissioner Lett put it, the black-voter populations in what became Districts 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14. *See id.* at 7642-7679.

At this point, Dr. Handley joined the meeting remotely and gave the Commission a second, brief presentation on partisan fairness. For the most part she discussed some other states’ plans that scored badly on various partisan-fairness metrics. Pastula said, “none of the plans that the MICRC has put through have come close to those numbers . . . so that is very good news for the Commission indeed.” *Id.* at 7683. The Commission then returned to revising house districts outside the Detroit area. At the end of the day on October 5, the Commission saved their House map as Draft Map 204. By that point, they had reduced the number of Detroit-area districts with BVAPs above 50% to zero.

<b>District No.</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>House Map Plan 183</b>	9/28/2021	28.62	79.04	54.09	42.74	65.66	43.74	38.33
<b>House Map Plan 193</b>	9/30/2021	36.58	66.54	50.37	58.44	49.23	43.74	39.21
<b>House Map Plan 204</b>	10/05/2021	41.63	39.85	40.72	42.68	47.37	49.89	42.80

The Commission completed further revisions to the house maps on October 6, but these did not affect the Detroit-area districts. *See id.* at 7726-34.



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7.

“*Compliance*” analyses. From October 6 to 11, the Commission did a partisan-fairness and population-deviation “compliance analysis” of its draft house and senate maps. *See, e.g., id.* at 7733-34. It began with the draft house map. From the start, the Commission recognized that by “achieving VRA compliance we did get better partisan fairness scores.” *Id.* at 7735. It then decided to take a “systematic approach” to improve those scores. *Id.* In doing so, however, the Commission also decided that since the districts in Detroit were “drawn that way for VRA reasons [it] might be a better idea to look at the other areas outside of Metro Detroit” to improve those metrics. *See id.* at 7737-81; 7867-77. Later, Adelson echoed this point: “my suggestion is we avoid districts that have VRA implications” and that the Commission work on “districts that are not in the Metro Detroit area.” *Id.* at 7781. The Commission followed this guidance: “we do not want to mess with 17, 14, because those are the VRA districts”, *id.* at 7782; “The reason I didn’t [change those districts] is because they are two VRA districts”, *id.* at 7785; “This was a VRA District that we tried really hard to get it as high as possible African/American vote. And we had lots of comments from Mr. Adelson that we should keep it as good as we got it”, *id.* at 7802; “I don’t want to go back into Detroit. I think it’s a spider’s web to try to sort out again. I think we got it as I recall the way we want it”, *id.* at 7816. This approach worked and changes in other areas improved the maps’ partisan fairness metrics. *See id.* at 7826.

The Commission simultaneously addressed population deviations in their draft plans. As to the so-called “VRA districts,” however, Adelson repeatedly told the Commission not to worry too much about population deviations, reiterating that “VRA compliance is a legitimate rationale for population[] deviations.” *Id.* at 7835. He then recommended “looking at districts first that are

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out of the VRA semicircle . . . . And then we can see where we are at that point.” *Id.* Again, the Commission followed his advice and reduced the population deviations in districts outside of the Detroit-metro area. *See, e.g., id.* at 7836-52; 7896-7902.

The Commission then turned to the draft senate map, addressing partisan fairness and population deviations simultaneously “to kill two birds with one stone.” *Id.* at 7960. As before, the Commission sought to avoid significant changes to VRA districts: “14 was drawn that way with Pontiac for VRA reasons so we might not want to change that one too much”, *id.* at 7960; “Are we identifying also VRA districts where we want to not change the deviation?”, *id.* at 7961; “Before any changes are made maybe we should jot down the VRA numbers just to make sure we don’t mess something up”, *id.*; “That is a VRA let’s put a check on it and move on”, *id.* at 7976; “We decided we had that as good as we could possibly get it for VRA and did not want to touch that at all. So I think we have to undo that”, *id.* at 7983; “there was something about 11 that we need to be careful of. But it does not seem to be a VRA District”, *id.* at 8044; “District 11 did not have a significant Black age voting population, right?”, *id.*; “I just wanted to point out that several of these districts are delicately balanced as far as minority population . . . . Just as an FYI as the [] adjustments are being made”, *id.* at 8046; “we are not going to be able to get [perfect partisan-fairness scores] because of how we have drawn some of the VRA districts to be compliant . . . . So I think this is a good map”, *id.* at 8053. The Commission eventually made small changes to what became Senate Districts 1, 3, 10, and 11. *See id.* at 7987-88. As it did so, however, the Commission continually checked its racial-percentages tool to ensure that it did not compromise its VRA goals. *See, e.g., id.* at 7991-94.

Later, the Commission returned to the draft house map and made further revisions to improve partisan fairness and population deviation. *Id.* at 8074. Again it focused on districts

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outside of Detroit. *See, e.g.*, 8074-8081. The Commission was careful to avoid moving black-voter population percentages out of the target ranges. *See, e.g., id.* at 8081-86. But it found (as Orton pointed out) that the “VRA districts that we worked so hard on” had caused the largest population deviations. *See id.* at 8087-88. Orton said “I just have to accept [the deviations in VRA districts] . . . I mean we may be able to make some improvements but I don’t think we will be able to change the plan deviation.” Clark agreed. But Adelson again reassured the Commission that “compliance with the Voting Rights Act” was a “legitimate state justification” for the deviations. *Id.*

Yet Szetela thought they could reduce deviations in VRA districts without “making changes to the VRA levels[.]” because “we know where the African/American population is” around those districts. *Id.* at 8089. Witjes pushed back, saying these districts “were carefully crafted with VRA in mind. So if we were to start messing with that, we could be opening up another can of worms.” *Id.* at 8090. Szetela persisted and she (and other commissioners) later made small changes to what became House Districts 10 and 11, among others. *See id.* at 8090-91. But the Commission made sure those changes did not move the black-voter population percentages beyond Adelson’s numbers. *See, e.g., id.* at 8090-8102. Throughout this process, commissioners frequently used the racial-dots tool and referred to the “African/American” or “Black voting population.” *See id.* at 8102-03. After one such reference, Adelson (seemingly for the purpose of the record) interjected: “The changes that are being made have nothing to do with race. Race is not predominating these decisions as you are trying to equalize your population deviation.” *Id.* at 8103.

Remarkably, by negative implication, Adelson then suggested that race *could* lawfully predominate when drawing the so-called VRA districts: “So if decisions were being made[.] *if*

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*race was the primary consideration without having anything to do with the VRA, that is another issue.” Id. at 8104 (emphasis added.) But these changes, Adelson said, were “deviation related.”*

*Id.*

By the end of October 8, the Commission had completed Draft House Plan 227, which it later named “Pine.”

District No.		1	7	8	10	11	12	14
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>House Map, Pine</b>	10/08/2021	41.63	39.85	40.72	42.05	48.00	49.89	42.80

The Commission had also completed Draft Senate Plan 220, which later it named “Cherry.”

District No.		1	3	6	8	10	11
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>Senate Map, Cherry</b>	10/07/2021	37.04	42.84	40.64	42.45	36.63	20.02

Neither map had any Detroit-area districts with black-voter populations above 50%.

C.

*Public reaction to the draft plans.* The Commission then commenced a new round of public hearings throughout Michigan; the one that matters here was held in Detroit, at the TCF Center, on October 20. Before that hearing, however, Detroit-area current and former state lawmakers, along with other community leaders, held a press conference in which they sharply criticized the Commission’s proposed maps. *See* Pl.’s Ex. 130 at 2. A news publication reported that one legislator said, “[t]he commission has drawn zero [black majority districts], and that’s an unacceptable change . . . . That doesn’t elect Black candidates, it doesn’t do Black people any

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good, it is not helpful to our community, it is not helpful to our issues.” *Id.* at 3. Another legislator said, “The current plans have diluted our voting bloc . . . . It will potentially take away all Black representation, potentially all Detroit representation.” *Id.* at 4. The president of the Detroit Branch of the NAACP added, “We want maps that reflect who we are.” *Id.*

Likewise, in the days before the TCF hearing, Michigan State University’s Institute for Public Policy and Social Research published an analysis of the Commission’s proposed plans. Its conclusions were unequivocal. The draft Senate plans, it said

are extremely unusual in engineering maps without a single majority-Black district. . . . These maps appear to deliberately dilute concentrations of Black voting age population above 50%, to create instead as many districts as possible in which the Black vote constitutes a large majority above 35%. . . . [T]he probability that plans like these without a Black-majority district arise by chance are remote. Rather, these plans’ outcome with no majority-Black district, and twice as many districts with a large minority of Black voters as in most other plans, is attained by design, following the advice to the Commission formulated by its VRA Legal Counsel [*i.e.*, Adelson] and its VRA Consultant [*i.e.*, Handley].

*See* Jon X. Eguia, “Michigan Redistricting Draft Map Analysis,” at 46, <https://ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/files/SOSS/IPPSRRedistrictingReportvOct20v1.1.pdf> (last visited Dec. 21, 2023).

The MSU Institute’s assessment of the House plans was similar:

The 2011 redistricting map arguably packed Black voters around Metro Detroit so that the number of such Black-majority districts increased to eleven . . . These [proposed] plans go in the opposite direction to an extraordinary extreme, arguably cracking the large majorities of Black voters to studiously avoid configuring a single district that would cross the 50% threshold of Black voters. By diluting the concentration of Black voters in the districts with the greatest share of them, these plans manage to generate an improbably high number of districts with over 40% and over 35% of Black voters.

*Id.* at 64. In summary, the Institute concluded, the “absence of majority-Black districts is extraordinary, and impossible to arise except by careful design.” *Id.* at 75.

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The reaction of Detroit residents at the TCF hearing itself, one can fairly say, was vociferous. Over the course of nine hours, more than 200 residents commented on the proposed plans. Most commenters were highly critical; a plurality of them complained specifically about cracking and the absence of any black-majority districts. A handful of examples are enough to convey the hearing's tenor. A former state legislator said, "it was not for you to peel off parts of Detroit and throw them in communities we have nothing in common with. Bloomfield Hills, Birmingham, Canton, Farmington, Madison Heights, New Baltimore and Sterling Heights. How can we advocate for the community when we are cracked into eight parts[?]" *Id.* at 8223. Another commenter said, "Your plan for the next ten years denies Black [and] Brown [people] in Michigan the opportunity to select representatives from their neighborhoods to send to Lansing." *Id.* at 8218.

Another said:

I'm really outraged at the way these maps are breaking up the north end and eliminating the political power of the people in the City of Detroit. . . . It's unfair. Put the north end back together. Keep it intact. Boston Edison, Hamtramck, Highland Park east side of Detroit, Senate District 2 now includes even the Grosse Pointe areas. Don't immigrate us to negate us and leave Black districts intact.

*Id.* at 8256-57. Another Detroiter said: "We know that you can draw better maps for Black Michiganders. Honor the Voting Rights Act to ensure Black people are able to elect leaders that look like themselves. Let's not return to the Jim [C]row politics of old." *Id.* at 8215. Another said, "we want to ensure that Black folks are kept [a] majority minority [in] our districts." *Id.* at 8220; *see also, e.g., id.* at 8233, 8241, 8261, 8320. Another cut to the heart of their complaints, saying a "majority of Black Detroit deserves the chance to be represented by Detroiters. Not just people that might share [a] political party." *Id.* at 8222.

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Some commenters made legal observations. The Executive Director of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, for example, told the commissioners that its draft Detroit-area districts “violate Federal civil rights law”:

They dilute majority minority districts and strip the ability for minority voter to elect legislatures [that] reflect their community and effect any meaningful opportunity to impact public policy and law making. If you approve any of your maps, we believe that you will be violating both Federal statutory and case law.

*Id.* at 8264. And an NAACP member cited a legal rule about which the Commission had heard very little during its own meetings: “[W]e do not appreciate the way the maps have been drawn to date. We want to remind you that the 14th [A]mendment prohibits legislatures and this Commission from engaging in both intentional and race[] based voter dilution and racial sorting.” *Id.* at 8303.

D.

*The “closed session.”* On October 27—nine days before its November 5 deadline for publishing maps ahead of the 45-day public comment period—the Commission held its first meeting after the TCF hearing. It promptly voted to go into “closed session” (meaning closed to the public)—something it had never done before—to discuss two purportedly “privileged and confidential” memoranda from Adelson. *Id.* at 8754. The meeting was not transcribed at the time; but it was recorded. (The Michigan Supreme Court later ordered the recording to be made public.)

General Counsel Pastula began the meeting by announcing the “rules of the closed session,” namely that “none of the discussion topics or documents may be shared outside of this room.” R.126-1 at PageID 4571. The commissioners had been told to sign a confidentiality agreement: Pastula said, “everyone [has] received the confidentiality agreement,” and told the commissioners to return to their signed copies to her or Sue Ann Hammersmith, the Commission’s

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Executive Director. *Id.* Adelson—who did not attend the TCF hearing—then took the floor, saying among other things:

We [*i.e.*, himself and Pastula] have become concerned that there is so much misinformation out there. We wanted to have an opportunity to set the record straight in a sense, provide our advice, provide you with information about what the law actually says[.]”

*Id.* at PageID 4573.

Adelson insisted that the VRA “does not require any numerical amount of majority-minority districts; indeed, does not even require majority-minority districts at all.” *Id.* at PageID 4572. The public comments to the contrary at the TCF hearing, Adelson said, were “woefully misleading.” *Id.* at PageID 4578. Throughout the closed session, Adelson and Pastula variously described these comments as “infused with either misinformation or lack of information,” based on “specific agendas,” and “flat out incorrect.” *Id.* at PageID 4578, 4596, 4608.

Adelson also discussed the lack of primary data available to the Commission during its mapping process. But he reassured the commissioners that, “while primaries can provide useful information, please be advised that . . . they’re not necessarily dispositive.” *Id.* at PageID 4577. Adelson also discussed the importance of the Commission’s record for the purpose of any future litigation challenging the maps, saying:

one of the things we have to stress, emphasize, insist on, plead, beg and say please, please don’t use phrases about adding black people, subtracting black people, adding white people, subtracting white people.

*Id.* at PageID 4579. He added, “one of the reasons we wanted to have this session is that in looking to the future, looking over the next eight days, we don’t want to give people out there specific paths to challenge what you’re doing. Remember . . . legally, race cannot predominate redistricting. It can be one factor of many.” *Id.*



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Adelson then referenced one of the Commission’s earlier decisions to keep together communities of interest in the Flint area. *Id.* at PageID 4580-81. He said that “a path forward” for the Commission might be to mimic that approach in the Detroit-area districts, “rather than focus on race predominantly.” *Id.* Eid asked, “so, how do we do that without packing the districts?” *Id.* Commissioner Kellom replied:

I think what I hear Bruce saying is the rhetoric and language that we use to justify. So, like, what we’re actually doing in reunifying folks is of course, we’re putting certain races together, we know that. But then what we say is that we’re observing the fact that these areas are uniquely different, like when we think about Detroit. So we’re not using the language that is going to question the maps when it gets to that point. So I think if we go back and look at the cultural aspects and the neighborhoods . . . the places that are completely black [laughing] just saying it like that, um, will be, the undertones will be accomplishing what folks want but doing it in a way that still upholds our criterion.

*Id.* at PageID 4581-82. Adelson suggested that the commissioners focus their future discussions on keeping “neighborhoods” and “communities” whole. *See id.* at PageID 4582-86. Orton echoed his advice: “when we’re talking about this, if we choose to put anything together that we currently have separated, we go back to the communities of interest, it’s a communities of interest thing not a VRA thing.” *Id.* at PageID 4588. Clark then replied to Adelson:

Detroit’s different. And so your comments were—it appears to be a neighborhood issue and they want to have the neighborhoods consolidated. So we can do that and make minor modifications to the districts we’ve done. But that to me doesn’t fix the problem that they [Black voters] were complaining about. The problem they were complaining about was, in my mind, was that the districts didn’t give them [Black voters] the opportunity to elect. And so changing just the neighborhoods, it’s not going to change that problem. So the way to change that would be to make the districts compress them so that more of the blacks are in Detroit.

*Id.* at PageID 4594. Commissioner Lett offered a suggestion about how the Commission could make changes to Detroit-area districts:

[C]ommunities of interest was created as a nebulous criteria that the redistricting commission could use later as cover for whatever map it draws. Communities of interest is a will-o’-the-wisp. It’s a wreath of smoke. It can be whatever is

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necessary, the crucial thing is who decides what a community of interest is that gets preserved. The answer? The Commission does. Who gets to review that? Frankly, nobody does. It's up to them. Was it originally intended? Yes. It was built in as nailing Jell-O to the wall. . . . that's what we can use now to justify what we're doing. And it's in the amendment. They put it in there. So let's use what we got.

*Id.* at PageID 4602. Lett concluded by saying the Commission could use communities of interest to “provide ourselves with cover. We can do it. Tomorrow.” *Id.* at PageID 4602-03. Commissioner Eid responded: “I agree with everything Steve [Lett] just said.” *Id.* at PageID 4603-04.

But Kellom said, “I can't ignore the people that are talking about how Southfield is ripped up, and that is true. How Palmer Park is ripped up, and that is true . . . the Detroit area is jacked up and we need to change it. And I don't want us to sit here and start think about ways we can keep it the same.” *Id.* at PageID 4607. Lett reassured Kellom: “Nobody in this room is saying we can't go in and make changes. The only thing that we are saying is when we make those changes, we need to be cognizant of the VRA and how we're doing that.” *Id.* at PageID 4612. Pastula added, “I would strongly advise you to listen to your lawyers” on this topic. *Id.* at PageID 4613. Orton agreed and reminded Kellom: “remember the wording. This can fall under communities of interest.” *Id.*

As the closed session wound up, Clark then reminded the other commissioners: “Anything discussed in this room today should stay in this room period . . . . Not discussed with anybody.” *Id.* at PageID 4617. Pastula then reminded them all to return their signed confidentiality agreements. *Id.*

E.

*Post-TCF changes.* Over the next week, the Commission finalized its draft senate and house maps. The Commission made minimal changes to the draft senate maps, none of which

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substantially affected the BVAPs in Detroit-area districts. *See* R.112 at PageID 3677-78; MICRC Tr at 8919-47, 9003-15. According to Szetela, however, Kellom and Rothhorn came to her and said they “wanted to increase the black voting age population” some Detroit-area house districts and that they had “had a discussion with Bruce Adelson that they could do that as long as they used neighborhoods as the basis.” R.112 at PageID 3718.

On November 2, the Commission began revising the draft house maps. *See* MICRC Tr. at 9157. At first, commissioners made only “small changes” to improve metrics such as population deviation. *See, e.g., id.* at 9164-9200. But then Rothhorn announced that he and Kellom had been “working together” on an “overlay” that included some “major changes” to certain Detroit-area districts. *Id.* at 9199-9201. Kellom and Rothhorn said that they had done so because they were concerned about the comments the Commission had received at the TCF hearing, and wanted to “honor[] our third criteria of diversity and COIs.” *Id.* at 9199-9204. Orton asked whether the map affected “VRA districts.” *Id.* at 9202. Kellom responded, “yes”; but Rothhorn said, “yes and no we don’t know if we got it right. It’s more communities of interest changes.” *Id.*

The Commission decided to create an alternate map based on Kellom and Rothhorn’s overlay. To do so, it deleted most of the districts in Detroit and drew new ones based on the overlay. *Id.* at 9202. As the draft progressed, Kellom explained that their map “honors the COIs” by reuniting “some of the [Detroit] neighborhoods.” *Id.* at 9206-07. She also said that Adelson had told them that, with that rationale, they “could increase BVAP” in Detroit-area districts. *Id.* at 9204.

Szetela responded that Kellom’s suggestion “was not consistent with what I was hearing from Detroit. I don’t remember [] individual commenters saying they wanted neighborhoods put back together. I remember a lot of comments about wanting minority majority districts with more

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than 50% African/American and I don't remember much of anything about neighborhoods honestly." *Id.* at 9207.

Pastula interjected, "I think what I hear Commissioner Kellom discuss is, again, the third criteria of diversity and communities of interest" and that "the focus of uniting neighborhoods that . . . I hear Commissioner Kellom attempting to do . . . wouldn't have VRA implications . . . would not have a Voting Rights Act component." *Id.* at 9207. Pastula added that if "the comments were advocating more than 50% majority minority districts based on VRA," then that "would likely be held to constitute racial gerrymandering. And, again, that would create VRA issues. What—where I see this conversation happening is not rooted or anchored in the VRA at all." *Id.* In the same vein, Kellom said, "this whole week I've been talking about neighborhoods. I specifically did not mention the VRA." *Id.* at 9208. Curry added, "communities of interest is all about neighborhoods." *Id.*

Chair Szetela was skeptical: "I think to me the biggest issue is you're mentioning these communities of interest but when we collaboratively mapped, we discussed many, many communities of interest," but "what is happening here is that you and [Rothhorn] and Commissioner Curry have individually decided which communities of interest you think are important for this area. And you're asking us as a collective to just accept them without consideration[.]" *Id.* at 9209. But Lett responded, "I think [Rothhorn] is trying to do what Detroit wants done." *Id.* at 9217.

The Commission moved ahead with the new draft. Kellom and Rothhorn's overlay guided the mapping process, but the Commission also continued to rely on the racial-dots tool and their knowledge of the racial makeup of the area as they mapped: "I think the dots are good", *id.* at 9217; "they are also pretty much the Black African neighborhoods too", *id.* at 9218; "when you

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look at Finkle and Dexter they are predominately Black African/Americans”, *id.* at 9219; “if it comes down to deciding between neighborhoods it might be a good idea to think about which of the minority groups in the neighborhood vote the same way”, *id.* at 9225; “7 is 68% nonwhite”, *id.* at 9237. But Commissioner Kellom continued to try and justify the changes on other grounds while the mapping progressed: “This is about the Detroit community,” so “open up your hearts and your minds. This comes from a very sincere place.” *Id.* at 9230.

The new draft revised what became House Districts 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14. *See, e.g., id.* at 9240, 9253. The Commission eventually reached a stopping place and decided to check the map’s “demographics,” i.e., black-voter percentages. Some other Detroit-area house districts now had BVAPs above 50%. Adelson commented on these changes:

This is—as you know we have discussed the VRA analysis and Dr. Handley’s analysis. And there has been nothing that I’m aware of where any of you have said we need to put more Black people in a certain area beyond what the Voting Rights Act says. When you take that and then look at the reunifying neighborhoods that is a different consideration. . . . I think the numbers are an improvement in the sense of responding to concerns about that I took to be community based. So those are my thoughts.

*Id.* at 9256.

Szetela asked, “So you’re okay with 55%, 54.9% Black VAP . . . I just want to confirm that you think that is acceptable.” *Id.* Adelson answered, “I’m fine with that from the perspective of what was discussed today.” *Id.* at 9256-57.

The Commission’s meeting the next day, November 3, began with a short public-comment period. A regular observer of the Commission’s meetings, Sarah Howard of the AFL-CIO Fair Maps Project, commented on the revisions made the day before. Specifically, she questioned why communities of interests had been honored then but not before:

Last night Mr. Adelson said districts can go as high as 55% BVAP as long as it is a side effect of recognizing a community of interest and not an explicit attempt to

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create a majority minority District. This is frankly [] an astonishing reversal. You must reassess all VRA districts based on community of interest testimony. We doubt for example that Birmingham and Detroit are a genuine community of interest. And find it very objectionable they had to protest the low BVAP targets. You missed out on a ton of community of interest data because they were under the incorrect impression their communities of interest didn't matter for this analysis.

*Id.* at 9264-65. The Commission thanked her for comments and moved on.

Over the next two days, the Commission revised house districts in other areas of Michigan. None of these changes, however, substantially affected the November 2 adjustments to the Detroit districts. *See id.* at 9399-9400 (pointing out that the Commission imported all the November 2 Detroit-area districts into the map finalized on November 4). On November 4, the Commission made its final edits to the Detroit-area house districts. In doing so, it again reviewed black-voter populations and "VRA compliance" for many of those districts. (*E.g.*, "That is an Oakland County VRA District where we are trying to keep it above 40", *id.* at 9406; "This is one of our VRA districts we did not want to mess with", *id.* at 9407; "Black voting age population is 44.17", *id.* at 9410; "District 18 is now 45.34% Black", *id.* at 9419.)

At the close of their work on November 4, the Commission named its house map "Hickory," renumbered its districts, and advanced it to a 45-day public comment period. *See id.* at 9484-85. The Commission also renamed its last senate draft "Linden," renumbered its districts, and advanced it to public comment. *Id.* at 9503. The final black-voter population percentages for all the Detroit-area districts at issue here were as follows:

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District No.		1	3	6	8	10	11
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>Senate Map Plan 162</b>	9/13/2021	10.98	50.82	76.56	63.77	18.1	7.8
<b>Senate Map Plan 165</b>	9/15/2021	34.86	44.87	51.99	59.06	49.38	11.02
<b>Senate Map, Cherry</b>	10/07/2021	37.04	42.84	40.64	42.45	36.63	20.02
<b>Linden Plan</b>	12/28/2021	35.03	42.09	39.15	40.25	40.43	19.19

District No.		1	7	8	10	11	12	14
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>House Map Plan 183</b>	9/28/2021	28.62	79.04	54.09	42.74	65.66	43.74	38.33
<b>House Map Plan 193</b>	9/30/2021	36.58	66.54	50.37	58.44	49.23	43.74	39.91
<b>House Map, Pine</b>	10/08/2021	41.63	39.85	40.72	42.05	48.00	49.89	42.80
<b>Hickory Plan</b>	12/28/2021	38.03	44.29	43.70	38.79	42.82	40.99	41.11

F.

1.

*Developments before final votes.* The Commission set a date of December 28 for votes on its final plans. On December 9, however, Dr. Handley sent an email to Pastula, Adelson, Kim Brace (a software-mapping consultant), and Executive Director Suann Hammersmith, in which Handley said she had begun writing a report for the Commission, but had “run across a serious wrinkle that I would like to discuss. Is this possible?” R.114-6 at Page ID 3982.

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Apparently that discussion took place within a day or so, by way of a “Teams” meeting; because the next day Pastula sent an email to the Commission’s “Legal Team” of outside counsel (all or most of them litigators, including three who have represented the Commission in this case). Pastula referred back to Handley’s September 2 presentation to the Commission—which provided the “analysis” on which all the Commission’s BVAP efforts had been based—and reported the following:

I did want to circulate the information from the Teams meeting and we can address/more fully discuss when appropriate how to present this information to our client [*i.e.*, the Commission] prior to their vote. As indicated during the call, *the percentage ranges provided by Dr. Handley in her September presentation/charts and utilized during drafting did not correspond to the information she shared today.* The lack of primary election data generally as well as promised information regarding whether the white candidates are candidates of choice . . . are relevant.

R.114-7 at PageID 3984 (emphasis added).

Apparently one of the participants in the “Teams” meeting told Chair Szetela about it; because on December 15 she emailed Pastula as follows:

I am deeply concerned to have learned that you personally became aware of critical issues with Dr. Handley’s VRA analysis earlier this week and, in addition to not notifying the Commission about this alarming development, have also directed staff members, vendors, and the [Secretary of State staff] not to alert Commissioners as to the issue until the week of December 28th—almost two weeks away. It’s my understanding that Dr. Handley has informed you, staff, vendors, and members of the [Secretary of State staff] that her analysis was deeply flawed and that, as a result of her flawed analysis, not a single one of our Senate maps are VRA compliant. . . . In addition, it’s my understanding that you were hoping to conceal this information from the public by having yet another closed session the week of the 28th, which contradicts our mission, vision, and values.

Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 69.

On December 27, Szetela also emailed Handley directly, and pointedly asked whether “for the Michigan State Senate, districts with BVAP of 47% or lower” are “able to elect candidates of



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choice.” *Id.* at 21-22. Handley replied that the “minority preferred candidate wins all of the general election[s] above 35%” black-voter population. But she added:

Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information to anticipate what might happen in the future Democratic primaries in the proposed districts. The reason is that we have only one statewide Democratic primary for which we can recompile results and minority voters were not cohesive in this primary. We simply do not know what would happen in a primary in which minority voters are cohesive.

*Id.* at 21.

2.

On December 28, at 10 a.m., the Commission reconvened to approve the final senate and house maps. Some commissioners said they were unhappy with the maps; others said they were happy with them. Szetela suggested that “we make some changes to accommodate public comments . . . particularly around VRA issues and particularly with primaries and democratic primaries and are these maps representative and do they actually provide the Black community in Detroit with the ability to elect. I think these are things we need to think seriously about[.]” *Id.* at 9877. Eid and Pastula alike said there was no time for that. So did Secretary of State Benson’s representative at the meeting. *See* MICRC Tr. at 9875, 9878-80.

Apparently, Dr. Handley had provided the Commission with her “report” an hour or two before (she undisputedly gave it to them that same day). Rothhorn’s impression of the report was that further “analysis must be undertaken” to confirm that black-preferred candidates could actually prevail in districts with the BVAP numbers that Handley had given them on September 2. *Id.* at 9880. Adelson gave a lengthy response in which (to summarize) he said that “I have no concerns based on her analysis that there are VRA compliance issues, issues that need to be addressed.” *Id.* at 9881. Szetela replied:

So, Mr. Adelson, so my specific concern reading Dr. Handley’s report is that when we were in Detroit . . . the comment we heard over and over and over again is you

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have to look at the primaries and we all know this is true especially in Districts that are heavily leaning democratic or republican the primary is where the real action is at for the election, whoever wins the primary is going to win the seat in that particular District.

And so we heard that very specific comments that we have to look at the primaries and very specific concerns about voter turnout which is also addressed in Handley's report as well and specifically the concern that when you have 35% or less than a certain number in districts which are supposedly VRA districts, those percentages for the Black community are not going to translate to the ability to win primary elections. And what I'm seeing in Dr. Handley's report is she has since validated that concern.

*Id.* at 9882-83. Adelson answered:

I disagree with your characterization of Dr. Handley's report she did not say 48% BVAP is required for bloc voters to elect candidates of choice. Much of the contrary. . . And her conclusion is that, yes, without—with the absence of additional primary election data we have to rely on what we have. What we have are general election results, recompiled election results, the gubernatorial primary from 2018.

*Id.* at 9883-84.

Szetela said that Dr. Handley's report "was a canary in the coal mine" and that she "continue[d] to have concerns because I want to make sure we do right by Detroit. I want to make sure we do right by the Black population, with our ability to elect who they want to elect." *Id.* at 9884-85. Kellom said she had "the same concern." *Id.* But Adelson said that "this is not October or early November. And there are issues that have been discussed with the reality of the calendar. So you know I appreciate your comments and your including me in the discussion." *Id.* at 9888.

The Commission proceeded to adopt—as its final redistricting plans—the "Linden" plan for the Senate and the "Hickory" plan for the House. The Linden plan reduced the number of majority-black senate districts in the Detroit area from two to zero; the Hickory plan reduced the same numbers for the House from ten to six. None of the districts challenged here have BVAPs at 50% or higher.

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G.

In March 2022, plaintiffs brought this suit against the Commission and Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson. In their complaint, plaintiffs challenged seven Detroit-area senate districts (1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11) and ten Detroit-area house districts (1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 26) under both the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The parties thereafter filed cross-motions for summary judgment. We denied plaintiffs’ motion and granted defendants’ motion in part. Specifically—on various grounds, some of them jurisdictional—we granted summary judgment to defendants on four of plaintiffs’ equal-protection claims (against House Districts 2, 13, and 26, and Senate District 5) and on eight of plaintiffs’ VRA claims (against House Districts 2, 8, 11, 13, and 26, and Senate Districts 5, 10, and 11). We denied summary judgment to defendants on thirteen of plaintiffs’ equal-protection claims (namely, against House Districts 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14, and Senate Districts 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 11). All those claims proceeded to a six-day bench trial, held in November 2023.

At trial, the parties called eleven fact witnesses, including six commissioners (Szetela, Rothhorn, Curry, Lange, Wagner, and Eid), Bruce Adelson, Dr. Lisa Handley, Virgil Smith (a former state senator from Detroit), and LaMar Lemmons III (a former house representative from Detroit). We discuss their testimony as relevant below. The parties also presented the testimony of five experts: Sean Trende, Dr. Handley, Dr. Brad Lockerbie, Dr. Maxwell Palmer, and Dr. Jonathan Rodden, all of whom submitted an expert report (Trende also submitted a supplemental report). Their testimony, as it turns out, is less important to our decision here. The parties also submitted more than 100 exhibits as evidence, including a complete transcript of the Commission’s proceedings, which totaled 10,603 pages. About 1800 pages of that transcript are particularly

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important here. This court has reviewed all the evidence in the record, including every page of the Commission’s transcript.

## II.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause “limits racial gerrymanders in legislative redistricting plans.” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 291. Specifically—absent some compelling interest which a racial gerrymander is narrowly tailored to serve—the Equal Protection Clause bars a State “from ‘separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.’” *Id.* (quoting *Bethune-Hill*, 580 U.S. at 187).

To prove an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, a plaintiff must prove that “‘race was the predominant factor motivating’” the State’s “‘decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.’” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 291 (quoting *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)). To make that showing, a plaintiff must show that the State “subordinated other factors” to “racial considerations.” *Id.* (cleaned up). A plaintiff can make that showing “even if the evidence reveals that [the State] elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, including political ones.” *Id.* at 291 n.1; *see also Miller*, 515 U.S. at 914 (stating that the “use of race as a proxy” for “political interest[s]” is “prohibit[ed]”).

We determine predominance district-by-district, though a plaintiff, “of course, can present statewide evidence in order to prove racial gerrymandering in a particular district.” *Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 575 U.S. 254, 263 (2015) (emphasis omitted). A plaintiff can show racial predominance “though ‘direct evidence’” of the State’s intent, or circumstantial evidence, or “a mix of both.” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 291. Evidence of “an announced racial target that subordinated other districting criteria” is important evidence “that race predominated” in drawing a district. *Id.* at 300-01; *see also Ala. Legis. Black Caucus*, 575 U.S. at 267.

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A.

The record here is almost oceanic in its direct evidence of intent. The relevant state actor in this case is the Commission. And the entirety of the Commission’s proceedings—the commissioners’ every word, as they drew every district, line-by-line, and often precinct-by-precinct—was transcribed. The thousands of pages of those transcripts reveal not only the commissioners’ every move as they drew and redrew legislative-district lines; it reveals also their reasoning, their motivations, their misgivings, in real time as they worked. In that respect this case is singular. We have carefully considered all the evidence in the record, including the testimony of six commissioners at trial, some two years after the fact. But the transcripts of the Commission’s proceedings are by far the most important and most probative evidence in the record here. Our findings based on this record now follow.

1.

Our first group of findings concern the Commission’s mapping process for Detroit-area districts generally.

a.

*BVAP targets for Detroit-area districts.* First, the Commission plainly acted under the constraint of across-the-board racial targets as it drew the boundaries of Detroit-area districts. By way of background, and to reiterate somewhat, Dr. Handley advised the Commission—on September 2, 2021, at the outset of its map-drawing process—about the BVAPs necessary for black voters to be able consistently to elect their “candidates of choice.” Specifically, she said, “[i]n Oakland County, 35% is going to work. 40 percent looks like it might work. In Wayne County where we have a lot more white crossover vote 35% might well work.” MICRC Tr. at 5386. (Those percentages were based only on general-election data, which rendered them close

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to useless in predicting the success of black-preferred candidates in contested primary elections; but neither she nor Adelson flagged that distinction for the Commission. *See, e.g.*, Def.’s Ex. 48 at 16-17.) Bruce Adelson then told the Commission that Handley’s analysis would be “very crucial[,] very important” for the Commission’s map-drawing in those counties. More to the point, Adelson treated those BVAPs as a ceiling, not a floor, in drawing districts in those counties. Specifically—on September 2, in his capacity as the Commission’s “voting rights act legal counsel”—Adelson told the commissioners that BVAPs higher than Handley’s numbers would amount to “packing” in violation of the VRA. He told them on September 2:

But to the point about packing, remember that the [sic] if a district can be established through analysis to be able to elect candidates of choice of the minority community at let’s say 40%, if you add on population to that, the courts constitute that as packing.

MICRC Tr. at 5389.

Handley’s numbers—plus what Adelson sometimes called a “cushion” of about 5%—yielded target BVAPs of 35-40% in Wayne County and about 40-45% (sometimes narrowed to 42-43%) in Oakland County. *See, e.g., id.* at 7230 (“the range for Detroit was 35-40%, Oakland County was above 40%.”); *id.* at 7440 (“What Dr. Handley’s racial bloc voting analysis has given the Commission is the benchmarks and the guide rails for each of the Counties that need to be adjusted. [In] Wayne County [it] is 35-40% . . . . And Oakland County is 42, 43%.”); *id.* at 7495 (“Dr. Handley in her analysis referenced Oakland County as having a 40% approximately [sic] threshold, not 35% . . . . 42-43% . . . . That is a good kind of benchmark guidepost.”); *id.* at 7563 (“remember it’s 35-40% in Wayne County. 40-45% in Oakland.”). And Adelson thereafter told the commissioners, more than 100 times—sometimes directly, sometimes more obliquely—that BVAPs in excess of those targets, in districts in those counties, would potentially violate the VRA. *See, e.g.*, MICRC Tr. at 5810 (“One of the things that I would strongly advise and something that

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we will be talking about a lot over the next couple of weeks is really study and internalize Lisa Handley's, Dr. Handley's PowerPoint . . . . And what I would suggest in moving forward in the areas where you are now, typically aim for Black populations in the roughly 40-45% range."); *id.* at 6201 ("Any District that has majority-minority VAP I think you should aim to let's see what we can do to kind of [ ]potentially unpack that based on Dr. Handley's analysis. . . . Because just as Dr. Handley said if you can elect 35%, 40%, then why would you add 40, 50% minority population?"); *id.* at 6688 ("I have to go back to what Dr. Handley analyzed and concluded in early September. That her threshold is the 35-40%. Which is I agree with that."); *id.* at 7199 ("I think that I would recommend focusing on the percentages and comparing them to Dr. Handley's percentages for Wayne County which as I recall is 35-40%."); *id.* at 7481 ("And it is the Supreme Court has made it very clear that if you pack voters, if voters are put in a District in [ex]cess of what racial bloc voting analysis shows, that's an issue. And I know we have talked about that. And we are going to continue to adhere to it[.]"); *id.* at 7482 (regarding the cushion: "So I think as Dr. Handley and I had said previously since they are estimates they are not adhering to absolute 35-40% is not something that in my cautious preference that I necessarily would recommend. Having a range, 35-40%, 40-45%, yeah, I think that is more advisable."); *id.* at 7646 ("Looking at [what] the law says and what Dr. Handley analyzed and Dr. Handley's analysis is in Wayne County BVAP and Black voters can elect candidates of choice at 35%. So if you make a District a majority minority District when that additional population goes beyond the ability to elect that is where you get more involved attempts at justification."); *see also id.* at 5650, 5813-15, 5816, 5821, 5822, 5826, 5828, 5834, 5844, 5845, 5847, 5849, 5871, 5876, 5877, 5881, 6189, 6201, 6202, 6203, 6217, 6219, 6221, 6419, 6420, 6426-27, 6430-31, 6432, 6433, 6445, 6446, 6454, 6508, 6513, 6515-16, 6525-26, 6526, 6566-67, 6568, 6573, 6574-75, 6596, 6619-20, 6625, 6633-34, 6672, 6684-85,

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6688, 6717, 6718, 6721-22, 6725, 6726-27, 6935, 6948, 7068-69, 7070, 7071, 7073, 7164-65, 7167, 7181, 7183, 7186, 7187-88, 7189, 7192-93, 7198, 7199, 7201, 7223-24, 7225-26, 7272, 7277, 7279, 7280, 7281, 7282, 7283-84, 7284, 7285, 7286, 7287, 7289, 7345, 7346, 7347, 7481, 7482, 7484-85, 7487, 7489, 7493, 7494, 7495, 7497, 7499, 7500, 7504, 7509, 7515, 7539, 7559, 7560, 7580, 7641, 7644, 7646, 7649, 7651, 7652, 7656, 7660, 7662, 7666, 7688, 7690, 7692-93, 7693-94, 7731, 7768, 7781, 7784, 7785, 7835, 7883, 7904, 8046, 9103, 9959.

The Commission’s general counsel, Julianne Pastula, likewise repeatedly advised the Commission to reduce the BVAPs in Detroit-area districts to the target ranges. *See, e.g., id.* at 7226 (“What I would recommend is that the Commissioner consider doing is for the active matrix to scroll starting with 1 and glance at the districts, anything that is higher than 40% for the Black voting age population and the population difference I mean just to glance at and just go down the list and then when we get to I anticipate number 6, number 18, and others that those quote unquote fixes can be dealt with and then this map can be ready for the partisan fairness analysis”); *id.* at 7227 (“start with the data chart and look at the list starting with one and I would recommend anything with a higher than 40% Black voting age population be looked at”); *id.* at 7229 (“start again with the list at District 1 and look at that the Black VAP, if it’s above that 40% particularly in the Metro Detroit area how can that minimized . . . look at the Black voting age population and proceed from there”); *id.* at 7436 (“So I believe Mr. Adelson did say if the effort was to be made to get those Metro Detroit districts closer to the 30 to 40% range that would be an excellent use of time”); *id.* at 7438 (“I think those districts that were up around and over 50% Mr. Adelson’s direction was to try to get those lower, to make the effort to get those lower. Particularly in the Metro Detroit Area”); Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 45 (email to Szetela: “Bruce and I are very concerned about



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the drafting of the packed districts that is occurring during today’s mapping session”); *see also id.* at 5734, 5921, 6672, 6767, 6768, 7230, 7243, 7440, 7441.

The commissioners fully internalized these BVAP targets, and not only complied with them but exhorted each other to do so. *See, e.g., id.* at 6434 (Clark: “what I’m trying to do is reduce the Black population”); *id.* at 6640 (Rothhorn: “And I do think that the margins with you know 36% was the threshold that was established by Lisa [Handley] so I think we are not too far over that [at] 38%. I think Bruce has said right 40% . . . At this point what we have done is a nice job of unpacking the old districts and getting a better . . . racially mixed balance.”); *id.* at 7439 (Rothhorn: “But I think we can interpret from their advice is if we don’t try to get to 35%, we have not done our due diligence and therefore we may be exposing ourselves to a legal risk we might be able to defend ourselves but can’t guarant[ee] that.”); *id.* at 7283 (Eid: “I know our analysis has said that it only takes about 35-40% of Black voting age population to elect candidates of choice for [the black] community. But I think my most basic question is: What is the highest percentage it can be to fend off legal challenges in the future?”); *id.* at 7435 (Szetela: “So that is what Bruce was saying to us last week and said it repeatedly we should aim between 35-40% African/American because those numbers [are] VRA compliant.”); *see also id.* at 5733, 5747, 5748, 5757, 5766, 5829, 5834, 5843, 5847, 5871, 5872, 5875, 5898, 5899, 5903, 5904, 5912, 5914, 5915, 5917, 5918, 5919, 5924, 5926, 5937, 5967, 6204, 6205, 6215, 6220, 6221, 6410, 6411, 6412, 6414, 6427, 6429, 6434, 6436, 6438, 6458, 6482, 6511, 6512, 6515, 6518, 6523, 6558, 6559, 6560, 6563, 6565, 6571, 6572, 6573, 6589, 6590, 6596, 6602, 6613, 6614, 6617, 6622, 6637, 6640, 6661, 6662, 6663, 6664, 6668, 6669, 6670, 6671, 6673, 6674, 6675, 6680, 6682, 6683, 6685-86, 6716, 6717, 6718, 6720, 6723, 6764, 6765, 6766, 6768, 6769, 6773-74, 6774, 6782, 6783, 6785, 6786, 6787, 6788, 6804, 6805, 6806-07, 6821, 6852, 6853, 6860, 6900, 6937, 6937-38, 6939, 6940,

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6946, 6947, 7068, 7070, 7074-75, 7075, 7168, 7169, 7173, 7182, 7185, 7188-89, 7190, 7191, 7194, 7197, 7198, 7200, 7201, 7219, 7219-20, 7220, 7221, 7222, 7223, 7225, 7227, 7229, 7229-30, 7230, 7231, 7231-32, 7232, 7233, 7234, 7235, 7235-36, 7236, 7237, 7238, 7240, 7241, 7242, 7242-43, 7243, 7244, 7270-71, 7273, 7275, 7276, 7277, 7278, 7283, 7285, 7287, 7289, 7343, 7343-44, 7344, 7346, 7348, 7349, 7433-34, 7434, 7435, 7436, 7436-37, 7438, 7439, 7440, 7441, 7442, 7443, 7444, 7445, 7446, 7447, 7448, 7449, 7450, 7451, 7464, 7468-69, 7469, 7472, 7473, 7474, 7475, 7476, 7478, 7479, 7480, 7481, 7483, 7484, 7492, 7509-10, 7510, 7513, 7514, 7515, 7516, 7517, 7558-59, 7560, 7576, 7578, 7580, 7581, 7582, 7622-23, 7627, 7639, 7648, 7649, 7651, 7652, 7653, 7654, 7655, 7656, 7657, 7658, 7659, 7660, 7662, 7663, 7664, 7665, 7667, 7668, 7669, 7672, 7675, 7676, 7677, 7679, 7685-86, 7687, 7688, 7689, 7691, 7695, 7696, 7697, 7698, 7699, 7726, 7727, 7728, 7729, 7730, 7733, 7735, 7781, 7785, 7802, 7822-23, 7883, 7891, 7896, 7896-97, 7901, 7903-04, 7904, 7905, 7926, 7931, 7949, 7960, 8099, 8100, 8840, 8859, 8883, 8898, 9011, 9321, 9357-58, 9942.

Relatedly, the commissioners equated hitting their BVAP targets with VRA compliance. Indeed, the commissioners used the terms “VRA” or “VRA compliance” as synonyms for hitting their BVAP targets. Those references are too numerous to collect here—they appear *passim* throughout the transcripts of the Commission’s work on Detroit-area districts (which the commissioners called “VRA districts”). But we offer some examples along those lines. *See, e.g., id.* at 7201 (Rothhorn: “[T]hat is changed because of [sic] to better comply with VRA bringing down the Black voting age population to a range that is closer to 40% actually reducing it.”); *id.* at 7229 (Orton: “So we are going to go through and we are going to look at anything above 40% because we want to be [sic] make sure that the whole plan is VRA compliant.”); *id.* at 7343-44 (Szetela: “District 2 was originally 60.73%. Voting age population African/American it’s now

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down to 46. 3 was 28 and I brought it up to 40 so it's a little more balanced. 6 was 64%. It's now down to 48%. 8 was 52% it's now down to 35%. 14 was at 59% it's now down to 49%. 15 was at 49% it's now down to 42%. And then 18 which was one of our big problem districts was at 76% and it's now down to 38%. So I have on that list three districts that are above 50, a 53.24 which is 4, 51.9, 50.89 but everything else is below 50%. So like I said it's just a thought. I mean I think we can accomplish what Mr. Adelson is suggesting we do. It's just going to require a little creativity and like I said I certainly don't think this is a final map. We could definitely move some of these lines make things a little fatter or skinnier to make them not look so long and skinny but the point is I think it's a little closer to a VRA compliant plan than what we had."); *id.* at 7445 (Szetela: "Yeah, I think you accomplished VRA with 6. You are just a hair over 40% and we are supposed to be between 35-40 so you are good there."); *id.* at 7474 (Rothhorn: "District 9 is lower so it's even more compliant with 38.6% so I think it's a positive with the numbers."); *see also id.* at 5733, 5747, 5748, 5757, 5765, 5767, 5829, 5834, 5843, 5847, 5871, 5872, 5875, 5898, 5899, 5903, 5904, 5912, 5914, 5915, 5917, 5918, 5919, 5924, 5925, 5926, 5937, 5967, 6204, 6205, 6215, 6216, 6220, 6221, 6223, 6410, 6411, 6412, 6414, 6427, 6428, 6429, 6434, 6436, 6438, 6458-59, 6482, 6511, 6512, 6515, 6516, 6523, 6559, 6560, 6563, 6563-64, 6564-65, 6566, 6571, 6572, 6573, 6589, 6590, 6596, 6602, 6613, 6614, 6617, 6622, 6638, 6640, 6661, 6662, 6663, 6664, 6668, 6669, 6670, 6671, 6673, 6674, 6675, 6680, 6682, 6683, 6685-86, 6716, 6717, 6718, 6720, 6724, 6764, 6765, 6766, 6768, 6769, 6773-74, 6674, 6782, 6783, 6785, 6786, 6787, 6788, 6804, 6805, 6806, 6821, 6822, 6852, 6853, 6860, 6900, 6913, 6937, 6938, 6939, 6940, 6946, 6947, 7068, 7070, 7074, 7075, 7168, 7169, 7173, 7182, 7185, 7188-89, 7190, 7191, 7194, 7197, 7198, 7200, 7201, 7219, 7220, 7221, 7222, 7225, 7227, 7228, 7229, 7229-30, 7231, 7231-32, 7232, 7233, 7234, 7235, 7236, 7237, 7238, 7240, 7241, 7242, 7242-43, 7243, 7244, 7270-71, 7273, 7275, 7277,

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7278, 7285, 7287, 7343, 7343-44, 7344, 7346, 7348, 7433, 7433-34, 7435, 7436, 7436-37, 7438, 7439, 7440, 7441, 7442, 7443, 7444, 7445, 7446, 7447, 7748, 7449, 7450, 7451, 7452, 7464, 7469, 7472, 7474, 7476, 7478, 7480, 7483, 7493, 7509-10, 7510, 7513, 7515, 7516, 7517, 7520, 7558-59, 7576, 7578, 7580, 7581, 7582, 7622-23, 7626, 7639, 7642, 7647, 7667, 7675, 7679, 7685, 7696, 7698, 7699, 7726, 7727, 7729, 7781, 7785, 7802, 7822, 7883, 7891, 7896, 7896-97, 7901, 7903, 7904, 7905, 7926, 7931, 7960, 8053, 8095, 8159, 8942, 9102.

Next—crossing the line from direct to circumstantial evidence, albeit barely—the commissioners continually monitored the BVAPs of Detroit-area districts as they drafted them, using the racial-percentages tool that Kim Brace had told them about on September 2. *See, e.g., id.* at 7277 (Orton: “Okay, so before you did this . . . the voting age Black population in District 4 was 41.2% which is quite a bit closer to the target that we are going for. Now it’s a lot higher . . . . I thought we were going 35-40% so [it is] way out from what I’m thinking.”); *id.* at 7446 (Szetela: “Brought your African/American below 40%. So now you are perfectly in the sweet spot of 35-40. All right.”); *id.* at 7453 (Rothhorn: “Started 57.32 now we are 44.13 nice work.”); *id.* at 7449 (Lett: “What’s the target for Macomb? Oakland.” Rothhorn: “Oakland County the target is 42 to 43ish.” Lett: “We are kind of splitting the difference right now.”); *id.* at 7464 (Rothhorn: “Correct so [this district] went from 50 to 40.7% so that is excellent.”); *id.* at 7657 (Clark: “So eight is another this is going to be in Wayne County and Macomb County I believe yeah so what are we focusing towards here? Wayne, we said 35 to 40% Macomb had nothing [and] we are currently at 35.71 so if we raised it to 40, I think we will okay.”); *see also id.* at 5733, 5748, 5757, 5829, 5838, 5843, 5875, 5898, 5902, 5917, 5924, 6213-14, 6219, 6221, 6414, 6422, 6425, 6426, 6428, 6432, 6433, 6436, 6471, 6483, 6484, 6511, 6518, 6525, 6562, 6565, 6572, 6581, 6615, 6617, 6617, 6618, 6633, 6640, 6670, 6671, 6676, 6678, 6683, 6684, 6686, 6724, 6726, 6765, 6774, 6785, 6804,

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6937, 7194, 7198, 7229, 7231-32, 7232, 7235, 7236, 7236, 7240, 7241, 7270-71, 7275, 7276, 7277, 7278, 7280, 7282, 7283, 7288, 7343, 7344, 7435, 7438, 7439, 7442, 7443, 7444, 7445, 7446, 7447, 7448, 7449, 7452, 7453, 7454, 7455, 7456, 7457, 7460, 7464, 7473, 7474, 7475, 7476, 7479, 7480, 7481, 7484, 7487, 7488, 7493, 7494, 7495, 7496, 7497, 7499, 7500, 7501, 7502, 7503, 7512, 7513, 7514, 7515, 7539, 7558, 7560, 7561, 7576, 7580, 7639, 7642, 7643, 7646, 7647, 7649, 7651, 7652, 7653, 7654, 7655, 7656, 7657, 7658, 7659, 7660, 7662, 7663, 7664, 7665, 7669, 7671, 7672, 7676, 7677, 7687, 7731, 7749, 8046, 8102, 8103, 8104, 8159, 8856-57, 8859, 8862, 8898, 8924, 8942, 9007, 9008, 9011, 9102, 9103, 9133, 9204, 9217, 9218, 9219, 9237, 9330, 9357.

Further circumstantial evidence of the Commission’s BVAP targets is that—with one exception—the BVAPs for all the districts challenged here fell within them. Admittedly, the Commission’s BVAP target ranges were not always perfectly clear as the commissioners and their counsel referred to them throughout the Commission’s work on these districts. Those targets did not take the form of positive law. But those references always fell within a BVAP range of 35-45%, which tracks Handley’s original numbers plus Adelson’s “cushion.” And though Detroit’s population is almost 80% African-American, 12 of the 13 districts at issue here ended up with BVAPs between 35.03% and 44.29%. The only exception is Senate District 11, which has a BVAP of 19.19%. And most of the African-American voters in that district were put there in order to lower the BVAP of an adjacent district. *See infra* at II.A.3.a.vi.

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b.

*Subordination of other criteria.* We also find that the Commission subordinated all other redistricting criteria to their target BVAPs in Detroit-area districts. Indeed, commissioners did so expressly.

First, the commissioners subordinated the criterion of “partisan fairness” to hitting their BVAP targets in Detroit-area districts. Partisan fairness ranks fourth in the hierarchy of the Michigan redistricting criteria, well after compliance with federal law (and specifically the VRA), which comes first. Mich. Const. art. IV, § 6(13). And (as noted above) the Commission equated hitting their BVAP targets with VRA compliance. Meanwhile, the Commission could not measure partisan fairness without a completed draft map (house or senate) for the entire State. Dr. Handley herself told the Commission as much when she presented to the Commission on October 1. MICRC Tr. at 7380 (“And you have to have a complete plan. This can only be done off a complete plan.”). Thus, partisan fairness is barely mentioned in the Commission’s meetings until October 6, when the Commission began its first partisan-fairness assessment (of its first completed drafts of house and senate maps).

When the Commission did turn to this criterion, they expressly avoided making any substantial partisan-fairness revisions to the Detroit-area districts, for fear of upsetting their “VRA compliance” (for which, again, hitting the BVAP targets was a proxy). On October 6, as the Commission began its “partisan fairness” assessment, Adelson advised the Commission not to make changes to Detroit-area districts on account of partisan fairness:

[M]y suggestion is we avoid districts that have VRA implications. We have a list of several other districts and some other possibilities. So in the interest of facilitating the partisan fairness adjustments our recommendation would be to move to districts that are not in the Metro Detroit area. And address other districts as we can.

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...

Our recommendation is we avoid those [Detroit-area districts]. Because adjusting in those areas will just make things unnecessarily complicated. I think that there are a lot of areas that potentially we can look at that just don't implicate these considerations, thank you.

*Id.* at 7781-82; *see also id.* at 6189 (“[I]f you can achieve other goals that are lower down on the list of criteria [than VRA], that’s a policy choice for you all. If they conflict, the Voting Rights Act, the 14th amendment win.”); *id.* at 7167 (“[Y]our legal team agrees that Friday is significant in that Dr. Handley will hopefully be able to present partisan fairness. But it is important and I’m sorry I’m going to speak for you. I will speak in one voice that the legal team strongly believes there are issues in addition of course to the partisan fairness. There are many voting rights issues and just in talking about the packed districts in Wayne County . . . . So there are other considerations. Certainly we agree with the partisan fairness and that is significant. But there are other issues.”); *id.* at 7784, 7785-86, 7904.

Dr. Handley likewise reminded the Commission that, whereas “it’s going to be a balancing act between voting rights and partisan fairness,” it is “not an equal *balance because the Voting Rights Act trumps partisan fairness.*” *Id.* at 7409 (emphasis added); *see also id.* at 7386 (stating with regard to partisan fairness: “But especially, again, you have the Voting Rights Act and other things you have to consider.”); *id.* at 7387 (“Again this is probably a legal question more, but it seems to me the [Michigan] Constitution does prioritize for you. And you know what comes first and what comes next.”); *see also id.* at 7382.

The Commissioners followed this guidance. *See, e.g., id.* at 7782 (Eid: “But we do not want to mess with 17, 14, because those are the VRA districts. Probably five as well just because of how it looks drawn.”); *id.* at 7785 (Eid: “The reason I didn’t [change these districts is] because they are two VRA districts.”); *id.* at 7785 (Orton: “We spent so many hours getting those balanced

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I think we should ignore or leave those alone . . . . We are trying to get partisan fairness. But that is a VRA issue, right?"); *id.* at 7816 (Commissioner Clark: "I agree Steve and I don't want to go back into Detroit. I think it's a spider's web to try to sort out again. I think we got it as I recall the way we want it. And so we should deal with everything outside that at this point."); *id.* at 7960 (Eid: "14 was drawn that way with Pontiac for VRA reasons so we might not want to change that one too much."); *id.* at 8053 (Eid: "For example lopsided margins test that one especially we are not going to be able to get it to 0 because of how we have drawn some of the VRA districts to be compliant."); *id.* at 7520, 7521, 7544, 7737, 7781-82, 7884, 7891, 7897, 7905, 7940.

The Commission likewise subordinated preservation of communities of interest to their "VRA compliance" (for which, again, hitting the BVAP targets was a proxy). Indeed, the commissioners frequently expressed their unhappiness about it. *See, e.g., id.* at 5747 (Szetela: "I appreciate and I did give it some thought but I'm trying to balance the Voting Rights Act against preferences because Voting Rights Act is our number one so I'm trying to make sure we don't get concentrated populations like we have in District nine . . . we received public commentary saying they did not want to be with Grosse Pointe and it's kind of mixed but doing it this way will us a more balanced from a voting rights and secondary is communities of interest."); *id.* at 6429 (Orton: "Looking at this overall, I have a comment which I think will be very unpopular. But I think it's maybe worth having a discussion about. The only way I see to make these districts make more of these Districts more balanced racially is to break up communities of interest. Because the only places I see are Hamtramck, Dearborn, Dearborn [H]eights, and the Grosse Points that you know show as not African/American. We know that there are certain populations in certain communities of interest in those and other areas. But I think we need to discuss what trumps. And we know that is VRA."); *id.* at 7242 (Eid: "And I hate to split them up but I think for this house map I don't



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see another way to do it because that is where the white population is around Detroit. We've already covered you know the other areas like Livonia for example. And Dearborn as well, which was split up the other day. So, I mean, I'd be welcome to any advice from anybody to figure out a way to not split it up but I think right now what we've heard is this map is currently not compliant and we need to get it to be compliant."); *id.* at 7444 (Witjes: "Don't worry if Harper Woods wants to be there or community of interest where Harper Woods should be. That should be not [sic] something we're looking at. We should be going into looking at just complying with the Voting Rights Act. And if we have to go in there don't let that be a reason as to why because you're thinking about public comment, go straight off the numbers to get where we need to be on with [VRA] stuff. And then go look at communities of interest."); *id.* at 7510 (Eid: "I mean I understand why we did it to become VRA compliant . . . . But it does have a significant change on communities of interest. . . . I think while it . . . might be better for VRA reasons it's really much worse for community of interest reasons."); *id.* (Rothhorn, responding to Eid: "I think you are speaking to many of us who are challenged by it and if we refer back to criteria number one as VRA and we are trying to achieve compliance and we've drawn communities of interest, drawn with communities of interest in mind and trying to get voting rights compliance which is number one not number three so I think unfortunately that is the shortest and quickest answer to your question. I know it hurts believe me."); *see also id.* at 5671, 5899-90, 5912, 5914, 5915, 5917-18, 6202, 6411, 6412, 6436, 6573, 6617, 6618, 6619, 6621, 6622, 6685-86, 6774, 6804, 7242, 7348, 7450-51, 7468, 7469, 7822.

We therefore find, as to the Commission's mapping process for Detroit-area districts generally, that the Commission adopted "an announced racial target" to which it "subordinated other districting criteria[.]" *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 300.

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2.

The Commission (in this litigation) disputes that finding on various grounds. The evidentiary bases, for most of the Commission’s arguments as to racial predominance generally, are a modest number of citations to the trial transcripts. The Commission has little to say about the 10,000-page contemporary record of its actions, or about the voluminous evidence of predominance catalogued above. But we address its handful of arguments in turn.

a.

The Commission first argues—citing trial testimony that in total runs just over two pages—that “[f]our commissioners attested [at trial] that race did not predominate.” R.115 at PageID 4015. But as an initial matter, the Commission’s chair, Rebecca Szetela, testified before those four commissioners did; and since their testimony refers to hers, we briefly recite some of hers first.

Szetela’s testimony echoed in large part the Commission’s hearing transcripts themselves. At trial, Szetela testified that—after Dr. Handley provided the Commission with the results of her racially polarized voting analysis on September 2—Adelson repeatedly told the commissioners that the “requirement of the law is to avoid packing minorities into districts above and beyond the percentage at which analysis is determined they need to elect candidates of choice.” R.112 at PageID 3640; *compare, e.g.*, MICRC Tr. at 5810 (Adelson: “Packing means adding or including additional minority voters typically the ones needed to elect what we call candidates of choice.”).

Szetela also testified that, “[o]nce we had received that analysis from Lisa Handley it became all about race . . . . At the direction of Mr. Adelson.” R.112 at PageID 3652; *compare, e.g.*, MICRC Tr. at 7439 (Rothhorn: “I think what we can interpret from [our legal counsel’s] advice is if we don’t try to get to 35%, we have not done our due diligence and therefore we may

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be exposing ourselves to a legal risk [for a VRA violation] we might be able to defend ourselves against but can't guarant[ee] that."). Relatedly, Szetela testified that—with Adelson's encouragement—the Commission drew districts that stretched into areas where it knew “that white voters” lived. R.112 at PageID 3646. She also testified, as to the line-drawing process, “we're just focused on bringing down the black population in Detroit, stretching those districts out into the suburbs surrounding Detroit to add white voters, making the districts thinner and skinnier within Detroit to reduce black voters and trying to hit those targets of 35 to 40 percent and 45 to 50 percent.” *Id.* at PageID 3651. That districting strategy was necessary, Szetela testified, “[b]ecause the population is just so concentrated that if you pull black people out of one neighborhood and move them into another neighborhood in Detroit, it's just not going to fix the problem because that's where people live.” *Id.* at 3684. The results of the line-drawing process itself support all those assertions.

Szetela also testified that, “[a]ny time there was a conflict between a community of interest and Voting Rights, the Voting Rights Act prevailed.” *Id.* at 3663-64; *compare, e.g.*, MICRC Tr. at 6619-20 (Adelson: “I think that the issues about communities of interest and keeping sort of communities together as I've read a lot of public comments in general . . . . But I think it is very important from a compliance standpoint to look at the ranked criteria and the number one criteria is the U.S. Constitution and Federal law.”); *id.* at 7242 (Eid: “So, I mean, I'd be welcome to any advice from anybody to figure out a way to not split it up but I think right now what we've heard is this map is currently not compliant and we need to get it to be compliant.”). For example, Szetela testified that, when the Commission drafted Senate District 8, it “grab[bed] Birmingham, which is an extraordinarily wealthy [and] white area,” and “pulled [it] into Detroit.” R.112 at PageID 3734; *compare, e.g.*, MICRC Tr. at 7451 (Clark: “When you go into Birmingham, we are

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stretching this all the way from mid-Detroit all the way up there.” Szetela: “What other way is it to get VRA [compliance]?”). She likewise testified that, as to Senate District 3, the Commission drew the lines from inner Wayne County to “out farther into Macomb and Oakland counties” to add white voters. R.112 at PageID 3741-42; *compare e.g.*, MICRC Tr. at 7449 (Szetela: “I think it’s good. I think you brought [the BVAP] down . . . you are right in the sweet spot at this point.”).

Yet Anthony Eid—the first of the four commissioners whose testimony the Commission now cites—disagreed with Szetela’s testimony. Eid was the Commission’s principal fact witness at trial. In testimony that the Commission now cites, Eid said that “there was no BVAP target and we could not use a target” in the Commission’s map-drawing in Detroit-area districts. R.104 at PageID 2852. But that assertion is belied not only by hundreds of citations to the contemporary record cited above, but by Eid’s own statements during the mapping process. For example, on September 30, 2021, alone, Eid said all of the following:

What is the Black VAP on [draft house district] 21 currently? Still 64 so it’s still high, higher than I think we would like it to be.

I hate to split them [*i.e.*, a Grosse Pointe COI] up but I think for this house map I don’t see another way to do it because that is where the white population is around Detroit.

MICRC Tr. at 7241-42.

I think the purpose [of some changes Eid had just made to the map] was to shift the Black voting age percentage from District 4 I’m sorry District 6 which was at 67% lower. So now instead of having one District way over on the percent we [ne]ed to hit we have two that are close to being around the 45-55% range which I think is more in line with what we need to get than the 68% range it was at before.

*Id.* at 7277.

what is the actual target we need to hit. As you said earlier, we are not going to be able to get to 35-40 percent for every one of these Detroit districts I mean I don’t see a way to do it.

*Id.* at 7283. Similarly, on October 4, Eid said:

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Mr. Adelson, I appreciate all of the advice that you give us but I got to be honest I'm becoming increasingly uncomfortable with this direction we're going under. . . . But it's just making me a little uncomfortable having to hit these percentages that are low I would be more comfortable with 45% but 35% thank you Commissioner Curry. (Who then says: "Absolutely I'm in full agreement with you.").

*Id.* at 7483. The Commission also cites the following testimony from Eid with regard to predominance:

This was a multi-factorial and multi-variable process that included many different variables, as we've talked about today and will talk about over the next few days, and it created a situation where we took a holistic view at all of the variables and not just one. There was not one issue that predominated over this process.

R.104 at PageID 2845. Eid's testimony as to racial predominance, however, was palpably rote and rehearsed. He repeated over a dozen times, for example, that the Commission had "many reasons" for its line-drawing decisions in the districts at issue here. *See id.* at PageID 2867, 2869, 2872, 2874, 2876, 2877, 2879, 2882, 2885, 2892, 2895, 2900, 2905, 2912. All that testimony was more scripted than probative.

Finally, though we take no pleasure in mentioning it, cross-examination revealed that—the year before Eid joined the Commission—another public entity had formally sanctioned Eid for dishonesty. *Id.* at PageID 2943, 2945-47. And Eid's testimony before us was by turns implausible and evasive. In demeanor and substance alike, Eid was not a credible witness.

The other three commissioners whom the Commission cites now were on the whole credible witnesses. Commissioner MC Rothhorn, for example, was an open, direct, and engaging witness. In testimony the Commission cites here—and in response to a question whether "the Commission let issues of race dominate this criteria"—Rothhorn answered, "[m]y personal memory is no, and it sure seemed like it when [Szetela's] testimony was being given, but my memory is no." R.112 at PageID 3771. A few minutes before, however, Rothhorn testified that

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his memory on this issue was “foggy” and that “[Szetela’s] memory was really great.” *Id.* at PageID 3766. And in nearly the same breath Rothhorn testified that, “I think with the first criteria being population and the Voting Rights Act, it was very important to get that one right first.” *Id.* Rothhorn also agreed that many of the Commission’s revisions to its maps involved “lowering the black voting age population,” and that the purpose of those revision was “I think to comply with the Voting Rights Act.” *Id.* at PageID 3765. Relatedly, Rothhorn testified that the Commission had used the “spoke” concept in mapping, and that its purpose was to “[m]ove out of the Detroit area where the black population is into the suburbs where the white population is.” *Id.* at PageID 3776. And when asked “[w]ere you ever yelled at for drawing districts in Detroit that had BVAP levels that were too high[,]” Rothhorn answered:

So, I certainly appreciate the sentiment. I don’t—I honestly don’t remember, but I remember extreme tension and feelings of—yeah, that feeling of being yelled at or—yeah.

*Id.* at PageID 3772.

In the contemporary record, too, Rothhorn regularly discussed the Commission’s BVAP target. For example, on one occasion he told a commissioner, “[w]e are currently at 43.25 so you want to try to get it to 35-40” percent BVAP and reminded him that “we are not focusing on” communities of interest. MICRC Tr. at 7446-47. Later, he told another commissioner that in “Oakland County the target is 42 to 43ish.” *Id.* at 7449. He also said, “I think what we can interpret from [our legal counsel’s] advice is if we don’t try to get to 35%, we have not done our due diligence and therefore we may be exposing ourselves to a legal risk we might be able to defend ourselves against but can’t guarant[ee] that.” *Id.* at 7439.

The Commission also cites the testimony of Juanita Curry. Specifically—in response to the question whether “the Commission let issues of race dominate in its application of this

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criteria”—Curry testified that, “[t]o my knowledge, I was not even thinking on that level at all throughout my whole process. It never dawned on me that we would even do anything like that so, no.” R.112 at PageID 3789. But Curry’s memory of the Commission’s proceedings was perceptibly shaky at trial. *See, e.g., id.* at PageID 3784-85. And during the Commission’s meetings themselves, for example, her revisions to one district “took out a lot of African/American population.” MICRC Tr. at 7235. Yet the BVAP for that district remained high, and she said the “only way to go is up north” to reduce it. *Id.* at 7239.

Finally, the Commission cites the testimony of Erin Wagner. Specifically—in response to a question whether “the Commission allowed partisan fairness to take priority over other considerations”—she testified:

I think, yes, we did—we did do that, but I also think that we just—we were 13 citizens that didn’t know what we were doing, and we were looking to people that were, you know, told—we were told were experts, so of course you’re going to lean on expert’s opinion.

R.112 at PageID 3807.

But Wagner also testified that she had felt like mapping Detroit-area districts was like playing “Blackjack,” explaining:

we were listening to all the people in Detroit and all the African American people state what their communities of interest were, and I was under the assumption, like [Rothhorn], that communities of interest was the main thing, but when we were given the percentages that we had to get down by, we were constantly having to drop those BVAP percentages down.

*Id.* at PageID 3803-04.

The testimony of none of these witnesses remotely displaces any of our findings based on the voluminous record evidence catalogued above.

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b.

The Commission also asserts that “[p]olitics better explains the lines” of the districts at issue here. R.115 at PageID 4016. As support, the Commission invokes not a word from the contemporary record of its work. And the Commission concedes that—unlike the racial-percentages tool, which the Commission employed on its mapping software from day one—its partisan-fairness tool was not activated until early October 2021. *Id.* at PageID 4018. Yet the Commission asserts that “the Commission” evaluated “every single” one of its completed maps for partisan fairness as they worked in September. *Id.* (alteration omitted). As support, the Commission cites the following testimony from Eid, which reads in full:

Every single time we completed a map, before we got our own internal partisan fairness tool, I would upload our completed maps into [third-party online] software to figure out if we were on the right track or not.

R.104 at PageID 2829.

We have no reason to doubt that Eid did as he said—on that point his testimony was credible—but to say on the basis of this testimony that “the Commission” did these evaluations is an overstatement. And meanwhile the commissioners said hardly a word about partisan fairness during their September mapping.

The Commission otherwise cites the testimony of one of its expert witnesses, Jonathan Rodden. Specifically, quoting Dr. Rodden, the Commission says that, “[b]ecause ‘Democrats in Michigan’ are ‘concentrated’ in Detroit, ‘a plan that’s drawn without regards for partisanship will generate extremely Democratic districts,’ which in turn ‘makes for an inefficient distribution of support across districts.’” R.115 at PageID 4017 (citing R.106 at PageID 3120-21). But the evidence afforded by Rodden’s testimony was purely circumstantial: his point, simply stated, was



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that the district lines at issue here improved the partisan fairness of the Commission's maps, and thus one might infer that partisan fairness was the object of the Commission's map-drawing.

So far as the direct evidence of the Commission's intent was concerned, however, Rodden had nothing to say. He admitted on cross-examination that he had not "read the transcripts of the Commission meetings" or done anything else to learn about the direct evidence available in this case. R.106 at PageID 3175-76, 3186. He also admitted that the statements of "the map drawers themselves, can provide critical evidence" of what predominated in their decision-making. *Id.* at PageID 3188. More to the point, Rodden said he had testified in another redistricting case—the *Bethune-Hill* case that the Supreme Court eventually decided in 2017. *Id.* at PageID 3176. And Rodden admitted that, in *Bethune-Hill*, he *did* review the contemporary record of the map drawers' work "in painstaking[] detail," and indeed made that record the basis of his testimony there. *Id.* at PageID 3180. But Rodden did none of that work here. (In fairness to Rodden, he explained that the Commission's counsel had not asked him to review the contemporary record, which itself yields an inference.) Rodden's testimony was therefore an abstraction, without any connection to the Commission's record. His testimony does nothing to rebut the direct evidence that partisan fairness was subordinated to racial line-drawing for the districts at issue here.

All that said, the Commission did strive to improve partisan fairness in districts outside the Detroit area. But when the Commission drew Detroit-area (or "VRA") districts, as shown above, it pointedly did not allow considerations of partisan fairness to intrude. The boundaries of the districts at issue here—stretching far into Oakland County and even beyond M-59 in Macomb—did improve the 2021 maps' partisan-fairness scores. But that was merely a byproduct of the Commission's racial line-drawing. What improved those scores was the Commission's decision intentionally to distribute African-American voters across a greater number of districts around

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Detroit. That racial line-drawing reduced Democratic majorities in general elections, leading to higher partisan-fairness scores—to the detriment, plaintiffs say, of their ability to elect their preferred candidates in Democratic primaries. Partisan fairness had little to do with the boundaries of the districts at issue here.

c.

The Commission’s next argument as to predominance is that it “gave overriding consideration to communities defined by actual shared interests.” R.115 at PageID 4019-21 (internal quotation marks omitted). As support, the Commission does rely on 18 citations—most of them to only a page or two—to the Commission’s meeting transcripts. *Id.* at PageID 4020. Seven of those citations are to discussions about communities of interests in areas well outside Detroit, including Muskegon County (near Lake Michigan, north of Grand Rapids), Lansing, Ann Arbor (some 45 miles away from Detroit), and Monroe County (ditto). *See* MICRC Tr. at 5514-17, 5526, 5559, 5562, 5576-77, 5596-97, 5603. Those discussions are irrelevant here.

The remaining 11 citations are to discussions among commissioners on a single day—namely September 9, 2021, which was the Commission’s first day of drafting its Detroit-area senate maps. *See id.* at 5661-65, 5667-70, 5680, 5683-85, 9986-96, 9999, 10001-02, 10004, 10008, 10011-13, 10019. Two of those 11 citations are to discussions about communities of interests that the Commission eventually split up—such as the Downriver community of interest whose fragmentation, four days later, distressed Commissioner Witjes. *Compare id.* at 5680 with 5912; *see also id.* at 10004. Those discussions likewise do not support the Commission’s point.

That leaves nine citations to different parts of the September 9 transcript. The Commission offers no explanation as to why these discussions (or any of the discussions it cites) support its assertion that communities of interest were an “overriding consideration” or even on par with the

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Commission’s BVAP targets as it drafted Detroit-area districts. Instead we just get the bare cites. Nor do we see these discussions as supportive of the Commission’s point. In two of them, rather, Adelson or a commissioner warns the group to be mindful of the districts’ BVAPs. *See id.* at 10008, 10013. And the remaining seven citations are simply to pages where a commissioner talks about a community of interest. None of these seven discussions involve talk of any tradeoff between COIs and the BVAP targets, or between COIs and any other criteria at all. Moreover, at the end of the mapping process, not a single one of the Commission’s Detroit-area Senate districts had a BVAP exceeding the 35-45% target range. None of these 18 citations to the meeting transcripts, therefore, undermine our conclusion—based on all the evidence cited above—that the Commission subordinated communities of interest to hitting its BVAP targets.

Two other points bear mention regarding the Commission’s assertion about “communities defined by actual shared interests.” At trial, two former state legislators from Detroit—Virgil Smith and Lamar Lemmons III—provided a ground-level perspective on what some of these Detroit-area districts were like. In 2022, Smith was the campaign manager for an incumbent state senator, Marshall Bullock of Detroit, who ran in the Democratic primary in the newly drawn Senate District 8. R.102 at PageID 2748. That district reaches north to include all of Birmingham. And in that election white voters rejected Bullock by a margin of 96% to 4%—which allowed their preferred candidate, from a Detroit suburb, to win the primary and then the general election. R.71-1 at PageID 1076. Smith testified about the difficulty that black candidates have campaigning in predominantly white suburbs—where, he explained, “the issues [that voters care about] are completely different.” R.102 at PageID 2750. Smith testified that “the more affluent the territory got” as Bullock’s supporters were canvassing, the less likely it was that voters would answer the door. *Id.* at PageID 2754. He testified: “We have a hard time getting them to answer the door for

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us, and if we can't get them to answer the door for us, how can we sell ourselves as a candidate to the new voters?" *Id.* at PageID 2750. And the attitude of some voters, he testified, was that "we have no business being out there." *Id.* Lemmons testified similarly, saying that he would hire white canvassers to cover those areas. *Id.* at PageID 2773.

Second, as a circumstantial matter, that the Commission put cities like Gross Pointe, Bloomfield Hills, and Birmingham—some of the wealthiest cities in Michigan, where Porsches and Range Rovers are commonplace, and Cadillacs more numerous than Chevrolets—in the same districts as some of the poorest neighborhoods in Detroit, itself belies the idea that "communities of interest" were paramount in drawing these districts. We reject the Commission's argument on this point also.

d.

More briefly, we likewise reject the Commission's argument—to which it devotes a single paragraph in its brief—that the reason the Commission extended its Detroit-area districts into Oakland and Macomb County was that the population in Detroit had declined since the 2010 census. *See* R.115 at PageID 4019. Nowhere in the contemporary record do we see any of the commissioners saying anything to that effect. Instead, they uniformly said they drew those "spokes"—as far north as Bloomfield Hills in Oakland County, and all the way to M-59 in Macomb—to reduce the percentages of black voters in those districts. *See, e.g.,* MICRC Tr. at 5902, 6157, 6482. The Commission's characterizations of its actions in this regard are *post hoc*.

In sum, therefore, we reject the Commission's contention that it did not adopt racial targets that predominated over other criteria in drawing Detroit-area districts.

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e.

Finally, in the interest of completeness, we do address one argument that the Commission has not made: namely, that inclusion of six black-majority districts in its final House Plan (called “Hickory”) tends to show that the Commission did not have a 35-45% BVAP target in drawing Detroit-area districts. By way of background (and to reiterate somewhat), the Commission released its proposed House and Senate plans for public comment on October 11. *See id.* at 8164, 8169. In both those plans the number of majority-black districts in Detroit stood at zero. Nine days later, on October 20, the Commission held its public hearing at the TCF Center. And there—not to put too fine a point on it—the Commission endured a nine-hour pounding from Detroit residents who were distressed, above all, about the proposed absence of any majority-black districts for their city.

A week later, before resuming any of its mapping work, the Commission (at the urging of its lawyers) took the extraordinary step of going into a closed session, where everything they said, Pastula announced, must remain confidential. During that session, Adelson said that “one of the things we have to stress, emphasize, insist on, plead, beg and say please, please don’t use phrases about adding black people, subtracting black people, adding white people, subtracting white people.” R.126-1 at PageID 4579. He then said that “a path forward” for the Commission—toward what, he did not expressly say, but the context, before and after, makes clear enough that he was alluding to raising the BVAPs in some districts—would be to invoke “communities of interest.” *Id.* at PageID 4572. Kellom and Orton understood his point, with Orton saying, “when we’re talking about this, if we choose to put anything together that we currently have separated, we go back to communities of interest. It’s a community of interest thing, not a VRA thing.” *Id.* at PageID 4588. Lett then spoke more directly, saying that the Commission could define

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communities of interest however it likes, and so COIs could give the Commission “cover.” *Id.* at PageID 4603.

Szetela testified that, before the Commission’s meeting the next day, Rothhorn and Kellom spoke to her and said that “they wanted to fix Detroit and they wanted to increase the black voting age population and that they had had a discussion with Bruce Adelson that they could do that as long as they used neighborhoods as the basis.” R.112 at PageID 3718. (Adelson had many sidebar discussions with commissioners. *See, e.g., id.* at PageID 3767 (Rothhorn); *id.* at PageID 3611 (Szetela)). Based in part on what followed, we find that testimony credible. During the Commission’s meeting on November 2—the first day it worked on its house maps after the TCF hearing—Adelson told the commissioners the following:

[G]oing higher with the BVAP as you’re reuniting the neighborhoods, as we were doing earlier, that is fine under the Michigan Constitution with the criteria number three. The diverse communities and the communities of interest. I just wanted to make that clarification.

MICRC Tr. at 9188.

Rothhorn then said that he and Kellom had been working on some “major changes” to the house maps. *Id.* at 9199-9201. Kellom explained that “we are offering this as a way to move forward in the Detroit area” and “reunite some of the neighborhoods.” *Id.* at 9206-07. Szetela objected, saying “I don’t remember Commissioner or individual commenters saying that they wanted neighborhoods put back together. I remember a lot of comments about wanting minority majority districts with more than 50% African/American and I don’t remember much of anything about neighborhoods honestly.” *Id.* at 9207. Pastula interjected: “I think what I hear Commissioner Kellom discuss is, again, the third criteria of diversity and communities of interest . . . [and] the focus of uniting neighborhoods[.]” *Id.*

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The Commission then moved forward with revisions according to Rothhorn and Kellom’s proposal. Then they checked the BVAPs for the house districts. That showed two things. First, that in five House Districts—namely, House Districts 4, 5, 6, 9, 16, and 18 (districts not challenged here), the BVAP rose up above 50%. Second, that in House Districts 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14 (which are challenged here), the BVAPs remained relatively stable—and indeed in House Districts 1, 10, 11, 12, and 14, the BVAPs dropped even further (though still within the 35-45% range). When they were done, Adelson said: “So the numbers to me I think I’m good with them. The I think the numbers are an improvement in the sense of responding to concerns about that I took to be community based. So those are my thoughts.” *Id.* at 9256.

From this sequence of events—beginning with the criticism the commissioners had endured at the TCF hearing—one could easily conclude that they invoked “neighborhoods” (mentioned 125 times in that day’s meeting) and “communities of interest” (mentioned 99 times) as pretexts, or “cover” (as Lett had said), for simply wanting to raise the BVAPs in some house districts. (Six of them, as it turned out in the final house plan.) And thus one could easily conclude that raising those BVAPs amounted to just so much more racial-line drawing.

But we need not make that determination here. For even if one accepts the “neighborhoods” rationale for those changes, that would mean only that the Commission carved out an exception—in those six house districts—to the BVAP targets that predominated in the Commission’s mapping process for Detroit-area districts generally. None of the BVAPs in the Commission’s Detroit-area senate districts changed materially after the TCF hearing. Those districts lines were thus still based on the BVAP targets that predominated before. The same is true for the seven house districts at issue here. It remains true, therefore, that the Commission

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drew its Detroit-area district lines—including the lines for every house and senate district at issue here—based predominantly on its racial targets.

3.

Racial gerrymandering claims apply “to the boundaries of individual districts.” *Ala. Legis. Black Caucus*, 575 U.S. at 262. Yet what we have already said, in the preceding 81 pages, should be enough to decide this case: the Commission generally drew its Detroit-area districts based predominantly on race, and the districts here were no exception. But again, in the interest of completeness (and with apologies for some repetition) we will examine the evidence specific to each district at issue here. That evidence only confirms that race predominated in drawing each of these districts.

a.

We begin with Senate Districts 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 11. The Commission drafted those districts (and others in Detroit) principally on September 9, 13, 14, and 15, 2021, on October 4, 11, 28, and 29, 2021, and on November 5, 2021. The Commission adopted the final version of the plan—renamed the Linden plan—on December 28, 2021. As enacted, each district’s black-voter percentage (apart from SD11) fell within the range prescribed by Bruce Adelson.


<b>District No.</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>Linden Plan</b>	12/28/2021	35.03	42.09	39.15	40.25	40.43	19.19



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(i)

*Senate District 1.* This district (which began as Senate District 17) is located entirely in Wayne County, and has a black-voting age percentage of 35.03.



As initially drafted (on September 13), this district ran from Melvindale and River Rouge (at its north end) down along the Detroit River through Trenton and Gibraltar (at its south end). So drafted, its black-voter percentage was 10.98. But the Commission thereafter looked for other districts—with lower BVAPs—where it could put black voters to “balance out the population in Detroit.” MICRC Tr. at 5912. This district was one of them.

Specifically, the Commission removed from this district mostly white neighborhoods further south (“Downriver”) and added mostly black neighborhoods in central Wayne County (including part of Davison-Schoolcraft and Dexter Linwood). *See id.* at. 5911-12. But when it first did so (on September 15), Commissioner Witjes objected:

Szetela: Go down . . . and try to fix that quickly. By taking off some of the Down River community. So we are going to work from the bottom. Go to the Township level. Commissioner Witjes?

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Witjes: Why exactly are we messing with the down river community on the south border based on all the praise that we receive that that's basically a perfect District from everyone that lives there.

Szetela: Because we are going to have to, to balance out the population in Detroit.

Witjes: I disagree completely.

Szetela: Okay.

Witjes: I mean where are you drawing this conclusion from out of curiosity? Because I don't see it.

Szetela: From what our voting rights expert indicated our populations were too packed.

*Id.* at 5912. Those changes and similar ones increased the district's BVAP from 10.98% to 34.86%. Yet on October 4, once the district had taken form, Commissioner Curry complained about its "crazy" and "terrible" shape. This exchange followed:

Rothhorn: I think the reason it's drawn if my understanding is correct Commissioner Curry it's related to the VRA. Right where the white and Black populations are balanced so yeah.

Curry: It may be balanced but it looks too crazy.

*Id.* at 7469. The Commission's Secretary, Sarah Reinhardt, then reminded Curry that "compactness" was the Commission's "lowest ranked criteria." *Id.* at 7470. But Curry again objected, this time speaking more generally about how the Commission had "chopped up Detroit."

*Id.* at 7479. Rothhorn again tried to explain why the Commission had "split Detroit":


The reason I think we are trying to split it is we are trying to get the numbers that we were given from Dr. Handley at 35% with the Black voting age population that is 35% so we did our best to try to draw that with that kind of understanding that the Black voting age population can elect a candidate of choice. I don't think there are any districts even though they may not look like it. And it looks like it's splintered. But there is no District in here with a Black community cannot elect its candidate of choice.

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*Id.* at 7480. When the Commission completed Senate Plan 199 (on October 4), the district that became Senate District 1 had a black-voter percentage of 36.73. The Commission thereafter made only minor adjustments to the senate maps; and the enacted version of this district—Senate District 1—has a black-voter percentage of 35.03.

(ii)

*Senate District 3.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 42.09 and encompasses parts of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb County.



The district runs from the Detroit River (including Belle Isle) through Hamtramck, all the way up to 14 Mile Road—where it combines at its north end parts of Clawson (in Oakland County) and parts of Warren (in Macomb County).

Here, too, the contemporary record shows that race predominated when the Commission drew this district. In its initial form, Senate District 3 (which began as Senate District 8) was majority-black, with a BVAP of 50.82%. But the Commission thereafter deliberately reduced that number to comport with Adelson’s directive. On October 4, for instance, while Commissioner Weiss was leading the mapping session, he asked:

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Weiss: All right, I guess I'm looking here and are we going to try to do something with [this district]?

Rothhorn: Yes. We are currently at 43.25 [BVAP] so you want to try to get it down to 35-40.

Weiss: Yes, I don't think my eraser is big enough.

....  
Szetela: Just for the public listening, MC Rothhorn was discussing with Commissioner Weiss the populations we are looking at . . . [including what became Senate District 3] . . . And just directing him those are the districts we are trying to remedy and bring into compliance.

Weiss: All right my suggestions from anybody? I guess I need some help on this one.

....  
Rothhorn: I can help too. One of the things I believe that District [] is where again we are not focusing on [communities of interest] so I want to offer this as a way to . . . decrease non-Hispanic Black . . . . And increasing our VRA compliance.

*Id.* at 7446-47. Rothhorn thereafter suggested moving the district slightly north (into what was then Senate District 16). Commissioner Weiss did so, namely, by “add[ing] a little more of Clawson”—an Oakland County suburb with a white population over 91%. *Id.* at 7448; *see* Clawson city, Michigan, U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/clawsoncitymichigan> (last visited Dec. 21, 2023). After Weiss did so, Commissioner Lett asked:

Lett: What's the target for Macomb? Oakland.

Rothhorn: Oakland County the target is 42 to 43ish.

Lett: We are kind of splitting the difference right now.

Szetela: Yep.

MICRC Tr. at 7449. The black-voter percentage dropped accordingly, and Szetela remarked: “I think it's good. I think you brought it down so as [Lett] said you are right in the sweet spot at this point.” *Id.*

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That same afternoon, Rothhorn asked Adelson to “help” the Commission determine whether this district, with its African-American population, still provided black voters with the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. He explained:

[W]e deliberately tried to unpack [several districts, including what became Senate District 3] because those are the highest percentages. And we brought them down significantly. And if you would like those numbers, I can give those to you.

*Id.* at 7487. Adelson agreed, remarking:

We talked about a systematic approach to compliance and that is very important for the record and record keeping in general so I would like to . . . work our way down the list.


*Id.* When the Commission got to what became Senate District 3—which at that point had a black-voting percentage of 43.35—Adelson confirmed that “all reveals candidates of choice being elected . . . [a]cross the board so I think for now let’s put an okay and go to our next District.” *Id.* at 7493.

The Commission thereafter made only minor adjustments to this district—and the black voting age percentage stayed virtually frozen; as adopted by the Commission, Senate District 3 has a black-voter percentage of 42.09.

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(iii)

*Senate District 6.* This district has a black-voting age population of 39.15% and encompasses parts of both Wayne and Oakland County.



The Commission reached that BVAP in Senate District 6 (which began as Senate District 9) by moving Southfield (a predominantly black city) into what became Senate District 7 (which in an earlier map was Senate District 14). Simultaneously, it brought Farmington (a predominately white city) into Senate District 6.

When the Commission began mapping on October 4, the black-voter percentage in this district was 51.99:

Szetela: I think you need to take Black population at this point. What you can do by bringing [this district] down.

...

Orton: Well from what I think [what became Senate District 6] is overpopulated . . . So . . . we want to reduce the African/American population in [this district] so what if we took all of Southfield and put it up into [another district] wouldn't that possibility take care of all those problems?

Rothhorn: I think that is what Commissioner Lett was suggesting too.

Szetela: Right. So you will bring [another district] down [into Southfield] and probably when you do that might have to take [what became Senate District 6] into Farmington a little bit. It's like you are working at a puzzle here. Shifting things around.

...

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Szetela: Yes, balance [it] out and then you're going to bring it into Farmington and that will reduce your African/American population.

...

Eid: And I'll point out too because [what became Senate District 6] is mostly in Oakland County we can probably get away with that 43% [BVAP] instead of going down to the 40% number.

Szetela: That's true.

*Id.* at 7452-59. By removing Southfield (mostly black) and adding Farmington (mostly white), the black-voter percentage fell by over 10%—down to 40.03%. Later on October 4, Rothhorn confirmed that these adjustments had the desired effect: “Correct so [this District] went from 50 to 40.7[%] so that is excellent.” *Id.* at 7464. Commissioner Witjes replied:

Yep, perfect. So I think I'm done at this particular point then for rationale these adjustments [are] taking into account the Voting Rights Act and looking at the voting age population and the Black voting age population to make them so that . . . the districts are able to elect candidates of choice and by definition . . . we are taking into account diverse population of the State of Michigan. Erasers down.

*Id.* At trial, Szetela testified specifically about this district, confirming what the contemporary record shows:


We reconfigured [this District] to bring it farther over into kind of the Livonia area, bring in white voters there, because Southfield has a significant black population so we needed to go west on that one to reduce the BVAP. And so, again, we're just stretching things out into areas where we know that white voters are making these districts in Detroit skinner, narrower to cut down the black population.

R.112 at PageID 3645-46.

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(iv)

*Senate District 8.* This district has a black-voting age population of 40.25% and crosses the county line between Wayne and Oakland County.



When the Commission first drafted this district (which began as Senate District 13), its shape was wide—stretching mostly east to west—and it encompassed large portions of predominantly black neighborhoods in Southfield and Lathrup Village (both in Oakland County). So drafted, its black-voter percentage was 63.77. But on September 15—two days after Pastula told Szetela that she and Adelson were “alarmed” by that number—the Commission reduced the black-voter percentage by narrowing the district and stretching it north to south. *See* Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 45. That day, Rothhorn explained their “rationale,” saying, “the reason I’m doing this . . . is to decrease the minority percentage, right, to have a more balanced Black-white ratio and not just Black and white but nonwhite and white balance.” *Id.* at 5898. He further explained:

I’m comparing it and we reduced it and it’s relatively high and it’s important – what I’m thinking about is flagging this in terms of VRA right in terms of the notes that we will follow-up with Bruce on it but this is in terms of, yeah and it’s too high, the percentage is too high and want to chip away at it. What I found is trying to improve



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the percentage of 13. . . . So moving west. I wasn't able to improve the minority percentage.

We have high minority populations in Lathrup Village and Southfield and definitely in the Detroit area so [another district] we have to go further north. And so what I'm going to do is suggest in [what became Senate District 8] any way we, yeah, I guess I'm going to suggest that we have to keep it but I want to get closer to the population. So I want to take off the northern so I think the southern end we have to keep unless other people have ideas. This is where you know again to decrease the minority percentage and increase the white or you know the people of color are too high at this point.

*Id.* at 5899. A few minutes later, however, Lett told Rothhorn, "looking at the percentages on voting whites and Blacks . . . it appears to me there is a lot of work that's got to be done to get the percentages down under 50." *Id.* at 5903. Rothhorn responded:

Yeah, so maybe so what I'm hearing you say [Lett] which acknowledges [this District] is not good. . . . let's keep playing because we know this one has to change. . . . [this District] is not okay.

*Id.* at 5904.

Yet at the end of that day's mapping session, the Commission had reduced the black-voter percentage to 59.06—just four points lower than it had been two days before. Thus, on October 4, the Commission again sought to reduce that percentage. They did so by further narrowing its shape and driving north into predominantly white suburbs—indeed as far as Birmingham, which is 87% white, and whose residents have a median household income of \$151,556:

Witjes: Let's go – let's keep going north . . . . Go as far into Birmingham. Anyone have a thought?

Szetela: I'm sorry could you repeat that.

Witjes: [This District] extending north into Birmingham.

Szetela: Why not. We got to get the VRA right and that is number one so.

Mr. Morgan: Birmingham not Troy?

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Clark: When you go into Birmingham, we are stretching this thing all the way from mid-Detroit all the way up there.

Szetela: What other way is it to get VRA.

Curry: That is okay. You can do that.

Clark: I know we can do it.

*Id.* at 7450-51; *see also* Birmingham city, Michigan, U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/birminghamcitymichigan/PST045222> (last visited Dec. 21, 2023).

That change reduced the black-voter percentage significantly, from almost 60% down to 48%. *See* MICRC Tr. at 7452 (Witjes: “So . . . 48% Black voting age population so it’s going down.”). But it also increased the district’s overall voting-age population, making it overpopulated (for purposes of achieving “equal population” in all districts) by roughly 36,000 people. *Id.* Commissioner Witjes therefore suggested a solution—namely, to remove “piece[s]” of Detroit, so that both the total voter-percentage and the black-voter percentage decreased simultaneously. *See* MICRC Tr. at 7452-53. Those changes had the desired effect:

Witjes: And what was the percentage that [this District] should go down.

Rothhorn: Started 57.32 now we are 44.13 nice work.

Witjes: What does it need to go down to?

Szetela: Wayne is 40 ideally. 35-40%.

*Id.* at 7453. By the end of the day on October 4, the Commission had reduced the black-voter percentage slightly more, to 42.45%. And after October 4, the Commission made only minor changes to the district; as enacted, Senate District 8 has black-voter percentage of 40.25. Commissioner Szetela explained at trial what the contemporary record shows:


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[This District] was originally entirely up in Oakland County with just a very small amount in Detroit. We’ve now brought it down, almost half of it into Detroit. . . . And so, again, we’re just stretching things out into areas where we know white voters are making these districts in Detroit skinnier, narrower to cut down the black population.

R.112 at PageID 3645-46.

(v)

*Senate District 10.* This district encompasses parts of Wayne and Macomb County and has a black-voter percentage of 40.43. Its shape is irregular, running north to south—from roughly 19 Mile Road down to 8 Mile Road—where its southernmost portion hooks east into Wayne County.



On October 4, this district (which began as Senate District 6) had a black-voter percentage of 49.38. As a result, Szetela identified this district as one where “we [] still have some VRA work to do[.]” MICRC Tr. at 7438. Rothhorn agreed, reminding the group to keep Dr. Handley’s racially polarized voting analysis in mind:

It might help Commissioners if you are looking at Lisa Handley’s presentation Page 20 the map that shows the State House districts and the State Senate districts for

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the 2010 maps what she shows on that Page 20 is the areas that are packed and what she describes as the most packed is 50% to 70% meaning if we are in 50%, we are not unpacked [] and if we are 40%, we have not unpacked it.

The map shows where we should target. All those districts [including what became Senate District 10] are all in the area if we are 50% range it's just as packed as it was in 2010. That's kind of the map I'm reading here.

*Id.*

Commissioner Vallette then led the mapping session during which the Commission modified this district's boundaries. To reduce the black-voting age percentage, Vallette narrowed the district and extended its northern edge further into Macomb County—all the way up into Sterling Heights and past 19 Mile Road. *Id.* at 7443. Those changes reduced the BVAP to a “hair over 40%”; but (as with Senate District 8) they also caused an increase in the district's overall voting age population, making it overpopulated by roughly 7,000 people. *Id.* at 7445. Szetela noted, however, that the district as amended had “accomplished” VRA compliance and that—though still slightly overpopulated—it fell “within” an appropriate “deviation.” *Id.* But then Orton suggested a simple solution:

Orton: [I]f you took some . . . more of the higher Black population [in this District] . . . and put it [another district] that's going to decrease the population over all and it will make [the BVAP] under 40% probably.

*Id.* Vallette thereafter moved a predominantly black precinct “south of 8 mile” into the district adjacent (which became Senate District 11). As a result, both the total voter-percentage and the black-voter percentage decreased:

Vallette: I think I'm good.

Rothhorn: Yes you are.

....

Szetela: Brought your African/American below 40%. So now you are perfectly in the sweet spot of 35-40. All right.


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*Id.* at 7446. Senate District 10 thereafter changed only slightly; in the map completed on October 4, its black-voter percentage was 41.2. As enacted in the Linden plan, that number is 40.43.

(vi)

*Senate District 11.* This district (which began as Senate District 5) has a black-voter percentage of 19.19 and is located almost entirely in Macomb County.



Its shape is long and narrow, stretching from just south of 8 Mile Road (in Wayne County) all the way past 24 Mile Road in Macomb Township. As the Commission did with Senate District 1, it looked for other districts to add black voters to “balance out” Detroit. MICRC Tr. at 5912. This district was one of them. As Szetela testified at trial: “So, again, we’re trying to reduce black population [in other districts] and that requires us to grab more white population, and that also shifts some of the black population into a district where there’s very little black population. So we [took] Eastpoint[e] . . . which is predominantly black, [out of Senate District 10], and we put it into a mostly white district [Senate District 11].” R.112 at PageID 3737. And when asked, “So if you’re black and you live in Eastpoint[e], why did the Commission put you in an 80 percent

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white district[.]” Szetela answered: “[b]ecause we had to reduce the black voting population in the district adjacent to it.” *Id.* at PageID 3739.

The contemporary record confirms the accuracy of Szetela’s testimony. For example, on October 4, Commissioner Vallette “[took] the top tier from Eastpointe” out of what became Senate District 10 and put it into what became Senate District 11—which, Rothhorn observed, “reduced” the BVAP in Senate District 10 “from 47.3 to 45.8 so you are definitely heading in the right direction.” MICRC Tr. at 7442; *see also id.* (“Okay so at this point you have most of Eastpointe [in what became Senate District 11].”); *id.* at 7443 (“Again Janice for context you started 47.83 non-Hispanic Black age population [in what became Senate District 10] so you are definitely working in the right direction.”).

Thus, the Commission moved a substantial number of voters into this district based on their race. And as enacted in the Linden plan, the black-voter percentage in Senate District 11 is 19.19.

b.


We next consider House Districts 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 14. The Commission drafted those districts (and others in Detroit) principally on September 20, 21, 22, 29, and 30, 2021, on October 5, and 8, 2021, and on November 2, 3, 4, and 5, 2021. The Commission adopted the final version of its house plan—the Hickory plan—on December 28, 2021. As enacted, each district’s black-voter percentage fell within the range prescribed by Bruce Adelson.

District No.		1	7	8	10	11	12	14
	Date	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP	BVAP
<b>Hickory Plan</b>	12/28/2021	38.03	44.29	43.70	38.79	42.82	40.99	41.11

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(i)

*House District 1.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 38.03.



On September 30—the day that Pastula advised the Commission to review its draft districts one-by-one to ensure that their BVAPs fell in the range specified by Dr. Handley’s report—the Commission skipped over House District 1 because, at that point, its black-voter percentage was only 36.58. *See id.* at 7226-39.

When the Commission sought to revise the house districts for “VRA compliance” (on October 5), Weiss said that House District 1 “looks good.” *Id.* at 7639. But he also noticed that an adjacent district—which became House District 2—was “a little high”, so suggested the Commission “maybe . . . swap some stuff out here[.]” *Id.* Szetela soon asked, “Just to be clear you’re trying to increase the African/American population in one and reduce it in two is that what I’m understanding you’re trying to do?” *Id.* at 7641. Weiss replied: “Yes at least that’s what I’m thinking. Any suggestions Chairperson?” *Id.* Szetela then suggested that, based on her “familiar[ity]” with Detroit, “if you take population from two up at the top and put it into one,

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you're adding more African/American into one . . . . [s]o that might enable you to balance it[.]”

*Id.* at 7641. Weiss thereafter did so, and the black-voter percentage rose to nearly 40. *Id.* at 7642

(“now we are 39.9”).

The Commission thereafter used the bellwether-election tool to confirm that black candidates could still elect their candidate of choice (in general elections, given its limitations); and unsurprisingly, it showed that black candidates of choice (Democrats) won in landslides. *See id.* at 7649 (“District 1 is for the election results as configured now 87 for Biden, 13 for Trump, 91 for Clinton, 9 for Trump, Obama 94, Romney 6 . . . .”). Adelson utilized this as a teaching moment, to again remind the Commissioners about the dangers of “packing”:

Election results are all uniform and play out and indicate this is a [district] that performs where minority candidates of choice can be elected but going back a little bit to my discussion [from earlier] . . . . Here this is a district where the margins are very strong. So rhetorically if you were going to add additional minority population here, wouldn't that be packing? That's not necessary to elect candidates of choice. That's the key metric.

So the margins were close like 50.1 to 49.9, yeah, I think that that would make sense. But when you have margins like this, the difficulty is in justifying it why did you do that? What would be constitutional rationale? If you will so that is part of seeing in real time since the election results all play out strongly, that's the Voting Rights Act metric, ability to elect.

*Id.* at 7649-50.


The black-voter percentage thereafter stayed remarkably stable; as enacted in the Hickory Plan, House District 1 has black-voter percentage of 38.03.



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(ii)

*House District 7.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 44.29. It is long and narrow, stretching from Davison-Schoolcraft (in Wayne County) through Royal Oak (in Oakland County) up to 12 Mile Road.



When the Commission began mapping on September 30, the district that became House District 7 had a black-voter percentage of over 75—and Adelson therefore identified it as a “serious district[.]” that “has[s] significantly more [black] population than Dr. Handley recommended in her analysis.” *Id.* at 7223. Rothhorn confirmed as much a few minutes later, saying, “I think I heard [what became House District 7] for example is one that needs to be fixed.” *Id.* at 7224. So did Curry: “I think . . . Bruce said that it was [the district that became House District 7] . . . [that was] over packed and maybe we could look [at it].” *Id.* at 7231. Pastula suggested that the Commission “scroll” down the list and identify “anything that is higher than

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40% for the Black voting age population”; she also noted that House District 7 was one she “anticipate[d]” the Commission would fix. *Id.* at 7226. A few minutes later, Pastula again told the Commission to look at the district that became House District 7 (among others) to see how the black-voter percentage “can be minimized.” *Id.* at 7229; *see also id.* at 7243 (Pastula) (“The data for [what became House District 7] is . . . 76.72 Black VAP [which] would be considered a packed District so what we were trying to do is utilizing the racial bloc voting, which the Commission with the percentage by which the minority voting population would have the opportunity to elect candidates of choice . . . so I hope that was helpful in what the goal is.”).

Szetela thereafter suggested that the Commission start there: “So [this district] is definitely the highest,” it “has 76% African/American. . . . We can certainly start with [what became House District 7].” *Id.* at 7232. As Curry began to lead the mapping session, Rothhorn gave her a reminder:

Rothhorn: I think our goal Commissioner Curry is to reduce [the BVAP].

Curry: 40, 45.

Rothhorn: Correct, yep.

*Id.* at 7234. Curry thereafter made several adjustments, one of which was to “put[] some of the African/American population from Detroit” into an adjacent district. *Id.* at 7234. Curry then asked “so we need to get rid of about how many more, unpack how many more?” *Id.* at 7325. Rothhorn explained that, consistent with the “spoke concept,” the Commission would need to draw the district further north: “[S]o we have taken away the Black population now add a white population in order to significantly reduce [the BVAP] and it looks like based on” the black-voter “theme” “it needs to be north to Berk[ley] and I don’t know what you think about as far as Berk[ley] being able to fit with this District and I think that is part of what we are struggling with.” *Id.* at 7236.

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
Curry then made some additional adjustments whose specifics are unclear from the record, but in any event the BVAP went down as result. Rothhorn confirmed: “Going to watch the numbers for the . . . Black voting age population so we reduced it by 13%.” *Id.* at 7239. Rothhorn then added, in apparent frustration how the district was drawn, “Mr. Adelson is asking us to experiment and don’t want to sacrifice people’s lives in the way they want their districts drawn but we do need to try it.” *Id.* By the end of the day on September 30, the district that became House District 7 had a black-voter percentage of 66.54.

On October 5, the Commission shifted what became House District 7 further east, thereby reducing the black-voter percentage substantially, to 39.85. In November, however, the BVAP for this district increased slightly. Clark said that a higher BVAP for this district “would further support what I heard at the TCF center of having more higher percentage African/American population that they have today so I think that would help what I heard at TCF.” *Id.* at 9416. As approved in the Hickory Plan, House District 7 has a black-voter percentage of 44.29.

(iii)

*House District 8.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 43.7. It is long and narrow, running from Midtown Detroit (in Wayne County) through Madison Heights (in Oakland County) and up to 14 Mile Road.

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On September 30, Adelson advised specifically that House District 8, which at that time had a black-voter percentage of 53.85 and was far more compact, was “still a little on the high side,” so he suggested “go[ing] back and see if we can make some further refinements.” *Id.* at 7282. But Eid was apparently confused, so he asked Kellom (who was leading the mapping session) for clarification, saying, “We are saying eight is still on the high side being at 53.85%?” *Id.* That led to the following exchange:

Kellom: So Commissioner Eid I was getting mixed messages I heard what Bruce said about that. And because I thought that 53 was high. But he said it’s not that high considering so I was going to stop my turn. But then we got more hands so I’m going to stop talking and I want a specific direction in terms of what to do.

Adelson: Commissioner Kellom, I don’t want you to use the term direction but I will say I wish you and I continued our collaboration with District eight to further our compliance refinement. And that the population that we will need to adjust from 8, that will you know obviously affect the connected districts. But I think that

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– my recommendation is you and I continue with eight to see how we can further improve the population[.]

....

Rothhorn: I think through the actions of Mr. Adelson and Kellom they will try to experiment to see if they can get it lower.

....

Adelson: But 53.85% yes, it’s an improvement. Yes, it is moving in the right direction. But my feeling is that there is more to be done here. Because I am just [loth] to say creating 54, 55, 56% majority minority districts in an area that analysis is determined, Black voters can elect at percentages lower. I’m not prepared to do that. So the axiom that Commissioner Rothhorn with all due respect kind of said in my head is try. There is still more trying to do. We are not at the end of the line yet.

*Id.* at 7283-84. Kellom thereafter continued to reduce the black-voter population, during which Adelson suggested “there may be places to adjust to the north . . . . Which I think . . . does not have a significant BVAP population so that is just the suggestion [as] another place to look for adjustments.” *Id.* at 7284. Kellom did so, drawing the district further north in Oakland County (namely, into Royal Oak and Madison Heights); that “adjustment” reduced the black-voter percentage from 54 to 50, which Adelson said was “a big improvement.” *Id.* at 7285, 7287.

On October 5, while the Commission worked on other house districts south and west of House District 8 to ensure compliance, it “[a]ccidentally” “balanced” the black-voter percentage in House District 8—namely, by reducing it further, to 35.71. *Id.* at 7648 (Rothhorn: “I think you may have balanced 8 it was 53.9[.]”). The Commission thereafter reviewed this district with Adelson, and Clark asked: “So eight is another this is going to be in Wayne County and Macomb County I believe yeah so [what] are [we] focusing towards here? Wayne, we said 35 to 40% Macomb had nothing [and] we are currently at 35.71 . . . so if we raised it to 40, I think we will be okay.” *Id.* at 7657. Adelson replied: “Commissioner Clark and particularly if you are moving population from Wayne County areas, I think that is the zone to look for[.]” *Id.* He added, however, that “this District is underpopulated [as a whole] so there is some room to grow here.”

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*Id.* Commissioner Clark thereafter “put the Black population on the screen” and suggested “add[ing]” from what became House District 14 “into” House District 8. That change slightly increased the black-voter percentage in House District 8, to 37.98. *Id.* Szetela then asked Adelson:

Szetela: 8 with 37.98 and we have ten with 42.53 so I mean we could try to balance them more but they are still both going to be about 40 is that acceptable?

Adelson: Is that mainly in Wayne County?

. . . .

Szetela: Eight I would say is more in Oakland County.

Clark: Eight goes a little further north than Oakland . . . .

Szetela: Eight does come all the way down so yeah, I would say they are 50/50. . . .

Adelson: [W]e can see if there are some additional judgments to make with the aim of hitting Dr. Handley’s marks and then we can look at the elections.


*Id.* at 7658. Commissioner Clark then “move[d] some” non-black population into what became House District 10 to “increase” the black voter-percentage in House District 8. *Id.*

In November, however, the Commission noticed that House District 8 was overpopulated. *See id.* at 9406 (Rothhorn: “The District that has the most to give is House District 8.”). But Szetela reminded the group that House District 8 is an “Oakland County VRA district where we are trying to keep it above 40.” *Id.* Accordingly, the Commission increased House District 8’s black-voter population slightly by removing white portions of Madison Heights in Oakland County. *See id.* at 9410 (Kellom: “sorry I was just double checking the African/American population in Madison Heights and it’s 8.51% so yes that is fine”); *id.* (Rothhorn: “Black voting population increased with that change. And may reflect what our fellow Detroiters were asking for. . . . And yeah, I think we are going to go with that.”). As finally approved, the black-voter percentage in House District 8 is 43.70.

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(iv)

*House District 10.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 38.79.



The Commission began drafting House District 10 (which began as House District 4) on September 21. Clark immediately noted that, since “[w]e’ve got a large portion of Detroit left . . . . We are going to end up with an African/American population that is going to be pretty significant.” *Id.* at 6410. Szetela recommended that they draw a “spoke” which (she said) would create more “balance[.]” *Id.* But Clark responded that it made little sense to group together “that eastern part of Detroit” with Grosse Pointe, which has the “majority of the money.” *Id.* at 6411. Szetela reminded Clark that “that VRA is first on our list. And so we have to look at accommodating VRA first. And if that requires [uniting those neighborhoods] to do it, I think that is where we need to look first.” *Id.* The Commission thereafter modified several other districts, and by September 28 the black-voter percentage for this district was 42.74. Yet on September 30, the Commission adjusted several districts south and west of House District 10, and in doing so increased the black-voter percentage to 58—which was “substantially more out of the range than we wanted.” *Id.* at 7277 (Orton: “Okay, so before you did this . . . the voting age Black population in District 4 was 41.2% which is quite a bit closer to the target that we are going for. Now it’s a lot higher . . . . I thought we were going 35-40% so [it is] way out from what I’m thinking.”).

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Thus, on October 5, the Commission stretched this District farther north to reduce its black-voter percentage. As Witjes explained, “I would imagine we would have to go north, correct? We got to take away some too.” *Id.* at 7642. The Commission thereafter narrowed the lower half of this district, and then extended its reach up to the Wayne-Macomb County border, which reduced the black-voter percentage substantially—all the way to 40%. *See id.* at 7643 (Szetela: “Brought it down quite a bit.”). Witjes then asked Adelson: “as District Four is below 40%. And 40% sweet spot still apply?” Adelson replied: “As we talked about yesterday, I think providing some leeway, a little cushion here I think that is important.” *Id.* at 7644. The Commission then made a few more adjustments, which (by the end of that day’s mapping session) increased this District’s BVAP to 42.68%.


The Commission thereafter made only minor adjustments in November, which decreased the black-voter percentage further, to 38.79.

(v)

*House District 11.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 42.82.



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When the Commission began mapping on September 30, House District 11 (which began as House District 6) had a black-voter percentage of over 65.66. Adelson therefore identified it as a “serious district” that “ha[s] significantly” more black “population than Dr. Handley recommended in her analysis.” *Id.* at 7223. Pastula thereafter advised the Commission to “start again with the list at District 1 and look at [] the Black VAP, if it’s above that 40% particularly in the Metro Detroit area how that can be minimized and I know from the chart . . . it’s also [what became House District 11].” *Id.* at 7229. Szetela then noted that what became House District 11 “definitely” had one of the “highest” black-voter populations. *Id.* at 7232. The Commission thereafter began adjusting other districts, but Eid suggested “go[ing] to” what became House District 11, since it was “64%” BVAP. *Id.* at 7241. Accordingly, the Commission added to this District a significant portion of Grosse Pointe Woods (to the north), and removed a portion of Harper Woods (to the south), which brought this district’s BVAP “significantly lower.” *Id.* at

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7241, 7277. By the end of the day on September 30, the Commission had adjusted the black-voter percentage down to 49.23.


On October 5, the Commission again identified each house district with black-voter percentages higher than 40-45, and thereafter sought to reduce those percentages. *See, e.g., id.* at 7639. In what became House District 11, the Commission accomplished that goal by again “expand[ing] [the district] north” further into Macomb County, as far as St. Clair Shores. *Id.* at 7644; *id.* at 7643 (Szetela: “With . . . [what became House District 11] we have room to go north” because it “kind of lead[s] out of Detroit.”); *id.* at 7644 (Witjes: “now [what became House District 11] needs to expand north”). Those changes and others reduced this district’s BVAP a little more, to 47.37. *See id.* at 7665 (Szetela: “What about taking a little bit of St. Clair shoes that western edge . . . isn’t that primarily white along there. Add a little more white to bring down your African/American?”).

In November, the Commission modified the district again by adding more white population in Macomb County, thereby reducing the black-voter population to 42.82—where it remained when the Commission adopted the Hickory Plan in December.

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(vi)

*House District 12.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 40.99.



Throughout the mapping process, the black-voter percentage in House District 12 (which began as House District 11) remained right around 43. On October 5, however, the Commission modified several adjacent districts, and the BVAP in what became House District 12 exceeded 50%. *See id.* at 7663 (Rothhorn: “the Black voting age population [in what became House District 12 was] 51.58 and went up to 61 so we are back down again”). Thus, the Commission sought to reduce it—specifically, by extending the district farther north to include more white population. *Id.* at 7664 (Lett: “The only thing I’m trying to do right now is get the percentage down on [what became House District 12].”); *id.* (Orton: “Well I’m thinking if you just add a little bit more into” the district adjacent “since it is [] a little bit under populated, that’s taking African/American population out [so] that will help the number [what became House District 12], I think.”); *id.* at 7665 (Clark: “That is the concept move more white into [this District].”). Those adjustments and


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others, which Adelson remarked moved “the numbers . . . in a positive direction” reduced the black voter percentage to 49.89, which Szetela noted was still “a hair high.” *Id.* at 7666.

In November—after Adelson’s admonition at the closed session meeting—the Commission modified what became House District 12 by extending it even farther north, through Roseville and up to 13 Mile Road in Macomb County. The Commission ostensibly aimed in part to keep the “Roseville community together,” in its effort to “mend some of these neighborhoods.” *Id.* at 8773. The Commission also excised portions of House District 12’s southern end in Wayne County. Those changes together reduced the black voter percentage down to 40.99.

(vii)

*House District 14.* This district has a black-voter percentage of 41.11 and encompasses parts of Wayne and Macomb County.



Throughout September and October, House District 14 (which began as House District 10) extended from the western half of Warren (in Macomb County) all the way down to just north of Eastern Market in Detroit (in Wayne County). For much of that time, this district’s BVAP

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remained just below 40. But on October 5, that number increased slightly because the Commission reduced the black-voter population in districts to the east and south. *See, e.g., id.* at 7643 (Orton: “It seems like [what became House District 14 is] now really high.”); *id.* (Witjes: “That [increase] happened because of how we are adjusting.”). The Commission thereafter sought to bring the BVAP for this district back down. *See id.* at 7657 (Clark: “Okay so [what became House District 14] is overpopulated so let’s take a look at the border of 8 and [what became House District 14] and let’s see if we can move some Black population. We may impact [what became House District 14] by doing that percentage wise.”); *id.* at 7658 (Clark: “Go to the top and Madison Heights and move some from eight into [what became House District 14] . . . . And that will bring non-Black population into [what became House District 14] which should reduce it a little.”). After the Commission made a few more changes that reduced this District’s BVAP further, Adelson approved: “I think the percentages there has been some positive movement . . . with the percentages but that is my only offhand thought.” *Id.* at 7660. By the end of the day on October 5, the black-voter percentage in what became House District 14 was 42.8.

In November, however, the Commission modified the district when it incorporated the “draft overlay” map proposed by Rothhorn and Kellom. Rothhorn nevertheless reminded the Commission that what became House District 14 was “one of those VRA districts.” *Id.* at 9410. As enacted in the Hickory Plan, House District 14 has a black-voter percentage of 41.11.

c.

Based on all the evidence cited above—including both the Commission’s race-based targets in drafting the Detroit area, and the district-specific evidence just described—we conclude

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that the boundaries of all the districts at issue here were drawn predominantly on the basis of race.

Indeed the record before us permits no other conclusion.

B.

We make shorter work of the Commission’s backup argument that its race-based line-drawing can survive strict scrutiny. Plaintiffs have shown that the lines for their districts were drawn predominantly on the basis of race, which means those districts “cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.” *Wis. Legis.*, 595 U.S. at 401 (quoting *Miller*, 515 U.S. at 904). The Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that compliance with the VRA can be a compelling interest that supports drawing districts along racial lines. *Id.* To that end, the Commission first asserts that, in the 2011 plan, Detroit-area districts had been “packed” in potential violation of the VRA. (Notably, no Detroit voters themselves ever chose to challenge the districts.) And the Commission argues that it had “good reasons to think” that Section 2 of the VRA itself required the Commission to reduce the BVAPs of plaintiffs’ districts to between 35-45%. *See Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 293.

That argument is meritless. The Commission repeats to us what Adelson so often told the commissioners: that BVAPs above 35-45% in these districts would amount to “packing” African-American voters in violation of the VRA. The Supreme Court recognized the possibility of packing claims in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, when it said that a state could violate § 2 by concentrating black voters “into districts where they constitute an excessive majority.” 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986). In the 37 years since, however, the Court has yet to hold that any district violated § 2 on grounds of packing.

The Commission had little reason to think these districts could be the first. Begin with what the Supreme Court actually said in *Thornburg*: that an “excessive majority” of black voters

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could amount to packing in violation of the VRA. *Id.* (emphasis added). Yet here the racial targets limited these plaintiffs to a political *minority* in their districts. True, in one case—30 years ago—the plaintiffs argued that the VRA required the state to change a majority-minority district to a minority-minority one. But the Supreme Court did not recognize that as a valid theory under § 2 then—it decided the case on other grounds—and it has not done so since. *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993). Moreover, in every case where the Supreme Court has found vote dilution in violation of § 2, it ordered the creation of a *majority-minority* (e.g., majority-black) district—rather than a minority-minority one, which is what (per Adelson’s advice) the Commission confined itself to here. And the Commission’s theory would make the BVAP floor necessary for “opportunity” districts under the VRA also a BVAP ceiling in those same districts. *See* MICRC Tr. at 5810-12. The Supreme Court has never said anything like that.

Thus, the Commission’s theory of potential liability, at best, is highly speculative. And speculative reasons are not “good reasons for thinking that the [VRA] *demand*ed” the racial line-drawing employed here. *Wis. Legis.*, 595 U.S. at 404 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted).

Nor did the Commission have anywhere near an adequate basis for the factual premise of its theory: namely, that black voters could in fact elect their preferred candidates at the BVAP levels prescribed for the districts here. Everyone agrees that the elections in these districts are decided in the Democratic primaries, not the general election. Yet Handley’s analysis lacked any primary-election data that was relevant to whether black voters could elect their preferred candidates at these BVAP levels. Even Adelson admitted as much. And Handley herself admitted to Szetela, at the eleventh hour, that “we simply do not know” how black-preferred candidates would fare in Democratic primaries. Yet these experts told the commissioners again and again—

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based on general-election data alone—that black-preferred candidates would “perform well” in these districts. That was a grave disservice to everyone involved with this case, above all the voters themselves.

All the districts in this case were drawn in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, given that holding, we need not reach plaintiffs’ § 2 claim under the VRA.

\* \* \*

We enjoin the Secretary of State from holding further elections in these districts as they are currently drawn. And we will direct that the parties appear before this court in early January to discuss how to proceed with redrawing them.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Date: December 21, 2023

/s/ Raymond M. Kethledge  
Raymond M. Kethledge  
United States Circuit Judge

/s/ Paul L. Maloney  
Paul L. Maloney  
United States District Judge

/s/ Janet T. Neff  
Janet T. Neff  
United States District Judge



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NEFF, District Judge, concurring in the result.

Although the majority reaches the correct result, I write separately because I believe the opinion is unnecessarily harsh to the Commission, Bruce Adelson, and Lisa Handley.

“Redistricting is never easy,” *Abbott v. Perez*, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2314 (2018), and is generally accomplished behind closed doors, either by legislators or the courts so there is no way to watch it being done. In 2018, the people of Michigan overwhelmingly voted to open the doors and take the politicians out of the redistricting process with the ultimate goal of creating more fair maps. To that end, the Michigan Independent Redistricting Commission—comprised of thirteen randomly selected lay citizens—is now entrusted with making the reapportionment decisions in Michigan. The process is conducted in full view of the public, the media, and any interested group or individual. The majority opinion makes that point throughout, quoting extensively from the 10,000+ page transcript of the Commission’s work and uses the commissioners’ own words to establish that the process was fatally flawed.

The thirteen civic-minded commissioners had a difficult job with scant preparation and nearly no experience in the reapportionment process. A difficult task became nearly impossible for the Commission when the pandemic hit in 2020. The Michigan Constitution required the Commission to publish proposed redistricting plans no later than September 17, 2021, and to adopt final plans by November 1, 2021. Mich. Const. art. IV, §§ 6(7) and 6(14)(b). The pandemic caused a six-month delay in the census data, and the Commission did not start map-drawing until mid-August 2021.

Commissioner Erin Wagner succinctly described the difficulty facing the commissioners, “we were 13 citizens that didn’t know what we were doing, and so we were looking to people that . . . we were told were experts, so of course you’re going to lean on an expert’s opinion.” (ECF No. 112 at PageID.3807.) The Commission’s experts—Mr. Adelson and Dr. Handley—are highly

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respected in the redistricting field. Dr. Handley is one of the leading experts and has testified about redistricting and voting rights in numerous courts across the nation. Here, she provided her racial bloc analysis but readily admitted that she did not have the most probative primary elections results until very late in the process. (ECF No. 106 at PageID.3219.) Mr. Adelson also has an extensive resume, including acting as the Voting Rights Act counsel for the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission in 2011.

In the face of such a daunting task, the extensive quotes of the Commission's work reflected all the best that could be expected: they took the work seriously, they worked hard to learn the job, they cooperated and collaborated, and they wanted to do the job well and right. Any suggestion otherwise does a disservice to the men and women who undertook a very difficult and unprecedented task. There was no history to follow or learn from and no role model to lead the way and to set a standard.

I do not believe that there was any ill intention by any individual in this case. In many respects, the adopted maps may have accomplished the ultimate goal of being more "fair." Previous maps commonly divided districts based on lines of historical segregation. (*See* ECF No. 102 at PageID.2653.) Were these old districts drawn predominately based on race or for another legitimate reason? We will never know because everything happened behind closed doors. Everything is public now. And the unique circumstances of this reapportionment process led to an extensive record of race predominating in the line drawing of certain districts. This finding, however, should not take away from the fact that the Commission worked extensively hard throughout this extremely difficult process to do what it thought was right.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONALD AGEE, JR., <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	No. 1:22-cv-272
v.	)	
	)	Three-Judge Court
JOCELYN BENSON, in her official	)	
capacity as the Secretary of State	)	
of Michigan, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
Defendants.	)	
_____	)	

**ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY INJUNCTION**

The Court enjoined the Secretary of State from holding elections in several of Michigan’s House and Senate districts because they were drawn in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 131). Defendant, the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”), filed a notice of appeal and moved to stay this Court’s injunction. (ECF Nos. 140, 141). Plaintiffs have not filed a response, but the Court need not wait. The Commission’s motion to stay our injunction is denied.

**I. Background**

In 2022, a group of African American Detroiters sued the Commission alleging Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) violations and Fourteenth Amendment violations stemming from the Commission’s redrawing of the state House and Senate districts in and around metro Detroit. This Court held that the Commission violated the Fourteenth Amendment by drawing thirteen of Michigan’s legislative districts predominately on the basis of race but did

not reach the VRA claims. As discussed at length in this Court’s opinion, the transcript that captured the Commission’s redrawing process showed overwhelmingly that the Commission subordinated all other redistricting criteria to their target BVAPs in Detroit-area districts. (ECF No. 131). In tandem with the transcript, the Court credited Plaintiffs’ witnesses at the six-day trial. At the same time, the Court could not credit the Commissioner’s key witness, Commissioner Anthony Eid, whose testimony was not credible. Between the transcripts and the testimony offered at trial, we reached the unassailable conclusion that race predominated the Commission’s redistricting of metro Detroit.

Now, the Commission urges us to set aside those findings in order to appeal to the Supreme Court on the issue of “whether the enjoined districts are narrowly tailored to §2 [VRA] compliance.” (ECF No. 141 at PID 4954). The Commission does not seem to challenge that race predominated its redistricting process, but instead insists that it had “good reasons” to believe its racial gerrymandering was necessary to comply with the VRA. As discussed in the Court’s earlier opinion—and below—that view is implausible because the Commission lacked the requisite data to believe the three *Gingles* preconditions were met.

## II. Legal Standard

To determine whether to grant a stay, courts typically consider “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether [it] will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties . . . ; and (4) where the public interest lies.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).

### III. Analysis

The Commission cannot make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits because it had no “good reason” to believe that the three *Gingles* prongs were met. To determine that the *Gingles* preconditions were met, the Commission needed data showing that (1) that African American Detroiters were sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in single-member districts; (2) that they were politically cohesive; (3) and that white voters voted as a bloc to usually defeat the African American candidate of choice. *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). The Court found that the districts were drawn predominantly on the basis of race, which means those districts “cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.” *Wisc. Legis. v. Wisc. Elections Comm’n*, 595 U.S. 398, 401 (2022) (quoting *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995)). The Supreme Court has assumed that compliance with the VRA can be a compelling interest that provides for drawing districts along racial lines. *Id.*

The Commission relied on data from Dr. Lisa Handley “indicating that voting [was] racially polarized in [metro Detroit] and that districts falling below certain BVAP levels (around 35%) would not afford African American voters an equal opportunity to the elect their preferred candidates.” (ECF No. 141 at PID 4954–55). The Commission then repeatedly lowered BVAP levels in districts in metro Detroit to conform with those racial targets. But that data set was nonprobative because it did not include primary election data. Detroit area politics rise and fall in the Democratic party’s primary elections because Democrats almost always prevail in the general elections. Simply put, the Commission had no data indicating how African American candidates of choice performed in the Democratic

primaries in Detroit. Working to prevent packing black voters into districts is not the same as splintering them to hit racial targets based on incomplete data. The Commission cannot show it engaged in a narrowly tailored approach to justify its racial gerrymandering.

The Commission can make a plausible showing that it will suffer irreparable harm because of the delicate balance between federal courts and a state's administration of its elections. "[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury." *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (quoting *New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.*, 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). We note that drawing an electoral map without racial predominance before the 2024 election is possible, however. Through the Supremacy Clause, this Court's authority to effectuate federal law trumps the Commission's "dignitary and practical interests" in creating electoral maps. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2; *see also Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013) ("Outside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives.").

The balance of harms and the public interest do not favor a stay. There's no doubt the Commission will face a tight timeline going forward as it endeavors to draw new Senate and House districts. But Plaintiffs, as well as the millions of Michiganders in metro Detroit, deserve maps that are not racially gerrymandered. Their injuries are not "ill-defined" as the Commission insists. (ECF No. 141 at PID 4960). The Commission avers it received little guidance from the Court and that it is unsure whether "to draw without racial considerations or whether to draw with *different* ones." (ECF No. 141 at PID 4959). Going forward, the

Commission should apply the criteria mandated by the Michigan Constitution and stop using the VRA as a proxy for race. The Court refuses to prescribe the Commission with a new racial target.

Finally, the Secretary of State needs a new Michigan House of Representatives electoral map as soon as possible. The Commission indicated it can produce maps for public comment by February 2, 2024. (ECF No. 145 at PID 5021). The Commission must publish proposed House maps for notice and comment by February 2, 2024. A detailed scheduling order is forthcoming.

The next Michigan Senate elections are in 2026. The Court will deny Plaintiffs' request for special Senate elections in 2024. The Court will issue a formal opinion relating to the Senate, but the parties should be aware now so they can focus on the House districts and 2024.

**IT IS ORDERED** that the Commission's motion to stay the injunction (ECF No. 141) is **DENIED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the Commission must produce an electoral map for the Michigan House of Representatives by February 2, 2024, for public comment.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Date: January 8, 2024

/s/ Paul L. Maloney  
Paul L. Maloney  
United States District Judge  
On Behalf of the Three Judge Court

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

DONALD AGEE, JR. et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOCELYN BENSON, et al.,

Defendants.

**Case No. 1:22-CV-00272-PLM-RMK-JTN**

**EXPERT REPORT OF DR. LISA HANDLEY**

**I. Scope of Project**

I was retained by lawyers for the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC) in *Agee v. Benson* to conduct an analysis of voting patterns by race in the 2022 Democratic primary and general election in Detroit area districts in the 2022 State House and State Senate Plans. In addition, I was asked to assess the opportunity that Black voters have to elect their candidates of choice in less than majority-Black legislative districts in the Detroit area in the 2022 State House and State Senate Plans based on the 2022 general and Democratic primary elections.<sup>1</sup>

As a consultant for the MICRC in 2021-2022, I analyzed earlier elections conducted under the 2012 Congressional, State Senate, and State House Plans and prepared a report entitled “Report to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission” (“2021 Report” attached at Appendix A).<sup>2</sup> Included in my 2021 Report were the following conclusions: (1) voting in Michigan is racially polarized, and as a consequence, (2) “districts that provide minority voters

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<sup>1</sup> I am being compensated at a rate of \$350 an hour for work on this project.

<sup>2</sup> I conducted the analysis and presented the results of my analysis to the MICRC during the redistricting process in 2021. My written report was completed and provided to the MICRC in January 2022.

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with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice must be drawn;”<sup>3</sup> and (3) “in no county [analyzed] is a 50% BVAP district required for the Black-preferred candidates to carry the district in a general election.”<sup>4</sup> I incorporate by reference the contents of Appendix A, including but not limited to my analysis and conclusions related to the existence of polarized voting in Michigan.

## **II. Professional Background and Experience**

I have over thirty-five years of experience as a voting rights and redistricting expert. I have advised scores of jurisdictions and other clients on minority voting rights and redistricting-related issues. I have served as an expert in dozens of voting rights cases. My clients have included state and local jurisdictions, independent redistricting commissions (Arizona, Colorado, Michigan), the U.S. Department of Justice, national civil rights organizations, and such international organizations as the United Nations.

I have been actively involved in researching, writing, and teaching on subjects relating to voting rights, including minority representation, electoral system design, and redistricting. I co-authored a book, *Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), and co-edited a volume, *Redistricting in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford University Press, 2008), on these subjects. In addition, my research on these topics has appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as *Journal of Politics*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *American Politics Quarterly*, *Journal of Law and Politics*, and *Law and Policy*, as well as law reviews (e.g., *North Carolina Law Review*) and a number of edited books. I hold a Ph.D. in political science from The George Washington University.

I have been a principal of Frontier International Electoral Consulting since co-founding the company in 1998. Frontier IEC specializes in providing electoral assistance in transitional democracies and post-conflict countries. In addition, I am a Visiting Research Academic at Oxford Brookes University in Oxford, United Kingdom. Attached to the end of this report is a copy of my curriculum vitae.

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<sup>3</sup> “2021 Report,” page 17.

<sup>4</sup> “2021 Report,” page 21.

### **III. Voting Patterns and Electing Black Voters' Candidates of Choice in Recent District Elections Prior to the Adoption of the 2022 Redistricting Maps**

***General Elections in 2018-2020*** I analyzed 31 district-level 2018 and 2020 general elections (congressional, state senate and state house) in Detroit area districts in the 2012 Congressional, State Senate, and State House Plans with Black voting age populations (BVAP) greater than 25%.<sup>5</sup> The results of this analysis are found in my 2021 Report to the MICRC (Appendix A). Only five of these general election contests were racially polarized, with Black and White voters supporting different candidates.<sup>6</sup> The candidates preferred by Black voters was successful in all of these polarized 2018 and 2020 elections. In summary, the candidates supported by Black voters won in all 35 of the Detroit area district general elections analyzed in districts with BVAPs greater than 25%. Clearly, general elections do not pose a barrier to electing Black voters' candidates of choice in Detroit area districts with substantial BVAPs.

***Democratic Primaries in 2018-2020*** I analyzed 22 district-level Democratic primaries in 2018 and 2020 in Detroit-area districts in the 2012 Congressional, State Senate, and State House Plans with BVAPs greater than 25% BVAP (Appendix A). Table 1 summarizes the results of this analysis.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> BVAP has been calculated here (as in my 2021 Report) by counting all persons 18 years and older who checked "Black or African American" on their census form, either alone or in conjunction with one or more additional races, but did not check that they were Hispanic.

<sup>6</sup> My assessment regarding whether a contest was racially polarized is based on the most methodologically sophisticated and what are generally accepted as the most accurate estimates, the EI RxC estimates. These estimates are found in the final column of the summary tables (Appendix B) in the 2021 Report and in the first column of estimates in the Appendices of this report.

<sup>7</sup> Table 1 considers all of the district-level elections – congressional, state senate and state house. I have combined all district elections to increase the number of observations. Tables 2 and 3 review state senate and state house districts separately with the addition of the earlier state senate and state house contests analyzed by Mr. Trende.

**Table 1**

<b>2012 Districts</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2020 Democratic Primary</b>	<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>
HD7	94.9	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates
HD8	92.9	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates
HD3	91.5	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates
HD9	74.9	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD10	67.9	8 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD1	65.2	no Democratic primary	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD35	63.0	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
HD2	58.1	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	7 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates
HD5	55.2	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
SD5	54.7	no contest	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
HD6	53.6	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	10 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates
CD14	53.5	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	no Democratic primary
CD13	52.9	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
SD2	51.4	no contest	7 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates
SD3	48.6	no contest	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
HD4	47.7	11 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates	14 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates
SD4	47.6	no contest	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
SD1	45.1	no contest	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
HD29	36.8	no Democratic primary	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
SD11	35.8	no contest	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD12	27.4	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
HD11	26.9	no Democratic primary	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won

Voting in half of the primary contests analyzed in these districts (11 out of 22 contests) was not racially polarized. Of the 11 contests that were polarized, the candidate preferred by Black voters won in seven district primary elections. This included a contest in a district with a 26.9% BVAP (State House District 11 in 2018).

One of the four polarized Democratic primaries in which the Black-preferred candidate was not successful was in State House District 12, with a BVAP of only 27.4%. The three primary contests in districts with substantial Black populations that I analyzed in which the candidates supported by Black voters lost were as follows:

- *Congressional District 13 in 2018 (52.9% BVAP)* Six candidates competed in this contest, four of whom were Black candidates. Despite a larger number of Black voters than White voters (the district is majority Black and a higher percentage of the Black voting age citizens than White voting age citizens turned out to vote), Brenda Jones, the candidate who garnered the plurality of the Black vote (43.5%), lost to the White candidate of choice, Rashida Tlaib, by 900 votes.
- *State Senate District 1 in 2018 (45.1% BVAP)* This contest also included six candidates, several of whom were Black. The plurality choice of Black voters (47.1% of the Black vote), Alberta Tinsley Talabi, lost to Stephanie Chang, the candidate supported by a large majority of White voters (76.7%) and the distant second choice (27.1%) of Black voters.
- *State House District 29 in 2018 (36.8%)* Six Black candidates competed in this primary. White voters' support (58.4%) for their preferred candidate, Brenda Carter, was high enough to defeat the candidate of choice of Black voters, Kermit Williams, who garnered 49.8% of Black voters' support.

The 2018 and 2020 Democratic district-level primary elections did not yield a straightforward calculation of the BVAP needed to provide Black voters' with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. In my 2021 Report to the MICRC, I wrote:

As the percentage Black VAP of proposed districts decreases, it may become more challenging for Black-preferred candidates to win not only the general election but the Democratic primary – but only if voting in Democratic primaries is racially polarized. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain exactly how much more difficult it would be – or even if it would be more difficult – given the lack of Democratic primary election data.

Overall, candidates supported by Black voters won in 18 of the 22 Detroit area district contests analyzed – 11 contests that were not polarized and seven that were, including a polarized primary in a district that had a BVAP of only 26.9%. However, Black-preferred candidates lost in four district-level primaries, including a primary in a majority Black district (Congressional District 12), as well as districts that with BVAPs of 45.1%, 36.8%, and 27.4%.

While the picture was less-than-straightforward, the pattern that emerged (albeit one with exceptions) was that the chances of the candidate of choice of Black voters' winning increased as the BVAP percentage increased. In districts with BVAP over 50%, the success rate of Black-preferred candidates was 92.9%; for districts in the 45-49.9% BVAP range, the Black-preferred candidate success rate was 66.7%; there were no districts in the 40 to 44.9% BVAP range; in the 35 to 39.9% BVAP range the Black-preferred success rate was 50%; but in the 25 to 34.9% BVAP range, the Black-preferred success rate increased to 66.7%.

*Additional Democratic Primary Elections Included in the Trende Report* Mr. Trende, in his report (“Expert Report of Sean P. Trende,” dated January 18, 2023) supplies the results of his analysis of some additional state senate (2014) and state house (2014 and 2016) Democratic primary elections in the 2012 State House and State Senate Plans. Without reflecting on the accuracy of his analysis or appropriateness of his approach, I have produced summary tables that combine the results of the state senate and state house contests each of us analyzed to determine if the addition of more contests shed more light on voting patterns in district-level Detroit area Democratic primaries. Table 2 summarizes the state senate contests.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> There are no state senate districts with BVAPs between 25 and 35%.

**Table 2**

<b>2012 State Senate District</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>	<b>2014 Democratic Primary (Trende Analysis)</b>
5	54.7	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
2	51.4	7 candidates, small vote variation made valid statistical analysis impossible	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
3	48.6	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	no Democratic primary
4	47.6	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
1	45.1	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST	no Democratic primary
11	35.8	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won

Mr. Trende’s analysis of the state senate contests in 2014 adds one contest that was not polarized and two contests that were racially polarized and the candidates of choice of Black voters won. Neither of these primaries were in majority Black districts: Senate District 4, with a BVAP of 47.6%, and Senate District 11, with a BVAP of 35.8%. Mr. Trende also found one racially polarized contest in which the Black-preferred candidate lost: State Senate District 5, which was a majority Black district (54.7% BVAP). Overall, in the nine 2014-2018 state senate primaries analyzed between Mr. Trende and myself, the candidates preferred by Black voters won seven and lost two contests.

Strangely, the success rate for Black-preferred candidates in the 2014 and 2018 state senate primaries is precisely the opposite of what might be expected (this is likely due, at least in part, to the limited number of contests considered): the chances of the candidate of choice of Black voters’ winning decreased as the BVAP percentage increased: over 50% BVAP (two districts, three elections), the Black-preferred candidate success rate was 66.7%; 45-49.9% BVAP (three districts, four elections), the Black-preferred candidate success rate was 75.0%; 35 to 39.9% BVAP (one district, two elections), the Black-preferred success rate was 100%. There were no state senate districts between 40 and 44.9% BVAP, or between 25 to 34.9% BVAP.

Table 3 reports our combined results for state house elections between 2014 and 2020. Mr. Trende identifies 11 additional contests that were racially polarized and eight that are not polarized. The candidate of choice of Black voters won all of the 11 polarized contests.

Because there are so few Democratic primary results for districts with BVAP less than 50% but greater than 25%, the success rate for Black-preferred candidates in the 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020 state house primaries is also odd: the chances of the candidate of choice of Black voters' winning districts over 50% BVAP was 100% (10 districts, 27 elections); for districts between 45-49.9% BVAP (one district, two elections), the Black-preferred candidate success rate was also 100.0%; there were no Detroit area state house districts between 40 to 44.9% BVAP; districts between 35 to 39.9% BVAP (one district, one election), the Black-preferred success rate was 0%; and districts between 25 to 34.9% BVAP (two districts, three elections): the Black-preferred success rate was 66.7%.

**Conclusion** The additional pre-2022 primary contests analyzed by Mr. Trende do not alter my conclusions regarding whether majority Black districts are necessary to provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to the state legislature – they are not. Moreover, majority Black districts do not necessarily elect the candidates of choice of Black voters. While the BVAP in a district has an impact on the success rate of candidates preferred by Black voters, so does such contest-specific factors as the number of candidates competing and the cohesiveness of Black voters in supporting their preferred candidates.

**Table 3**

2012 State House District	Percent Black VAP	2020 Democratic Primary	2018 Democratic Primary	2016 Democratic Primary (Trende analysis)	2014 Democratic Primary (Trende analysis)
7	94.9%	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
8	92.9%	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	no Democratic primary	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
3	91.5%	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	insufficient White voters for accurate estimates	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
9	74.9%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
10	67.9%	8 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
1	65.2%	no Democratic primary	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
35	63.0%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	no Democratic primary	<i>Trende does not report results</i>
2	58.1%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	7 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
5	55.2%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
6	53.6%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	10 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
4	47.7%	11 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates	14 candidates, small vote variation, no accurate estimates	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
29	36.8%	no Democratic primary	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST	no Democratic primary	no Democratic primary
12	27.3%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST	<i>Trende does not report results</i>	no Democratic primary
11	26.9%	no Democratic primary	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won	no Democratic primary	<i>Trende does not report results</i>



#### **IV. Voting Patterns and Electing Black Voters' Candidates of Choice in the 2022 Elections**

**2022 General Election Contests** I analyzed 27 district-level 2022 general elections (congressional, state senate and state house) in Detroit area districts in the 2022 Congressional, State Senate, and State House Plans with Black voting age populations (BVAP) greater than 25%. The results of this analysis can be found in Appendix B1 (Congress), B2 (State Senate) and B3 (State House).<sup>9</sup> Only one of these general election contests was racially polarized: State Senate District 10. The candidate of choice of Black voters was successful in this election contest. Overall, the candidates supported by Black voters won in all 27 of the Detroit area district general elections in districts with BVAPs greater than 25%. As was the case with the earlier general elections analyzed, the 2022 general election did not pose a barrier for electing Black voters' candidates of choice in districts with substantial BVAPs in the Detroit area.

**2022 Democratic Primaries** I analyzed 24 2022 district-level Democratic primaries in Detroit area districts in the 2022 Congressional, State Senate, and State House Plans with BVAPs greater than 25%. The results can be found in Appendix C1 (Congress), C2 (State Senate) and C3 (State House). Table 4 summarized the results of this analysis.

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<sup>9</sup> The Center for Shared Solutions has not yet released the precinct level returns for the 2022 general election – the Center is still in the process of, among other things, disaggregating the City of Detroit Absentee Vote Counting Board (AVCB) returns down to the precinct level. In the City of Detroit, absentee ballots cast in general elections are counted at a higher geographic level than the precinct – instead a number of precincts are combined into AVCBs. To report Detroit returns at the precinct level, the AVCB returns must be disaggregated down to the precinct level. The Center does this on the basis of the ratio of precinct absentee ballots provided to the total number of absentee ballots counted at the AVCB level for each AVCB. Because this process has not yet been completed, I conducted my analysis of voting patterns in the 2022 general election twice: once using Detroit AVCBs (aggregating the precinct level demographics and election day ballots up to the AVCB level) and a second time using the precinct ratios the Center provided and plans to use for the disaggregation process. The results of the two analyses are very similar, with no estimate varying by more than a percentage point or two between the two approaches. Appendix B1-3 reports the estimates arrived at using AVCBs in the City of Detroit.

Table 4

2022 Districts	Percent BVAP	2022 Democratic Primary
HD4	57.2%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
HD5	56.9%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
HD16	56.5%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD6	56.5%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD18	54.0%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD9	53.2%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
SD7	46.5%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
CD13	46.3%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD7	45.9%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
HD8	45.7%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters not cohesive, top choices LOST
CD12	45.3%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD11	44.0%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters not cohesive, top choices LOST
HD17	44.0%	no Democratic primary
SD3	43.7%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD14	42.7%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
HD12	42.6%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice won
SD10	41.7%	no Democratic primary
SD8	41.6%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
SD6	40.6%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD10	40.2%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD13	39.8%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD1	39.7%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
HD26	37.8%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
SD1	36.6%	<b>polarized</b> - Black voters' choice LOST
HD53	34.3%	no Democratic primary
HD3	34.0%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)
SD2	25.5%	not polarized (Black voters' choice won)

The majority of these contests (14) were not racially polarized. When only state senate and state house contests are considered, 22 primaries were analyzed, 12 (54.5%) of which were not polarized.<sup>10</sup>

The candidates of choice of Black voters won four of the 10 polarized 2022 state legislative primary contests. Three of the racially polarized contests won by the Black candidate of choice were held in less-than-majority Black districts: State House District 7 (45.9% BVAP), State House District 14 (42.7% BVAP), and State House District 12 (42.6% BVAP).<sup>11</sup>

In six of the state legislative primaries analyzed, the candidate preferred by Black voters was defeated. The range in the Black composition of these six districts was broad and included a majority Black district, State House District 5. The following provides a description of the polarized Democratic primaries lost by the candidates of choice of Black voters:

- *State House District 5 (56.9% BVAP)* Five candidates competed in this primary, two Black candidates and three White candidates. A majority of Black voters (55.2%) supported Black candidate Reggie Davis. He was defeated by a White candidate, Natalie Price, who was supported by a large majority (71.4%) of the White voters.
- *State House District 8 (45.7% BVAP)* Five candidates, two Black candidates and three White candidates, ran in this contest. A majority (56.5%) of the White voters supported one of the White candidates, Mike McFall. Black voters did not coalesce around a single candidate – they divided their support between the two Black candidates, with each receiving about 32% of the Black vote. (McFall received slightly less than 25% of the Black vote.) McFall won the election.
- *State House 11 (44.0% BVAP)* Nine candidates, including several Black candidates, several White candidates, and a Hispanic candidate, competed in this primary. Neither Black nor White voters coalesced around a single candidate. White voters primarily spread their votes across three candidates, with 27.1% supporting Hispanic candidate Veronica Paiz, 22.0% supporting Alex Manwell (White candidate), and 15.6% voting for

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<sup>10</sup> Neither of the 2022 congressional district primaries (Congressional Districts 12 and 13) were racially polarized.

<sup>11</sup> The candidate preferred by Black voters also won a polarized primary election in majority Black House District 4 (56.9% BVAP).

Black candidate Ricardo White. Black voters primarily spread their votes across four candidates: 24.2% for Black candidate Regina Williams, 22.2% for Ricardo White, and 18.7% and 17.1% for Black candidates Athena Lynn Thorton and Marvin Cotton Jr., respectively. Veronica Paiz won the nine candidate primary with 1844 (18.9%) votes out of the 9751 votes cast.

- *State Senate District 8 (41.6% BVAP)* In this contest, a large majority (75.8%) of Black voters supported Black candidate Marshall Bullock and an even larger majority (95.9%) of White voters, who turned out at a very high rate relative to other districts, supported his White opponent, Mallory McMorrow. McMorrow won the primary with 68.4% of the vote.
- *State House District 26 (37.8% BVAP)* In this four candidate contest, a majority (55.4%) of Black voters supported Black candidate Steven Chisholm and a large majority (76.2%) of White voters cast their vote for White candidate Dylan Wegela. Wegela won the primary with a plurality of the vote.
- *State Senate District 1 (36.6% BVAP)* Six candidates, four of whom were Black candidates, competed in this primary contest. The plurality of Black voters (34.0%) supported Black candidate Brenda Sanders; the second choice of Black voters (24.3%) was Black candidate Erika Geiss. A majority (55.9%) of White voters supported Geiss. Geiss won the primary with 32.3% of the vote.

Overall, candidates supported by Black voters won in 16 of the 22 state legislative primary contests analyzed. This includes contests in State Senate District 2 (25.5% BVAP), State House District 3 (34.0% BVAP), State House District 1 (39.7% BVAP), and State House District 13 (39.8% BVAP) – all district contests in which Black and White voters supported the same candidate. It also includes several polarized contests in non-majority Black districts: State House District 12 (42.6% BVAP), State House District 14 (42.7% BVAP), and State House District 7 (45.9% BVAP). However, candidates preferred by Black voters lost primaries in six districts, with BVAPs as follows: 56.9%, 45.7%, 44.0%, 41.6%, 37.8% and 36.6%. In some instances, contest-specific factors such as the number of candidates competing and a lack of cohesion on the part of Black voters contributed to the loss.

Overall, districts with more substantial BVAPs produced a higher likelihood of success for candidates preferred by Black voters. However, the success rate never dipped below 50% for any

of the ranges examined. Considering all district-level primaries together (which produces more observations): for districts over 50% BVAP (six district primaries), the Black-preferred candidate success rate was 83.3%; for districts between 45-49.9% BVAP (five district primaries), the success rate for Black-preferred candidates was 80.0%; for districts in the range of 40 to 44.9% BVAP (nine districts but only seven district primaries), the Black-preferred success rate was 71.4%; for districts between 35 to 39.9% BVAP (four district primaries), the Black-preferred candidates success rate was 50%; and for districts in the 25 to 34.9% BVAP range (three districts, but only two primaries), the Black-preferred candidate success rate was 100.0%.

## **V. Conclusion**

The district-level 2022 Democratic primary results reveal that majority Black districts are not necessary to provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to the Michigan state legislature in the Detroit area. Many less-than-majority districts elected the candidates supported by Black voters to legislative office. While this is obviously true in districts where voting was not polarized, it is also true in a substantial number of racially polarized primaries. On the other hand, majority Black districts did not necessarily elect the candidates of choice of Black voters. While districts with higher BVAPs are likely to produce more wins for candidates preferred by Black voters, candidates supported by Black voters were successful in 75% of the 2022 primary contests in Detroit area districts with between 40 and 49.9% BVAP and were successful in 68.8% of the primary contests in districts with between 35 and 49.9% BVAP.

**CERTIFICATION**

I certify that the statements and opinions provided in this report are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

*Lisa Handley*  
Lisa Handley, Ph.D.

3/8/2023  
Date

**Lisa R. Handley**  
CURRICULUM VITAE

## **Professional Experience**

Dr. Handley has over thirty years of experience in the areas of redistricting and voting rights, both as a practitioner and an academician, and is recognized nationally and internationally as an expert on these subjects. She has advised numerous clients on redistricting and has served as an expert in dozens of redistricting and voting rights court cases. Her clients have included the U.S. Department of Justice, civil rights organizations, independent redistricting commissions and scores of state and local jurisdictions. Internationally, Dr. Handley has provided electoral assistance in more than a dozen countries, serving as a consultant on electoral system design and redistricting for the United Nations, UNDP, IFES, and International IDEA. In addition, Dr. Handley served as Chairman of the Electoral Boundaries Commission in the Cayman Islands.

Dr. Handley has been actively involved in research, writing and teaching on the subjects of redistricting and voting rights. She has co-written a book, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality (Cambridge University Press, 1992) and co-edited a volume (Redistricting in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008) on these subjects. Her research has also appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as *Journal of Politics*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *American Politics Quarterly*, *Journal of Law and Politics*, and *Law and Policy*, as well as law reviews and edited books. She has taught political science undergraduate and graduate courses related to these subjects at several universities including the University of Virginia and George Washington University. Dr. Handley is a Visiting Research Academic at Oxford Brookes University in the United Kingdom.

Dr. Handley is the President of Frontier International Consulting, a consulting firm that specializes in providing electoral assistance in transitional and post-conflict democracies. She also works as an independent election consultant both in the United States and internationally.

## **Education**

Ph.D. The George Washington University, Political Science, 1991

## **Present Employment**

**President**, Frontier International Electoral Consulting LLC (since co-founding company in 1998).

**Senior International Electoral Consultant**, Technical assistance for clients such as the UN, UNDP and IFES on electoral system design and boundary delimitation

**Visiting Research Academic**, Centre for Development and Emergency Practice (CENDEP), Oxford Brookes University

## **U.S. Clients since 2000**

American Civil Liberties Union – expert testimony in Voting Right Act challenges in several states, expert testimony in Ohio partisan gerrymander challenge and challenge to Commerce Department inclusion of citizenship question on 2020 census form

Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law – expert testimony in challenges to statewide judicial elections in Texas and Alabama

US Department of Justice – expert witness testimony in several Section 2 and Section 5 cases

Alaska: Redistricting Board (2001 and 2011) – redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony

Arizona: Independent Redistricting Board (2001 and 2021) – redistricting consultation

Boston (2022): City Attorney General, redistricting consultation

Colorado: Redistricting Commission (2021), Redistricting Board (2001 and 2011) – redistricting consultation

Connecticut: State Senate and State House of Representatives (2001 and 2011) – redistricting consultation

Florida: State Senate (2000) – redistricting consultation

Kansas: State Legislative Research Department (2001, 2011, 2021) – redistricting consultation

Louisiana: Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus (2001) – expert witness testimony

Massachusetts: State Senate (2001 and 2011) – redistricting consultation

Maryland: Attorney General (2001) – redistricting consultation

Michigan: Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (2021) – redistricting consultation

Miami-Dade County, Florida: County Attorney (2001 and 2011) – redistricting consultation

Nassau County, New York: Redistricting Commission (2001) – redistricting consultation

New Mexico: State House (2001) – redistricting consultation, expert witness testimony

New York: State Assembly (2001), State Senate (2021) – redistricting consultation

New York City: Redistricting Commission and Charter Commission (2001, 2011, 2022) – redistricting consultation and Section 5 submission assistance

New York State Court: Expert to the Special Master (drew congressional lines for state court)

Rhode Island: State Senate and State House (2001 and 2021) – redistricting consultation



## International Clients since 2000

### United Nations

- Afghanistan – electoral system design and district delimitation expert
- Bangladesh (UNDP) – redistricting expert
- Sierra Leone (UNDP) – redistricting expert
- Liberia (UNMIL, UN peacekeeping mission) – redistricting expert
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, UN peacekeeping mission) – election feasibility mission, electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Kenya (UN) – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Haiti (UN) – election feasibility mission, electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Zimbabwe (UNDP) – redistricting expert
- Lead Writer on the topic of boundary delimitation (redistricting) for ACE (Joint UN, IFES and IDEA project on the Administration and Cost of Elections Project)

### International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)

- Afghanistan – district delimitation expert
- Sudan – redistricting expert
- Kosovo – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Nigeria – redistricting expert
- Nepal – redistricting expert
- Georgia – electoral system design and district delimitation expert
- Yemen – redistricting expert
- Lebanon – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Malaysia – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Myanmar – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Ukraine – electoral system design and redistricting expert
- Pakistan – consultant for developing redistricting software
- Principal consultant for the Delimitation Equity Project – conducted research, wrote reference manual and developed training curriculum
- Writer on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting), Elections Standards Project
- Training – developed training curriculum and conducted training workshops on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) in Azerbaijan and Jamaica

### International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA):

- Consultant on electoral dispute resolution systems
- Technology consultant on use of GIS for electoral district delimitation
- Training – developed training material and conducted training workshop on electoral boundary delimitation (redistricting) for African election officials (Mauritius)
- Curriculum development – boundary delimitation curriculum for the BRIDGE Project

Other international clients have included The Cayman Islands; the Australian Election Commission; the Boundary Commission of British Columbia, Canada; and the Global Justice Project for Iraq.

## **Publications**

### ***Books:***

Does Torture Prevention Work? Liverpool University Press, 2016 (served as editor and author, with Richard Carver)

Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008 (first editor, with Bernard Grofman).

Delimitation Equity Project: Resource Guide, Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance at IFES and USAID publication, 2006 (lead author).

Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality, Cambridge University Press, 1992 (with Bernard Grofman and Richard Niemi).

### ***Academic Journal Articles:***

"Drawing Electoral Districts to Promote Minority Representation" Representation, forthcoming, published online DOI:10.1080/00344893.2020.1815076.

"Evaluating national preventive mechanisms: a conceptual model," Journal of Human Rights Practice, Volume 12 (2), July 2020 (with Richard Carver).

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"1990s Issues in Voting Rights," Mississippi Law Journal, 65 (2), Winter 1995 (with Bernard Grofman).

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"Identifying and Remediating Racial Gerrymandering," Journal of Law and Politics, 8 (2), Winter 1992 (with Bernard Grofman).

"The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation in Southern State Legislatures," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16 (1), February 1991 (with Bernard Grofman).

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***Chapters in Edited Volumes:***

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"Redistricting" in Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems, Erik Herron Robert Pekkanen and Matthew Shugart (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

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"Delimiting Electoral Boundaries in Post-Conflict Settings," in Comparative Redistricting in Perspective, edited by Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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***Electronic Publication:***

"Boundary Delimitation" Topic Area for the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project, 1998. Published by the ACE Project on the ACE website ([www.aceproject.org](http://www.aceproject.org)).

***Additional Writings of Note:***

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford, Brief of Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae, 2017 (one of many social scientists to sign brief)

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder, Brief of Historians and Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 2013 (one of several dozen historians and social scientists to sign brief)

Amicus brief presented to the US Supreme Court in Bartlett v. Strickland, 2008 (with Nathaniel Persily, Bernard Grofman, Bruce Cain, and Theodore Arrington).

## Recent Court Cases

Pending cases:

- Louisiana: *Nairne, et al., v. Ardoin* (Docket Number: 3:22-cv-00178-SDD-SDJ) (Middle District of Louisiana)
- Louisiana: *Robinson, et al., v. Ardoin* (Docket Number: 3:22-cv-0211-SDD-SDJ) (Middle District of Louisiana)
- Georgia: *Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc., et al., v. Raffensperger, et al.* (Docket Number: 1:21-CV-05337-SCJ) (Northern District of Georgia)
- Arkansas: *Arkansas State Conference NAACP, et al., v. Arkansas Board of Apportionment, et al.* (Case Number: 4:21-cv-01239-LPR) (Eastern District of Arkansas, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals)
- Ohio: *League of Women Voters of Ohio, et al., v. Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.* (Case Number: 2021-1193) (Supreme Court of Ohio); *League of Women Voters of Ohio, et al., v. Governor DeWine* (Case Number: 2021-1449) (Supreme Court of Ohio)

*Ohio Philip Randolph Institute v. Larry Householder* (2019) – partisan gerrymander challenge to Ohio congressional districts; testifying expert for private plaintiffs on minority voting patterns

*State of New York v. U.S. Department of Commerce* (2018-2019) – challenge to inclusion of citizenship question on 2020 census form; testifying expert on behalf of private plaintiffs

*U.S. v. City of Eastpointe* (settled 2019) – minority vote dilution challenge to City of Eastpointe, Michigan, at-large city council election system; testifying expert on behalf of U.S. Department of Justice

*Alabama NAACP v. State of Alabama* (decided 2020) – minority vote dilution challenge to Alabama statewide judicial election system; testifying expert on behalf of private plaintiffs

*Lopez v. Abbott* (2017-2018) – minority vote dilution challenge to Texas statewide judicial election system; testifying expert on behalf of private plaintiffs

*Personhuballuah v. Alcorn* (2015-2017) – racial gerrymandering challenge to Virginia congressional districts; expert for the Attorney General and Governor of the State of Virginia

*Perry v. Perez* (2014) – Section 2 case challenging Texas congressional and state house districts; testifying expert for the U.S. Department of Justice

*Jeffers v. Beebe* (2012) – Arkansas state house districts; testifying expert for the Plaintiffs

*State of Texas v. U.S.* (2011-2012) – Section 5 case challenging Texas congressional and state house districts; testifying expert for the U.S. Department of Justice

# Appendix A

# Report to the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission

Dr. Lisa Handley

## Preface

This report outlines the analyses I conducted on behalf of the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC) and relays my findings. I also briefly explain the partisan fairness measures I advised the MICRC to adopt as a component of the redistricting software and why I made these recommendations. The legal implications of my findings and the assessment of any proposed plans have been left to the MICRC legal team.

### I. The Voting Rights Act and Racially Polarized Voting

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure – including redistricting plans – that result in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to establish that intentional discrimination need not be proven (as the Supreme Court determined was required under the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution). The U.S. Supreme Court first interpreted the amended Act in *Thornburg v. Gingles*,<sup>1</sup> a challenge to the 1982 North Carolina state legislative plans. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
- The minority group must be politically cohesive
- Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates

What do we mean when we say minority voters must be politically cohesive? And how do we know if white voters usually vote as a bloc to defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters? According to the Court, racially polarized voting is the “evidentiary linchpin” of a vote dilution claim. Voting is racially polarized if minorities and whites consistently vote for different candidates. More specifically, if minorities consistently support the same candidates, they are said to be politically cohesive. If whites are consistently *not* supporting these candidates, they are said to be bloc voting against the minority-preferred candidates.

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<sup>1</sup> 478 U.S. 30 (1986).



The Voting Rights Act requires a state or local jurisdiction to create districts that provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice if voting is racially polarized and the candidates preferred by minority voters usually lose. If districts that provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates already exist, these must be maintained.

### **A. Analyzing Voting Patterns by Race**

An analysis of voting patterns by race serves as the foundation of two of the three elements of the “results test” as outlined in *Gingles*: a racial bloc voting analysis is needed to determine whether the minority group is politically cohesive; and the analysis is required to determine if whites are voting sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the candidates preferred by minority voters. The voting patterns of white and minority voters must be estimated using statistical techniques because direct information the race of the voters is not, of course, available on the ballots cast.

To carry out an analysis of voting patterns by race, an aggregate level database must be constructed, usually employing election precincts as the units of observation. Information relating to the demographic composition and election results in these precincts is collected, merged and statistically analyzed to determine if there is a relationship between the racial composition of the precincts and support for specific candidates across the precincts.

***Standard Statistical Techniques*** Three standard statistical techniques have been developed over time to estimate vote choices by race: homogeneous precinct analysis, ecological regression, and ecological inference.<sup>2</sup> Two of these analytic procedures – homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression – were employed by the plaintiffs’ expert in *Gingles*, have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s approval in that case, and have been used in most subsequent voting rights cases. The third technique, ecological inference, was developed after the *Gingles* decision and was designed, in part, to address some of the disadvantages associated with ecological regression analysis. Ecological inference analysis has been introduced and accepted in numerous court proceedings.

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<sup>2</sup> For a detailed explanation of homogenous precinct analysis and ecological regression see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, *Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 1992). See Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem* (Princeton University Press, 1997) for a more detailed explanation of ecological inference.

Homogeneous precinct (HP) analysis is the simplest technique. It involves comparing the percentage of votes received by each of the candidates in precincts that are racially or ethnically homogeneous. The general practice is to label a precinct as homogeneous if at least 90 percent of the voting age population is composed of a single race.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the homogeneous results reported are not estimates – they are the actual precinct results. However, most voters in Michigan do not reside in homogeneous precincts and voters who reside in homogeneous precincts may not be representative of voters who live in more racially diverse precincts. For this reason, I refer to these percentages as estimates.

The second statistical technique employed, ecological regression (ER), uses information from all precincts, not simply the homogeneous ones, to derive estimates of the voting behavior of minorities and whites. If there is a strong linear relationship across precincts between the percentage of minorities and the percentage of votes cast for a given candidate, this relationship can be used to estimate the percentage of minority (and white) voters supporting the candidate.

The third technique, ecological inference (EI), was developed by Professor Gary King. This approach also uses information from all precincts but, unlike ecological regression, it does not rely on an assumption of linearity. Instead, it incorporates maximum likelihood statistics to produce estimates of voting patterns by race. In addition, it utilizes the method of bounds, which uses more of the available information from the precinct returns as well as providing more information about the voting behavior being estimated.<sup>4</sup> Unlike ecological regression, which can produce percentage estimates of less than 0 or more than 100 percent, ecological inference was designed to produce only estimates that fall within the possible limits. However, EI does not guarantee that the estimates for all of the candidates add to 100 percent for each of the racial groups examined.

In conducting my analysis of voting patterns by race in statewide elections in Michigan, I also used a more recently developed version of ecological inference, which I have labeled “EI

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<sup>3</sup> If turnout or registration by race is available, this information is used to identify homogenous precincts.

<sup>4</sup> The following is an example of how the method of bounds works: if a given precinct has 100 voters, of whom 75 are Black and 25 are white, and the Black candidate received 80 votes, then at least 55 of the Black voters voted for the Black candidate and at most all 75 did. (The method of bounds is less useful for calculating estimates for white voters in this example as anywhere between none of the whites and all of the whites could have voted for the candidate.)

RxC” in the summary tables found in the Appendices at the end of the report. EI RxC expands the analysis so that more than two racial/ethnic groups can be considered simultaneously. It also allows us to take into account differences in the relative rates of minority and white turnout when, as is the case in Michigan, we do not have turnout by race but instead must rely on voting age population by race to derive estimates of minority and white support for each of the candidates.

**Database** To analyze voting patterns by race using aggregate level information, a database that combines election results with demographic information is required. This database is almost always constructed using election precincts as the unit of analysis. The demographic composition of the precincts is based on voter registration or turnout by race/ethnicity if this information is available; if it is not, then voting or citizen voting age population is used. Michigan does not collect voter registration data by race and therefore voting age population (VAP) by race and ethnicity as reported in the PL94-171 census redistricting data was used for ascertaining the demographic composition of the precincts.<sup>5</sup>

The precinct election returns for the general elections, as well as precinct shape files, census block-to-precinct assignment files,<sup>6</sup> and election results disaggregated to the block level were supplied by the Michigan Secretary of State. The Democratic primary results had to be collected county by county and were either downloaded directly or cut and pasted from pdf files.

**Geographic areas** Producing reliable estimates of voting patterns by race requires an adequate number of minority and white voters, an adequate number of election precincts, and sufficient variation in the percentage of minority and white voters across the precincts. Only a few counties in Michigan satisfied these conditions, and only for one group of minority voters – Black voters. It was not possible to produce reliable statewide or countywide estimates for Hispanic or Asian voters in Michigan. However, estimates for Hispanics, as well as some additional minority groups, were produced for very localized areas in Michigan and this analysis is discussed below in a separate section entitled “Voting Patterns of Minority Voters other than Black Voters.” As a

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<sup>5</sup> Since the only minority group sufficiently large enough in the State of Michigan to produce estimates of voting patterns is Black residents and there is not a high non-citizenship rate to account for when conducting the analysis, estimates of citizen voting age population by race were not included in the database.

<sup>6</sup> Shape files and block-to-precinct equivalency files made it possible to account for changes in precinct boundaries, and therefore precinct demographics, over time.

consequence of the three limitations listed above, I was able to reliably estimate the voting patterns of Blacks and whites statewide and in the four counties: Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw.

*Elections analyzed* All statewide elections held in the State during the preceding decade (2012-2020) were analyzed, both for voters within the state as a whole and in the four counties that had a sufficient number of Black VAP conduct the analysis – Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw. The general elections analyzed included: U.S. President (2012, 2016, 2020), U.S. Senate (2012, 2014, 2018, 2020), and the statewide offices of Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General in 2014 and 2018.

Four of these contests included African American candidates:<sup>7</sup> the 2012 presidential election, the 2014 election contest for Secretary of State, and the U.S. Senate contests in 2018 and 2020. Only two of these four contests included African American candidates supported by Black voters, however: Barack Obama in his bid for re-election in 2012 and Godfrey Dillard in his race for Secretary of State in 2014. John James, an African American Republican who ran for U.S. Senate in 2018 and 2020, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters. In addition, two election contests included African American candidates as running mates: the 2018 gubernatorial race in which Garlin Gilchrist ran for Lieutenant Governor and Gretchen Whitmer as Governor, and the 2020 presidential race in which Kamala Harris ran for Vice President. Both sets of running mates were strongly supported by Black voters.

There was only one statewide Democratic primary for statewide office the previous decade: the 2018 race for governor. I analyzed this Democratic primary (as well as congressional and state legislative Democratic primaries) and not Republican primaries because the overwhelming majority of Black voters who choose to vote in primaries cast their ballots in Democratic rather than Republican primaries. As a consequence, Democratic primaries are far more probative than Republican primaries for ascertaining the candidates preferred by Black voters.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, this

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<sup>7</sup> Courts consider election contests that include minority candidates more probative than contests that include only white candidates for determining if voting is racially polarized. This is because it is not sufficient for minority voters to be able to elect their candidates of choice only if these candidates are white. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that not all minority candidates are the preferred candidates of minority voters.

<sup>8</sup> In addition, producing reliable estimates for Black voters in Republican primaries would not have been possible.

primary included two minority candidates: Abdul El-Sayed, who is of Egyptian descent, and Shri Thanedar, who is Indian-American.

In addition to these statewide elections, I also analyzed recent congressional and state legislative elections in districts that fell within Wayne, Oakland, Saginaw and Genesee Counties and had a Black VAP that was large enough to produce reliable estimates.<sup>9</sup> Because of the very substantial changes in district boundaries between the current district boundaries and any of the proposed district plan boundaries, these election contests cannot be considered indicative of voting patterns in any proposed districts. However, they are important for at least two reasons. First, although few minority candidates ran for office statewide, there were many who ran in legislative elections, especially in Wayne County. Second, while there was only one statewide Democratic primary conducted over the course of the previous decade, there have been numerous recent Democratic primaries for congressional and state legislative office.

## **B. Statewide and County Results**

Table 1, below, lists the number of statewide election contests that were racially polarized, both for Michigan as a whole, and for each of the four counties considered individually. This tabulation is based on the racial bloc voting summary tables found in Appendix A. The second column indicates the number of contests that included African American candidates that were polarized (over the total number of contests with African American candidates), the third column is the number of statewide general elections (out of the 13 analyzed) that were polarized and the final column reports the results of the only statewide Democratic primary.

Statewide, all election contests other than the 2012 US. Senate race won by Debbie Stabenow were racially polarized. (Her 2018 election contest, however, was racially polarized.) The candidate who obtained the lowest vote percentage statewide was African American candidate for Secretary of State in 2014, Godfrey Dillard. This was because he received less white crossover votes than any other candidate – the percentage of Black voters supporting him was comparable to the percentage of Black voters supporting the other Democratic candidates competing statewide.

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<sup>9</sup> In some state house districts, there was not enough whites of voting age to conduct an analysis of voting patterns by race.

**Table 1: Number of Statewide Elections Analyzed that were Polarized**

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Every statewide general election contest analyzed was polarized in Oakland County – only in the Democratic primary for Governor in 2018 did Black and white voters support the same candidate (Gretchen Whitmer). Voting in Saginaw County was nearly as polarized: two U.S. Senate contests (2012 and 2014) were not polarized, but the gubernatorial primary was polarized. Black and white voters agreed on the same candidates slightly more often in Genesee County – in addition to supporting U.S. senate candidates Debbie Stabenow in 2012 and Gary Peters in 2014, they both supported Barack Obama in 2012 and Democrat Mark Schauer for Governor in 2014.

Voting in Wayne County was considerably less racially polarized than statewide or in the other three counties studied. However, slightly more than half of the general election contests and the one statewide Democratic primary analyzed were polarized, with Black and white voters supporting the same candidates in 2012, disagreeing on the three statewide offices, but supporting the same U.S. Senate candidate in 2014, supporting different candidates for U.S. President in 2016 and 2020, and voting for most of the same candidates in 2018.

**C. Congressional and State Legislative Election Results**

This section provides a summary of my racial bloc voting analysis of recent congressional and state legislative districts in the four-county area of Wayne, Oakland, Genesee and Saginaw. I analyzed 2018 and 2020 general elections, and the 2018 and 2020 Democratic primaries if at least one African American candidate competed in the election contest. However, for a number of state

legislative elections, there were too many candidates and too few votes cast to obtain reliable estimates. In addition, there were three state house districts – districts 3, 7, 8 – where there were an insufficient number of white voters to produce reliable estimates. The summary tables reporting each of estimates for these contests are found in Appendix B.

Table 2, below, summarizes the congressional district results for congressional districts 5, 9, 12, 13 and 14.<sup>10</sup> In most instances, voting was not racially polarized – in 80% of the general elections and 75% of the contested Democratic primaries analyzed, Black and white voters supported the same candidates. Three of the contests analyzed were, however, polarized. The Black-preferred candidate won two of these contests: Districts 5 and 13 in the 2020 general election. The other polarized contest was the 2018 bid for the Democratic nomination for full two-year term the in District 13. Six candidates competed in this contest, four African American candidates, including the candidate of choice of a plurality of Black voters, Brenda Jones; Bill Wild, a white candidate; and Rashida Tlaib, an American of Palestinian descent. White voters divided their votes between Wild and Tlaib. Tlaib won the nomination with 27,841 votes (31.17%), and Benda Jones came in a close second with 26,941 votes (30.16%).<sup>11</sup>

**Table 2: Summary of Congressional District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

<b>Congress District</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent BVAP</b>	<b>2018 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2018 General election</b>	<b>2020 Democratic primary</b>	<b>2020 General election</b>
5	Genesee & Saginaw, plus	16.63	no contest	not polarized	no contest	polarized - won
9	Oakland & Macomb	13.83	only white candidates	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
12	Wayne & Washtenaw	11.73	no contest	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized

<sup>10</sup> Congressional District 11, which is also located in the area of interest (Oakland and Wayne), as well as Districts 8 (partially in Oakland) and 4 (partially in Saginaw), had too few Black voters to produce reliable estimates of their vote choices.

<sup>11</sup> A special election for filling the partial term for District 13 – left vacant when John Conyers resigned – was conducted at the same time with many of the same candidates. Brenda Jones won this contest with 32,769 (37.75%) votes; Rashida Tlaib came in second with 31,121 (35.85%) votes.

Congress District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election	2020 Democratic primary	2020 General election
13	Wayne	54.78	polarized - lost	not polarized	not polarized	polarized - won
14	Wayne & Oakland	55.16	no contest	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized

The results of my analysis recent state senate elections is found in Table 3, below. There were no Democratic primaries in two districts (12 and 27), and no minority candidates competed in a third (District 32). In addition, there was one Democratic primary in which 11 candidates competed – too many to produce reliable estimates. Of the 16 contests analyzed, 10 were not polarized (three primaries and seven general elections), four were polarized but the Black-preferred candidate won (two primaries and two generals), and two were polarized and the candidates of choice of Black voters lost. One of these contests was the general election in District 32, which has only 13.45% BVAP.<sup>12</sup> The other polarized contest that the Black-preferred candidate lost was the Democratic primary in State Senate District 1 in 2018. Six candidates competed in this election. The plurality choice of Black voters was African American candidate, Alberta Tinsley Talabi. A very large majority of white voters supported the Asian candidates, Stephanie Chang, who was the second choice of Black voters. Chang won with 49.8% of the vote (Talabi received 26.4%).

**Table 3: Summary of State Senate District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

State Senate District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election
1	Wayne	44.68	polarized - lost	not polarized
2	Wayne	50.82	<i>na</i> (11 candidates)	not polarized

<sup>12</sup> The Black VAP percentages listed throughout this report are from the MICRC redistricting GIS active matrix tab labeled “5A,” which indicates the percentage of non-Hispanic voting age population who indicated they were Black or Black in combination with any other race. This produces the maximum number of individuals within each racial group, including Black, but will result in totals over 100% since persons identifying as more than one race will be counted more than once.



State Senate District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election
3	Wayne	48.14	polarized - won	not polarized
4	Wayne	47.00	not polarized	not polarized
5	Wayne	54.25	polarized - won	not polarized
6	Wayne	21.29	not polarized	polarized - won
11	Oakland	35.48	not polarized	not polarized
12	Oakland	14.87	no contest	polarized - won
27	Genesee	30.42	no contest	not polarized
32	Genesee & Saginaw	13.45	no minority candidates	polarized - lost

The final table in this section, Table 4, summarized the results of my analysis of recent state house election. A number of the cells in the table have “na” as an entry because estimates are not available. This was for one of two reasons: there were too many candidates and too few votes cast to obtain reliable estimates, or there were an insufficient number of white voters to produce reliable estimates (state house districts 3, 7, 8).

It was possible to produce estimates for 54 contests. The majority of these contests were not polarized – in 37 contests (68.5%), white and Black voters supported the same candidates. In another 13 contests, voting was polarized but the candidate preferred by Black voters won. There were four contests – all Democratic primaries – that were racially polarized and the Black-preferred candidate lost. In three of these contests, the BVAP of the districts was less than 30% (Districts 12, 16, and 37). The Black-preferred candidates also lost the 2018 Democratic primary in House District 29, which has a 36.04% BVAP. All six of the candidates competing were African Americans. The plurality choice of Black voters was Kermit Williams; Brenda Carter was the candidate of choice of a majority of white voters. Carter won with 30.7% of the vote and Williams came in second with 24.7% of the vote.

**Table 4: Summary of State House District Racial Bloc Voting Analysis**

State House District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election	2020 Democratic primary	2020 General election
1	Wayne	64.76	not polarized	polarized - won	no contest	polarized - won
2	Wayne	57.70	<i>na</i> (7 candidates)	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
3	Wayne	90.93	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
4	Wayne	47.27	<i>na</i> (15 candidates)	not polarized	<i>na</i> (13 candidates)	not polarized
5	Wayne	54.12	polarized - won	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
6	Wayne	52.86	<i>na</i> (10 candidates)	not polarized	polarized - won	no contest
7	Wayne	94.27	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
8	Wayne	92.42	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>
9	Wayne	74.22	not polarized	not polarized	polarized - won	not polarized
10	Wayne	67.41	not polarized	not polarized	<i>na</i> (8 candidates)	not polarized
11	Wayne	26.53	polarized - won	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
12	Wayne	26.97	polarized - lost	polarized - won	not polarized	polarized - won
16	Wayne	23.25	polarized - lost	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
27	Oakland	24.35	not polarized	not polarized	<i>na</i> (8 candidates)	not polarized

State House District	Location	Percent BVAP	2018 Democratic primary	2018 General election	2020 Democratic primary	2020 General election
29	Oakland	36.04	polarized - lost	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
35	Oakland	62.50	polarized - won	not polarized	not polarized	not polarized
37	Oakland	17.91	no contest	not polarized	polarized - lost	not polarized
34	Genesee	60.96	not polarized	polarized - won	not polarized	polarized - won
49	Genesee	29.47	not polarized	not polarized	no contest	not polarized
95	Saginaw	35.50	no contest	not polarized	polarized - won	polarized - won

**D. Voting Patterns of Minority Voters other than Black Voters**

As noted above, it was not possible to produce estimates of voting patterns by race for any groups other than Blacks and whites (more specifically, non-Hispanic whites) statewide or by county. However, by localizing the analysis in geographic areas much smaller than counties, it was possible to derive estimates for several additional minority groups: Hispanics, Arab Americans, Chaldeans, and Bangladeshi Americans.<sup>13</sup> Because these estimates could not be generated statewide, it is difficult to know if the voters included in the analysis are representative of the group as a whole statewide. The summary tables reporting the estimates for these groups can be found in the Appendix C.



**Hispanic Voters** Hispanics live in large enough concentrations to produce estimates in two areas of Michigan. Because these concentrations are in different areas of the state, I did not combine them. Instead, I have produced estimates for Hispanics living in the area of Detroit depicted in the first map below (“Areas included in Analysis of Voting Patterns – Hispanics

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<sup>13</sup> Interest in the voting patterns of Arab Americans, Chaldeans and Bangladeshi Americans was prompted by comments received in public hearings and on the public portal.

(Detroit)”) and in the Grand Rapids area depicted in the second map (“Areas included in Analysis of Voting Patterns – Hispanics in Grand Rapids”). In both maps, the precincts are shaded based on the percentage Hispanic in the precinct.<sup>14</sup>


While the voting patterns do not appear to be very different – both groups provide strong support for Democratic candidates in general elections – the turnout levels differ. In the Grand Rapids area, turnout among Hispanics of voting age is lower than it is in the Detroit area.



<sup>14</sup> The Hispanic VAP used for shading the map and conducting the racial bloc voting analysis was derived from the 2020 94-171 census redistricting data, which reports Hispanic VAP by census block. This data was then aggregated up to the precinct level.


**Arab American Voters** Approximately 38% of the Arab American population in Michigan is concentrated in the Dearborn and Dearborn Heights area. Localizing the racial bloc voting analysis to this specific area offered sufficient variation across the precincts to produce estimates of the voting behavior of this group. The map below indicates the geographic area included in the analysis; the precincts are shaded by the percentage of residents who are Arab American.<sup>15</sup>

Arab Americans voters, at least in this area of Michigan, strongly support Democratic candidates in general elections – over 80% consistently supported the Democratic candidate in the six 2018-2020 general elections examined. These voters, unlike other groups of voters studied, were also very cohesive in 2018 Democratic primary for Governor – they strongly supported of Abdul El-Sayed in his bid for the nomination.



<sup>15</sup> The Arab American data was derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), Table B04004, “People Reporting Single Ancestry.” This data, reported at the census tract level, was attributed down to the census block level and then aggregated up to the election precinct level.


*Chaldeans*, like Arab Americans in Michigan, tend to reside in a geographically concentrated area of Michigan – in this instance, Sterling Heights. Over 40% of the Chaldean population can be found here.<sup>16</sup> Localizing the voting analysis to Sterling Heights produced reliable estimates of the voting patterns of this community. Chaldeans are not nearly as cohesive as Arab Americans – they consistently divided their support between the Democratic and Republican candidates. However, a clear majority of Chaldean voters supported Donald Trump in his bid for re-election in 2020.



<sup>16</sup> The Chaldean data was derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), Table B04004, “People Reporting Single Ancestry” using the Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac designation. This census tract level data was attributed down to the census block level and then aggregated up to the election precinct level.



**Bangladeshi American Voters** Using a map identifying the Bangladeshi American community of interest submitted to the MICRC,<sup>17</sup> this localized analysis focused on West Warren and Hamtramck to produce estimates of the vote choices of this group. Bangladeshi American voting patterns are very similar to Arab American voting patterns.<sup>18</sup> Both groups provided strong support for Democratic candidates in general elections and both groups were cohesive in their support of Abdul El-Sayed in the 2018 Democratic primary for Governor.



<sup>17</sup> The map was submitted on the public comment portal on 9/8/2021 by Hayg Oshagan with the following comment “This is the Bengali community of SE MI. The area around Hamtramck (to the South) is most densely populated and is the center of the community.”

<sup>18</sup> Asian VAP by census block as reported by the 2020 94-171 census redistricting data was used to create the shading on the map and the racial bloc voting database.

## II. Drawing Minority Opportunity Districts

Because voting in Michigan is racially polarized, districts that provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice must be drawn. If they already exist – as many do in Michigan – they must be maintained. But maintaining minority opportunity districts does not necessarily require that the districts be redrawn with the same percentage minority voting age population. In fact, many of the minority districts in the current plan are packed with far more Black VAP than needed to elect candidates of choice, as indicated by the percentage of votes the minority candidates are garnering. (See Tables 9 and 10, in the next section of this report, for the Black VAP of the current state house and senate districts, the current incumbents and their race and party, and the percentage of votes each of the incumbents received in 2020.)

An analysis must be undertaken to determine if a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to office. This analysis must be district-specific – that is, must recognize there are likely to be differences in participation rates and voting patterns in districts across the state – and it must be functional – that is, it must be based on actual voting behavior of whites and minorities. There is no single universal or statewide demographic target that can be applied for Black voters to elect their candidates of choice in Michigan.<sup>19</sup>

There are two related approaches to conducting a district-specific, functional analysis, both of which take into account the relative turnout rates and voting patterns of minorities and whites. The first approach uses estimates derived from racial bloc voting analysis to calculate the percent minority population needed in a specific area for minority-preferred candidates to win a district in that area.

The second approach relies on election results from previous contests that included minority-preferred candidates (as identified by the racial bloc voting analysis) to determine if these candidates would win election in the proposed districts. The election results for these “bellwether elections” – racially polarized elections that include minority candidates who are preferred by minority voters – are disaggregated down from the election precinct to the census block level and then recompiled to reflect the boundaries of the proposed district. If the minority-

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<sup>19</sup> Establishing a demographic target (e.g., 55% black voting age population) for all minority districts across the jurisdiction was, in fact, expressly forbidden by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 575 U.S. 254 (2015).



preferred candidates in these bellwether elections win in the proposed district, this district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. This latter approach can be used only if proposed district boundaries have been drawn. The former approach can be carried out before any new boundaries are drafted.

### A. Calculating the Black VAP Needed to Elect Black-Preferred Candidates

The percentage of minority voting age population needed in a district to provide minority voters with the opportunity to elect minority-preferred candidates to congress or to the state legislature varies. Using the estimates produced from the racial bloc voting analysis, I calculated the Black VAP percentages needed to elect minority-preferred candidates in each of the general elections included in the summary tables in the Appendix. This calculation takes into account the relative participation rates of age eligible Blacks and whites, as well as the level of Black support for the Black-preferred candidate (the "cohesiveness" of Black voters), and the level of whites "crossing over" to vote for the Black-preferred candidate.

*Equalizing minority and white turnout* Because Blacks who are age eligible to vote often turn out to vote at lower rates than white voters in Michigan, the Black VAP needed to ensure that Black voters comprise at least half of the voters in an election is often higher than 50%. Once the respective turnout rates of Black and Whites eligible to vote have been estimated using the statistical techniques described above (HP, ER and EI), the percentage needed to equalize Black and white voters can be calculated mathematically.<sup>20</sup> But equalizing turnout is

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<sup>20</sup> The equalizing percentage is calculated mathematically by solving the following equation:

Let  
M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is Black  
W = 1-M = the proportion of the district's voting age population that is white  
A = the proportion of the Black voting age population that turned out to vote  
B = the proportion of the white voting age population that turned out to vote

Therefore,

M(A) = the proportion of the population that is Black and turned out to vote (1)  
(1-M)B = the proportion of total population that is white and turned out to vote (2)

To find the value of M that is needed for (1) and (2) to be equal, (1) and (2) are set as equal and we solve for M algebraically:

$$\begin{aligned} M(A) &= (1 - M) B \\ M(A) &= B - M(B) \\ M(A) + M(B) &= B \\ M(A + B) &= B \\ M &= B / (A+B) \end{aligned}$$

only the first step in the process – it does not take into account the voting patterns of Black and white voters. If voting is racially polarized but a significant number of white voters typically “crossover” to vote for Black voters’ preferred candidate, it may be the case that crossover voting can more than compensate for depressed Black turnout.

***Incorporating Minority Cohesion and White Crossover Voting*** Even if Black citizens are turning out at lower rates than whites, and voting is racially polarized, if a relatively consistent percentage of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, the candidates preferred by Black voters can be elected in districts that are less than majority Black. On the other hand, if voting is starkly polarized, with few or no whites crossing over to vote for the candidates supported by Black voters, it may be the case that a district that is more than 50% Black VAP is needed to elect Black-preferred candidates. A district-specific, functional analysis should take into account not only differences in turnout rates, but also the voting patterns of Black and white voters.<sup>21</sup>

To illustrate this mathematically, consider a district that has 1000 persons of voting age, 50% of who are Black and 50% of who are white. Let us begin by assuming that Black turnout is lower than white turnout in a two-candidate general election. In our hypothetical election example, 42% of the Black VAP turn out to vote and 60% of the white VAP vote. This means that, for our illustrative election, there are 210 Black voters and 300 white voters. Further suppose that 96% of the Black voters supported their candidate of choice and 25% of the white voters cast their votes for this candidate (with the other 75% supporting her opponent in the election contest). Thus, in our example, Black voters cast 200 of their 210 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and their other 8 votes for her opponent; white voters cast 75 of their 300 votes for the Black-preferred candidate and 225 votes for their preferred candidate:

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Thus, for example, if 39.3% of the Black population turned out and 48.3% of the white population turned out,  $B = .483$  and  $A = .393$ , and  $M = .483 / (.393 + .483) = .483 / .876 = .5513$ , therefore a Black VAP of 55.1% would produce an equal number of Black and white voters. (For a more in-depth discussion of equalizing turnout see Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, “Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice,” *Law and Policy*, 10 (1), January 1988.)

<sup>21</sup> For an in-depth discussion of this approach to creating effective minority districts, see Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and David Lublin, “Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” *North Carolina Law Review*, volume 79 (5), June 2001.

	VAP	turnout	voters	support for Black-preferred candidate	votes for Black-preferred candidate	support for white-preferred candidate	votes for white-preferred candidate
Black	500	0.42	210	0.96	202	0.04	8
White	500	0.60	300	0.25	75	0.75	225
			510		277		233

The candidate of choice of Black voters would receive a total of 277 votes (202 from Black voters and 75 from white voters), while the candidate preferred by white voters would receive only 233 votes (8 from Black voters and 225 from white voters). The Black-preferred candidate would win the election with 55.4% (277/500) of the vote in this hypothetical 50% Black VAP district. And the Black-preferred candidate would be successful despite the fact that the election was racially polarized and that Blacks turned out to vote at a lower rate than whites.

The candidate of choice of Black voters would still win the election by a very small margin (50.9%) in a district that is 45% Black with these same voting patterns:

	VAP	turnout	voters	support for Black-preferred candidate	votes for Black-preferred candidate	support for white-preferred candidate	votes for white-preferred candidate
Black	450	0.42	189	0.96	181	0.04	8
White	550	0.60	330	0.25	83	0.75	248
			519		264		255

In a district with a 40% BVAP, however, the Black-preferred candidate would garner only 47.5% of the vote in this example.

***Percent Black VAP needed to win recent general elections in Michigan Counties***

Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 utilize the results of the racial bloc voting analysis (see Appendix A) to indicate the percentage of vote a Black-preferred candidate would receive, given the turnout rates of Blacks and whites and the degree of black cohesion and white crossover voting for each

general election contests examined, in a 55%, 50%, 45%, 40% and 35% BVAP district in Wayne, Oakland, Genesee, and Saginaw Counties.<sup>22</sup> Because voting patterns vary by county, the percentage of votes the Black-preferred candidates would receive also varies. However, in no county is a 50% BVAP district required for the Black-preferred candidates to carry the district in a general election.

Table 5 reports the percentage of votes the Black-preferred candidate would receive in Wayne County, given voting patterns in previous general elections. The Black-preferred candidate would win every general election in a district with a BVAP of 35% or more, and would win with at least 54.4% of the vote – and in most election contests, a substantially higher percentage of the vote. The variation in the percentage of votes received by the Black-preferred candidate is due to the variation in the white vote rather than the Black vote because in every election contest considered at least 95% of Black voters supported the Black-preferred candidate. The Black-preferred candidate of choice who would receive the lowest percentage of the vote would be African American Godfrey Dillard, a candidate for Secretary of State in 2014.

The voting patterns by race, and therefore the percent BVAP needed to win general elections is very similar in Genesee County, as shown in Table 6. Unlike Wayne County, however, the percentage of vote the Black-preferred candidate would garner in a 35% BVAP district in this county is declining slightly over the course of the decade – although the Black-preferred candidate would still win every general election in a 35% BVAP district.

In Oakland County, the Black-preferred candidate does not win every general election contest in a 35% BVAP district. It is not until the 40% BVAP column in Table 7 that the candidate of choice of Black voters wins every election examined. The most challenging election is again the race for Secretary of State in 2014. And even at 40% BVAP, Dillard would receive only 51.3% of the vote.

Saginaw County (Table 8) is similar to Oakland County in that it is only at 40% that the Black-preferred candidate wins every general election contest – and at 40% a couple of the contests are very close. Not only are the winning percentages for the Black-preferred candidates consistently lower in Saginaw County than they are for Oakland County, they have been decreasing over the course of the decade.

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<sup>22</sup> Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 are generated using EI RxC estimates reported in the racial bloc voting tables in the Appendix.

**Table 5: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Wayne County**

WAYNE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	58.0	97.5	2.5	76.6	47.5	52.5	71.5	69.0	66.6	64.3	62.0
2020 US Senate	W	57.8	95.2	4.8	75.6	47.2	52.8	70.4	68.0	65.7	63.4	61.2
2018 Governor	W	33.2	97.0	3.0	63.2	53.5	46.5	70.5	68.5	66.6	64.8	63.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	33.1	97.0	3.0	62.2	53.6	46.4	70.7	68.7	66.8	65.0	63.3
2018 Attorney General	W	32.7	95.5	4.5	61.3	49.4	50.6	67.6	65.4	63.4	61.5	59.7
2018 US Senate	W	33.1	95.8	4.2	63.1	52.3	47.7	69.3	67.3	65.4	63.6	61.9
2016 President	W	57.0	98.4	1.6	64.0	39.7	60.3	70.3	67.4	64.4	61.6	58.7
2014 Governor	W	35.8	96.5	3.5	47.7	41.3	58.7	67.7	65.0	62.3	59.7	57.2
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.5	96.8	3.2	46.1	36.8	63.2	65.9	62.9	60.0	57.2	54.4
2014 Attorney General	W	35.3	95.7	4.3	45.9	41.0	59.0	67.5	64.8	62.1	59.5	57.0
2014 US Senate	W	35.7	98.0	2.0	46.8	53.4	46.6	74.9	72.7	70.5	68.4	66.4
2012 President	AA	60.4	99.0	1.0	65.7	51.9	48.1	76.8	74.5	72.1	69.8	67.5
2012 US Senate	W	59.9	98.1	1.9	64.4	57.6	42.4	79.1	77.1	75.1	73.1	71.1

**Table 6: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Genesee County**

GENESEE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	53.0	96.1	3.9	79.6	42.1	57.9	66.3	63.7	61.1	58.7	56.4
2020 US Senate	W	56.6	95.0	5.0	78.7	43.5	56.5	67.6	65.0	62.6	60.2	57.9
2018 Governor	W	45.1	95.3	4.7	59.8	46.2	53.8	69.8	67.3	64.9	62.6	60.4
2018 Secretary of State	W	44.9	95.2	4.8	58.6	48.0	52.0	70.8	68.5	66.2	64.0	61.8
2018 Attorney General	W	44.6	94.1	5.9	58.4	41.1	58.9	66.7	64.0	61.5	59.0	56.5
2018 US Senate	W	45.1	95.2	4.8	59.6	45.8	54.2	69.5	67.1	64.7	62.4	60.1
2016 President	W	59.0	96.4	3.6	67.3	37.4	62.6	67.9	65.0	62.0	59.2	56.3
2014 Governor	W	35.8	95.8	4.2	47.5	51.8	48.2	72.9	70.7	68.6	66.5	64.5
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.9	95.6	4.4	46.1	46.2	53.8	70.3	67.8	65.4	63.1	60.8
2014 Attorney General	W	35.9	95.6	4.4	45.5	45.2	54.8	69.9	67.4	65.0	62.6	60.2
2014 US Senate	W	36.1	95.6	4.4	47.1	58.6	41.4	76.5	74.7	72.9	71.1	69.4
2012 President	AA	61.0	97.6	2.4	68.4	53.7	46.3	76.6	74.4	72.2	70.1	67.9
2012 US Senate	W	60.7	96.7	3.3	67.5	60.2	39.8	79.3	77.5	75.7	73.9	72.1

**Table 7: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Oakland County**

OAKLAND COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	71.6	93.4	6.6	86.4	45.9	54.1	69.8	67.4	65.1	62.8	60.6
2020 US Senate	W	71.4	92.1	7.9	85.4	43.5	56.5	68.1	65.6	63.2	60.9	58.6
2018 Governor	W	53.2	94.1	5.9	68.8	47.4	52.6	70.1	67.8	65.5	63.3	61.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	53.1	94.2	5.8	67.7	47.5	52.5	70.4	68.0	65.8	63.5	61.4
2018 Attorney General	W	52.5	93.8	6.2	67.0	43.0	57.0	67.9	65.3	62.8	60.4	58.1
2018 US Senate	W	53.2	93.0	7.0	68.7	45.5	54.5	68.6	66.2	63.9	61.7	59.5
2016 President	W	65.6	95.1	4.9	73.5	39.1	60.9	68.3	65.5	62.7	60.0	57.3
2014 Governor	W	46.3	94.8	5.2	54.6	30.6	69.4	63.3	60.1	56.9	53.8	50.7
2014 Secretary of State	AA	45.9	94.6	5.4	53.1	26.4	73.6	61.4	58.0	54.7	51.3	48.1
2014 Attorney General	W	45.8	94.1	5.9	52.6	32.9	67.1	64.5	61.4	58.4	55.4	52.4
2014 US Senate	W	46.5	95.0	5.0	53.7	46.7	53.3	71.5	69.1	66.7	64.4	62.1
2012 President	AA	68.9	95.7	4.3	75.7	42.1	57.9	70.3	67.6	65.0	62.3	59.7
2012 US Senate	W	67.8	95.8	4.2	74.0	47.6	52.4	73.1	70.6	68.3	65.9	63.5

**Table 8: Percent BVAP Needed to Win, Saginaw County**

SAGINAW COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	48.6	95.3	4.7	79.6	36.3	63.7	61.5	58.7	56.0	53.4	50.9
2020 US Senate	W	48.4	93.8	6.2	78.7	37.5	62.5	61.7	58.9	56.3	53.9	51.5
2018 Governor	W	37.7	93.6	6.4	63.0	40.9	59.1	63.2	60.6	58.2	55.9	53.7
2018 Secretary of State	W	38.0	93.7	6.3	61.4	39.2	60.8	62.7	60.0	57.5	55.1	52.8
2018 Attorney General	W	37.6	93.4	6.6	61.0	33.3	66.7	59.1	56.2	53.4	50.8	48.3
2018 US Senate	W	37.8	93.5	6.5	62.8	39.3	60.7	62.3	59.7	57.2	54.8	52.6
2016 President	W	52.3	95.0	5.0	70.2	30.6	69.4	61.3	58.1	55.0	52.0	49.0
2014 Governor	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.8	42.2	57.8	65.1	62.5	60.1	57.8	55.6
2014 Secretary of State	AA	32.6	94.4	5.6	49.2	36.3	63.7	62.3	59.5	56.7	54.1	51.6
2014 Attorney General	W	32.4	94.1	5.9	50.1	32.6	67.4	59.8	56.8	53.9	51.1	48.5
2014 US Senate	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.1	50.6	49.4	69.9	67.8	65.7	63.8	61.9
2012 President	AA	56.2	95.7	4.3	70.3	42.9	57.1	69.0	66.4	63.8	61.3	58.8
2012 US Senate	W	55.7	95.4	4.6	68.7	52.3	47.7	73.8	71.6	69.5	67.4	65.4

It is important to remember that winning office in the United States usually requires winning two elections: a primary and a general election. The tables above consider only general election contests. Producing a comparable set of tables for Democratic primaries is not possible. First, there was only one statewide Democratic primary – the 2018 primary contest for Governor. There were three candidates competing in this election and because 50% of the vote was not required to win the election, a mathematical equation setting the percentage needed to win 50% of the vote does not work. Second, Black voters were not cohesive in support of any one of these three candidates. In fact, the candidate preferred by even the plurality of Black voters was not the same in the four counties examined. Drawing a district that Black-preferred candidate could win this primary is not possible when there is no Black-preferred candidate.

In areas where most of the white voters are likely to vote in Republican primaries, the inability to calculate the percent needed to win in Democratic primaries is not particularly important. Black voters will dominate the Democratic primary unless they make up only a very small portion of the voters in the district. However, in the counties examined in Michigan, many white voters elect to participate in the Democratic primary, especially in Wayne County. As the percentage Black VAP of proposed districts decreases, it may become more challenging for Black-preferred candidates to win not only the general election but the Democratic primary – but only if voting in Democratic primaries is racially polarized. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain exactly how much more difficult it would be – or even if it would be more difficult – given the lack of Democratic primary election data.

### **B. Threshold of Representation in the Current State House and Senate Districts**

A useful check on the percent needed to win estimates found in Tables 5-8 that can be done prior to drawing any districts is to produce what have been referred to by some political scientists as “threshold of representation” tables. These tables are designed to identify the lowest minority percentage above which minority candidates are consistently elected. Tables 9 and 10, below, report the BVAP of the current Michigan state house and senate districts with over 20% BVAP, and indicate the race and party of the candidate elected to represent the district.<sup>23</sup> Sorted

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<sup>23</sup> There are no African American state senators or representatives elected from districts that are less than 20% Black in VAP. However, there are other minority candidates (Hispanic, Asian, and Middle Eastern) elected to state house districts with considerably less than 20% BVAP.

by the percent BVAP, the tables can sometimes provide evidence of a clear breakpoint between those districts that are probably electing candidates of choice and those that are not.<sup>24</sup>

An examination Table 9 indicates that every Michigan state house district with a BVAP of at least 35% elects a minority representative to the state house. In fact, every district with a BVAP of more than 26.53% elects a minority to office with the exception of District 49 in Genesee County. And the racial bloc voting analysis of House District 49 indicates that the white incumbent, John Cherry, is the candidate of choice of Black voters, even in the 2018 Democratic primary when he faced several African American candidates.

**Table 9: Threshold of Representation for State House Districts, 2021**

State House District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	Party	Race	Percent of Vote 2020
7	60347	57256	94.27%	Helena Scott	D	Black	93.00%
8	62448	58042	92.42%	Stephanie A. Young	D	Black	96.70%
3	54130	49536	90.93%	Shri Thanedar	D	Asian	93.30%
9	62529	46806	74.22%	Karen Whitsett	D	Black	94.20%
10	69209	46977	67.41%	Mary Cavanagh	D	Hispanic	84.80%
1	59788	38993	64.76%	Tenisha R. Yancey	D	Black	75.80%
35	78306	49325	62.50%	Kyra Harris Bolden	D	Black	82.90%
34	49491	30419	60.96%	Cynthia R. Neeley	D	Black	86.70%
2	57031	33142	57.70%	Joe Tate	D	Black	74.10%
5	49290	27190	54.12%	Cynthia A. Johnson	D	Black	93.40%
6	67505	36182	52.86%	Tyrone Carter	D	Black	100.00%
4	68749	32761	47.27%	Abraham Aiyash	D	ME	89.80%
29	72319	26621	36.04%	Brenda Carter	D	Black	72.90%
95	58640	21320	35.50%	Amos O'Neal	D	Black	70.10%
49	64844	19308	29.47%	John D. Cherry	D	White	68.90%
54	72426	21212	28.79%	Ronnie Peterson	D	Black	77.70%
12	73883	20207	26.97%	Alex Garza	D	Hispanic	62.40%
11	73586	19760	26.53%	Jewell Jones	D	Black	65.20%
92	66135	16957	25.34%	Terry J. Sabo	D	White	65.30%
27	73337	18051	24.35%	Regina Weiss	D	White	74.40%
16	74617	17556	23.25%	Kevin Coleman	D	White	62.50%
75	76956	18127	22.56%	David LaGrand	D	White	74.60%
68	71672	16808	22.44%	Sarah Anthony	D	Black	75.90%
18	75251	16519	21.76%	Kevin Hertel	D	White	60.30%
22	68758	14588	21.00%	Richard Steenland	D	White	59.90%
60	74176	15887	20.97%	Julie M. Rogers	D	White	71.40%

<sup>24</sup> Without the confirmation provided by a racial bloc voting analysis, it could conceivably be the case that the minority legislator is not the candidate of choice of minority voters.



Interpreting Table 10, for the Michigan state senate, is less straightforward. The four districts with BVAP percentages over 47% elect African Americans to office. However, Stephanie Chang, the state senator in District 1, which is 44.68% BVAP, was not the candidate of choice of Black voters in the 2018 Democratic primary, though she is the candidate of choice in the general election.

**Table 10: Threshold of Representation for State Senate Districts, 2021**

State Senate District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	party	race	Percent of vote 2018
5	203828	111418	54.25%	Betty Alexander	D	Black	77.4%
2	169357	86961	50.82%	Adam Hollier	D	Black	75.7%
3	186758	90737	48.14%	Sylvia Santana	D	Black	81.8%
4	180199	85691	47.00%	Marshall Bullock	D	Black	78.3%
1	193087	87075	44.68%	Stephanie Chang	D	Asian	72.0%
11	229870	82336	35.48%	Jeremy Moss	D	White	76.7%
27	175918	54071	30.42%	Jim Ananich	D	White	71.2%
9	219325	50800	22.95%	Paul Wojno	D	White	65.9%
6	217734	46997	21.29%	Erika Geiss	D	Black	61.4%

**C. Recompiled Election Results**

As noted above, once draft districts have been drawn, there is a second approach available for ascertaining whether a proposed district is likely to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice to legislative or congressional office. This approach relies on recompiling election results from previous elections to see if the candidates preferred by minority voters would win in the draft district. This process entails (1) identifying “bellwether” elections, (2) disaggregating the precinct level results for these elections down to the census block level and then (3) re-aggregating the results up to conform to proposed district boundaries to determine if the minority-preferred candidate would win. This recompilation can only be done

for elections that cover a broad enough area to encompass all of the draft districts, hence only statewide elections can be used for this exercise. “Bellwether” elections are statewide elections that included minority candidates who were the candidates of choice of minority voters but were not supported by white voters.

Although there were six statewide general elections that included African American candidates or running mates, the African American was the candidate of choice of Black voters in only four of these contests: U.S. President in 2012 and 2020, Secretary of State in 2014, and Governor in 2018. All of these contests were racially polarized statewide, but only the 2014 Secretary of State contest was polarized in all four counties. This election contest was also the contest in which the candidate strongly preferred by Black voters garnered the least amount of white crossover votes. Thus, while recompiled elections results for all four elections provide important information for determining if a proposed district would provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in general elections, the single best “bellwether” contest for that purpose is the vote for Godfrey Dillard in 2014.

The redistricting software used by MICRC automatically included recompiled election results for all draft districts for all four of these elections – in fact, it included this information for every statewide general election conducted between 2012 and 2020. Ascertaining if the African American candidates of choice of Black voters, especially Dillard in 2014, carried a proposed district provides evidence that the proposed district in a draft plan will provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in general elections.

The redistricting software also reported recompiled election results for the one statewide Democratic primary conducted in the past decade: the 2018 race for Governor. However, because there were three candidates and because Black voters were not cohesive in supporting any of these candidates, these recompiled results are not particularly useful in ascertaining whether a proposed district would provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in Democratic primaries.

### **III. Measuring Partisan Fairness in Redistricting Plans**

According to 13(d) of Article IV, Section 6 of the Michigan State Constitution: “Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.” A number of objective mathematical measures have been developed by social scientists and mathematicians to determine if an existing or proposed redistricting map disadvantages one political party relative to the other. Using these measures, we can compare an existing or proposed redistricting map to a large set of other possible maps to determine if the proposed map exhibits more or less political bias. The maps used for comparative purposes can be previous redistricting maps used in the state, or the redistricting maps of other states, or they can be computer simulated maps.

I proposed incorporating three measures of partisan fairness measures into the redistricting software used by the MICRC to draw redistricting maps. The reasons for my choice were as follows:

- The measures are easy to understand and straightforward to calculate. They produce scores that indicate both the direction and the magnitude of any political bias in the redistricting map.
- Because I easily calculated the scores for each of these measures in excel, I knew it would be possible to incorporate an automated report function into the redistricting software that could provide these scores for any draft plans drawn.
- Although these three measures have only recently been developed, they have all have been introduced and accepted by federal and state courts as useful tools for determining if a redistricting map is politically fair.

The three partisan fairness measures I selected are the lopsided margins test, the mean-median difference, and the efficiency gap.

In addition to these three measures, a simple metric for indicating whether a redistricting plan is fair is to compare the proportion of the statewide vote each party receives to the proportion of the districts each party wins or is likely to win under the proposed plan. The proportionality of a redistricting plan is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the party from the percentage of seats that party won (or would win) in congressional and state

legislative elections. So, for example, if Party A won 52.3% of the vote statewide but only won 44.7% of the seats in the state senate, the proportionality bias would be  $44.7 - 52.3$  or  $-7.6$  in favor of Party B.

Each of these measures use historical election results to evaluate the partisan fairness of redistricting plans. However, in the case of proposed districts, previous election results must be reconfigured to conform to the proposed district boundaries to evaluate the partisan fairness of the proposed plans.<sup>25</sup> A composite election index was constructed using the statewide general elections between 2012 and 2020 – all 13 of the election contests included in the GIS redistricting database and analyzed in the racial bloc voting analysis. The composite index was weighted to give each election cycle equal weight in the index. However, the partisan fairness report function in the redistricting software was designed so that any of the individual 13 elections could be substituted for the composite index in calculating the partisan fairness scores.

### **A. Lopsided Margins Test**

In a perfectly fair plan – at least in a state in which the two political parties are competitive (closely divided) – we would expect a mix of districts, some strongly partisan districts, some moderately reliable districts, and some tossups – but each party would have a roughly similar mix. If one party has a smaller number of victories with larger margins of victory than the other party, this is an indication that one party is being disfavored over the other in the map. This pattern of outcomes can be quantified by sorting the districts into two groups, by winning party. Each party's winning vote share can then be compared to see if one party has significantly higher margin of victories than the other.<sup>26</sup> The following is an example of how this is calculated:

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<sup>25</sup> Both the efficiency gap and the mean-median difference have been used to evaluate computer simulated alternative redistricting maps for comparative purposes in partisan gerrymandering challenges. Election results for select statewide elections were reconfigured to determine how the candidates in these elections would have fared in the alternative districts.

<sup>26</sup> This measure was first discussed in Sam Wang, “Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering,” *Stanford Law Journal*, 16, June 2016. Available at: <https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/three-tests-for-practical-evaluation-of-partisan-gerrymandering/>

District	Party A	Party B	Total Votes	Percent of Votes		Party Wins	
				Party A	Party B	Party A	Party B
1	279	120	399	69.9%	30.1%	69.9%	
2	172	198	370	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
3	167	192	359	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
4	148	212	360	41.1%	58.9%		58.9%
5	185	180	365	50.7%	49.3%	50.7%	
6	139	193	332	41.9%	58.1%		58.1%
7	169	201	370	45.7%	54.3%		54.3%
8	179	206	385	46.5%	53.5%		53.5%
9	234	99	333	70.3%	29.7%	70.3%	
10	178	199	377	47.2%	52.8%		52.8%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1850</b>	<b>1800</b>	<b>3650</b>	<b>50.7%</b>	<b>49.3%</b>	<b>63.6%</b>	<b>54.9%</b>

Party A in the example is winning districts with a much higher average vote (63.6%) than Party B (54.9%) – and the difference between the two percentages is 8.7 (63.6 – 54.9). This indicates that Party A supporters are packed into a few districts that it wins by large margins. Party B, on the other hand, is winning substantially more districts with substantially lower vote margins.

## B. Mean-Median Difference

Comparing a dataset’s mean and median is a common statistical analysis used to assess how skewed the dataset is – if the dataset is balanced, the mean will be very close in value to its median. As a dataset becomes more skewed, the mean and median begin to diverge; looking at the difference between the two can be used determine the extent to which the data is skewed.

Based on this principle, the mean-median district vote share difference compares a party’s mean district vote share to its median district vote share:<sup>27</sup>

- Mean = average party vote share across all districts
- Median = party vote share in the median district when districts are sorted on share of party vote

<sup>27</sup> This approach to ascertaining political bias in redistricting maps was proposed by Michael D. McDonald and Robin Best in “Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases,” *Election Law Journal* 14(4), 2015 (available at: <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2015.0358>). It was further quantified by Wang (see full citation above).

The difference between the mean and median vote shares provides a measure of whether the redistricting map produces skewed election results. The following is an example of how this is calculated:

Party A	Percentages
	41.1%
	41.9%
	45.7%
	46.5%
	46.5%
	46.5%
	47.2%
	50.7%
	69.9%
	70.3%
District median percentage	46.5%
Statewide mean percentage	50.7%
Mean-Median Difference	4.2%

In this example, Party A received 50.7% of the statewide vote. Party A’s median vote share (46.5%) is 4.2% lower than its mean vote share of 50.7%. This indicates that Party A must win more districts than Party B to win half of the seats – the redistricting map is skewed in favor of Party B. In fact, Party A would have had to win 54.2% ( $50.0 + 4.2$ ) of the statewide vote to win 50% of the seats.

### C. Efficiency Gap

This measure, introduced by University of Chicago law professor Nick Stephanopoulos and Public Policy Institute of California research fellow Eric McGhee, looks at the number of “wasted votes” across districts.<sup>28</sup>

In any election, nearly 50 percent of votes are wasted: all votes cast for a losing candidate, and any votes cast for a winning candidate beyond the threshold needed to win (50 percent in a two-candidate contest). In a hypothetical map with perfect partisan symmetry, both

<sup>28</sup> Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap,” *University of Chicago Law Review*: Vol. 82 (2), 2015. Available at: <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol82/iss2/4>.

parties would waste the same number of votes. A large difference between the parties' wasted votes indicates one party is treated more favorably than the other by the redistricting map. This is because the plan packs and cracks one party's supporters more than the other party's supporters.

The efficiency gap is calculated by taking one party's total wasted votes in an election, subtracting the other party's total wasted votes, and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. It captures in a single number the extent to which district lines waste the two parties votes unequally.

$$\text{Efficiency Gap} = \frac{[\text{Party A wasted votes}] - [\text{Party B wasted votes}]}{\text{total number of votes cast statewide}}$$

Example:

District	Party A	Party B	Total Votes	Lost Votes		minimum to win	Surplus Votes		Total Wasted Votes	
				Party A	Party B		Party A	Party B	Party A	Party B
1	279	120	399	0	120	200	79	0	79	120
2	172	198	370	172	0	185	0	13	172	13
3	167	192	359	167	0	180	0	12	167	12
4	148	212	360	148	0	180	0	32	148	32
5	185	180	365	0	180	183	2	0	2	180
6	139	193	332	139	0	166	0	27	139	27
7	169	201	370	169	0	185	0	16	169	16
8	179	206	385	179	0	193	0	13	179	13
9	234	99	333	0	99	167	67	0	67	99
10	178	199	377	178	0	189	0	10	178	10
TOTAL	1850	1800	3650	1152	399		148	123	1300	522

In this example, supporters of Party A cast 1152 votes for losing candidates and 148 surplus votes – votes beyond what was necessary to elect Party A candidates. Supporters of Party B, on the other hand, cast only 399 of their votes for losing candidates and 522 surplus votes. Adding together these two sets of votes, Party A had a total of 1300 wasted votes; Party B had a total of only 522 votes. The efficiency gap is therefore calculated as 21.3% ( $(1300-522)/3650 = 778/3650 = .213$ ). This efficiency gap in favor of Party B can be interpreted as the percentage of seats Party B won above what would be expected in a politically fair or neutral map.

#### D. Court Acceptance of these Measures

These three measures have all been developed within the last decade and therefore do not have a long history of consideration by the courts. However, they have been introduced recently

in the context of partisan gerrymandering challenges. While recognizing each of the measures have some disadvantages, the courts in each instance relied on these measures (in addition to other measures introduced) to find the plans before them were politically biased towards one of the political parties at the expense of the other.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Examples of court cases relying on at least one of the measures of political fairness described in this report include: *League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson*, in which the federal court held the congressional and state legislative plans in Michigan to be an unconstitutional gerrymander; *Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Householder*, which held the Ohio congressional map to be an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; *League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* in which the State Supreme Court held the Pennsylvania congressional districts to be in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution; *Whitford v. Gill* in which the federal court determined the Wisconsin state assembly districts were unconstitutional; *Common Cause v. Rucho* in which the federal court found the North Carolina congressional district plan adopted in 2016 was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. This North Carolina decision, along with the Maryland case, *Lamone v. Benisek*, was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on unrelated grounds, but grounds that served to moot all of the federal decisions discussed above. However, in a separate challenge before the North Carolina Superior Court, *Common Cause v. Lewis*, the court held that the state legislative districts violated the North Carolina State Constitution.



## **APPENDIX A**

Statewide				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>											
<b>U.S. President</b>											
Barack Obama	D	AA	54.2%	98.6	106.5	99.2	97.8	44.0	42.7	43.3	44.5
Mitt Romney	R	W	44.7%	1.2	-6.6	0.4	1.2	54.8	55.9	55.3	54.6
others				0.2	0.2	1.1	1.1	1.3	13.8	1.2	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>62.1</i>	<i>57.3</i>	<i>59.1</i>	<i>59.1</i>	<i>69.2</i>	<i>66.1</i>	<i>68.1</i>	<i>68.1</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	58.8%	97.3	103.8	99.2	96.8	50.1	49.4	49.1	50.6
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	38.0%	1.2	-5.3	0.5	1.1	46.5	46.9	46.9	46.2
others				1.5	1.5	1.7	2.0	3.4	3.7	3.6	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>61.6</i>	<i>56.9</i>	<i>58.8</i>	<i>58.8</i>	<i>68.0</i>	<i>64.9</i>	<i>66.9</i>	<i>66.9</i>
<b>2014 General</b>											
<b>Governor</b>											
Mark Schauer	D	W	46.9%	94.4	101.3	97.4	95.7	38.7	37.1	36.2	38.4
Rick Snyder	R	W	50.9%	4.8	-2.2	2.1	2.5	58.9	60.2	61.3	59.4
others				0.8	0.8	1.4	1.8	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>36.9</i>	<i>31.6</i>	<i>35.1</i>	<i>35.1</i>	<i>49.6</i>	<i>46.7</i>	<i>49.1</i>	<i>49.1</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>											
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	42.9%	94.4	102.0	97.6	95.8	33.8	31.9	31.3	33.5
Ruth Johnson	R	W	53.5%	4.2	-3.3	1.5	2.1	62.3	63.9	64.7	62.9
others				1.4	1.3	1.2	2.1	3.9	4.3	4.0	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>36.5</i>	<i>31.3</i>	<i>34.8</i>	<i>34.8</i>	<i>48.3</i>	<i>45.4</i>	<i>47.8</i>	<i>47.8</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>											
Mark Totten	D	W	44.2%	93.3	101.3	97.0	95.2	34.7	32.8	33.0	35.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	52.1%	5.2	-2.9	2.1	2.5	61.3	62.8	62.9	61.2
others				1.5	1.6	1.2	2.2	4.0	4.4	4.1	3.8
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>36.4</i>	<i>31.2</i>	<i>34.6</i>	<i>34.6</i>	<i>48.3</i>	<i>45.5</i>	<i>47.8</i>	<i>47.8</i>

Statewide				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Gary Peters	D	W	54.6%	96.8	103.9	99.1	96.5	46.2	44.8	45.1	47.3
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	41.3%	2.0	-5.0	0.5	1.6	49.4	50.3	50.2	48.5
others				1.2	1.1	1.0	2.0	4.5	4.8	4.6	4.2
<i>votes for office</i>				36.8	31.5	35.0	35.0	48.9	46.1	48.5	48.5
<b>2016 General</b>											
<b>U.S. President</b>											
Hillary Clinton	D	W	47.3%	96.8	106.3	98.9	97.3	33.6	30.2	32.0	34.3
Donald Trump	R	W	47.5%	2.0	-7.4	0.3	1.1	61.0	63.9	61.6	60.0
others				1.2	1.2	0.8	1.6	5.4	6.0	6.2	5.7
<i>votes for office</i>				58.9	53.6	54.1	54.1	68.2	65.8	67.2	67.2
<b>2018 General</b>											
<b>Governor</b>											
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	53.3%	95.6	104.3	98.6	95.3	41.1	38.9	40.6	44.8
Schuetz/Lyons	R	W/W	43.8%	2.5	-6.4	0.6	1.8	56.0	57.9	56.2	52.8
others				1.9	2.1	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.2	2.9	2.5
<i>votes for office</i>				36.6	31.6	35.2	35.2	61.9	61.7	63.3	63.3
<b>Secretary of State</b>											
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	52.9%	95.7	104.7	98.7	95.6	40.1	38.0	39.9	43.9
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	44.0%	2.4	-6.6	0.6	1.8	56.5	58.3	56.4	53.1
others				1.9	1.9	1.7	2.7	3.4	3.7	3.5	2.9
<i>votes for office</i>				36.4	31.6	35.1	35.1	60.9	60.7	62.2	62.2
<b>Attorney General</b>											
Dana Nessel	D	W	49.0%	94.1	103.3	97.7	94.4	36.1	33.6	35.3	39.4
Tom Leonard	R	W	46.3%	2.4	-6.9	0.5	1.7	59.0	61.1	59.3	55.9
others				3.5	3.6	3.0	3.9	4.9	5.3	5.2	45.9
<i>votes for office</i>				36.0	31.2	34.6	34.6	60.4	60.1	61.7	61.7

Statewide				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	52.3%	93.9	102.5	97.5	94.3	40.3	38.1	39.5	43.7
John James	R	AA	45.8%	3.8	-5.1	1.1	2.0	57.8	59.9	58.4	55.1
others				2.3	2.5	2.4	3.7	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>36.5</i>	<i>31.5</i>	<i>35.0</i>	<i>35.0</i>	<i>61.8</i>	<i>61.6</i>	<i>63.1</i>	<i>63.1</i>
<b>2020 General</b>											
<b>U.S. President</b>											
Joseph Biden	D	W	50.6%	95.4	105.0	98.4	96.2	37.0	34.7	36.9	40.0
Donald Trump	R	W	47.8%	3.8	-5.4	1.1	1.9	61.5	63.6	61.2	59.1
others				0.8	0.8	1.3	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>61.2</i>	<i>53.3</i>	<i>55.2</i>	<i>55.2</i>	<i>79.1</i>	<i>77.7</i>	<i>79.0</i>	<i>79.0</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>											
Gary Peters	D	W	49.9%	93.4	102.3	97.2	93.9	36.9	34.8	36.4	39.4
John James	R	AA	48.2%	3.8	-5.6	1.1	1.7	61.5	63.5	61.7	59.8
others				2.7	3.1	3.7	4.4	1.6	1.6	1.4	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>59.9</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>55.0</i>	<i>55.0</i>	<i>78.3</i>	<i>76.8</i>	<i>78.1</i>	<i>78.1</i>

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	99.0	107.0	99.5	97.6	52.9	52.7	52.8	53.7
Mitt Romney	R	W	0.7	-6.7	0.5	1.3	46.1	46.0	46.0	45.5
others			0.2	0.3	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.3	0.9	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>64.1</i>	<i>57.4</i>	<i>61.0</i>	<i>61.0</i>	<i>70.1</i>	<i>65.1</i>	<i>68.4</i>	<i>68.4</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.8	103.9	99.7	96.7	59.7	59.8	59.4	60.2
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	0.9	-5.3	0.5	1.3	36.7	36.3	36.5	35.2
others			1.3	1.3	1.1	2.0	3.6	3.9	3.8	32.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>63.7</i>	<i>57.3</i>	<i>60.7</i>	<i>60.7</i>	<i>69.2</i>	<i>64.4</i>	<i>67.5</i>	<i>67.5</i>
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	97.1	104.2	99.3	95.8	50.7	50.5	49.5	51.8
Rick Snyder	R	W	2.0	-5.0	0.6	2.3	46.5	46.5	47.5	45.8
others			0.9	0.9	1.1	1.9	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.4
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>37.6</i>	<i>31.4</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>48.8</i>	<i>44.6</i>	<i>47.5</i>	<i>67.5</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	96.1	104.3	99.0	95.6	45.3	45.8	44.2	46.2
Ruth Johnson	R	W	2.6	-5.3	0.3	2.2	50.7	50.5	51.5	50.2
others			1.3	1.1	1.1	2.2	4.1	4.3	4.1	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>37.4</i>	<i>31.5</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>47.4</i>	<i>43.3</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	95.2	103.4	98.7	95.6	44.2	43.9	43.3	45.2
Bill Schuette	R	W	3.7	-4.4	0.8	2.4	52.6	52.6	53.3	51.9
others			1.1	1.1	0.9	2.0	3.3	3.5	3.3	2.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>37.3</i>	<i>31.4</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>46.8</i>	<i>42.8</i>	<i>45.5</i>	<i>45.5</i>

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	97.2	103.9	99.5	95.6	57.0	57.0	56.4	58.6
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	1.7	-4.8	0.6	2.2	38.7	38.3	39.0	37.5
others			1.2	0.9	0.8	2.2	4.3	4.6	4.4	3.9
<i>votes for office</i>			37.6	31.5	36.1	36.1	48.3	44.3	47.1	47.1
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	97.5	106.0	99.5	96.4	37.8	34.5	35.3	37.4
Donald Trump	R	W	1.5	-7.0	0.4	1.7	57.0	59.4	58.5	57.1
others			1.0	1.1	1.0	1.9	5.2	6.1	6.1	5.5
<i>votes for office</i>			70.6	59.8	59.0	59.0	70.9	63.5	67.3	67.3
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	96.2	103.6	99.2	95.3	46.7	45.5	45.8	46.2
Schuetz/Lyons	R	W/W	2.2	-5.5	0.2	2.0	50.5	50.9	50.5	50.8
others			1.6	1.9	1.7	2.7	2.8	3.6	3.2	3.0
<i>votes for office</i>			54.2	43.5	45.1	45.1	62.6	57.0	59.8	59.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	96.5	103.7	99.2	95.2	45.7	44.7	44.9	48.0
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	2.0	-5.8	0.3	2.0	50.9	51.2	50.8	48.7
others			1.5	2.1	1.4	2.8	3.4	4.2	3.7	3.4
<i>votes for office</i>			53.9	43.5	44.9	44.9	61.3	55.7	58.6	58.6
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	94.5	102.3	98.6	94.1	39.9	37.6	37.9	41.1
Tom Leonard	R	W	2.3	-5.8	0.6	2.0	55.3	56.3	55.9	53.7
others			3.2	3.5	3.8	3.9	47.7	6.0	5.1	5.1
<i>votes for office</i>			53.7	43.2	44.6	44.6	61.0	55.6	58.4	58.4

County: Genesee			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	95.3	103.2	98.9	95.2	43.8	42.6	42.8	45.8
John James	R	AA	3.0	-5.3	0.7	2.1	54.3	54.8	54.6	52.6
others			1.7	2.2	1.7	2.8	1.9	2.6	1.8	1.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>54.2</i>	<i>43.8</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>62.4</i>	<i>56.8</i>	<i>59.6</i>	<i>59.6</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	96.5	104.4	99.3	96.1	39.9	37.7	38.6	42.1
Donald Trump	R	W	3.0	-5.1	0.5	2.1	58.7	60.5	59.6	56.7
others			0.5	0.7	0.9	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>67.3</i>	<i>54.8</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>53.0</i>	<i>81.5</i>	<i>75.4</i>	<i>79.6</i>	<i>79.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	95.1	103.0	98.9	95.0	41.1	39.7	40.1	43.5
John James	R	AA	3.2	-5.3	0.7	1.8	57.4	58.4	57.6	55.5
others			1.7	2.1	2.7	3.2	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>67.1</i>	<i>54.8</i>	<i>56.6</i>	<i>56.6</i>	<i>80.6</i>	<i>74.4</i>	<i>78.7</i>	<i>78.7</i>

County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA		114.3	99.5	95.7	41.6	39.2	41.1	42.9
Mitt Romney	R	W		-14.8	0.4	2.5	57.0	59.1	57.1	55.9
others				0.2	0.6	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				56.7	56.2	56.2	71.4	69.5	70.3	70.3
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W		111.0	99.5	95.4	51.0	49.0	50.1	52.3
Peter Hoekstra	R	W		-11.6	0.7	2.2	46.0	47.6	46.3	44.9
others				0.7	0.0	2.4	2.9	3.3	3.3	2.8
<i>votes for office</i>				56.3	55.7	55.7	69.9	67.7	68.7	68.7
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W		11.2	99.6	94.1	41.1	38.4	39.1	42.2
Rick Snyder	R	W		-12.3	0.5	3.0	56.3	58.9	58.1	55.7
others				1.0	0.7	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				31.1	32.7	32.7	51.5	49.9	50.8	50.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA		111.3	99.2	94.4	35.3	32.6	33.5	36.3
Ruth Johnson	R	W		-12.5	0.5	2.8	60.5	63.0	62.0	59.9
others				1.1	0.9	2.8	4.2	4.5	4.4	3.8
<i>votes for office</i>				31.4	32.6	32.6	49.9	48.4	49.2	49.2
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W		110.7	98.6	94.1	32.1	28.9	29.8	32.6
Bill Schuette	R	W		-12.1	0.5	2.9	65.2	68.2	67.2	65.1
others				1.3	1.1	3.0	2.7	3.0	2.9	23.3
<i>votes for office</i>				31.0	32.4	32.4	50.8	49.3	50.1	50.1



County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W		110.3	99.5	94.1	48.3	46.7	47.6	50.6
Terry Lynn Land	R	W		-10.6	0.7	3.0	47.8	49.2	47.9	45.8
others				0.5	0.4	2.9	3.9	4.3	4.2	3.5
<i>votes for office</i>				31.2	32.7	32.7	50.8	49.2	50.1	50.1
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W		116.7	99.6	95.0		25.1	28.1	30.6
Donald Trump	R	W		-17.2	0.5	2.5		69.0	66.1	64.0
others				0.4	0.0	2.5		5.8	5.6	5.4
<i>votes for office</i>				55.5	52.3	52.3		69.0	70.2	70.2
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA		112.4	99.4	93.6		34.8	36.4	40.9
Schuetz/Lyons	R	W/W		-14.2	0.6	2.9		62.4	60.3	56.9
others				1.8	1.6	3.5		2.8	2.5	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>				38.9	37.7	37.7		61.5	63.0	63.0
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W		113.3	99.6	93.7		33.6	35.4	39.2
Mary Treder Lang	R	W		-14.9	0.6	3.2		62.8	60.6	57.7
others				3.5	1.2	3.1		3.6	3.3	3.0
<i>votes for office</i>				39.7	38.0	38.0		60.0	61.4	61.4
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W		112.5	99.0	93.4		27.6	29.0	33.3
Tom Leonard	R	W		-15.5	0.5	2.6		66.8	64.6	61.7
others				3.0	2.1	4.0		5.6	5.5	5.0
<i>votes for office</i>				38.7	37.6	37.6		59.7	61.0	61.0

County: Saginaw			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W		110.6	99.3	93.5		33.7	34.6	39.3
John James	R	AA		-13.0	0.8	2.9		64.5	63.0	59.6
others				2.4	2.2	3.6		1.8	1.8	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>				39.2	37.8	37.8		61.5	62.8	62.8
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W		114.2	99.0	95.3		29.3	32.0	36.3
Donald Trump	R	W		-14.9	0.6	2.7		69.0	66.2	62.6
others				0.6	1.1	2.0		1.6	1.5	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>				50.7	48.6	48.6		78.3	79.6	79.6
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W		112.5	99.5	93.8		31.1	33.1	37.5
John James	R	AA		-14.7	0.6	3.0		67.3	65.0	61.6
others				2.1	2.8	3.2		1.5	1.2	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>				50.7	48.4	48.4		77.2	78.7	78.7

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	98.2	111.7	99.4	95.7	43.9	39.5	40.7	42.1
Mitt Romney	R	W	1.6	-11.8	0.5	2.3	55.0	59.4	58.1	57.2
others			0.3	0.2	1.7	2.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.6
<i>votes for office</i>			78.9	69.2	68.9	68.2	75.7	74.8	75.7	75.7
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.3	110.5	99.1	95.8	48.4	44.5	45.7	47.6
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	1.6	-11.4	0.0	1.9	47.9	51.8	50.3	49.2
others			1.1	0.9	0.8	2.3	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>			78.3	69.2	67.8	67.8	74.0	73.0	74.0	74.0
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	94.5	108.9	99.1	94.8	33.9	27.9	28.2	30.6
Rick Snyder	R	W	5.0	-9.5	0.8	2.8	64.1	70.1	69.8	68.1
others			0.5	1.9	1.0	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			51.5	44.4	46.3	46.3	54.5	53.6	54.6	54.6
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	93.3	109.7	99.1	94.6	29.1	23.5	24.3	26.4
Ruth Johnson	R	W	5.4	-9.5	0.4	2.7	67.9	73.5	72.7	71.4
others			1.3	1.9	1.2	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>			51.1	44.4	45.9	45.9	53.2	52.1	53.1	53.1
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	93.0	107.5	98.8	94.1	35.0	30.1	30.3	32.9
Bill Schuette	R	W	5.6	-8.8	0.8	3.0	61.3	66.2	65.9	64.0
others			1.4	1.3	1.5	2.9	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.1
<i>votes for office</i>			51.1	44.2	45.8	45.8	52.7	51.7	52.6	52.6

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	96.8	110.6	99.4	95.0	46.9	43.0	44.0	46.7
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	2.0	-10.9	0.0	2.4	48.7	52.6	51.5	49.7
others			1.2	0.3	0.5	2.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			51.5	44.7	46.5	46.5	53.7	53.7	53.7	53.7
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	95.2	108.8	99.4	95.1	36.0	34.2	34.3	39.1
Donald Trump	R	W	3.4	-9.7	0.8	2.4	58.6	59.8	59.6	55.8
others			1.4	0.7	0.1	2.5	5.4	6.0	6.0	5.1
<i>votes for office</i>			73.0	61.1	65.6	65.6	74.6	72.4	73.5	73.5
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	95.3	107.6	99.3	94.1	44.2	42.4	42.2	47.4
Schuetz/Lyons	R	W/W	3.5	-9.0	0.7	2.7	53.3	55.0	54.6	50.7
others			1.2	1.3	1.4	3.3	2.5	2.6	2.6	1.9
<i>votes for office</i>			62.5	51.6	53.2	53.2	69.6	68.2	68.8	68.8
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	95.2	108.1	99.1	94.2	44.3	42.4	42.3	47.5
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	3.4	-9.4	0.7	2.7	53.0	54.7	54.5	50.5
others			1.4	1.3	1.3	3.1	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			62.1	51.5	53.1	53.1	68.7	67.1	67.7	67.7
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	93.8	107.3	99.2	93.8	40.2	37.9	37.5	43.0
Tom Leonard	R	W	3.5	-9.7	0.6	2.6	55.4	96.8	57.5	53.0
others			2.7	2.4	2.0	3.6	4.4	0.5	4.4	4.0
<i>votes for office</i>			61.4	50.7	52.5	52.5	67.9	66.4	67.0	67.0

County: Oakland			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	93.8	106.5	98.7	93.0	42.7	41.1	40.9	45.5
John James	R	AA	4.8	-8.4	0.8	2.8	55.9	57.5	57.5	53.6
others			1.5	1.7	1.6	4.2	1.4	1.4	1.5	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>62.5</i>	<i>51.5</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>69.5</i>	<i>68.1</i>	<i>68.7</i>	<i>68.7</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	94.2	105.1	99.0	93.4	42.0	41.6	41.2	45.9
Donald Trump	R	W	5.3	-5.7	1.3	3.6	56.4	56.8	57.2	53.1
others			0.6	1.6	1.7	3.0	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>76.1</i>	<i>64.6</i>	<i>71.6</i>	<i>71.6</i>	<i>85.7</i>	<i>84.9</i>	<i>86.4</i>	<i>86.4</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	93.1	104.5	98.8	92.1	40.7	39.9	39.4	43.5
John James	R	AA	5.2	-6.7	0.8	2.9	57.9	58.9	59.3	55.7
others			1.8	2.2	2.2	5.0	1.4	1.2	1.2	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>75.7</i>	<i>64.7</i>	<i>71.4</i>	<i>71.4</i>	<i>84.8</i>	<i>84.1</i>	<i>85.4</i>	<i>85.4</i>

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2012 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Barack Obama	D	AA	98.6	102.2	99.5	99.0	51.1	51.2	51.1	51.9
Mitt Romney	R	W	1.2	-2.4	0.5	0.6	48.0	47.8	47.7	47.3
others			0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>61.3</i>	<i>58.3</i>	<i>60.4</i>	<i>60.4</i>	<i>68.9</i>	<i>63.4</i>	<i>65.7</i>	<i>65.7</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.3	100.2	98.9	98.1	56.8	57.2	56.6	57.6
Peter Hoekstra	R	W	1.2	-1.6	0.4	0.6	39.6	38.8	39.1	38.6
others			1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3	3.6	4.0	4.0	3.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>60.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>59.9</i>	<i>59.9</i>	<i>67.6</i>	<i>62.1</i>	<i>64.4</i>	<i>64.4</i>
<b>2014 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Mark Schauer	D	W	94.2	97.8	96.4	96.5	41.1	41.2	39.2	41.3
Rick Snyder	R	W	5.0	1.4	2.9	2.6	56.9	56.3	58.4	56.6
others			0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	2.0	2.5	2.3	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>36.3</i>	<i>33.0</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>35.8</i>	<i>50.7</i>	<i>44.1</i>	<i>47.7</i>	<i>47.7</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Godfrey Dillard	D	AA	94.3	98.4	96.7	96.8	36.8	36.6	35.0	36.8
Ruth Johnson	R	W	4.3	0.3	2.1	1.9	59.7	59.2	61.2	59.6
others			1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	3.4	4.1	3.8	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>35.9</i>	<i>32.7</i>	<i>35.5</i>	<i>35.5</i>	<i>49.0</i>	<i>42.5</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Mark Totten	D	W	93.2	97.0	95.5	95.7	41.0	40.7	39.1	41.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	5.3	1.5	3.2	2.9	55.4	54.9	56.8	55.1
others			1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	3.7	4.4	4.1	3.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>35.7</i>	<i>32.5</i>	<i>35.3</i>	<i>35.3</i>	<i>48.8</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>45.9</i>

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	96.8	100.0	98.5	98.0	52.8	52.7	51.4	53.4
Terry Lynn Land	R	W	2.0	-1.1	0.6	1.0	42.7	42.0	43.4	41.8
others			1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	4.5	5.3	5.0	4.7
<i>votes for office</i>			36.2	32.9	35.7	35.7	49.8	43.2	46.8	46.8
<b>2016 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Hillary Clinton	D	W	96.8	101.0	99.0	98.4	47.1	39.1	38.2	39.7
Donald Trump	R	W	2.0	-2.1	0.6	0.7	47.8	54.8	55.4	54.4
others			1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	5.1	6.1	6.0	5.9
<i>votes for office</i>			57.7	55.7	57.0	57.0	72.2	61.6	64.0	64.0
<b>2018 General</b>										
<b>Governor</b>										
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	95.6	99.0	97.6	97.0	53.4	49.7	47.9	53.5
Schuetz/Lyons	R	W/W	2.5	-1.0	0.9	1.1	44.6	47.3	49.1	44.0
others			2.0	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.0	3.0	2.8	2.5
<i>votes for office</i>			33.9	30.9	33.2	33.2	67.2	59.8	63.2	63.2
<b>Secretary of State</b>										
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	95.7	99.0	97.7	97.0	53.1	50.0	49.1	53.6
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	2.4	-1.0	1.0	1.1	44.7	46.8	48.5	43.6
others			2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.2	3.2	3.2	2.8
<i>votes for office</i>			33.7	30.8	33.1	33.1	66.2	58.8	62.2	62.2
<b>Attorney General</b>										
Dana Nessel	D	W	94.1	97.7	96.3	95.5	49.6	45.6	43.6	49.4
Tom Leonard	R	W	2.4	-1.3	0.8	1.0	47.2	49.9	51.8	46.6
others			3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.3	44.9	4.3	4.1
<i>votes for office</i>			33.3	30.4	32.7	32.7	65.4	58.0	61.3	61.3

County: Wayne			Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	93.8	97.1	95.9	95.8	52.4	48.9	47.1	52.3
John James	R	AA	3.8	0.4	1.9	1.5	46.5	49.4	52.2	46.5
others			2.4	2.5	2.4	2.7	1.1	1.7	1.4	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>33.7</i>	<i>30.8</i>	<i>33.1</i>	<i>33.1</i>	<i>67.2</i>	<i>59.6</i>	<i>63.1</i>	<i>63.1</i>
<b>2020 General</b>										
<b>U.S. President</b>										
Joseph Biden	D	W	95.4	99.0	97.9	97.5	53.3	45.9	44.5	47.5
Donald Trump	R	W	3.8	0.2	1.6	1.5	45.4	52.6	53.9	51.3
others			0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.3	0.8	1.5	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>59.2</i>	<i>55.6</i>	<i>58.0</i>	<i>58.0</i>	<i>81.3</i>	<i>74.1</i>	<i>76.6</i>	<i>76.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>										
Gary Peters	D	W	93.3	96.0	95.3	95.2	51.7	46.6	44.4	47.2
John James	R	AA	3.8	0.3	1.7	1.6	47.0	52.1	53.7	51.5
others			2.8	3.0	2.9	3.2	1.3	1.9	1.8	1.4
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>58.9</i>	<i>55.3</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>80.6</i>	<i>73.0</i>	<i>75.6</i>	<i>75.6</i>



2018 Democratic Primary for Governor				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>STATEWIDE</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	30.2%	21.0	24.2	23.5	26.0	25.7	27.1	30.2	28.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	17.7%	42.5	44.2	42.2	39.0	15.8	12.9	10.8	9.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.0%	36.5	31.6	33.5	35.0	58.6	60.0	59.4	62.0
<i>votes for office</i>				23.0	22.5	24.5	24.5	13.9	12.0	14.0	14.0
<b>Genesee</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	22.9%	16.5	18.6	17.9	21.0	22.3	24.8	24.2	23.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	23.6%	46.0	49.9	47.2	43.4	15.7	13.6	13.3	11.5
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	53.4%	37.5	31.6	34.5	35.7	62.0	61.6	61.9	65.1
<i>votes for office</i>				26.9	23.4	25.9	25.9	15.5	13.3	14.8	14.8
<b>Saginaw</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	22.2%		18.9	17.5	21.0		21.9	23.6	21.0
Shri Thanedar	D	A	24.7%		51.5	51.1	44.7		16.8	14.7	14.5
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	53.1%		29.6	31.3	34.4		61.4	61.8	64.5
<i>votes for office</i>					19.7	20.7	20.7		12.4	13.2	13.2
<b>Oakland</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	32.5%	23.2	24.1	23.2	25.3	29.8	34.2	36.0	34.9
Shri Thanedar	D	A	13.4%	32.7	38.5	37.5	34.7	8.4	4.3	4.3	3.0
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	54.1%	44.1	37.5	39.0	40.0	61.8	61.4	61.0	62.1
<i>votes for office</i>				31.4	33.3	35.0	35.0	20.8	16.1	18.2	18.2
<b>Wayne</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	32.0%	21.2	20.8	21.0	22.2	43.4	41.3	41.3	41.6
Shri Thanedar	D	A	24.3%	42.8	45.6	43.8	42.5	7.5	4.8	5.4	3.9
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	43.7%	36.1	33.7	34.8	35.3	49.2	53.9	54.0	54.5
<i>votes for office</i>				22.4	21.1	23.5	23.5	19.3	16.0	17.4	17.4

## **APPENDIX B**

Congressional District General Elections				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>Congressional District 5</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Daniel Kildee	D	W	59.5%	96.2	104.4	99.1	95.0	48.4	46.5	47.5	50.5
Travis Wines	R	W	35.9%	1.3	-7.8	0.2	1.7	47.0	48.3	46.9	44.9
others				2.5	3.3	3.2	3.3	4.6	5.2	4.9	4.7
<i>votes for office</i>				53.8	42.7	43.8	43.8	59.2	56.5	58.3	58.3
<b>2020 General</b>											
Daniel Kildee	D	W	54.5%	95.4	105.2	99.0	95.0	41.6	39.6	41.0	44.2
Tim Kelly	R	W	41.8%	2.1	-8.4	0.6	1.6	54.8	56.3	54.4	52.3
others				2.6	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.6	4.1	3.9	3.5
<i>votes for office</i>				67.1	54.5	54.5	54.5	76.6	73.8	76.0	76.0
<b>Congressional District 9</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Andy Levin	D	W	59.7%		95.2	98.2	71.5		50.2	48.9	55.7
Candius Stearns	R	W	36.8%		-3.5	0.3	62.9		47.5	47.4	43.2
others					8.4	9.4	22.2		2.4	2.3	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>					17.9	17.5	17.5		66.2	66.4	66.4
<b>2020 General</b>											
Andy Levin	D	W	57.7%		92.6	96.6	74.7		48.3	45.9	52.0
Charles Langworthy	R	W	38.4%		-0.6	0.5	5.6		48.8	50.0	46.7
others					7.9	8.1	19.7		3.0	2.7	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>					37.9	27.6	27.6		80.2	82.7	82.7
<b>Congressional District 12</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Debbie Dingell	D	W	68.1%		91.9	97.3	75.5		58.4	57.5	63.3
Jeff Jones	R	W	28.9%		3.1	1.8	9.8		38.6	38.9	35.6
others					5.0	4.4	14.7		3.0	3.0	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>					33.4	37.1	37.1		58.9	62.4	62.4

Congressional District General Elections				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2020 General</b>											
Debbie Dingell	D	W	66.4%		91.2	95.9	75.3		56.4	55.3	58.7
Jeff Jones	R	W	30.7%		4.2	2.7	11.4		40.6	41.6	40.0
others					4.3	4.2	13.2		3.0	3.2	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>					<i>50.3</i>	<i>58.2</i>	<i>58.2</i>		<i>73.8</i>	<i>75.0</i>	<i>75.0</i>
<b>Congressional District 13</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Rashida Tlaib	D	ME	84.2%	93.4	95.5	94.9	95.2		64.2	64.5	65.6
others				6.6	4.5	5.4	4.8		35.7	35.7	34.4
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>32.5</i>	<i>32.3</i>	<i>34.7</i>	<i>34.7</i>		<i>39.1</i>	<i>41.3</i>	<i>41.3</i>
<b>2020 General</b>											
Rashida Tlaib	D	ME	78.1%	94.6	97.8	96.5	96.1		46.5	47.0	46.9
David Dudenhoefer	R	W	18.7%	2.7	-0.4	1.1	1.2		49.2	48.7	49.0
others				2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7		4.4	4.2	4.1
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>587.0</i>	<i>57.5</i>	<i>60.0</i>	<i>60.0</i>		<i>59.0</i>	<i>61.1</i>	<i>61.1</i>
<b>Congressional District 14</b>											
<b>2018 General</b>											
Brenda Lawrence	D	AA	80.9%	96.3	99.3	98.1	96.7	40.8	51.3	52.3	61.1
Marc Herschfus	R	W	17.3%	1.7	-1.4	0.5	1.6	58.1	46.9	40.9	36.9
others				2.0	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.8	2.2	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>36.1</i>	<i>33.8</i>	<i>40.0</i>	<i>40.0</i>	<i>74.3</i>	<i>72.6</i>	<i>74.5</i>	<i>74.5</i>
<b>2020 General</b>											
Brenda Lawrence	D	AA	79.3%	95.0	97.9	96.6	96.5	41.6	49.3	50.3	55.6
Robert Vance Patrick	R	W	18.3%	2.6	-0.3	0.9	1.3	56.4	48.2	47.5	41.7
others				2.4	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.4	2.6
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>59.9</i>	<i>57.4</i>	<i>61.7</i>	<i>61.7</i>	<i>90.7</i>	<i>85.0</i>	<i>86.3</i>	<i>86.3</i>

2018 General: State Senate Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 1 (Wayne)</b>											
Stephanie Chang	D	A	72.0%	91.3	97.8	94.1	93.2	47.2	49.0	48.8	53.3
Pauline Montie	R	W	24.2%	2.1	-4.2	0.8	1.1	51.0	49.4	48.6	44.6
others			3.8%	6.1	6.4	6.3	5.6	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>				33.3	27.8	31.0	31.0	66.6	54.7	57.3	57.3
<b>District 2 (Wayne)</b>											
Adam Hollier	D	AA	75.7%	96.4	99.5	98.0	97.9	37.7	47.7	46.5	52.8
Lisa Papas	R	W	24.3%	3.6	0.5	2.0	2.1	62.3	52.2	53.4	47.2
<i>votes for office</i>				31.3	28.0	30.9	30.9	74.1	69.6	73.3	73.3
<b>District 3 (Wayne)</b>											
Sylvia Santana	D	AA	81.8%	94.2	95.6	95.4	95.6	78.8	67.9	64.4	66.3
Kathy Stecker	R	W	15.3%	2.5	1.1	1.5	1.3	18.9	29.3	32.6	31.0
others			2.9%	3.9	3.3	3.3	3.1	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.7
<i>votes for office</i>				30.7	29.2	30.0	30.0	38.7	42.8	45.4	45.4
<b>District 4 (Wayne)</b>											
Marshall Bullock	D	AA	78.3%		97.0	100.2	98.7		45.3	46.1	51.1
Angela Savino	R	W	21.7%		3.0	-0.1	1.3		54.7	53.9	48.9
<i>votes for office</i>				32.4	30.6	32.2	32.2		50.2	51.2	51.2
<b>District 5 (Wayne)</b>											
Betty Jean Alexander	D	AA	77.4%	93.4	95.5	95.4	95.3		49.9	48.9	50.7
DeShawn Wilkins	R	AA	18.2%	3.3	1.2	1.6	1.6		43.7	44.5	43.1
others			4.4%	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.1		6.4	6.5	6.2
<i>votes for office</i>				34.9	36.2	39.4	39.4		44.2	44.1	44.1
<b>District 6 (Wayne)</b>											
Erika Geiss	D	AA	61.4%		107.3	99.4	92.8		42.6	43.8	47.8
Brenda Jones	R	AA	38.7%		-7.2	0.5	7.2		57.4	56.4	52.3
<i>votes for office</i>					38.3	35.9	35.9		50.0	52.9	52.9

2018 General: State Senate Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 11 (Oakland)</b>											
Jeremy Moss	D	W	76.7%		99.0	99.2	96.3	80.9	60.2	56.9	60.2
Boris Tuman	R	W	20.9%		0.0	0.4	2.0	17.5	36.0	39.2	36.6
others			12.4%		1.0	1.0	1.7	1.6	3.7	3.8	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>					60.6	63.4	63.4	83.7	59.9	60.1	60.1
<b>District 12 (Oakland)</b>											
Rosemary Bayer	D	W	49.4%		122.0	99.6	87.9		33.2	33.3	42.1
Michael D. McCready	R	W	48.6%		-23.8	0.6	4.6		64.9	64.2	56.7
others			2.0%		1.7	2.0	7.4		2.0	2.0	1.2
<i>votes for office</i>					14.5	25.6	25.6		75.1	74.4	74.4
<b>District 27 (Genesee)</b>											
Jim Ananich	D	W	71.2%	97.6	103.0	99.3	97.7	53.9	53.3	54.2	55.6
Donna Kekesis	R	W	28.8%	2.4	-3.0	0.7	2.3	46.1	46.7	45.8	44.4
<i>votes for office</i>				53.7	46.5	50.5	50.5	58.7	46.9	49.9	49.9
<b>District 32 (Genesee and Saginaw)</b>											
Phil Phelps	D	W	44.5%		113.0	99.7	96.1		29.5	30.1	33.5
Ken Horn	R	W	55.5%		-13.0	0.4	3.9		70.5	69.9	66.5
<i>votes for office</i>					37.9	37.6	37.6		61.4	62.3	62.3

2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 1 (Wayne)</b>											
Tenisha Yancey	D	AA	72.9%	96.3	101.0	99.1	97.3		33.3	36.2	47.0
Mark Corcoran	R	W	25.0%	2.2	-2.5	0.5	1.7		63.8	59.7	49.5
others			2.1%	1.5	1.5	1.6	0.9		2.9	3.9	3.5
<i>votes for office</i>				30.5	28.8	30.1	30.1		81.0	80.4	80.4
<b>District 2 (Wayne)</b>											
Joe Tate	D	AA	73.5%	97.4	101.5	98.8	98.8	41.6	46.8	47.2	53.0
John Palffy	R	W	26.5%	2.6	-1.4	1.1	1.2	58.5	53.1	53.1	47.0
<i>votes for office</i>				33.9	26.9	28.3	28.3	74.0	77.0	78.2	78.2
<b>District 3 (Wayne)</b>											
Wendell L. Byrd	D	AA	96.7%		97.4	97.8	98.8		89.6	87.3	80.4
Dolores Brodersen	R		3.3%		2.6	2.2	1.2		10.5	12.3	19.6
<i>votes for office</i>					28.5	32.0	32.0		76.7	67.4	67.4
<b>District 4 (Wayne)</b>											
Isaac Robinson	D	W	94.6%	97.6	97.3	97.7	97.2		89.5	86.3	85.5
Howard Weathington	R	AA	5.4%	2.4	2.7	2.2	2.8		10.4	13.6	14.5
<i>votes for office</i>				27.0	30.1	30.3	30.3		24.5	24.1	24.1
<b>State House District 5</b>											
Cynthia A. Johnson	D	AA	92.5%	97.0	97.8	98.2	97.7		72.4	62.2	na
Dorothy Patterson	R		5.5%	3.0	2.2	2.0	2.4		27.8	37.8	na
<i>votes for office</i>				29.8	30.2	31.3	31.3		na	na	
<b>District 6 (Wayne)</b>											
Tyrone Carter	D	AA	91.1%	95.6	98.4	98.2	96.3		66.3	65.0	66.0
Linda Sawyer	R	W	8.9%	4.4	1.7	1.9	3.7		33.5	35.0	34.0
<i>votes for office</i>				34.9	35.3	38.2	38.2		18.2	25.3	25.3

2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 7 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
LaTanya Garrett	D	AA	97.6%								
Marcelis Turner	R	AA	2.4%								
others											
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 8 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
Sherry Gay Dagnogo	D	AA	96.4%								
Valerie R. Parker	R	AA	3.7%								
others											
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 9 (Wayne)</b>											
Karen Whitsett	D	AA	95.1%		97.5	97.7	98.5		85.2	84.1	78.8
James Stephens	R		4.9%		2.5	2.3	1.5		14.8	16.0	21.2
<i>votes for office</i>					30.8	31.4	31.4		18.1	17.6	17.6
<b>District 10 (Wayne)</b>											
Leslie Love	D	AA	84.0%		99.1	98.7	96.7		48.3	48.8	59.3
William Brang	R	W	14.2%		-0.3	0.6	2.2		47.8	46.1	37.5
others			1.8%		1.2	1.2	1.2		3.9	3.6	3.3
<i>votes for office</i>					33.4	34.8	34.8		65.1	69.4	69.4
<b>District 11 (Wayne)</b>											
Jewell Jones	D	AA	66.9%		106.0	99.2	96.2		50.4	51.0	51.9
James Townsend	R	W	33.1%		-6.0	0.8	3.8		49.8	49.1	48.1
<i>votes for office</i>					37.9	38.9	38.9		44.9	45.2	45.2
<b>District 12 (Wayne)</b>											
Alex Garza	D	H	66.6%		104.7	98.8	90.6		43.9	46.3	49.0
Michelle Bailey	R	W	33.4%		-4.7	1.1	9.4		56.1	54.1	51.0
<i>votes for office</i>					47.8	48.0	48.0		41.8	42.8	42.8



2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 16 (Wayne)</b>											
Kevin Coleman	D	W	67.3%		111.8	99.1	<b>81.5</b>		50.2	51.5	<b>60.1</b>
Jody Rice-White	R	W	32.8%		-11.9	1.1	<b>18.5</b>		49.8	48.9	<b>39.9</b>
<i>votes for office</i>					18.3	48.0	<b>18.7</b>		56.1	57.0	<b>57.0</b>
<b>District 27 (Oakland)</b>											
Robert Wittenberg	D	W	78.5%		96.3	97.6	93.0	75.4	71.2	70.3	73.8
Janet Flessland	R	W	18.5%		1.7	1.0	3.0	22.5	35.6	26.2	24.3
others			3.0%		2.1	2.1	4.0	2.0	3.2	3.4	1.9
<i>votes for office</i>					53.6	58.1	<b>58.1</b>	<b>78.1</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>65.8</b>	<b>65.8</b>
<b>District 29 (Oakland)</b>											
Brenda Carter	D	AA	74.1%		114.5	99.2	94.5		36.7	41.8	<b>54.6</b>
Timothy D. Carrier	R	W	25.9%		-14.5	1.1	5.5		63.1	58.3	<b>45.4</b>
<i>votes for office</i>					32.8	46.3	<b>46.3</b>		54.5	52.1	<b>52.1</b>
<b>District 34 (Genesee)</b>											
Sheldon A. Neeley	D	AA	90.0%		101.5	99.5	98.7		58.9	64.0	<b>46.7</b>
Henry Swift	R		10.0%		-1.4	0.5	9.3		41.1	0.5	<b>53.4</b>
<i>votes for office</i>					52.6	54.7	<b>54.7</b>		18.8	22.1	<b>22.1</b>
<b>District 35 (Oakland)</b>											
Kyra Harris Bolden	D	AA	85.5%		102.7	99.6	98.2		53.5	57.2	63.1
Theodore Alfonsetti III	R	W	14.6%		-2.7	0.3	1.8		46.5	42.9	36.9
<i>votes for office</i>					56.1	55.6	<b>55.6</b>		74.5	77.2	<b>77.2</b>
<b>District 37 (Oakland)</b>											
Christine Greig	D	W	67.2%		111.4	98.2	69.5		59.6	61.5	68.2
Mitch Swoboda	R	W	32.8%		-11.2	2.2	30.5		40.6	38.7	31.8
<i>votes for office</i>					34.8	35.6	<b>35.6</b>		85.0	82.3	<b>82.3</b>

2018 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 49 (Genesee)</b>											
John D. Cherry	D	W	72.4%		104.9	99.2	94.1		55.6	57.2	61.4
Patrick Duvendeck	R	W	27.6%		-5.0	0.8	6.0		44.4	42.7	38.7
<i>votes for office</i>					<i>40.0</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>42.3</i>		<i>53.0</i>	<i>57.8</i>	<i>57.8</i>
<b>District 95 (Saginaw)</b>											
Vanessa Guerra	D	H	73.1%		109.8	99.0	96.0		43.3	47.3	50.5
Dorothy Tanner	R	W	26.9%		-9.9	0.8	4.0		56.7	52.8	49.5
<i>votes for office</i>					<i>44.9</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>46.1</i>		<i>50.1</i>	<i>49.4</i>	<i>49.4</i>

2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 1 (Wayne)</b>											
Tenisha R. Yancey	D	AA	75.8%	94.9	99.4	97.3	98.3		38.0	42.2	46.9
Latricia Ann Lanier	R	AA	22.2%	3.7	-0.7	1.5	0.9		59.0	55.7	49.5
others			2.0%	1.4	1.3	1.0	0.8		3.0	3.1	3.6
<i>votes for office</i>				53.8	52.3	53.0	53.0		94.2	92.4	92.4
<b>District 2 (Wayne)</b>											
Joe Tate	D	AA	74.1%	93.5	96.8	95.0	95.9	46.0	50.7	50.9	54.6
Mayra Rodriguez	R	H	23.8%	3.2	-0.2	1.3	1.0	53.1	48.7	47.9	44.4
others			2.1%	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.0	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>				55.8	51.5	51.9	51.9	89.8	92.0	92.9	92.9
<b>District 3 (Wayne)</b>											
Shri Thanedar	D	A	93.3%		95.0	95.0	97.7		73.1	72.9	55.4
Anita Vinson	R	AA	4.0%		3.3	3.3	1.4		12.3	12.6	25.1
others			2.7%		1.6	1.8	0.9		14.5	12.9	19.5
<i>votes for office</i>					50.8	55.8	55.8		117.2	97.7	97.7
<b>District 4 (Wayne)</b>											
Abraham Aiyash	D	ME	89.8%		95.9	96.7	95.5		92.9	90.3	86.6
Howard Weatherington	R	AA	5.7%		1.1	1.3	1.8		5.7	7.6	8.7
others			4.5%		3.0	3.0	2.8		1.3	1.4	4.7
<i>votes for office</i>					89.7	90.1	90.1		57.7	68.1	68.1
<b>District 5 (Wayne)</b>											
Cynthia A. Johnson	D	AA	93.0%	97.3	98.0	98.0	98.3		73.2	69.1	na
Harold M. Day	R		2.3%	2.7	2.1	2.0	1.7		27.1	32.7	na
<i>votes for office</i>				54.3	55.7	56.9	56.9		na	na	
<b>District 6 (Wayne)</b>											
Tyrone Carter	D	AA	100%								
<i>votes for office</i>											

2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 7 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
Helena Scott	D	AA	93.0%								
Ronald Cole	R		2.3%								
others			4.7%								
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 8 (Wayne)</b>				insufficient white voters to produce estimates of voting patterns by race							
Stephanie A. Young	D	AA	96.7%								
Mirosława Teresa Gorak	R	W	3.3%								
<i>votes for office</i>											
<b>District 9 (Wayne)</b>											
Karen Whitsett	D	AA	94.2%		96.5	96.5	97.2		83.7	83.4	75.4
James Stephens	R		5.8%		3.5	3.4	2.8		16.3	16.1	24.5
<i>votes for office</i>					56.3	57.3	57.3		29.7	27.1	27.1
<b>District 10 (Wayne)</b>											
Mary Cavanagh	D	H	84.8%		99.1	98.9	98.3		51.1	50.8	53.7
Cathy L. Alcorn	R		15.3%		0.9	1.1	1.7		48.9	49.4	46.3
<i>votes for office</i>					62.9	65.3	65.3		69.1	68.3	68.3
<b>District 11 (Wayne)</b>											
Jewell Jones	D	AA	65.2%		104.7	99.0	96.9		48.8	48.5	50.7
James C. Townsend	R	W	34.8%		-4.6	1.0	3.1		51.2	51.5	49.3
<i>votes for office</i>					53.0	53.5	53.5		62.1	63.2	63.2
<b>District 12 (Wayne)</b>											
Alex Garza	D	H	62.4%		103.0	99.4	91.8		38.2	38.8	41.4
Michelle Bailey	R	W	37.7%		-3.0	0.6	8.2		61.8	60.9	58.6
<i>votes for office</i>					64.7	66.4	66.4		57.9	57.9	57.9

2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 16 (Wayne)</b>											
Kevin Coleman	D	W	62.5%		111.3	99.0	84.8		44.4	45.6	54.2
Emily Bauman	R	W	37.5%		-11.4	1.0	15.2		55.7	54.4	45.8
<i>votes for office</i>					29.9	33.5	33.5		75.1	76.0	76.0
<b>District 27 (Oakland)</b>											
Regina Weiss	D	W	74.4%		95.4	97.3	93.3	68.7	64.2	63.4	66.4
Elizabeth Goss	R	W	22.4%		2.6	1.5	3.9	28.8	32.0	32.5	30.6
others			3.2%		1.7	1.6	2.8	2.5	3.9	4.1	33.0
<i>votes for office</i>					73.8	76.6	76.6	88.1	77.7	77.4	77.4
<b>District 29 (Oakland)</b>											
Brenda Carter	D	AA	72.9%		111.1	99.1	94.7		37.1	38.8	51.3
S. Dave Sullivan	R	W	27.1%		-11.0	0.8	53.3		62.7	61.5	48.7
<i>votes for office</i>					47.6	61.1	61.1		67.5	61.5	61.5
<b>District 34 (Oakland)</b>											
Cynthia R. Neeley	D	AA	86.7%		100.5	99.2	98.3		51.6	56.1	45.9
James Miraglia	R	W	13.3%		-4.8	0.7	1.7		48.4	43.8	54.1
<i>votes for office</i>					65.6	67.6	67.6		32.5	36.8	36.8
<b>District 35 (Oakland)</b>											
Kyra Harris Bolden	D	AA	82.9%		99.8	99.4	97.2		51.5	51.2	58.5
Daniela Davis	R	AA	15.9%		-0.4	0.3	2.3		46.4	46.2	39.3
others			1.0%		0.6	0.5	0.5		2.1	2.4	2.2
<i>votes for office</i>					70.1	68.4	68.4		93.4	94.5	94.5
<b>District 37 (Oakland)</b>											
Samantha Steckloff	D	W	63.9%		106.1	96.4	<b>57.5</b>		56.8	56.9	<b>66.4</b>
Mitch Swoboda	R	W	34.1%		-8.7	0.8	<b>34.2</b>		41.7	40.8	<b>32.2</b>
others			2.0%		2.5	6.3	<b>8.3</b>		1.7	1.3	<b>1.4</b>
<i>votes for office</i>					55.5	54.9	<b>54.9</b>		106.2	94.0	<b>94.0</b>

2020 General: State House Districts				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>District 49 (Genesee)</b>											
John D. Cherry	D	W	68.9%		104.3	98.8	94.8		50.2	51.9	56.6
Bryan Lutz	R	W	31.1%		-4.3	1.0	5.2		49.8	48.3	43.6
<i>votes for office</i>					52.5	60.7	60.7		68.0	69.1	69.1
<b>District 95 (Saginaw)</b>											
Amos O'Neal	D	AA	70.1%		111.7	99.2	96.6		34.7	41.1	42.7
Charlotte DeMaet	R	W	29.9%		-11.5	0.9	3.4		65.2	58.9	57.3
<i>votes for office</i>					59.0	60.6	60.6		62.9	61.5	61.5

Recent Democratic Primaries: Congress			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>2018</b>								
<b>Congressional District 13</b>								
Ian Conyers	B	6.6	8.3	9.1	9.3		1.3	1.1
Shanelle Jackson	B	5.4	7.7	7.1	7.5		1.6	1.2
Brenda Jones	B	30.2	42.5	43.7	43.5		2.9	5.3
Rashinda Tlaib	ME	31.2	22.3	21.3	22.4		48.1	45.3
Bill Wild	W	14.1	1.6	-1.4	0.7		46.2	43.9
Coleman Young II	B	12.5	17.7	20.1	18.9		-0.3	1.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			23.0	22.2	24.3		12.2	14.1
<b>2020</b>								
<b>Congressional District 12</b>								
Debbie Dingell	W	80.9		81.4	81.2		87.9	87.7
Solomon Rajput	A	19.1		18.9	19.0		12.1	12.2
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				18.8	24.2		13.6	13.1
<b>Congressional District 13</b>								
Brenda Jones	B	33.7	37.8	37.7	37.3		27.0	27.9
Rashida Tlaib	ME	66.3	62.2	62.3	62.7		72.9	72.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			28.0	26.7	29.5		14.1	15.8
<b>Congressional District 14</b>								
Brenda Lawrence	B	93.2	92.7	92.7	92.8	92.1	91.6	92.0
Terrance Morrison		6.8	7.3	7.3	7.5	7.9	8.4	8.7
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			25.9	23.7	28.0	22.4	13.3	18.5

Recent Democratic Primaries: 2018 State Senate			Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters		
	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI	HP	ER	EI
<b>State Senate District 1 (Wayne)</b>								
Stephanie Chang	A	49.8	24.6	23.5	27.1	71.6	79.2	76.7
James Cole	B	5.2	6.2	7.8	6.2	4.3	3.6	3.9
Nicholas Rivera	H	2.9	1.3	0.9	0.8	4.3	5.9	5.2
Stephanie Roehm		4.4	2.1	1.0	1.5	8.6	9.9	8.7
Bettie Cook Scott	B	11.2	18.2	17.9	15.7	6.6	17.0	6.1
Alberta Tinsley Talabi	B	26.4	47.7	48.9	47.1	4.7	-2.7	2.9
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			20.0	20.9	23.3	17.4	13.3	13.9
<b>State Senate District 3 (Wayne)</b>								
Anita Belle	B	14.3	23.7	25.5	25.4	4.9	1.9	1.9
Terry Burrell	W	5.5	8.5	8.6	8.4	3.9	2.1	2.2
Sylvia Santana	B	41.5	56.6	60.2	60.3	20.2	19.9	18.7
Gary Woronchak	W	38.7	11.2	5.7	8.0	71.0	76.2	76.0
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			18.7	16.8	17.9	17.2	17.3	17.8
<b>State Senate District 4 (Wayne)</b>								
Marshall Bullock	B	44.3	46.8	44.5	47.2		39.2	38.6
Fred Durhal	B	38.3	39.4	42.6	40.6		30.8	31.3
Carron Pinkins	B	17.5	13.8	12.8	12.6		30.0	29.1
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			21.5	21.8	26.3		8.7	10.5
<b>State Senate District 5 (Wayne)</b>								
Betty Jean Alexander	B	54.5	66.9	69.1	68.1		27.2	27.5
David Knezek	W	45.5	33.1	30.9	31.9		72.8	72.6
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			22.2	21.6	23.1		10.7	11.4
<b>State Senate District 6</b>								
Erika Geiss	B	65.4		86.1	89.5		55.6	55.9
Robert Kosowski	W	34.6		13.9	10.3		44.4	44.0
<i>turnout of VAP</i>				19.5	18.0		12.4	14.3
<b>State Senate District 11 (Oakland)</b>								
Crystal Bailey	B	21.2	36.6	27.0	24.9	7.9	16.7	17.3
Jeremy Moss	W	51.8	35.4	49.0	53.1	78.1	51.9	51.0
Vanessa Moss	B	18.5	20.2	17.5	16.2	10.2	20.4	20.3
James Turner	B	8.6	7.8	6.5	5.8	3.7	11.0	10.9
<i>turnout of VAP</i>			29.0	30.8	33.4	43.3	20.5	20.6



## **APPENDIX C**

Detroit area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	75.4	76.0
Donald Trump	R	W	24.3	23.9
others			0.3	0.2
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	14.8
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	73.6	74.8
John James	R	W	22.6	21.9
others			3.8	3.2
<i>votes for office</i>			13.5	14.6
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	83.1	80.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	15.3	14.8
others			1.5	1.8
<i>votes for office</i>			3.5	5.1
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	84.0	82.6
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	14.4	13.5
others			1.7	14.0
<i>votes for office</i>			3.3	4.4
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	80.1	78.9
Tom Leonard	R	W	16.4	15.2
others			3.4	3.7
<i>votes for office</i>			3.4	4.8

Detroit area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	82.5	82.2
John James	R	W	16.4	17.1
others			1.3	0.0
<i>votes for office</i>			3.3	4.5
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	55.5	58.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	13.6	12.7
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	30.8	28.7
<i>votes for office</i>			-2.0	1.0

Grand Rapids area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	98.6	94.8
Donald Trump	R	W	0.5	0.1
others			1.0	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>0.0</i>	<i>8.6</i>
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	96.1	93.3
John James	R	W	-1.6	3.2
others			5.3	9.2
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>0.0</i>	<i>7.3</i>
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	99.5	95.0
Bill Schuette	R	W	-4.5	1.6
others			5.6	6.1
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>1.1</i>
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	102.1	97.0
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-5.3	1.1
others			3.3	6.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>0.3</i>
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	97.2	93.1
Tom Leonard	R	W	-6.4	1.2
others			9.3	9.8
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>-9.0</i>	<i>0.8</i>

Grand Rapids area			Estimates for Hispanics	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	97.2	93.2
John James	R	W	-3.4	2.0
others			6.2	10.4
<i>votes for office</i>			-9.0	1.1
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	51.1	51.3
Shri Thanedar	D	A	39.8	42.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	8.9	11.9
<i>votes for office</i>			-2.3	0.1

			Estimates for Arab Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	98.3	98.9
Donald Trump	R	W	1.3	0.8
others			0.6	1.0
<i>votes for office</i>			24.1	26.7
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	100.7	99.0
John James	R	W	-2.9	0.8
others			2.1	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>			22.2	24.9
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	103.9	99.3
Bill Schuette	R	W	-6.2	1.1
others			2.5	2.1
<i>votes for office</i>			8.6	10.3
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	104.7	99.3
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-6.3	0.9
others			1.7	1.7
<i>votes for office</i>			8.5	9.8
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	106.8	99.5
Tom Leonard	R	W	-8.0	0.6
others			1.3	1.3
<i>votes for office</i>			8.6	10.1

			Estimates for Arab Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	107.2	99.1
John James	R	W	-9.0	1.1
others			1.9	1.9
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>8.4</i>	<i>10.0</i>
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	116.4	92.8
Shri Thanedar	D	A	-0.3	0.2
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	-16.0	0.6
<i>votes for office</i>			<i>15.0</i>	<i>15.1</i>

			Estimates for Chaldeans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	19.5	20.5
Donald Trump	R	W	81.9	80.3
others			-0.8	2.0
<i>votes for office</i>			31.2	29.6
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	26.3	26.2
John James	R	W	74.0	72.8
others			-0.6	0.2
<i>votes for office</i>			27.9	27.2
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.9	48.9
Bill Schuette	R	W	47.9	47.4
others			0.2	8.0
<i>votes for office</i>			-12.2	0.0
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	55.3	53.7
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	44.7	42.0
others			0.4	7.9
<i>votes for office</i>			-10.8	0.3
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	52.5	48.0
Tom Leonard	R	W	47.4	47.4
others			0.4	0.1
<i>votes for office</i>			-10.3	2.5



			Estimates for Chaldeans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	55.2	55.6
John James	R	W	43.2	44.0
others			0.7	0.9
<i>votes for office</i>			-11.4	0.4
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	50.1	na
Shri Thanedar	D	A	11.2	na
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	38.7	na
<i>votes for office</i>			-1.1	0.1

			Estimates for Bangladeshi Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>2020 General</b>				
<b>U.S. President</b>				
Joseph Biden	D	W	104.7	96.1
Donald Trump	R	W	-4.4	3.2
others			0.1	0.1
<i>votes for office</i>			31.6	25.2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Gary Peters	D	W	104.4	96.2
John James	R	W	-5.2	3.3
others			0.9	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			31.6	24.6
<b>2018 General</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	105.7	99.1
Bill Schuette	R	W	-7.4	1.1
others			1.1	1.1
<i>votes for office</i>			13.7	18.7
<b>Secretary of State</b>				
Jocelyn Benson	D	W	105.7	98.9
Mary Treder Lang	R	W	-7.1	1.3
others			2.5	2.4
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	19.3
<b>Attorney General</b>				
Dana Nessel	D	W	107.5	98.2
Tom Leonard	R	W	-8.0	0.7
others			2.3	2.3
<i>votes for office</i>			13.8	19.2

			Estimates for Bangladeshi Americans	
	Party	Race	ER	EI 2x2
<b>U.S. Senate</b>				
Debbie Stabenow	D	W	107.1	99.1
John James	R	W	-7.7	0.9
others			1.7	0.7
<i>votes for office</i>			13.9	18.4
<b>2018 Democratic Primary</b>				
<b>Governor</b>				
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	98.8	97.3
Shri Thanedar	D	A	6.5	5.1
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	-5.2	4.5
<i>votes for office</i>			16.4	14.7

# Appendix B

**APPENDIX B1  
Michigan  
2022 General Election  
Congressional  
Contests**

**Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 General Election**

			Black Voters					White Voters					
			95% confidence interval					95% confidence interval					
Race	Party	Vote	EI <sup>1</sup>		EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	EI <sup>1</sup>		EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	
<b>Congress 12th District</b>													
Rashida Tliab	ME	D	70.8	97.8	97.2, 98.3	98.0	98.6	95.5	52.3	50.4, 54.0	44.8	46.0	50.5
Steven Elliot	W	R	26.3	1.4	1.0, 2.0	0.8	-0.2	2.8	46.7	45.0, 48.5	50.4	49.4	46.1
Gary Walkowicz	W	WC	2.9	0.8	.6, 1.0	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.0	.8, 1.3	4.6	4.6	3.4
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>					<b>44.7</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>42.0</b>				<b>57.4</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>59.9</b>
<b>Congress 13th District</b>													
Shri Thandedar	A	D	71.1	94.2	93.5, 94.8	94.6	96.1	91.4	55.6	54.4, 56.7	43.8	42.5	44.0
Martell Bivings	B	R	24.0	1.3	.9, 1.7	0.9	-1.5	3.5	42.8	41.8, 43.9	50.8	52.6	53.9
Others			4.9	4.5	4.0, 5.1	5.3	5.4	5.1	1.7	1.2, 2.3	4.8	4.9	2.1
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>					<b>36.2</b>	<b>34.6</b>	<b>35.8</b>				<b>57.4</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>74.6</b>

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 General Election

APPENDIX B2  
Michigan  
2022 General Election  
State Senate Contests

			Black Voters					White Voters					
Race	Party	Vote	95% confidence EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	95% confidence EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	
<b>State Senate District 1</b>													
Erika Geiss	B	D	71.6	98.3	97.2, 99.1	99.2	101.0	96.7	55.2	52.5, 57.5	43.2	42.5	-
Erik Soderquist		R	28.4	1.7	.9, 2.8	0.9	-1.1	3.3	44.8	42.5, 47.5	56.8	57.5	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>34.4</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>34.6</b>			<b>50.0</b>	<b>49.8</b>	-
<b>State Senate District 2</b>													
Sylvie Santana	B	D	68.0	95.0	92.7, 96.8	97.5	99.1	94.7	58.7	56.1, 61.2	52.1	53.3	59.8
Harry Sawicki		R	29.4	2.2	1.0, 3.9	0.5	-2.0	2.7	40.4	38.0, 43.0	44.8	43.9	37.5
Others			2.6	2.8	1.7, 4.4	2.8	3.0	2.6	0.8	.5, 1.3	2.8	2.8	2.7
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>35.2</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>36.3</b>			<b>41.6</b>	<b>39.3</b>	<b>35.4</b>
<b>State Senate District 3</b>													
Stephanie Chang	A	D	85.7	96.6	95.3, 97.6	96.8	97.8	94.2	78.8	75.0, 83.4	71.1	69.4	-
Linda Rayburn		R	14.3	3.4	2.4, 4.7	3.2	2.2	5.8	21.2	16.6, 25.0	28.9	30.5	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>36.2</b>	<b>34.9</b>	<b>36.8</b>			<b>37.4</b>	<b>37.2</b>	-
<b>State Senate District 6</b>													
Mary Cavanagh	H	D	68.0	94.3	93.0, 95.5	95.9	96.6	93.4	55.6	53.5, 57.8	45.8	46.1	50.5
Ken Crider		R	28.9	1.3	.8, 2.1	0.6	-1.3	2.8	43.6	41.4, 45.7	50.4	51.5	47.6
Kimberly Givens		WC	3.1	4.4	3.3, 5.5	4.6	4.7	3.8	0.8	.4, 1.4	2.3	2.4	1.8
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>41.4</b>	<b>40.3</b>	44.5			<b>70.9</b>	<b>69.2</b>	<b>72.0</b>
<b>State Senate District 7</b>													
Jeremy Moss	W	D	74.2	97.9	96.9, 98.7	99.1	102.8	96.8	57.6	55.7, 59.4	45.3	43.3	48.0
Corinne Khederian		R	25.8	2.1	1.3, 3.1	0.9	-2.9	3.2	42.4	40.6, 44.3	54.7	56.7	52.0
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>48.2</b>	<b>45.0</b>	43.8			<b>76.0</b>	<b>74.9</b>	<b>84.1</b>
<b>State Senate District 8</b>													
Mallory McMorrow	W	D	78.9	99.0	98.4, 99.4	98.6	98.6	96.8	72.0	70.2, 73.8	66.3	66.2	70.0
Brandon Ronald Simpson		R	21.1	1.0	.6, 1.6	1.6	1.4	3.2	28.0	26.2, 29.8	33.7	33.9	30.0
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>43.4</b>	<b>42.7</b>	43.8			<b>73.4</b>	<b>73.0</b>	<b>78.4</b>

APPENDIX B2  
Michigan  
2022 General Election  
State Senate Contests

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 General Election

	Race	Party	Vote	Black Voters					White Voters				
				El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP
<b>State Senate District 10</b>													
Paul Wojno	W	D	67.7	98.2	97.0, 99.1	98.7	100.5	95.6	49.1	44.3, 54.0	43.9	43.5	-
Paul Smith		R	32.3	1.8	.9, 3.0	1.2	-0.5	4.4	50.9	46.0, 55.7	56.2	56.6	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>32.5</b>	<b>30.8</b>	33.7			<b>55.2</b>	<b>54.4</b>	-

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 General Election

APPENDIX B3

Michigan

2022 General Election  
State House Contests

Black Voters

White Voters

Race	Party	Vote	Black Voters					White Voters					
			95% confidence interval	95% confidence interval	ER	HP	95% confidence interval	95% confidence interval	ER	HP			
<b>State House District 1</b>													
Tyrone Carter	B	D	87.5	95.5	92.3, 97.9	96.0	97.0	93.9	70.0	51.2, 83.6	48.4	46.4	-
Paula Campbell		R	10.8	3.3	1.2, 6.5	3.0	1.6	4.2	26.7	13.8, 44.1	48.6	49.6	-
Donnie Love		L	1.7	1.1	.4, 2.0	1.3	1.2	1.9	3.4	1.1, 6.8	5.1	3.8	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>41.7</b>	<b>40.9</b>	<b>37.2</b>			<b>39.5</b>	<b>27.1</b>	-
<b>State House District 3</b>													
Alabas Farhat	ME	D	74.6	94.6	89.0, 98.3	99.1	101.9	-	65.8	58.6, 73.0	55.6	57.2	-
Ginger Shearer		R	25.4	5.4	1.7, 11.0	0.8	-2.2	-	34.2	27.0, 41.4	44.3	42.8	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>RF</b>	<b>25.9</b>	-			<b>39.2</b>	<b>39.9</b>	-
<b>State House District 4</b>													
Karen Whitsett	B	D	87.1	99.2	98.4, 99.7	98.3	98.1	96.5	66.2	57.8, 74.1	60.5	60.9	64.2
Tonya Renay Wells		R	12.9	0.8	.3, 1.6	1.7	1.9	3.5	33.8	25.9, 42.2	39.5	39.1	35.8
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>37.7</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>36.8</b>			<b>19.8</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>21.0</b>
<b>State House District 5</b>													
Natalie Price	W	D	78.4	99.0	98.1, 99.6	98.8	98.9	97.2	62.5	59.8, 65.1	56.6	56.7	56.6
Paul Taros		R	21.7	1.0	.4, 1.9	1.3	1.1	2.8	37.5	34.9, 40.3	43.4	43.3	43.4
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>42.9</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>44.5</b>			<b>75.8</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>77.3</b>
<b>State House District 6</b>													
Regina Weiss	W	D	83.9	99.2	98.5, 99.7	99.0	99.5	97.4	72.8	70.1, 75.3	67.3	68.2	75.2
Charles Villerot		R	16.1	0.8	.3, 1.5	1.4	0.6	2.6	27.2	24.7, 29.9	32.7	31.8	24.8
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>42.7</b>	<b>41.9</b>	<b>43.8</b>			<b>75.1</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>79.1</b>
<b>State House District 8</b>													
Mike McFall	W	D	78.9	97.7	95.9, 99.0	97.4	100.5	95.8	65.8	60.8, 70.8	59.8	57.7	-
Robert Noble		R	21.1	2.3	1.0, 4.1	2.6	-0.5	4.2	34.2	29.2, 39.2	40.2	42.2	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>34.9</b>	<b>34.2</b>	<b>36.9</b>			<b>50.0</b>	<b>49.2</b>	-



Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 General Election

APPENDIX B3  
Michigan  
2022 General Election  
State House Contests

			Black Voters					White Voters					
Race	Party	Vote	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	
<b>State House District 9</b>													
Abraham Aiyash	ME	D	91.6	97.2	95.0, 98.9	97.1	97.7	96.4	83.9	67.6, 94.9	73.7	76.8	-
Michele Lundgren		R	8.4	2.8	1.1, 5.0	2.9	2.3	3.6	16.1	5.1, 32.4	26.2	23.1	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>38.3</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>34.9</b>			<b>16.5</b>	<b>16.6</b>	-
<b>State House District 10</b>													
Joe Tate	B	D	68.4	98.2	96.6, 99.3	99.1	108.1	97.2	58.8	56.3, 60.9	52.2	46.8	45.1
Mark Corcoran		R	31.6	1.8	.7, 3.4	0.5	-7.8	2.8	41.2	39.1, 43.7	47.8	53.3	54.9
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>25.8</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>36.7</b>			<b>81.4</b>	<b>80.8</b>	<b>75.8</b>
<b>State House District 11</b>													
Veronica Paiz	H	D	66.6	97.9	95.6, 99.3	99.1	101.6	95.8	50.2	46.7, 53.7	44.3	43.4	46.8
Mark Foster		R	33.4	2.1	.7, 4.4	0.9	-1.6	4.2	49.8	46.3, 53.3	55.6	56.6	53.2
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>36.5</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>34.5</b>			<b>64.9</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>64.8</b>
<b>State House District 12</b>													
Kimberly Edwards	B	D	70.4	95.0	91.1, 97.6	98.8	101.9	95.2	51.7	43.7, 59.0	45.5	43.5	-
Diane Saber		R	27.4	3.9	1.4, 7.8	0.9	-2.9	3.4	47.4	40.1, 55.3	51.4	53.3	-
Gregory Creswell		L	2.2	1.1	.4, 2.0	1.0	1.0	1.4	0.9	.3, 1.9	3.1	3.2	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>47.7</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>32.1</b>			<b>42.4</b>	<b>47.5</b>	-
<b>State House District 13</b>													
Lori Stone	W	D	67.4	95.2	90.1, 98.3	99.2	101.3	96.6	53.2	46.5, 59.2	44.5	43.7	-
Ronald Singer		R	32.6	4.8	1.7, 9.9	0.4	-1.4	3.4	46.8	40.8, 53.5	55.4	56.3	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>30.6</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>32.6</b>			<b>54.5</b>	<b>54.2</b>	-
<b>State House District 14</b>													
Donavan McKinney	B	D	71.4	94.5	90.7, 97.2	98.0	98.6	95.0	56.9	40.3, 71.6	40.0	40.0	-
Wendy Jo Watters		R	27.0	3.8	1.4, 7.6	1.0	0.2	3.8	42.0	27.4, 58.5	57.4	57.6	-
Jeff Sparling		G	1.7	1.6	.8, 2.7	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.1	.4, 2.0	2.3	2.4	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>34.4</b>	<b>30.3</b>	<b>35.7</b>			<b>46.6</b>	<b>48.6</b>	-

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 General Election

APPENDIX B3  
Michigan  
2022 General Election  
State House Contests

			Black Voters						White Voters					
Race	Party	Vote	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP		
<b>State House District 16</b>														
Stephanie Young	B	D	77.9	98.3	96.5, 99.4	99.0	100.5	96.1	57.1	52.6, 61.5	50.4	49.5	55.7	
Keith Jones		R	22.1	1.7	.6, 3.5	0.8	-0.5	3.9	42.9	38.5, 47.4	49.6	50.5	44.3	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>46.0</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>45.0</b>			<b>64.7</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>66.3</b>	
<b>State House District 17</b>														
Laurie Pohutsky		D	69.0	97.4	94.9, 99.6	98.5	99.6	96.3	56.0	51.5, 60.1	47.3	46.9	49.9	
Penny Crider		R	31.0	2.6	1.0, 5.1	1.5	0.4	3.7	44.0	39.9, 48.5	52.7	53.2	50.1	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>34.7</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>42.0</b>			<b>68.5</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>74.5</b>	
<b>State House District 18</b>														
Jason Hoskins	B	D	79.6	96.9	94.6, 98.6	98.4	97.7	95.3	60.6	53.2, 67.6	50.5	51.0	-	
Wendy Webster Jackson		R	20.4	3.1	1.4, 5.5	1.6	2.4	4.7	39.4	32.4, 46.8	49.4	48.9	-	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>58.4</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>49.7</b>			<b>62.9</b>	<b>62.2</b>	-	
<b>State House District 19</b>														
Samantha Steckloff		D	67.1	94.8	89.7, 98.2	99.8	106.5	-	60.1	56.7, 63.2	50.1	48.5	-	
Anthony Paesano		R	32.9	5.2	1.8, 10.3	0.0	-6.5	-	39.9	36.8, 43.3	50.3	51.6	-	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>42.7</b>	<b>41.2</b>	-			<b>82.5</b>	<b>82.5</b>	-	
<b>State House District 26</b>														
Dylan Wegela	W	D	67.8	96.4	93.2, 98.7	99.2	102.8	-	51.0	45.1, 56.5	44.3	43.4	-	
James Townsend		R	32.2	3.6	1.3, 6.8	0.8	-2.8	-	49.0	43.4, 54.9	55.8	56.6	-	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>35.8</b>	<b>35.3</b>	-			<b>50.6</b>	<b>49.0</b>	-	
<b>State House District 53</b>														
Brenda Carter	B	D	67.4	95.4	90.5, 98.6	98.9	112.7	-	53.3	47.3, 58.8	38.9	37.6	-	
Anthony Bartolotta		R	32.6	4.6	1.4, 9.5	1.0	-12.7	-	46.7	41.2, 52.7	61.4	62.4	-	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>38.2</b>	<b>24.7</b>	-			<b>60.6</b>	<b>57.6</b>	-	

# Appendix C

APPENDIX C1  
Michigan  
2022  
Congressional  
Democratic Primaries

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 Democratic Primary

				Black Voters					White Voters				
				95% confidence interval					95% confidence interval				
Race	Party	Vote	El <sup>1</sup>	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	El <sup>1</sup>	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP			
<b>Congress 12th District</b>													
Rashida Tliab	ME	D	63.8	57.7	56.7, 58.6	55.5	56.2	57.1	79.7	77.6, 81.8	74.2	76.0	72.5
Janice Winfrey	B	D	22.4	30.6	29.8, 31.4	31.9	32.4	31.7	12.3	10.2, 13.8	10.6	9.8	13.5
Kelly Garrett	B	D	8.6	6.2	5.6, 6.7	6.6	5.5	5.5	5.3	4.1, 6.9	11.3	10.6	10.0
Shanelle Jackson	B	D	5.1	5.6	5.2, 6.1	6.1	5.9	5.7	2.7	2.1, 3.4	3.7	3.6	4.0
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>22.6</b>	<b>18.5</b>	<b>19.4</b>			<b>15.8</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>16.4</b>
<b>Congress 13th District</b>													
Shri Thandedar	A	D	28.3	25.4	24.7, 26.1	25.2	26.8	28.9	34.0	32.9, 35.1	32.4	34.6	21.9
Adam Hollier	B	D	23.5	24.5	23.8, 25.2	24.7	23.7	23.6	23.1	22.1, 24.1	22.4	20.9	28.6
Portia Roberson	B	D	16.9	14.3	13.6, 14.9	14.2	12.2	10.7	20.4	19.4, 21.4	21.4	19.9	26.7
John Conyers	B	D	8.6	9.6	9.1, 10.0	9.7	10.1	10.0	6.8	6.0, 7.6	6.8	7.7	3.6
Sherry Gay-Dagnogo	B	D	8.2	11.5	11.1, 12.0	11.8	11.8	11.5	3.1	2.5, 3.7	2.6	3.1	2.5
Sharon McPhail	B	D	6.4	8.3	7.9, 8.7	8.4	9.0	8.8	3.4	2.8, 4.0	3.1	3.3	2.7
Michael Griffie	B	D	4.6	2.6	2.3, 2.9	2.4	2.1	2.3	6.8	6.2, 7.4	6.6	7.6	12.1
Sam Riddle	B	D	2.3	3.2	3.0, 3.5	3.3	3.7	3.6	1.0	.8, 1.2	0.9	0.6	0.5
Lorrie Rutledge	B	D	1.2	0.6	.5, .8	0.7	0.6	0.7	1.4	1.2, 1.6	1.6	2.1	1.3
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>17.8</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>15.0</b>			<b>16.1</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>18.5</b>

APPENDIX C2

Michigan  
2022

State Senate  
Democratic Primaries

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 Democratic Primary

Black Voters

White Voters

	Race	Party	Vote	95% confidence interval					95% confidence interval						
				EI <sup>1</sup>	interval		EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	EI <sup>1</sup>	interval		EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP
<b>State Senate District 1</b>															
Erika Geiss	B	D	32.3	24.3	21.6, 27.1		23.4	21.2	21.8	55.9	50.8, 60.6		45.6	47.3	-
Brenda Sanders	B	D	23.3	34.0	31.8, 36.1		33.7	38.7	40.1	16.8	13.5, 20.2		14.4	15.4	-
Frank Liberati	W	D	22.9	13.8	12.2, 15.5		15.4	9.8	5.5	11.0	7.3, 15.2		18.0	18.4	-
Shellee Brooks	B	D	9.9	13.4	12.0, 14.8		13.2	13.7	14.8	7.1	5.0, 9.3		7.2	9.1	-
Ricardo Moore	B	D	7.9	11.2	10.1, 12.3		10.6	12.7	14.3	5.7	4.2, 7.4		5.5	5.1	-
Carl Schwartz	W	D	3.7	3.4	2.6, 4.2		4.1	4.0	3.6	3.5	2.4, 4.8		3.8	4.7	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>							<b>18.3</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>14.3</b>				<b>9.2</b>	<b>7.8</b>	-
<b>State Senate District 2</b>															
Sylvie Santana	B	D	80.7	79.9	76.5, 83.2		79.5	79.5	79.4	90.6	85.9, 94.0		81.3	80.0	80.1
Maurice Sanders		D	19.3	20.1	16.8, 23.5		20.4	20.4	20.6	9.4	6.0, 14.1		18.6	20.0	19.9
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>							<b>14.3</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>15.6</b>				<b>11.8</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>10.8</b>
<b>State Senate District 3</b>															
Stephanie Chang	A	D	82.8	77.2	75.1, 79.2		76.3	73.5	73.0	93.4	90.8, 95.7		92.3	93.4	-
Toinu Reeves	B	D	17.2	22.9	20.8, 24.9		23.8	26.6	27.0	6.6	4.3, 9.2		7.7	6.6	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>							<b>16.8</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>15.0</b>				<b>13.2</b>	<b>11.5</b>	-
<b>State Senate District 6</b>															
Mary Cavanagh	H	D	43.9	49.4	46.9, 52.0		47.4	47.9	46.6	50.0	43.8, 56.8		41.4	45.0	50.0
Vicki Barnett	W	D	35.8	13.1	10.9, 15.4		14.3	13.4	16.3	45.9	38.5, 52.4		57.2	52.2	43.2
Darryl Brown	B	D	20.2	37.5	35.2, 39.7		38.8	38.5	37.1	4.2	2.5, 6.2		3.2	2.7	6.8
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>							<b>19.7</b>	<b>17.2</b>	19.4				<b>17.3</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>17.4</b>
<b>State Senate District 7</b>															
Jeremy Moss	W	D	82.9	85.2	82.9, 87.4		83.3	78.4	74.8	91.4	87.0, 94.8		85.8	84.5	89.4
Ryan Foster	B	D	17.1	14.8	12.6, 17.1		16.6	21.5	25.2	8.6	5.2, 13.0		14.2	15.3	10.6
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>							<b>25.7</b>	<b>21.8</b>	18.3				<b>20.5</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>20.3</b>

APPENDIX C2  
 Michigan  
 2022  
 State Senate  
 Democratic Primaries

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 Democratic Primary

Race	Party	Vote	Black Voters						White Voters				
			EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	
<b>State Senate District 8</b>													
Mallory McMorrow	W	D	68.4	24.2	21.7, 26.6	26.0	27.2	30.9	95.9	94.3, 97.2	97.1	97.1	90.5
Marshall Bullock II	B	D	31.6	75.8	73.4, 78.3	73.9	72.8	69.1	4.1	2.8, 5.7	2.8	2.9	9.5
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>20.5</b>	<b>17.5</b>	18.9			<b>30.5</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>36.1</b>

APPENDIX C3

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 Democratic Primary

Michigan

2022

State House

Democratic Primaries

Black Voters

White Voters

State House District 1

	Race	Party	Vote	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP
Tyrone Carter	B	D	78.4	83.1	79.5, 86.7	85.2	79.1	78.4	64.8	43.1, 81.6	59.2	64.5	-
Jemaine Tobey	B	D	21.6	16.9	13.3, 20.5	14.9	21.0	21.6	35.2	18.4, 56.9	40.7	35.0	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>18.0</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>14.3</b>			<b>7.9</b>	<b>2.3</b>	-

State House District 3

Alabas Farhat	ME	D	54.3	62.9	55.0, 70.3	61.9	61.1	60.8	57.8	48.5, 67.4	49.5	47.1	-
Sam Luqman	ME	D	28.7	15.1	9.1, 22.2	15.8	16.4	17.9	30.0	20.2, 39.3	37.5	38.0	-
Khalil Othman	ME	D	17.0	22.0	15.9, 28.5	21.8	22.5	21.4	12.2	6.9, 17.9	13.5	14.8	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>10.5</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>12.6</b>			<b>13.0</b>	<b>11.7</b>	-

State House District 4

Karen Whitsett	B	D	55.2	65.4	63.3, 67.5	64.5	61.1	62.5	17.0	6.8, 30.8	27.4	27.0	28.1
Lori Lynn Turner	B	D	26.9	32.7	30.6, 34.8	32.6	36.0	31.7	11.0	4.4, 20.1	9.6	10.3	11.3
Gus Tarraf	ME	D	17.9	1.9	1.0, 3.0	3.3	3.2	5.8	72.0	56.1, 84.6	62.0	62.7	60.6
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>15.6</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>15.2</b>			<b>5.6</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>6.2</b>

State House District 5

Natalie Price	W	D	38.4	16.7	14.1, 19.2	16.7	16.0	17.9	71.4	62.9, 78.4	66.0	63.4	54.7
Reggie Davis	B	D	29.7	55.2	52.9, 57.4	51.6	54.6	51.6	4.2	2.0, 7.3	2.2	1.0	8.4
Michelle Wooddell	W	D	18.9	10.5	8.6, 12.7	12.1	12.5	12.7	19.8	13.2, 27.9	27.5	28.6	30.4
Steele Hughes	B	D	10.3	15.6	14.2, 17.1	15.6	14.2	15.1	3.0	1.4, 5.2	3.7	3.9	4.6
Ksenia Milstein	W	D	2.8	2.0	1.3, 2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	1.5	.7, 2.6	2.7	2.9	1.9
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>19.2</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>19.3</b>			<b>25.1</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>22.6</b>

State House District 6

Regina Weiss	W	D	62.0	44.1	41.4, 46.9	42.7	41.7	41.6	91.2	87.9, 94.0	82.0	82.1	84.6
Danielle Hall	B	D	14.8	24.5	22.5, 26.4	23.8	23.3	24.4	3.4	1.6, 5.6	5.6	5.4	5.0
Mya Jones	B	D	14.8	21.5	19.6, 23.5	22.1	23.2	22.3	3.3	1.4, 5.9	7.0	6.8	5.9
Mark Murphy		D	8.4	9.9	8.4, 11.4	11.1	11.8	11.7	2.1	.9, 3.9	5.5	5.7	4.5
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>17.4</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>18.0</b>			<b>33.2</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>38.8</b>

APPENDIX C3 Michigan 2022 State House Democratic Primaries			Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 Democratic Primary										
			Black Voters						White Voters				
			Race	Party	Vote	EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>
<b>State House District 7</b>													
Helena Scott	B	D	53.2	87.5	84.0, 90.6	80.8	80.2	77.4	37.4	29.0, 45.5	33.4	31.9	-
Melanie Macey	W	D	40.1	10.1	7.0, 13.4	14.2	14.4	17.4	59.3	51.3, 67.7	58.8	60.4	-
Grant Rivet	W	D	6.7	2.5	1.4, 3.7	4.8	5.4	5.3	3.2	1.5, 5.4	8.0	7.8	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>20.4</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>13.6</b>			<b>31.7</b>	<b>30.4</b>	-
<b>State House District 8</b>													
Mike McFall	W	D	37.8	24.7	20.4, 29.1	24.5	23.5	27.6	56.5	47.9, 64.3	53.9	54.6	-
Durrel Douglas	B	D	21.6	31.6	27.5, 35.6	33.1	31.9	26.8	9.0	4.4, 14.9	8.1	9.7	-
Ernest Little	B	D	17.2	32.3	29.0, 35.7	33.6	33.2	29.3	3.9	1.7, 7.0	0.7	-1.1	-
David Soltis	W	D	14.0	3.8	2.4, 5.5	3.8	2.1	6.3	24.0	17.0, 30.4	26.5	26.7	-
Ryan Nelson	W	D	9.4	7.5	5.0, 10.2	8.8	9.5	10.0	6.6	3.2, 10.9	10.2	10.4	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>14.6</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>13.8</b>			<b>14.0</b>	<b>13.4</b>	-
<b>State House District 9</b>													
Abraham Aiyash	ME	D	61.3	50.5	46.8, 54.2	46.0	45.7	48.2	77.9	65.9, 85.9	91.7	98.4	-
Darnell Gardner	B	D	18.1	25.7	23.1, 28.4	27.6	26.4	24.7	6.3	2.5, 12.6	4.4	-3.0	-
Abraham Shaw	B	D	8.8	11.2	9.4, 12.9	12.6	13.3	12.9	5.4	2.5, 9.6	1.2	-1.0	-
William Phillips	B	D	6.1	6.9	5.3, 8.5	7.6	7.8	7.7	4.7	2.0, 8.7	2.2	2.1	-
Paul Smith	B	D	5.8	5.6	4.3, 7.1	7.2	6.8	6.5	5.7	2.7, 10.0	0.0	3.8	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>13.9</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>12.7</b>			<b>8.4</b>	<b>7.5</b>	-
<b>State House District 10</b>													
Joe Tate	B	D	81.3	83.2	77.8, 88.3	76.4	78.8	82.1	92.5	87.6, 96.1	84.5	84.1	88.0
Toni Mua	B	D	18.7	16.8	11.7, 22.2	23.2	21.2	17.9	7.5	3.9, 12.4	15.4	15.8	12.0
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>16.5</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.6</b>			<b>21.2</b>	<b>19.1</b>	<b>16.8</b>



APPENDIX C3

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 Democratic Primary

Michigan  
2022

Black Voters

White Voters

State House  
Democratic Primaries

95%  
confidence  
interval

95%  
confidence  
interval

	Race	Party	Vote	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	El <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	El <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	
<b>State House District 11</b>														
Veronica Paiz	H	D	18.9	6.6	3.0, 10.9	12.6	9.5	6.9	27.1	16.3, 37.3	24.4	25.4	23.1	
Ricardo White	B	D	18.1	22.2	18.5, 26.0	22.1	22.6	23.8	15.6	7.1, 24.5	14.7	14.2	14.4	
Alex Manwell	W	D	15.3	6.7	4.2, 9.7	7.2	8.0	9.7	22.0	12.3, 31.2	22.2	22.0	21.1	
Regina Williams	B	D	14.5	24.2	20.7, 27.7	23.3	23.6	21.7	6.5	2.8, 12.1	7.1	7.4	9.2	
Athena Lynn Thornton	B	D	10.2	18.7	15.6, 21.7	18.4	17.1	15.6	4.1	1.7, 7.3	3.4	3.9	4.8	
Marvin Cotton Jr.	B	D	7.8	17.1	14.3, 19.7	16.5	15.1	13.4	3.1	1.3, 5.6	1.1	1.0	2.2	
David Maynard		D	7.2	1.7	.8, 2.9	2.4	2.5	4.4	9.0	4.1, 14.5	11.3	12.3	9.7	
Paul Robert Francis	W	D	4.9	1.6	.8, 2.6	1.5	1.3	2.8	7.9	4.8, 11.2	7.5	8.5	10.6	
Patrick Biange	W	D	3.0	1.2	.6, 2.1	1.0	0.5	1.5	4.6	2.3, 7.1	5.0	5.4	5.0	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>14.8</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>10.6</b>			<b>14.6</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>14.6</b>	
<b>State House District 12</b>														
Kimberly Edwards	B	D	51.9	83.4	73.1, 91.7	85.8	85.9	83.0	42.0	20.6, 65.6	17.9	18.0	-	
Richard Steenland	W	D	48.1	16.7	8.3, 26.9	14.1	14.0	17.0	58.0	34.4, 79.4	82.2	82.0	-	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>14.3</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>10.3</b>			<b>8.4</b>	<b>10.0</b>	-	
<b>State House District 13</b>														
Lori Stone	W	D	73.7	53.0	48.9, 57.3	51.3	51.8	52.6	91.5	86.9, 95.3	91.7	93.0	-	
Myles Miller	B	D	26.3	47.0	42.7, 51.1	48.4	48.3	47.4	8.5	4.7, 13.1	9.1	7.1	-	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>9.8</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>10.3</b>			<b>11.8</b>	<b>11.1</b>	-	
<b>State House District 14</b>														
Donavan McKinney	B	D	59.3	80.6	77.8, 83.2	82.8	82.2	80.4	39.5	31.1, 48.7	26.0	25.8	-	
Kristina Lodovisi	W	D	28.4	13.9	11.7, 16.5	12.7	13.4	14.1	42.3	33.0, 50.2	50.5	49.5	-	
Aaron Delikta	W	D	12.3	5.4	4.0, 7.1	4.7	4.5	5.6	18.2	12.7, 23.1	24.2	24.7	-	
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>						<b>13.2</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>13.8</b>			<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.1</b>	-	

APPENDIX C3  
Michigan  
2022  
State House  
Democratic Primaries

Estimates of Voting Patterns by Race in 2022 Democratic Primary

			Black Voters					White Voters				
Race	Party	Vote	EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP	EI <sup>1</sup>	95% confidence interval	EI <sup>2</sup>	ER	HP
<b>State House District 16</b>												
Stephanie Young	B	D	88.4	93.0 90.5, 95.1	89.2	89.3	90.7	91.4	84.2, 96.4	87.2	86.3	87.9
Ishmail Terry	B	D	11.6	7.0 4.9, 9.5	10.7	10.7	9.3	8.6	3.6, 15.8	13.0	13.8	12.1
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>					<b>22.7</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>21.9</b>			<b>15.6</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>16.8</b>
<b>State House District 18</b>												
Jason Hoskins	B	D	55.1	53.1 47.6, 58.4	52.1	51.7	47.2	65.0	44.2, 83.6	61.5	61.6	-
Caprice Jackson	B	D	44.9	46.9 41.6, 52.4	47.7	48.1	52.8	35.0	16.4, 55.8	38.8	38.3	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>					<b>31.2</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>21.5</b>			<b>17.4</b>	<b>16.2</b>	-
<b>State House District 26</b>												
Dylan Wegela	W	D	42.1	6.4 2.7, 11.5	1.2	-5.3	-	76.2	66.4, 84.3	78.2	82.3	-
Steven Chisholm	B	D	29.7	55.4 49.1, 62.0	59.6	64.4	-	9.1	4.3, 15.8	3.5	1.0	-
Allen Wilson	B	D	18.9	32.2 25.8, 38.1	32.7	32.2	-	9.0	4.0, 15.6	6.7	6.4	-
Stephen Patterson	W	D	9.3	5.9 2.9, 9.6	8.6	9.2	-	5.6	2.6, 10.2	9.9	9.8	-
<b>Turnout:votes/VAP</b>					<b>15.1</b>	<b>14.9</b>	-			<b>11.6</b>	<b>10.2</b>	-

# DETERMINING IF A REDISTRICTING PLAN COMPLIES WITH THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT


DTX048

Dr. Lisa Handley

DTX048-001

# Redistricting Criteria Priority Pyramid: Voting Rights Act of 1965

- Section 2 prohibits any voting standard, practice or procedure, including a redistricting plan, that results in the denial or dilution of minority voting strength.
- All state and local jurisdictions are covered by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.




# Redistricting Plans that Violate the Voting Rights Act


Redistricting plans cannot:

- crack, or
- pack

a geographically concentrated minority community across districts or within a district in a manner that dilutes their voting strength.



Plan that cracks minority community across 5 districts



Plan that packs minority community into single district

**DTX048-003**

## *Thornburg v. Gingles*: Three-Pronged Test

U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions to qualify for relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:

- The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district
- The minority group must be politically cohesive
- Whites must vote as a bloc to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidates

A racial bloc voting analysis is used to ascertain whether minority voters are politically cohesive and if white voters bloc vote to usually defeat minority-preferred candidates.



**DTX048-004**



# Analyzing Voting Behavior by Race

Two standard statistical techniques for estimating voting patterns of minority and white voters:


- Ecological regression analysis (ER)
- Ecological inference analysis (EI)



**DTX048-005**

# Area-Specific Analyses

- Wayne
- Oakland
- Genesee
- Saginaw



**DTX048-006**



# Elections Analyzed to Date

- All federal and statewide general election contests, 2012-2020.
  - Four election contests included minority candidates:
    - 2012 U.S. President (Barack Obama)
    - 2014 Secretary of State (Godfrey Dillard)
    - 2018 U.S. Senate (John James)
    - 2020 U.S. Senate (John James)
  - Two contests included minority candidates as running mates
    - 2018 Governor (Gretchen Whitmer/Garlin Gilchrist)
    - 2020 U.S. President (Joseph Biden/Kamala Harris)
- Only Democratic primary for statewide office this past decade: 2018 race for governor

**DTX048-007**

# Example of RBV Results: 2018 General and Democratic Primary for Governor

Statewide				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2018 General</b>											
<b>Governor</b>											
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	53.3%	95.6	104.3	98.6	95.3	41.1	38.9	40.6	44.8
Schuette/Lyons	R	W	43.8%	2.5	-6.4	0.6	1.8	56.0	57.9	56.2	52.8
others				1.9	2.1	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.2	2.9	2.5
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>36.6</i>	<i>31.6</i>	<i>35.2</i>	<i>35.2</i>	<i>61.9</i>	<i>61.7</i>	<i>63.3</i>	<i>63.3</i>

2018 Democratic Primary for Governor				Estimates for Black Voters				Estimates for White Voters			
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>STATEWIDE</b>											
Abdul El-Sayed	D	ME	30.2%	21.0	24.2	23.5	26.0	25.7	27.1	30.2	28.5
Shri Thanedar	D	A	17.7%	42.5	44.2	42.2	39.0	15.8	12.9	10.8	9.4
Gretchen Whitmer	D	W	52.0%	36.5	31.6	33.5	35.0	58.6	60.0	59.4	62.0
<i>votes for office</i>				<i>23.0</i>	<i>22.5</i>	<i>24.5</i>	<i>24.5</i>	<i>13.9</i>	<i>12.0</i>	<i>14.0</i>	<i>14.0</i>

- **votes for office** = percentage of voting age population who turned out and cast a vote for the office
- **HP** = vote percentages from homogeneous precincts
- **ER** = estimates derived from ecological regression analysis
- **EI 2x2** = estimates derived from standard EI (as developed by Prof. Gary King)
- **EI RxC** = estimates derived from EI technique that takes into account differences in participation by race

**DTX048-008**

# Number of Racially Polarized Elections

	General Elections with Minority Candidates	All Statewide General Election Contests	Statewide Democratic Primary
Statewide	6/6	12/13	1/1
Genesee	5/6	9/13	1/1
Saginaw	6/6	11/13	1/1
Oakland	6/6	13/13	0/1
Wayne	3/6	7/13	1/1

Number of polarized contests / total number of contests

# Complying with the Voting Rights Act

- If, based on the racial bloc voting (RBV) analysis, it is determined voting is racially polarized, and candidates preferred by a politically cohesive minority group are usually defeated by white voters not supporting these candidates, a district(s) that offers minority voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice must be drawn.
- If such districts already exist, and minority-preferred candidates are winning only because these districts exist, then these minority districts must be maintained in a manner that continues to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates.

**DTX048-010**

# Drawing Minority Opportunity Districts

- Line drawers cannot simply set an arbitrary demographic target (e.g., 50% black voting age population) for all minority districts across the jurisdiction (*Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 2015).
- A district-specific, functional analysis is required to determine if a proposed district will provide minority voters with the ability to elect minority-preferred candidates to office.

**DTX048-011**

# District-specific, Function Approaches

- Estimates of participation rates, minority cohesion and white crossover voting for minority-preferred candidates derived from the RBV analysis can be used to calculate the percent minority population needed in a specific area for minority-preferred candidates to win a district in that area.
- Election results from previous contests that included minority-preferred candidates (“bellwether elections” as identified by the RBV analysis) can be recompiled to reflect the boundaries of the proposed district to determine if minority-preferred candidates would consistently carry this proposed district.

**DTX048-012**

Michigan STATEWIDE Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	55.2	96.2	3.8	79.0	40.0	60.0	65.9	63.1	60.4	57.9	55.4
2020 US Senate	W	55.0	93.9	6.1	78.1	39.4	60.6	64.6	61.9	59.3	56.8	54.4
2018 Governor	W	35.2	95.3	4.7	63.3	44.8	55.2	65.2	62.8	60.6	58.5	56.4
2018 Secretary of State	W	35.1	95.6	4.4	62.2	43.9	56.1	65.0	62.6	60.2	58.0	55.9
2018 Attorney General	W	34.6	94.4	5.6	61.7	39.4	60.6	61.8	59.2	56.7	54.4	52.2
2018 US Senate	W	35.0	94.3	5.7	63.1	43.7	56.3	64.1	61.8	59.5	57.4	55.3
2016 President	W	54.1	97.3	2.7	67.2	34.3	65.7	65.5	62.4	59.3	56.3	53.4
2014 Governor	W	35.1	95.7	4.3	49.1	38.5	61.5	65.2	62.3	59.6	57.0	54.4
2014 Secretary of State	AA	34.8	95.8	4.2	47.8	33.5	66.5	62.8	59.7	56.8	53.9	51.0
2014 Attorney General	W	34.6	95.2	4.8	47.8	35.0	65.0	63.3	60.3	57.4	54.6	51.9
2014 US Senate	W	35.0	96.5	3.5	48.5	47.3	52.7	70.4	67.9	65.6	63.3	61.1
2012 President	AA	59.1	97.8	2.2	68.1	44.5	55.5	71.9	69.3	66.6	64.0	61.5
2012 US Senate	W	58.8	96.8	3.2	66.9	50.6	49.4	74.5	72.2	69.9	67.7	65.4

Statewide	Estimates for Black Voters			Estimates for White Voters							
	Party	Race	Vote	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC	HP	ER	EI 2x2	EI RxC
<b>2018 General</b>											
<b>Governor</b>											
Whitmer/Gilchrist	D	W/AA	53.3%	95.6	104.3	98.6	95.3	41.1	38.9	40.6	44.8
Schuetz/Lyons	R	W	43.8%	2.5	-6.4	0.6	1.8	56.0	57.9	56.2	52.8
others				1.9	2.1	2.6	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
votes for office				36.6	31.6	35.2	35.2	61.9	61.7	63.3	63.3

DTX048-013

SAGINAW COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	48.6	95.3	4.7	79.6	36.3	63.7	61.5	58.7	56.0	53.4	50.9
2020 US Senate	W	48.4	93.8	6.2	78.7	37.5	62.5	61.7	58.9	56.3	53.9	51.5
2018 Governor	W	37.7	93.6	6.4	63.0	40.9	59.1	63.2	60.6	58.2	55.9	53.7
2018 Secretary of State	W	38.0	93.7	6.3	61.4	39.2	60.8	62.7	60.0	57.5	55.1	52.8
2018 Attorney General	W	37.6	93.4	6.6	61.0	33.3	66.7	59.1	56.2	53.4	50.8	48.3
2018 US Senate	W	37.8	93.5	6.5	62.8	39.3	60.7	62.3	59.7	57.2	54.8	52.6
2016 President	W	52.3	95.0	5.0	70.2	30.6	69.4	61.3	58.1	55.0	52.0	49.0
2014 Governor	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.8	42.2	57.8	65.1	62.5	60.1	57.8	55.6
2014 Secretary of State	AA	32.6	94.4	5.6	49.2	36.3	63.7	62.3	59.5	56.7	54.1	51.6
2014 Attorney General	W	32.4	94.1	5.9	50.1	32.6	67.4	59.8	56.8	53.9	51.1	48.5
2014 US Senate	W	32.7	94.1	5.9	50.1	50.6	49.4	69.9	67.8	65.7	63.8	61.9
2012 President	AA	56.2	95.7	4.3	70.3	42.9	57.1	69.0	66.4	63.8	61.3	58.8
2012 US Senate	W	55.7	95.4	4.6	68.7	52.3	47.7	73.8	71.6	69.5	67.4	65.4

**DTX048-014**



GENESEE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	53.0	96.1	3.9	79.6	42.1	57.9	66.3	63.7	61.1	58.7	56.4
2020 US Senate	W	56.6	95.0	5.0	78.7	43.5	56.5	67.6	65.0	62.6	60.2	57.9
2018 Governor	W	45.1	95.3	4.7	59.8	46.2	53.8	69.8	67.3	64.9	62.6	60.4
2018 Secretary of State	W	44.9	95.2	4.8	58.6	48.0	52.0	70.8	68.5	66.2	64.0	61.8
2018 Attorney General	W	44.6	94.1	5.9	58.4	41.1	58.9	66.7	64.0	61.5	59.0	56.5
2018 US Senate	W	45.1	95.2	4.8	59.6	45.8	54.2	69.5	67.1	64.7	62.4	60.1
2016 President	W	59.0	96.4	3.6	67.3	37.4	62.6	67.9	65.0	62.0	59.2	56.3
2014 Governor	W	35.8	95.8	4.2	47.5	51.8	48.2	72.9	70.7	68.6	66.5	64.5
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.9	95.6	4.4	46.1	46.2	53.8	70.3	67.8	65.4	63.1	60.8
2014 Attorney General	W	35.9	95.6	4.4	45.5	45.2	54.8	69.9	67.4	65.0	62.6	60.2
2014 US Senate	W	36.1	95.6	4.4	47.1	58.6	41.4	76.5	74.7	72.9	71.1	69.4
2012 President	AA	61.0	97.6	2.4	68.4	53.7	46.3	76.6	74.4	72.2	70.1	67.9
2012 US Senate	W	60.7	96.7	3.3	67.5	60.2	39.8	79.3	77.5	75.7	73.9	72.1

**DTX048-015**

OAKLAND COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	71.6	93.4	6.6	86.4	45.9	54.1	69.8	67.4	65.1	62.8	60.6
2020 US Senate	W	71.4	92.1	7.9	85.4	43.5	56.5	68.1	65.6	63.2	60.9	58.6
2018 Governor	W	53.2	94.1	5.9	68.8	47.4	52.6	70.1	67.8	65.5	63.3	61.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	53.1	94.2	5.8	67.7	47.5	52.5	70.4	68.0	65.8	63.5	61.4
2018 Attorney General	W	52.5	93.8	6.2	67.0	43.0	57.0	67.9	65.3	62.8	60.4	58.1
2018 US Senate	W	53.2	93.0	7.0	68.7	45.5	54.5	68.6	66.2	63.9	61.7	59.5
2016 President	W	65.6	95.1	4.9	73.5	39.1	60.9	68.3	65.5	62.7	60.0	57.3
2014 Governor	W	46.3	94.8	5.2	54.6	30.6	69.4	63.3	60.1	56.9	53.8	50.7
2014 Secretary of State	AA	45.9	94.6	5.4	53.1	26.4	73.6	61.4	58.0	54.7	51.3	48.1
2014 Attorney General	W	45.8	94.1	5.9	52.6	32.9	67.1	64.5	61.4	58.4	55.4	52.4
2014 US Senate	W	46.5	95.0	5.0	53.7	46.7	53.3	71.5	69.1	66.7	64.4	62.1
2012 President	AA	68.9	95.7	4.3	75.7	42.1	57.9	70.3	67.6	65.0	62.3	59.7
2012 US Senate	W	67.8	95.8	4.2	74.0	47.6	52.4	73.1	70.6	68.3	65.9	63.5

**DTX048-016**

WAYNE COUNTY Percent Black VAP needed to win	race of B-P candidate	turnout rate for office and percent vote for black-preferred candidates						percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 55% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 50% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 45% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 40% black VAP	percent of vote B-P cand would have received if district was 35% black VAP
		Black votes			White votes							
		votes cast for office	B-P	all others	votes cast for office	B-P	all others					
GENERAL ELECTIONS												
2020 President	W	58.0	97.5	2.5	76.6	47.5	52.5	71.5	69.0	66.6	64.3	62.0
2020 US Senate	W	57.8	95.2	4.8	75.6	47.2	52.8	70.4	68.0	65.7	63.4	61.2
2018 Governor	W	33.2	97.0	3.0	63.2	53.5	46.5	70.5	68.5	66.6	64.8	63.1
2018 Secretary of State	W	33.1	97.0	3.0	62.2	53.6	46.4	70.7	68.7	66.8	65.0	63.3
2018 Attorney General	W	32.7	95.5	4.5	61.3	49.4	50.6	67.6	65.4	63.4	61.5	59.7
2018 US Senate	W	33.1	95.8	4.2	63.1	52.3	47.7	69.3	67.3	65.4	63.6	61.9
2016 President	W	57.0	98.4	1.6	64.0	39.7	60.3	70.3	67.4	64.4	61.6	58.7
2014 Governor	W	35.8	96.5	3.5	47.7	41.3	58.7	67.7	65.0	62.3	59.7	57.2
2014 Secretary of State	AA	35.5	96.8	3.2	46.1	36.8	63.2	65.9	62.9	60.0	57.2	54.4
2014 Attorney General	W	35.3	95.7	4.3	45.9	41.0	59.0	67.5	64.8	62.1	59.5	57.0
2014 US Senate	W	35.7	98.0	2.0	46.8	53.4	46.6	74.9	72.7	70.5	68.4	66.4
2012 President	AA	60.4	99.0	1.0	65.7	51.9	48.1	76.8	74.5	72.1	69.8	67.5
2012 US Senate	W	59.9	98.1	1.9	64.4	57.6	42.4	79.1	77.1	75.1	73.1	71.1

**DTX048-017**

State Senate District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	party	race	Percent of vote 2018
5	203828	111418	54.66%	Betty Jean Alexander	D	Black	77.4
2	169357	86961	51.35%	Adam Hollier	D	Black	75.7
3	186758	90737	48.59%	Sylvia Santana	D	Black	81.8
4	180199	85691	47.55%	Marshall Bullock	D	White	78.3
1	193087	87075	45.10%	Stephanie Chang	D	Asian	72.0
11	229870	82336	35.82%	Jeremy Moss	D	White	76.7
27	175918	54071	30.74%	Jim Ananich	D	White	71.2
9	219325	50800	23.16%	Paul Wojno	D	White	65.9
6	217734	46997	21.58%	Erika Geiss	D	Black	61.4
12	211638	32206	15.22%	Rosemary Bayer	D	White	49.4
18	243159	36228	14.90%	Jeff Irwin	D	White	76.6
23	215527	30579	14.19%	Curtis Hertel Jr.	D	White	68.5
32	202924	28006	13.80%	Ken Horn	R	White	55.5
29	225476	30876	13.69%	Winnie Brinks	D	White	56.9
20	204328	24631	12.05%	Sean McCann	D	White	53.1
34	195673	19534	9.98%	Jon Bumstead	R	White	50.7
21	207567	20185	9.72%	Kim LaSata	R	White	58.1
10	232106	19162	8.26%	Michael Macdonald	R	White	51.0
7	225553	17825	7.90%	Dayna Polehanki	D	White	50.6
19	204186	15725	7.70%	John Bizon	R	White	58.6
15	226099	16436	7.27%	Jim Runestad	R	White	51.7
8	227952	15653	6.87%	Peter J. Lucido	R	White	61.8
26	212280	14313	6.74%	Aric Nesbitt	R	White	56.7
16	195953	12509	6.38%	Mike Shirkey	R	White	62.7
14	201692	11250	5.58%	Ruth Johnson	R	White	55.7
28	214199	10152	4.74%	Peter Macgregor	R	White	58.4
24	213683	8997	4.21%	Tom Barrett	R	White	53.5
13	229773	9353	4.07%	Mallory Mcmorrow	D	White	51.9
33	193451	7781	4.02%	Rick Outman	R	White	58.8
17	200526	6436	3.21%	Dale W. Zorn	R	White	57.9
30	226068	5258	2.33%	Roger Victory	R	White	63.3
25	206658	4409	2.13%	Dan Lauwers	R	White	64.0
37	209210	4076	1.95%	Wayne Schmidt	R	White	59.0
31	195335	3241	1.66%	Kevin Daley	R	White	60.2
38	202739	3086	1.52%	Ed McBroom	R	White	54.6
22	213082	2912	1.37%	Lana Theis	R	White	56.0
35	204742	2729	1.33%	Curt VanderWall	R	White	63.2
36	196947	1872	0.95%	Jim Stamas	R	White	64.3

# Threshold of Representation: State Senate

- All districts over 48% Black elect minority candidates
- 67% of districts over 35% Black elect minority candidates
- No state senate districts between 36 and 45% Black

**DTX048-018**

State House District	Total VAP	Black VAP	Percent Black VAP	Name	Party	Race	Percent of Vote 2020
7	60347	57256	94.88%	Helena Scott	D	Black	93.0
8	62448	58042	92.94%	Stephanie A. Young	D	Black	96.7
3	54130	49536	91.51%	Shri Thanedar	D	Asian	93.3
9	62529	46806	74.85%	Karen Whitsett	D	Black	94.2
10	69209	46977	67.88%	Mary Cavanagh	D	Hispanic	84.8
1	59788	38993	65.22%	Tenisha R. Yancey	D	Black	75.8
35	78306	49325	62.99%	Kyra Harris Bolden	D	Black	82.9
34	49491	30419	61.46%	Cynthia R. Neeley	D	Black	86.7
2	57031	33142	58.11%	Joe Tate	D	Black	74.1
5	49290	27190	55.16%	Cynthia A. Johnson	D	Black	93.4
6	67505	36182	53.60%	Tyrone Carter	D	Black	100.0
4	68749	32761	47.65%	Abraham Aiyash	D	ME	89.8
29	72319	26621	36.81%	Brenda Carter	D	Black	72.9
95	58640	21320	36.36%	Amos O'Neal	D	Black	70.1
49	64844	19308	29.78%	John D. Cherry	D	White	68.9
54	72426	21212	29.29%	Ronnie Dean Peterson	D	Black	77.7
12	73883	20207	27.35%	Alex Garza	D	Hispanic	62.4
11	73586	19760	26.85%	Jewell Jones	D	Black	65.2
92	66135	16957	25.64%	Terry J. Sabo	D	White	65.3
27	73337	18051	24.61%	Regina Weiss	D	White	74.4
75	76956	18127	23.56%	David LaGrand	D	White	74.6
16	74617	17556	23.53%	Kevin Coleman	D	White	62.5
68	71672	16808	23.45%	Sarah Anthony	D	Black	75.9
18	75251	16519	21.95%	Kevin Hertel	D	White	60.3
60	74176	15887	21.42%	Julie M. Rogers	D	White	71.4
22	68758	14588	21.22%	Richard M. Steenland	D	White	59.9
28	70132	14012	19.98%	Lori M. Stone	D	White	60.3
79	65091	12312	18.92%	Pauline Wendzel	R	White	56.6
31	71180	13047	18.33%	William J. Sowerby	D	White	56.3
37	78055	14166	18.15%	Samantha Steckloff	D	White	63.9
62	69641	11301	16.23%	Jim Haadsma	D	White	51.3
21	77493	11721	15.13%	Ranjeev Puri	D	Asian	59.2
76	79357	11258	14.19%	Rachel Hood	D	White	62.8
72	79315	10619	13.39%	Steven Johnson	R	White	55.1
50	72856	8173	11.22%	Tim Sneller	D	White	54.2
24	73550	8072	10.97%	Steve Marino	R	White	57.5
55	79483	8123	10.22%	Felicia Brabec	D	White	72.4
64	65167	6497	9.97%	Julie Alexander	R	White	60.6

# Threshold of Representation: State House

- All districts over 36% Black elect minority candidates
- 89% of districts over 25% Black elect minority candidates
- No state house districts between 37 and 47% Black

**DTX048-019**





## Michigan - District Percentage of Voting-Age Non-Hispanic African Americans including combination with other races



State House Districts

State Senate Districts



0 10 20 40 Miles

Election Data Services

**DTX048-020**

# ↑↓	Plan ↑↓	Remark ↑↓	Created Date ↑↓	Owner ↑↓	Tag ↑↓	# of Comments ↑↓	Attachment ↑↓	District Shapes ↑↓	Comment Link ↑↓
162	9-13-21 v2 SD		2021-09-23	Admin User	Agency Uploaded	0	NO ATTACHMENT	<a href="#">Download</a>	<a href="#">Open</a>

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Enterprise Redistricting Software & Services by Citygate GIS

9-13-21 V2 SD

Map Styles


Add Comment

Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	0	District 0	0	847,536	847,536	735,463 (86.78%)	58,780 (6.94%)	17,425 (2.06%)	14,629 (1.73%)	690 (0.08%)	11,980 (1.41%)	46,461 (5.48%)	666,188	587,563 (88.2%)	40,340 (6.06%)	12,933 (1.94%)	10,136 (1.52%)	434 (0.07%)	8,614 (1.29%)	29,848 (4.48%)
	1	District 1	265,193	-265,193 (-100%)	0	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
	2	District 2	265,193	-265,193	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Draft State Senate Map162  
9-13-21 v2 SD  
257a

PX098-0001






Draft State Senate Map 162  
9-13-21 v2 SD  
258a

PX098-0002





Draft State Senate Map 162

Map Satellite  
9-13-21 v2 SD

259a

PX098-0003

Keyboard shortcuts

Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	0	District 0	847,536 (0%)	0	847,536	735,463(86.78%)	58,780(6.94%)	17,425(2.06%)	14,629(1.73%)	690(0.08%)	11,980(1.41%)	46,461(5.48%)	666,188	587,563(88.2%)	40,340(6.06%)	12,933(1.94%)	10,136(1.52%)	434(0.07%)	8,614(1.29%)	29,848(4.48%)
	1	District 1	-265,193 (-100%)	0	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
	2	District 2	-265,193 (-100%)	0	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
	3	District 3	39,053 (14.73%)	265,193	304,246	232,407(76.39%)	47,697(15.68%)	6,694(2.2%)	12,485(4.1%)	339(0.11%)	4,459(1.47%)	18,943(6.23%)	236,354	185,654(78.55%)	31,713(13.42%)	4,924(2.08%)	9,006(3.81%)	228(0.1%)	3,164(1.34%)	12,396(5.24%)
	4	District 4	2,766 (1.04%)	265,193	267,959	175,118(65.35%)	81,760(30.51%)	6,150(2.3%)	4,631(1.73%)	252(0.09%)	3,398(1.27%)	11,361(4.24%)	206,699	139,212(67.35%)	58,030(28.07%)	4,667(2.26%)	3,420(1.65%)	160(0.08%)	2,464(1.19%)	7,573(3.66%)
	5	District 5	730 (0.28%)	265,193	265,923	228,293(85.85%)	23,148(8.7%)	4,212(1.58%)	10,044(3.78%)	212(0.08%)	3,488(1.31%)	8,251(3.1%)	210,334	182,700(86.86%)	16,409(7.8%)	3,110(1.48%)	7,259(3.45%)	136(0.06%)	2,478(1.18%)	5,452(2.59%)
	6	District 6	532 (0.2%)	265,193	265,725	193,515(72.83%)	55,333(20.82%)	5,017(1.89%)	14,368(5.41%)	244(0.09%)	3,554(1.34%)	7,151(2.69%)	210,564	158,807(75.42%)	38,117(18.1%)	3,833(1.82%)	10,471(4.97%)	168(0.08%)	2,542(1.21%)	4,846(2.3%)
	7	District 7	-1,534 (-0.58%)	265,193	263,659	146,327(55.5%)	110,214(41.8%)	3,821(1.45%)	4,249(1.61%)	194(0.07%)	2,789(1.06%)	6,508(2.47%)	205,347	120,968(58.91%)	78,505(38.23%)	2,804(1.37%)	3,092(1.51%)	137(0.07%)	1,974(0.96%)	4,157(2.02%)
	8	District 8	-1,483 (-0.56%)	265,193	263,710	96,797(36.71%)	136,454(51.74%)	3,414(1.29%)	29,351(11.13%)	249(0.09%)	2,815(1.07%)	5,758(2.18%)	206,312	78,570(38.08%)	104,838(50.82%)	2,660(1.29%)	21,345(10.35%)	172(0.08%)	2,008(0.97%)	4,177(2.02%)
	9	District 9	3,278 (1.24%)	265,193	268,471	25,760(9.6%)	202,420(75.4%)	3,116(1.16%)	1,743(0.65%)	297(0.11%)	2,342(0.87%)	41,722(15.54%)	198,202	20,131(10.16%)	151,740(76.56%)	2,369(1.2%)	1,329(0.67%)	195(0.1%)	1,618(0.82%)	26,863(13.55%)
	10	District 10	-5,913 (-2.23%)	265,193	259,280	168,050(64.81%)	76,688(29.58%)	5,473(2.11%)	8,485(3.27%)	221(0.09%)	3,507(1.35%)	10,461(4.03%)	206,065	138,490(67.21%)	55,607(26.99%)	4,108(1.99%)	6,595(3.2%)	165(0.08%)	2,586(1.25%)	7,027(3.41%)
	11	District 11	-645 (-0.24%)	265,193	264,548	183,428(69.34%)	28,843(10.9%)	2,929(1.11%)	46,235(17.48%)	192(0.07%)	3,775(1.43%)	9,633(3.64%)	208,684	148,000(70.92%)	22,257(10.67%)	2,186(1.05%)	33,142(15.88%)	137(0.07%)	2,640(1.27%)	6,561(3.14%)
	12	District 12	-4,120 (-1.55%)	265,193	261,073	182,055(69.73%)	46,401(17.77%)	4,483(1.72%)	26,954(10.32%)	242(0.09%)	3,679(1.41%)	10,395(3.98%)	205,308	146,718(71.46%)	33,489(16.31%)	3,392(1.65%)	19,690(9.59%)	156(0.08%)	2,689(1.31%)	7,072(3.44%)
	13	District 13	7,730 (2.91%)	265,193	272,923	87,984(32.24%)	177,796(65.15%)	3,677(1.35%)	5,188(1.9%)	209(0.08%)	3,177(1.16%)	5,939(2.18%)	218,615	73,033(33.41%)	139,400(63.77%)	2,914(1.33%)	4,103(1.88%)	157(0.07%)	2,340(1.07%)	4,303(1.97%)
	14	District 14	-5,899 (-2.22%)	265,193	259,294	217,558(83.9%)	18,530(7.15%)	2,714(1.05%)	18,691(7.21%)	222(0.09%)	3,797(1.46%)	8,235(3.18%)	208,325	175,600(84.29%)	14,418(6.92%)	1,981(0.95%)	14,105(6.77%)	160(0.08%)	2,734(1.31%)	5,582(2.68%)
	15	District 15	-265,193 (-100%)	0	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
	16	District 16	654 (0.25%)	265,193	265,847	199,538(75.06%)	12,119(4.56%)	2,708(1.02%)	48,370(18.19%)	197(0.07%)	3,422(1.29%)	9,424(3.54%)	209,073	160,060(76.56%)	8,879(4.25%)	1,962(0.94%)	35,276(16.87%)	137(0.07%)	2,354(1.13%)	6,366(3.04%)
	17	District 17	789 (0.3%)	265,193	265,982	200,059(75.22%)	31,879(11.99%)	6,084(2.29%)	6,401(2.41%)	261(0.1%)	3,755(1.41%)	30,708(11.55%)	208,806	161,926(77.55%)	22,935(10.98%)	4,681(2.24%)	4,576(2.19%)	179(0.09%)	2,672(1.28%)	20,251(9.7%)
	18	District 18	1,870 (0.71%)	265,193	267,063	193,953(72.62%)	42,404(15.88%)	4,893(1.83%)	9,289(3.48%)	199(0.07%)	3,786(1.42%)	25,079(9.39%)	211,970	159,209(75.11%)	30,560(14.42%)	3,810(1.8%)	7,042(3.32%)	158(0.07%)	2,773(1.31%)	16,315(7.7%)
	19	District 19	-1,882 (-0.71%)	265,193	263,311	203,118(77.14%)	40,678(15.45%)	3,637(1.38%)	8,560(3.25%)	245(0.09%)	3,982(1.51%)	15,281(5.8%)	193,738	151,713(78.31%)	27,508(14.2%)	2,820(1.46%)	6,299(3.25%)	164(0.08%)	2,788(1.44%)	10,165(5.25%)
	20	District 20	1,256 (0.47%)	265,193	266,449	214,115(80.36%)	27,622(10.37%)	5,281(1.98%)	8,088(3.04%)	271(0.1%)	3,704(1.39%)	19,369(7.27%)	202,424	167,234(82.62%)	18,460(9.12%)	3,776(1.87%)	5,418(2.68%)	186(0.09%)	2,643(1.31%)	11,732(5.8%)
	21	District 21	-107,957 (-40.71%)	265,193	157,236	146,334(93.07%)	4,608(2.93%)	3,622(2.3%)	1,697(1.08%)	118(0.08%)	2,296(1.46%)	5,597(3.56%)	121,122	113,912(94.05%)	2,820(2.33%)	2,622(2.16%)	1,101(0.91%)	72(0.06%)	1,637(1.35%)	3,363(2.78%)
	22	District 22	-620 (-0.23%)	265,193	264,573	222,119(83.95%)	6,540(2.47%)	3,675(1.39%)	9,733(3.68%)	323(0.12%)	3,032(1.15%)	29,032(10.97%)	200,843	172,479(85.88%)	3,795(1.89%)	2,535(1.26%)	6,699(3.34%)	214(0.11%)	2,086(1.04%)	18,527(9.22%)
	23	District 23	-1,413 (-0.53%)	265,193	263,780	156,413(59.3%)	49,387(18.72%)	3,732(1.41%)	14,305(5.42%)	263(0.1%)	3,087(1.17%)	48,920(18.55%)	200,247	127,262(63.55%)	33,492(16.73%)	2,793(1.39%)	10,360(5.17%)	170(0.08%)	2,118(1.06%)	31,031(15.5%)
	24	District 24	730 (0.28%)	265,193	265,923	223,331(83.98%)	18,955(7.13%)	4,549(1.71%)	7,676(2.89%)	309(0.12%)	3,414(1.28%)	20,009(7.52%)	208,605	178,983(85.8%)	12,501(5.99%)	3,297(1.58%)	5,438(2.61%)	195(0.09%)	2,395(1.15%)	13,042(6.25%)
	25	District 25	817 (0.31%)	265,193	266,010	249,867(93.93%)	6,590(2.48%)	5,391(2.03%)	1,971(0.74%)	143(0.05%)	3,430(1.29%)	9,146(3.44%)	211,201	200,034(94.71%)	3,936(1.86%)	3,873(1.83%)	1,380(0.65%)	94(0.04%)	2,517(1.19%)	5,853(2.77%)
	26	District 26	7,604 (2.87%)	265,193	272,797	239,439(87.77%)	12,957(4.75%)	7,350(2.69%)	3,926(1.44%)	302(0.11%)	4,246(1.56%)	18,669(6.84%)	211,581	189,108(89.38%)	8,549(4.04%)	5,278(2.49%)	2,762(1.31%)	198(0.09%)	3,113(1.47%)	11,282(5.33%)

Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	27	District 27	265,193	5,312 (2%)	270,505	184,126(68.07%)	41,580(15.37%)	3,798(1.4%)	36,703(13.57%)	478(0.18%)	4,643(1.72%)	16,218(6%)	224,279	155,451(69.31%)	31,279(13.95%)	2,986(1.33%)	29,855(13.31%)	374(0.17%)	3,530(1.57%)	12,031(5.36%)
	28	District 28	265,193	5,358 (2.02%)	270,551	245,202(90.63%)	9,743(3.6%)	6,204(2.29%)	2,754(1.02%)	173(0.06%)	3,539(1.31%)	14,872(5.5%)	211,819	193,801(91.49%)	7,000(3.3%)	4,677(2.21%)	1,844(0.87%)	112(0.05%)	2,648(1.25%)	9,501(4.49%)
	29	District 29	265,193	-2,032 (-0.77%)	263,161	231,574(88%)	20,669(7.85%)	5,627(2.14%)	4,314(1.64%)	162(0.06%)	3,498(1.33%)	10,432(3.96%)	207,092	184,069(88.88%)	14,392(6.95%)	4,167(2.01%)	2,982(1.44%)	123(0.06%)	2,474(1.19%)	6,527(3.15%)
	30	District 30	265,193	3,279 (1.24%)	268,472	203,317(75.73%)	38,602(14.38%)	5,892(2.19%)	9,092(3.39%)	314(0.12%)	3,766(1.4%)	23,163(8.63%)	209,399	163,176(77.93%)	26,258(12.54%)	4,453(2.13%)	6,575(3.14%)	218(0.1%)	2,718(1.3%)	15,260(7.29%)
	31	District 31	265,193	-13,007 (-4.9%)	252,186	239,383(94.92%)	3,212(1.27%)	5,362(2.13%)	3,695(1.47%)	295(0.12%)	3,499(1.39%)	7,350(2.91%)	198,357	189,302(95.43%)	1,993(1%)	4,060(2.05%)	2,495(1.26%)	186(0.09%)	2,491(1.26%)	4,736(2.39%)
	32	District 32	265,193	7,632 (2.88%)	272,825	230,886(84.63%)	15,799(5.79%)	4,839(1.77%)	15,890(5.82%)	304(0.11%)	3,644(1.34%)	13,750(5.04%)	219,811	187,298(85.21%)	11,848(5.39%)	3,640(1.66%)	12,457(5.67%)	232(0.11%)	2,659(1.21%)	9,433(4.29%)
	33	District 33	265,193	7,413 (2.8%)	272,606	250,161(91.77%)	8,185(3%)	5,281(1.94%)	2,273(0.83%)	237(0.09%)	3,639(1.33%)	13,213(4.85%)	210,313	193,929(92.21%)	6,580(3.13%)	3,842(1.83%)	1,368(0.65%)	160(0.08%)	2,583(1.23%)	8,310(3.95%)
	34	District 34	265,193	1,962 (0.74%)	267,155	221,347(82.85%)	28,224(10.56%)	7,572(2.83%)	2,567(0.96%)	261(0.1%)	3,978(1.49%)	16,431(6.15%)	210,295	178,251(84.76%)	19,608(9.32%)	5,524(2.63%)	1,718(0.82%)	150(0.07%)	2,881(1.37%)	10,235(4.87%)
	35	District 35	265,193	-2,893 (-1.09%)	262,300	239,647(91.36%)	8,590(3.27%)	8,136(3.1%)	2,809(1.07%)	205(0.08%)	3,303(1.26%)	10,470(3.99%)	209,528	192,430(91.84%)	6,476(3.09%)	5,984(2.86%)	2,110(1.01%)	134(0.06%)	2,557(1.22%)	7,201(3.44%)
	36	District 36	265,193	-6,554 (-2.47%)	258,639	249,406(96.43%)	2,341(0.91%)	6,409(2.48%)	1,839(0.71%)	245(0.09%)	3,499(1.35%)	5,105(1.97%)	210,538	204,199(96.99%)	1,231(0.58%)	4,843(2.3%)	1,223(0.58%)	146(0.07%)	2,699(1.28%)	3,153(1.5%)
	37	District 37	265,193	-3,486 (-1.31%)	261,707	241,604(92.32%)	3,424(1.31%)	16,879(6.45%)	2,673(1.02%)	365(0.14%)	3,606(1.38%)	6,422(2.45%)	213,146	198,622(93.19%)	2,320(1.09%)	12,005(5.63%)	1,797(0.84%)	246(0.12%)	2,726(1.28%)	4,159(1.95%)
	38	District 38	265,193	1,423 (0.54%)	266,616	246,823(92.58%)	5,819(2.18%)	15,620(5.86%)	2,940(1.1%)	273(0.1%)	3,061(1.15%)	4,638(1.74%)	217,404	202,334(93.07%)	4,737(2.18%)	10,699(4.92%)	2,236(1.03%)	161(0.07%)	2,264(1.04%)	3,105(1.43%)

Color	#	Name	VAP NH Black (Combo)
	0	District 0	40,340(6.06%)
	1	District 1	0(0%)
	2	District 2	0(0%)
	3	District 3	31,713(13.42%)
	4	District 4	58,030(28.07%)
	5	District 5	16,409(7.8%)
	6	District 6	38,117(18.1%)
	7	District 7	78,505(38.23%)
	8	District 8	104,838(50.82%)
	9	District 9	151,740(76.56%)
	10	District 10	55,607(26.99%)
	11	District 11	22,257(10.67%)
	12	District 12	33,489(16.31%)
	13	District 13	139,400(63.77%)
	14	District 14	14,418(6.92%)
	15	District 15	0(0%)
	16	District 16	8,879(4.25%)
	17	District 17	22,935(10.98%)
	18	District 18	30,560(14.42%)
	19	District 19	27,508(14.2%)

	20	District 20	18,460(9.12%)
	21	District 21	2,820(2.33%)
	22	District 22	3,795(1.89%)
	23	District 23	33,492(16.73%)
	24	District 24	12,501(5.99%)
	25	District 25	3,936(1.86%)
	26	District 26	8,549(4.04%)
	27	District 27	31,279(13.95%)
	28	District 28	7,000(3.3%)
	29	District 29	14,392(6.95%)
	30	District 30	26,258(12.54%)
	31	District 31	1,993(1%)
	32	District 32	11,848(5.39%)
	33	District 33	6,580(3.13%)
	34	District 34	19,608(9.32%)
	35	District 35	6,476(3.09%)
	36	District 36	1,231(0.58%)
	37	District 37	2,320(1.09%)
	38	District 38	4,737(2.18%)



#	Plan	Remark	Created Date	Owner	Tag	# of Comments	Attachment	District Shapes	Comment Link
183	9-28-21 v1 HD	Complete	2021-09-28	Admin User	Agency Uploaded	35	NO ATTACHMENT	<a href="#">Download</a>	<a href="#">Open</a>

**My Districting | MICHIGAN**  
Enterprise Redistricting Software & Services by Citygate GIS
9-28-21 V1 HD

**CENSUS LEGEND**

- Counties  
Labels visible at zoom level 10.
- Townships  
Labels visible at zoom level 13.
- Voting Precincts  
Labels visible at zoom level 15.
- Blocks  
Labels visible at zoom level 17.

CURRENT MAP ZOOM: 6

**Map Styles**

- District 1
- District 2
- District 3
- District 4
- District 5
- District 6
- District 7
- District 8
- District 9
- District 10

Hide Legends


Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)
	0	Unassign	0	0 (0%)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Draft State House Map 183  
9-28-21 v1 HD  
264a









Draft State House Map 183

Map 9-28-21 V1 HD

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Keyboard shortcuts



Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	0	Unassign	0	0 (0%)	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
	1	District 1	91,612	-1,382 (-1.51%)	90,230	23,435(25.97%)	24,504(27.16%)	1,114(1.23%)	1,107(1.23%)	124(0.14%)	949(1.05%)	42,287(46.87%)	64,947	18,709(28.81%)	18,591(28.62%)	839(1.29%)	918(1.41%)	81(0.12%)	661(1.02%)	27,228(41.92%)
	2	District 2	91,612	-171 (-0.19%)	91,441	29,273(32.01%)	50,414(55.13%)	1,006(1.1%)	11,196(12.24%)	106(0.12%)	1,078(1.18%)	2,462(2.69%)	70,355	22,293(31.69%)	39,295(55.85%)	767(1.09%)	8,213(11.67%)	82(0.12%)	767(1.09%)	1,698(2.41%)
	3	District 3	91,612	509 (0.56%)	92,121	81,821(88.2%)	4,623(5.02%)	624(0.68%)	4,228(4.59%)	74(0.08%)	1,643(1.78%)	3,062(3.32%)	65,953	58,028(87.98%)	3,501(5.31%)	482(0.73%)	3,171(4.81%)	32(0.05%)	1,056(1.6%)	2,158(3.27%)
	4	District 4	91,612	257 (0.28%)	91,869	49,427(53.8%)	38,927(42.37%)	1,081(1.18%)	2,389(2.6%)	78(0.08%)	920(1%)	2,370(2.58%)	75,064	40,116(53.44%)	32,085(42.74%)	811(1.08%)	1,877(2.5%)	57(0.08%)	686(0.91%)	1,623(2.16%)
	5	District 5	91,612	2,913 (3.18%)	94,525	68,835(72.82%)	8,174(8.65%)	2,176(2.3%)	1,858(1.97%)	105(0.11%)	1,354(1.43%)	16,861(17.84%)	73,119	55,368(75.72%)	5,702(7.8%)	1,679(2.3%)	1,372(1.88%)	73(0.1%)	942(1.29%)	11,089(15.17%)
	6	District 6	91,612	2,973 (3.25%)	94,585	27,276(28.84%)	65,746(69.51%)	1,184(1.25%)	934(0.99%)	66(0.07%)	800(0.85%)	1,813(1.92%)	71,442	23,239(32.53%)	46,908(65.66%)	899(1.26%)	717(1%)	40(0.06%)	508(0.71%)	1,151(1.61%)
	7	District 7	91,612	-2,022 (-2.21%)	89,590	71,535(79.85%)	11,202(12.5%)	1,164(1.3%)	2,330(2.6%)	79(0.09%)	1,199(1.34%)	5,751(6.42%)	66,350	53,734(80.99%)	7,617(11.48%)	897(1.35%)	1,707(2.57%)	60(0.09%)	861(1.3%)	3,826(5.77%)
	8	District 8	91,612	-799 (-0.87%)	90,813	36,458(40.15%)	51,627(56.85%)	1,558(1.72%)	1,935(2.13%)	96(0.11%)	1,099(1.21%)	2,536(2.79%)	73,539	31,381(42.67%)	39,776(54.09%)	1,231(1.67%)	1,489(2.02%)	63(0.09%)	799(1.09%)	1,839(2.5%)
	9	District 9	91,612	-1,080 (-1.18%)	90,532	80,151(88.53%)	3,786(4.18%)	2,149(2.37%)	1,733(1.91%)	79(0.09%)	1,303(1.44%)	5,536(6.11%)	73,547	65,925(89.64%)	2,707(3.68%)	1,655(2.25%)	1,227(1.67%)	59(0.08%)	960(1.31%)	3,784(5.15%)
	10	District 10	91,612	3,539 (3.86%)	95,151	41,183(43.28%)	37,922(39.85%)	1,244(1.31%)	15,702(16.5%)	81(0.09%)	1,025(1.08%)	1,952(2.05%)	72,334	33,236(45.95%)	27,723(38.33%)	954(1.32%)	10,899(15.07%)	51(0.07%)	719(0.99%)	1,303(1.8%)
	11	District 11	91,612	1,160 (1.27%)	92,772	45,906(49.48%)	44,739(48.22%)	1,896(2.04%)	1,626(1.75%)	73(0.08%)	1,237(1.33%)	2,250(2.43%)	70,522	37,666(53.41%)	30,845(43.74%)	1,456(2.06%)	1,082(1.53%)	50(0.07%)	900(1.28%)	1,449(2.05%)
	12	District 12	91,612	-1,274 (-1.39%)	90,338	39,757(44.01%)	45,904(50.81%)	1,562(1.73%)	4,239(4.69%)	87(0.1%)	1,052(1.16%)	2,057(2.28%)	68,451	32,576(47.59%)	32,130(46.94%)	1,174(1.72%)	2,983(4.36%)	60(0.09%)	727(1.06%)	1,374(2.01%)
	13	District 13	91,612	-2,801 (-3.06%)	88,811	73,866(83.17%)	11,992(13.5%)	1,772(2%)	1,689(1.9%)	78(0.09%)	1,129(1.27%)	2,390(2.69%)	73,143	62,017(84.79%)	8,618(11.78%)	1,313(1.8%)	1,267(1.73%)	58(0.08%)	870(1.19%)	1,605(2.19%)
	14	District 14	91,612	-1,079 (-1.18%)	90,533	19,756(21.82%)	69,129(76.36%)	1,113(1.23%)	834(0.92%)	87(0.1%)	866(0.96%)	1,912(2.11%)	69,099	16,293(23.58%)	51,618(74.7%)	844(1.22%)	635(0.92%)	54(0.08%)	613(0.89%)	1,185(1.71%)
	15	District 15	91,612	-3,012 (-3.29%)	88,600	27,471(31.01%)	57,675(65.1%)	1,253(1.41%)	1,210(1.37%)	82(0.09%)	893(1.01%)	3,815(4.31%)	65,157	21,458(32.93%)	41,231(63.28%)	921(1.41%)	782(1.2%)	63(0.1%)	606(0.93%)	2,459(3.77%)
	16	District 16	91,612	2,760 (3.01%)	94,372	67,120(71.12%)	17,945(19.02%)	2,301(2.44%)	3,659(3.88%)	112(0.12%)	1,401(1.48%)	7,125(7.55%)	73,856	54,818(74.22%)	12,068(16.34%)	1,806(2.45%)	2,656(3.6%)	79(0.11%)	1,055(1.43%)	4,742(6.42%)
	17	District 17	91,612	-1,124 (-1.23%)	90,488	23,652(26.14%)	65,117(71.96%)	1,561(1.73%)	890(0.98%)	57(0.06%)	995(1.1%)	2,103(2.32%)	68,780	19,549(28.42%)	47,655(69.29%)	1,141(1.66%)	717(1.04%)	41(0.06%)	708(1.03%)	1,383(2.01%)
	18	District 18	91,612	-969 (-1.06%)	90,643	17,449(19.25%)	72,035(79.47%)	1,014(1.12%)	859(0.95%)	57(0.06%)	969(1.07%)	1,361(1.5%)	69,856	13,703(19.62%)	55,214(79.04%)	764(1.09%)	632(0.9%)	40(0.06%)	704(1.01%)	916(1.31%)
	19	District 19	91,612	-212 (-0.23%)	91,400	84,642(92.61%)	3,943(4.31%)	1,978(2.16%)	1,281(1.4%)	58(0.06%)	1,201(1.31%)	2,434(2.66%)	73,151	68,304(93.37%)	2,634(3.6%)	1,424(1.95%)	871(1.19%)	34(0.05%)	912(1.25%)	1,593(2.18%)
	20	District 20	91,612	-1,291 (-1.41%)	90,321	70,488(78.04%)	16,428(18.19%)	1,735(1.92%)	2,212(2.45%)	75(0.08%)	1,208(1.34%)	2,902(3.21%)	72,844	58,502(80.31%)	11,400(15.65%)	1,324(1.82%)	1,651(2.27%)	58(0.08%)	857(1.18%)	1,921(2.64%)
	21	District 21	91,612	-1,189 (-1.3%)	90,423	37,247(41.19%)	50,482(55.83%)	1,047(1.16%)	1,954(2.16%)	62(0.07%)	1,059(1.17%)	1,966(2.17%)	71,233	29,338(41.19%)	39,830(55.92%)	831(1.17%)	1,398(1.96%)	46(0.06%)	736(1.03%)	1,361(1.91%)
	22	District 22	91,612	634 (0.69%)	92,246	50,412(54.65%)	35,911(38.93%)	859(0.93%)	4,917(5.33%)	77(0.08%)	1,165(1.26%)	2,430(2.63%)	74,302	40,061(53.92%)	29,467(39.66%)	663(0.89%)	3,695(4.97%)	64(0.09%)	840(1.13%)	1,687(2.27%)

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Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	23	District 23	91,612	-37 (-0.04%)	91,575	79,264(86.56%)	5,449(5.95%)	1,357(1.48%)	5,113(5.58%)	89(0.1%)	1,266(1.38%)	3,311(3.62%)	77,478	67,396(86.99%)	4,204(5.43%)	1,096(1.41%)	4,132(5.33%)	58(0.07%)	908(1.17%)	2,441(3.15%)
	24	District 24	91,612	3,971 (4.33%)	95,583	59,741(62.5%)	17,655(18.47%)	996(1.04%)	16,566(17.33%)	70(0.07%)	1,309(1.37%)	3,014(3.15%)	78,055	49,841(63.85%)	13,980(17.91%)	743(0.95%)	12,695(16.26%)	47(0.06%)	984(1.26%)	2,137(2.74%)
	25	District 25	91,612	-656 (-0.72%)	90,956	71,952(79.11%)	10,120(11.13%)	899(0.99%)	7,650(8.41%)	81(0.09%)	1,314(1.44%)	2,406(2.65%)	72,926	57,941(79.45%)	7,894(10.82%)	622(0.85%)	5,893(8.08%)	57(0.08%)	987(1.35%)	1,634(2.24%)
	26	District 26	91,612	2,175 (2.37%)	93,787	62,496(66.64%)	4,191(4.47%)	883(0.94%)	25,149(26.82%)	55(0.06%)	1,195(1.27%)	3,171(3.38%)	73,492	50,710(69%)	3,058(4.16%)	610(0.83%)	18,044(24.55%)	43(0.06%)	813(1.11%)	2,155(2.93%)
	27	District 27	91,612	1,755 (1.92%)	93,367	52,463(56.19%)	37,431(40.09%)	2,297(2.46%)	1,346(1.44%)	81(0.09%)	1,187(1.27%)	4,315(4.62%)	71,669	41,954(58.54%)	26,453(36.91%)	1,767(2.47%)	1,047(1.46%)	45(0.06%)	843(1.18%)	2,937(4.1%)
	28	District 28	91,612	523 (0.57%)	92,135	50,798(55.13%)	37,942(41.18%)	2,003(2.17%)	886(0.96%)	91(0.1%)	1,065(1.16%)	4,157(4.51%)	70,311	40,308(57.33%)	27,167(38.64%)	1,553(2.21%)	622(0.88%)	69(0.1%)	773(1.1%)	2,750(3.91%)
	29	District 29	91,612	-1,803 (-1.97%)	89,809	49,724(55.37%)	36,755(40.93%)	2,099(2.34%)	1,454(1.62%)	106(0.12%)	1,232(1.37%)	3,750(4.18%)	69,124	40,053(57.94%)	26,181(37.88%)	1,620(2.34%)	1,138(1.65%)	70(0.1%)	896(1.3%)	2,483(3.59%)
	30	District 30	91,612	674 (0.74%)	92,286	72,543(78.61%)	7,291(7.9%)	1,292(1.4%)	9,028(9.78%)	71(0.08%)	1,410(1.53%)	4,770(5.17%)	73,602	58,330(79.25%)	5,652(7.68%)	985(1.34%)	6,917(9.4%)	51(0.07%)	1,005(1.37%)	3,209(4.36%)
	31	District 31	91,612	-1,174 (-1.28%)	90,438	45,697(50.53%)	33,014(36.5%)	1,414(1.56%)	1,454(1.61%)	105(0.12%)	1,103(1.22%)	11,982(13.25%)	69,020	37,474(54.29%)	23,182(33.59%)	1,085(1.57%)	1,093(1.58%)	72(0.1%)	758(1.1%)	7,811(11.32%)
	32	District 32	91,612	496 (0.54%)	92,108	85,757(93.1%)	1,722(1.87%)	2,025(2.2%)	2,240(2.43%)	129(0.14%)	1,430(1.55%)	2,847(3.09%)	72,431	67,993(93.87%)	1,017(1.4%)	1,482(2.05%)	1,560(2.15%)	86(0.12%)	1,052(1.45%)	1,786(2.47%)
	33	District 33	91,612	-395 (-0.43%)	91,217	63,204(69.29%)	20,328(22.29%)	2,149(2.36%)	5,164(5.66%)	68(0.07%)	1,337(1.47%)	4,036(4.42%)	73,826	52,338(70.89%)	15,109(20.47%)	1,643(2.23%)	4,103(5.56%)	54(0.07%)	1,030(1.4%)	2,782(3.77%)
	34	District 34	91,612	2,585 (2.82%)	94,197	87,828(93.24%)	1,855(1.97%)	1,937(2.06%)	1,908(2.03%)	62(0.07%)	1,582(1.68%)	3,300(3.5%)	74,525	70,026(93.96%)	1,207(1.62%)	1,478(1.98%)	1,333(1.79%)	50(0.07%)	1,155(1.55%)	2,055(2.76%)
	35	District 35	91,612	1,492 (1.63%)	93,104	82,708(88.83%)	3,787(4.07%)	1,284(1.38%)	4,479(4.81%)	60(0.06%)	1,136(1.22%)	3,162(3.4%)	76,532	68,481(89.48%)	2,893(3.78%)	995(1.3%)	3,336(4.36%)	34(0.04%)	842(1.1%)	2,191(2.86%)
	36	District 36	91,612	-539 (-0.59%)	91,073	60,340(66.25%)	4,830(5.3%)	738(0.81%)	23,838(26.17%)	49(0.05%)	1,224(1.34%)	3,343(3.67%)	69,707	48,005(68.87%)	3,525(5.06%)	546(0.78%)	16,245(23.3%)	34(0.05%)	819(1.17%)	2,275(3.26%)
	37	District 37	91,612	138 (0.15%)	91,750	75,736(82.55%)	6,741(7.35%)	1,472(1.6%)	6,463(7.04%)	83(0.09%)	1,463(1.59%)	3,906(4.26%)	72,047	60,195(83.55%)	5,026(6.98%)	1,094(1.52%)	4,679(6.49%)	65(0.09%)	1,006(1.4%)	2,549(3.54%)
	38	District 38	91,612	193 (0.21%)	91,805	71,134(77.48%)	3,833(4.18%)	1,039(1.13%)	13,782(15.01%)	69(0.08%)	1,404(1.53%)	4,303(4.69%)	71,848	56,609(78.79%)	2,881(4.01%)	777(1.08%)	9,898(13.78%)	46(0.06%)	969(1.35%)	2,857(3.98%)
	39	District 39	91,612	-2,297 (-2.51%)	89,315	39,128(43.81%)	33,598(37.62%)	1,522(1.7%)	2,535(2.84%)	81(0.09%)	1,048(1.17%)	15,851(17.75%)	68,482	32,855(47.98%)	24,184(35.31%)	1,145(1.67%)	1,889(2.76%)	65(0.09%)	766(1.12%)	10,209(14.91%)
	40	District 40	91,612	537 (0.59%)	92,149	81,519(88.46%)	3,809(4.13%)	1,707(1.85%)	2,272(2.47%)	44(0.05%)	1,368(1.48%)	5,600(6.08%)	73,775	66,153(89.67%)	2,622(3.55%)	1,354(1.84%)	1,568(2.13%)	39(0.05%)	979(1.33%)	3,721(5.04%)
	41	District 41	91,612	-755 (-0.82%)	90,857	74,371(81.86%)	6,058(6.67%)	978(1.08%)	9,221(10.15%)	95(0.1%)	1,047(1.15%)	2,487(2.74%)	73,234	60,522(82.64%)	4,337(5.92%)	750(1.02%)	7,340(10.02%)	57(0.08%)	735(1%)	1,742(2.38%)
	42	District 42	91,612	993 (1.08%)	92,605	75,422(81.44%)	9,808(10.59%)	1,298(1.4%)	6,474(6.99%)	73(0.08%)	1,054(1.14%)	2,214(2.39%)	75,134	61,977(82.49%)	7,295(9.71%)	948(1.26%)	4,856(6.46%)	52(0.07%)	786(1.05%)	1,573(2.09%)
	43	District 43	91,612	-581 (-0.63%)	91,031	77,728(85.39%)	7,596(8.34%)	1,226(1.35%)	4,042(4.44%)	64(0.07%)	1,273(1.4%)	2,941(3.23%)	71,033	61,187(86.14%)	5,543(7.8%)	896(1.26%)	2,856(4.02%)	36(0.05%)	882(1.24%)	1,912(2.69%)
	44	District 44	91,612	-132 (-0.14%)	91,480	59,653(65.21%)	10,313(11.27%)	1,233(1.35%)	19,685(21.52%)	68(0.07%)	1,286(1.41%)	3,377(3.69%)	69,996	46,524(66.47%)	7,419(10.6%)	900(1.29%)	14,245(20.35%)	47(0.07%)	896(1.28%)	2,302(3.29%)
	45	District 45	91,612	-565 (-0.62%)	91,047	82,207(90.29%)	2,945(3.23%)	1,054(1.16%)	4,207(4.62%)	63(0.07%)	1,125(1.24%)	2,655(2.92%)	71,691	65,209(90.96%)	2,097(2.93%)	785(1.09%)	2,977(4.15%)	48(0.07%)	773(1.08%)	1,792(2.5%)

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Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	46	District 46	91,612	426 (0.47%)	92,038	87,459(95.02%)	1,121(1.22%)	1,684(1.83%)	1,583(1.72%)	88(0.1%)	1,336(1.45%)	2,438(2.65%)	73,386	70,081(95.5%)	758(1.03%)	1,311(1.79%)	1,055(1.44%)	45(0.06%)	954(1.3%)	1,581(2.15%)
	47	District 47	91,612	1,859 (2.03%)	93,471	85,151(91.1%)	1,968(2.11%)	1,630(1.74%)	3,090(3.31%)	52(0.06%)	1,404(1.5%)	4,141(4.43%)	71,979	66,317(92.13%)	1,244(1.73%)	1,178(1.64%)	2,084(2.9%)	33(0.05%)	972(1.35%)	2,584(3.59%)
	48	District 48	91,612	1,435 (1.57%)	93,047	85,275(91.65%)	2,782(2.99%)	1,909(2.05%)	683(0.73%)	89(0.1%)	1,265(1.36%)	4,709(5.06%)	73,300	67,821(92.53%)	2,022(2.76%)	1,402(1.91%)	430(0.59%)	59(0.08%)	953(1.3%)	3,013(4.11%)
	49	District 49	91,612	980 (1.07%)	92,592	84,108(90.84%)	5,086(5.49%)	2,121(2.29%)	973(1.05%)	70(0.08%)	1,245(1.34%)	3,725(4.02%)	72,928	66,975(91.84%)	3,095(4.24%)	1,503(2.06%)	700(0.96%)	47(0.06%)	885(1.21%)	2,369(3.25%)
	50	District 50	91,612	-826 (-0.9%)	90,786	86,657(95.45%)	647(0.71%)	1,614(1.78%)	472(0.52%)	56(0.06%)	997(1.1%)	3,061(3.37%)	71,801	68,995(96.09%)	344(0.48%)	1,155(1.61%)	306(0.43%)	33(0.05%)	702(0.98%)	1,999(2.78%)
	51	District 51	91,612	908 (0.99%)	92,520	79,038(85.43%)	5,229(5.65%)	4,034(4.36%)	1,734(1.87%)	92(0.1%)	1,002(1.08%)	5,400(5.84%)	73,959	63,756(86.2%)	4,311(5.83%)	2,864(3.87%)	1,301(1.76%)	68(0.09%)	766(1.04%)	3,526(4.77%)
	52	District 52	91,612	2,270 (2.48%)	93,882	81,824(87.16%)	7,144(7.61%)	2,185(2.33%)	2,348(2.5%)	91(0.1%)	1,356(1.44%)	3,751(4%)	73,619	64,845(88.08%)	5,056(6.87%)	1,602(2.18%)	1,707(2.32%)	56(0.08%)	992(1.35%)	2,373(3.22%)
	53	District 53	91,612	-3,648 (-3.98%)	87,964	82,482(93.77%)	2,285(2.6%)	2,318(2.64%)	758(0.86%)	52(0.06%)	1,362(1.55%)	2,933(3.33%)	70,139	66,197(94.38%)	1,632(2.33%)	1,774(2.53%)	487(0.69%)	35(0.05%)	1,029(1.47%)	1,846(2.63%)
	54	District 54	91,612	-1,119 (-1.22%)	90,493	81,819(90.41%)	3,374(3.73%)	1,863(2.06%)	794(0.88%)	48(0.05%)	1,188(1.31%)	5,489(6.07%)	71,846	65,874(91.69%)	2,209(3.07%)	1,375(1.91%)	547(0.76%)	22(0.03%)	820(1.14%)	3,413(4.75%)
	55	District 55	91,612	1,538 (1.68%)	93,150	88,619(95.14%)	886(0.95%)	2,084(2.24%)	1,194(1.28%)	145(0.16%)	1,272(1.37%)	2,810(3.02%)	72,169	68,961(95.55%)	495(0.69%)	1,529(2.12%)	821(1.14%)	103(0.14%)	886(1.23%)	1,837(2.55%)
	56	District 56	91,612	3,164 (3.45%)	94,776	87,982(92.83%)	3,195(3.37%)	2,274(2.4%)	1,353(1.43%)	86(0.09%)	1,286(1.36%)	3,037(3.2%)	74,876	70,205(93.76%)	2,042(2.73%)	1,720(2.3%)	939(1.25%)	50(0.07%)	959(1.28%)	1,907(2.55%)
	57	District 57	91,612	-700 (-0.76%)	90,912	82,872(91.16%)	2,753(3.03%)	1,493(1.64%)	1,475(1.62%)	74(0.08%)	1,011(1.11%)	4,285(4.71%)	72,810	67,101(92.16%)	1,888(2.59%)	1,075(1.48%)	1,075(1.48%)	43(0.06%)	783(1.08%)	2,816(3.87%)
	58	District 58	91,612	3,855 (4.21%)	95,467	89,058(93.29%)	2,157(2.26%)	1,940(2.03%)	703(0.74%)	35(0.04%)	1,360(1.42%)	3,852(4.03%)	75,803	71,383(94.17%)	1,305(1.72%)	1,493(1.97%)	517(0.68%)	15(0.02%)	1,020(1.35%)	2,532(3.34%)
	59	District 59	91,612	-810 (-0.88%)	90,802	86,463(95.22%)	1,170(1.29%)	2,124(2.34%)	818(0.9%)	90(0.1%)	1,376(1.52%)	2,773(3.05%)	71,474	68,511(95.85%)	612(0.86%)	1,592(2.23%)	520(0.73%)	62(0.09%)	1,025(1.43%)	1,780(2.49%)
	60	District 60	91,612	-3,066 (-3.35%)	88,546	85,320(96.36%)	786(0.89%)	2,154(2.43%)	538(0.61%)	63(0.07%)	1,098(1.24%)	1,859(2.1%)	72,112	69,864(96.88%)	433(0.6%)	1,664(2.31%)	383(0.53%)	28(0.04%)	864(1.2%)	1,189(1.65%)
	61	District 61	91,612	-996 (-1.09%)	90,616	79,397(87.62%)	5,947(6.56%)	2,497(2.76%)	1,452(1.6%)	51(0.06%)	1,381(1.52%)	4,886(5.39%)	70,744	63,017(89.08%)	3,730(5.27%)	1,852(2.62%)	1,024(1.45%)	32(0.05%)	998(1.41%)	3,195(4.52%)
	62	District 62	91,612	1,142 (1.25%)	92,754	87,545(94.38%)	1,771(1.91%)	2,156(2.32%)	892(0.96%)	60(0.06%)	1,205(1.3%)	3,150(3.4%)	73,059	69,494(95.12%)	1,139(1.56%)	1,608(2.2%)	568(0.78%)	43(0.06%)	867(1.19%)	1,966(2.69%)
	63	District 63	91,612	-481 (-0.53%)	91,131	79,499(87.24%)	3,465(3.8%)	2,098(2.3%)	861(0.94%)	37(0.04%)	1,102(1.21%)	8,117(8.91%)	72,029	63,802(88.58%)	2,505(3.48%)	1,582(2.2%)	583(0.81%)	24(0.03%)	841(1.17%)	5,257(7.3%)
	64	District 64	91,612	-1,004 (-1.1%)	90,608	84,481(93.24%)	1,871(2.06%)	1,972(2.18%)	832(0.92%)	70(0.08%)	1,096(1.21%)	3,755(4.14%)	69,603	65,370(93.92%)	1,404(2.02%)	1,485(2.13%)	568(0.82%)	45(0.06%)	798(1.15%)	2,264(3.25%)
	65	District 65	91,612	594 (0.65%)	92,206	81,821(88.74%)	3,853(4.18%)	2,036(2.21%)	1,028(1.11%)	73(0.08%)	1,482(1.61%)	6,403(6.94%)	70,733	63,887(90.32%)	2,484(3.51%)	1,493(2.11%)	694(0.98%)	39(0.06%)	1,063(1.5%)	3,813(5.39%)
	66	District 66	91,612	-5 (-0.01%)	91,607	68,663(74.95%)	18,420(20.11%)	2,371(2.59%)	1,982(2.16%)	108(0.12%)	1,498(1.64%)	3,985(4.35%)	71,987	54,893(76.25%)	13,470(18.71%)	1,793(2.49%)	1,443(2%)	69(0.1%)	1,139(1.58%)	2,635(3.66%)
	67	District 67	91,612	449 (0.49%)	92,061	84,473(91.76%)	2,259(2.45%)	1,660(1.8%)	3,259(3.54%)	72(0.08%)	1,410(1.53%)	3,363(3.65%)	72,617	67,305(92.68%)	1,441(1.98%)	1,221(1.68%)	2,234(3.08%)	63(0.09%)	967(1.33%)	2,017(2.78%)
	68	District 68	91,612	-498 (-0.54%)	91,114	54,604(59.93%)	29,000(31.83%)	1,828(2.01%)	4,658(5.11%)	193(0.21%)	1,603(1.76%)	5,941(6.52%)	72,403	45,302(62.57%)	20,852(28.8%)	1,453(2.01%)	3,617(5%)	139(0.19%)	1,215(1.68%)	4,135(5.71%)

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Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	69	District 69	91,612	-1,963 (-2.14%)	89,649	63,042(70.32%)	10,262(11.45%)	1,279(1.43%)	13,016(14.52%)	129(0.14%)	1,436(1.6%)	5,807(6.48%)	72,880	51,914(71.23%)	7,883(10.82%)	976(1.34%)	10,038(13.77%)	91(0.12%)	1,026(1.41%)	4,197(5.76%)
	70	District 70	91,612	-1,821 (-1.99%)	89,791	63,203(70.39%)	5,879(6.55%)	737(0.82%)	18,754(20.89%)	158(0.18%)	1,568(1.75%)	4,578(5.1%)	78,653	55,608(70.7%)	4,976(6.33%)	600(0.76%)	16,009(20.35%)	138(0.18%)	1,286(1.64%)	3,773(4.8%)
	71	District 71	91,612	2,106 (2.3%)	93,718	75,476(80.54%)	14,600(15.58%)	2,136(2.28%)	1,616(1.72%)	72(0.08%)	1,220(1.3%)	4,377(4.67%)	73,553	60,084(81.69%)	10,243(13.93%)	1,618(2.2%)	1,151(1.56%)	57(0.08%)	844(1.15%)	2,682(3.65%)
	72	District 72	91,612	586 (0.64%)	92,198	84,503(91.65%)	4,170(4.52%)	2,038(2.21%)	743(0.81%)	55(0.06%)	1,055(1.14%)	3,439(3.73%)	71,982	66,650(92.59%)	2,710(3.76%)	1,502(2.09%)	509(0.71%)	41(0.06%)	792(1.1%)	2,188(3.04%)
	73	District 73	91,612	155 (0.17%)	91,767	84,325(91.89%)	3,970(4.33%)	2,287(2.49%)	1,414(1.54%)	70(0.08%)	1,365(1.49%)	2,888(3.15%)	71,423	66,398(92.96%)	2,413(3.38%)	1,669(2.34%)	975(1.37%)	50(0.07%)	998(1.4%)	1,770(2.48%)
	74	District 74	91,612	3,203 (3.5%)	94,815	62,635(66.06%)	24,269(25.6%)	2,081(2.19%)	2,816(2.97%)	119(0.13%)	1,495(1.58%)	8,073(8.51%)	75,142	52,098(69.33%)	16,318(21.72%)	1,565(2.08%)	2,364(3.15%)	81(0.11%)	1,150(1.53%)	5,469(7.28%)
	75	District 75	91,612	-2,368 (-2.58%)	89,244	67,223(75.32%)	14,638(16.4%)	2,268(2.54%)	3,924(4.4%)	103(0.12%)	1,200(1.34%)	5,699(6.39%)	68,391	53,148(77.71%)	9,702(14.19%)	1,679(2.46%)	2,631(3.85%)	62(0.09%)	834(1.22%)	3,581(5.24%)
	76	District 76	91,612	-583 (-0.64%)	91,029	75,577(83.03%)	8,673(9.53%)	1,376(1.51%)	3,578(3.93%)	124(0.14%)	1,084(1.19%)	5,082(5.58%)	71,137	60,355(84.84%)	5,735(8.06%)	1,000(1.41%)	2,390(3.36%)	75(0.11%)	704(0.99%)	3,314(4.66%)
	77	District 77	91,612	-3,377 (-3.69%)	88,235	68,818(77.99%)	8,344(9.46%)	1,784(2.02%)	2,304(2.61%)	123(0.14%)	1,109(1.26%)	10,198(11.56%)	72,088	58,298(80.87%)	5,639(7.82%)	1,355(1.88%)	1,830(2.54%)	90(0.12%)	827(1.15%)	6,907(9.58%)
	78	District 78	91,612	-2,535 (-2.77%)	89,077	81,295(91.26%)	1,745(1.96%)	1,121(1.26%)	2,206(2.48%)	92(0.1%)	989(1.11%)	4,746(5.33%)	65,246	60,290(92.4%)	941(1.44%)	708(1.09%)	1,367(2.1%)	74(0.11%)	591(0.91%)	2,819(4.32%)
	79	District 79	91,612	-1,461 (-1.59%)	90,151	40,742(45.19%)	27,051(30.01%)	1,191(1.32%)	3,465(3.84%)	84(0.09%)	1,031(1.14%)	20,785(23.06%)	66,874	33,732(50.44%)	18,553(27.74%)	888(1.33%)	2,490(3.72%)	53(0.08%)	712(1.06%)	12,865(19.24%)
	80	District 80	91,612	972 (1.06%)	92,584	61,426(66.35%)	8,839(9.55%)	1,504(1.62%)	3,381(3.65%)	96(0.1%)	1,043(1.13%)	20,651(22.31%)	70,652	49,512(70.08%)	5,788(8.19%)	1,099(1.56%)	2,563(3.63%)	64(0.09%)	722(1.02%)	13,354(18.9%)
	81	District 81	91,612	-1,401 (-1.53%)	90,211	74,645(82.74%)	8,142(9.03%)	1,578(1.75%)	5,088(5.64%)	93(0.1%)	1,299(1.44%)	4,124(4.57%)	69,763	58,712(84.16%)	5,411(7.76%)	1,151(1.65%)	3,543(5.08%)	63(0.09%)	853(1.22%)	2,691(3.86%)
	82	District 82	91,612	312 (0.34%)	91,924	77,851(84.69%)	7,309(7.95%)	2,707(2.94%)	2,081(2.26%)	147(0.16%)	1,564(1.7%)	5,680(6.18%)	72,730	62,696(86.2%)	5,063(6.96%)	1,906(2.62%)	1,567(2.15%)	103(0.14%)	1,155(1.59%)	3,542(4.87%)
	83	District 83	91,612	-333 (-0.36%)	91,279	62,968(68.98%)	3,456(3.79%)	1,070(1.17%)	5,889(6.45%)	150(0.16%)	950(1.04%)	20,288(22.23%)	70,195	50,968(72.61%)	2,107(3%)	795(1.13%)	4,288(6.11%)	95(0.14%)	698(0.99%)	13,201(18.81%)
	84	District 84	91,612	-712 (-0.78%)	90,900	83,407(91.76%)	2,117(2.33%)	1,736(1.91%)	1,887(2.08%)	84(0.09%)	1,249(1.37%)	4,199(4.62%)	71,051	66,009(92.9%)	1,297(1.83%)	1,208(1.7%)	1,225(1.72%)	52(0.07%)	896(1.26%)	2,613(3.68%)
	85	District 85	91,612	2,097 (2.29%)	93,709	63,428(67.69%)	24,435(26.08%)	2,535(2.71%)	901(0.96%)	111(0.12%)	1,406(1.5%)	6,386(6.81%)	72,516	50,910(70.21%)	17,221(23.75%)	1,860(2.56%)	620(0.85%)	67(0.09%)	993(1.37%)	4,008(5.53%)
	86	District 86	91,612	-842 (-0.92%)	90,770	82,721(91.13%)	2,644(2.91%)	1,850(2.04%)	1,253(1.38%)	90(0.1%)	1,209(1.33%)	4,749(5.23%)	70,334	64,616(91.87%)	1,837(2.61%)	1,350(1.92%)	891(1.27%)	49(0.07%)	861(1.22%)	3,061(4.35%)
	87	District 87	91,612	1,488 (1.62%)	93,100	66,748(71.69%)	12,324(13.24%)	1,169(1.26%)	8,754(9.4%)	74(0.08%)	1,208(1.3%)	6,994(7.51%)	69,820	51,794(74.18%)	8,145(11.67%)	844(1.21%)	6,106(8.75%)	42(0.06%)	787(1.13%)	4,310(6.17%)
	88	District 88	91,612	-24 (-0.03%)	91,588	64,901(70.86%)	18,206(19.88%)	2,061(2.25%)	2,251(2.46%)	79(0.09%)	1,413(1.54%)	6,962(7.6%)	70,747	52,651(74.42%)	12,405(17.53%)	1,477(2.09%)	1,585(2.24%)	54(0.08%)	1,041(1.47%)	4,170(5.89%)
	89	District 89	91,612	-986 (-1.08%)	90,626	75,596(83.42%)	3,694(4.08%)	2,319(2.56%)	994(1.1%)	77(0.08%)	1,313(1.45%)	10,937(12.07%)	70,468	60,667(86.09%)	2,489(3.53%)	1,693(2.4%)	637(0.9%)	57(0.08%)	985(1.4%)	6,701(9.51%)
	90	District 90	91,612	1,104 (1.21%)	92,716	68,642(74.03%)	9,123(9.84%)	1,057(1.14%)	11,944(12.88%)	111(0.12%)	1,030(1.11%)	4,903(5.29%)	78,686	58,890(74.84%)	7,496(9.53%)	850(1.08%)	9,438(11.99%)	90(0.11%)	749(0.95%)	3,717(4.72%)
	91	District 91	91,612	-829 (-0.9%)	90,783	58,995(64.98%)	20,080(22.12%)	2,119(2.33%)	4,626(5.1%)	116(0.13%)	1,333(1.47%)	10,006(11.02%)	70,233	47,755(68%)	13,599(19.36%)	1,595(2.27%)	3,394(4.83%)	81(0.12%)	956(1.36%)	6,596(9.39%)





















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Color	#	Name	Target	Deviation	Total Population	NH White (Combo)	NH Black (Combo)	NH Native (Combo)	NH Asian (Combo)	NH Pac Islander (Combo)	NH Other (Combo)	Hispanic	Voting Age Population	VAP NH White (Combo)	VAP NH Black (Combo)	VAP NH Native (Combo)	VAP NH Asian (Combo)	VAP NH Pac Islander (Combo)	VAP NH Other (Combo)	VAP Hispanic
	92	District 92	91,612	-1,405 (-1.53%)	90,207	58,446(64.79%)	19,262(21.35%)	1,952(2.16%)	4,213(4.67%)	112(0.12%)	1,382(1.53%)	10,826(12%)	71,583	48,587(67.88%)	13,378(18.69%)	1,485(2.07%)	3,144(4.39%)	92(0.13%)	989(1.38%)	7,387(10.32%)
	93	District 93	91,612	1,030 (1.12%)	92,642	83,650(90.29%)	2,764(2.98%)	1,802(1.95%)	2,456(2.65%)	88(0.09%)	1,263(1.36%)	4,617(4.98%)	71,701	65,340(91.13%)	1,834(2.56%)	1,287(1.79%)	1,888(2.63%)	59(0.08%)	877(1.22%)	2,857(3.98%)
	94	District 94	91,612	441 (0.48%)	92,053	85,972(93.39%)	1,862(2.02%)	2,008(2.18%)	999(1.09%)	98(0.11%)	1,234(1.34%)	3,799(4.13%)	71,736	67,628(94.27%)	1,052(1.47%)	1,501(2.09%)	712(0.99%)	53(0.07%)	903(1.26%)	2,382(3.32%)
	95	District 95	91,612	139 (0.15%)	91,751	87,368(95.22%)	1,907(2.08%)	2,364(2.58%)	703(0.77%)	58(0.06%)	1,312(1.43%)	2,010(2.19%)	72,641	69,415(95.56%)	1,212(1.67%)	1,789(2.46%)	549(0.76%)	39(0.05%)	990(1.36%)	1,370(1.89%)
	96	District 96	91,612	-2,135 (-2.33%)	89,477	84,019(93.9%)	1,548(1.73%)	2,084(2.33%)	854(0.95%)	66(0.07%)	1,266(1.41%)	3,491(3.9%)	68,232	64,704(94.83%)	823(1.21%)	1,482(2.17%)	503(0.74%)	46(0.07%)	935(1.37%)	2,119(3.11%)
	97	District 97	91,612	705 (0.77%)	92,317	78,062(84.56%)	6,020(6.52%)	1,640(1.78%)	4,106(4.45%)	131(0.14%)	1,122(1.22%)	5,382(5.83%)	67,934	58,494(86.1%)	3,725(5.48%)	1,113(1.64%)	2,762(4.07%)	83(0.12%)	745(1.1%)	3,221(4.74%)
	98	District 98	91,612	3,181 (3.47%)	94,793	86,096(90.83%)	4,043(4.27%)	1,659(1.75%)	759(0.8%)	62(0.07%)	1,045(1.1%)	4,389(4.63%)	73,528	66,822(90.88%)	3,485(4.74%)	1,208(1.64%)	427(0.58%)	55(0.07%)	742(1.01%)	2,770(3.77%)
	99	District 99	91,612	-4,303 (-4.7%)	87,309	79,486(91.04%)	2,353(2.7%)	1,433(1.64%)	1,451(1.66%)	74(0.08%)	1,271(1.46%)	4,973(5.7%)	65,555	60,554(92.37%)	1,354(2.07%)	956(1.46%)	881(1.34%)	45(0.07%)	871(1.33%)	2,976(4.54%)
	100	District 100	91,612	290 (0.32%)	91,902	85,063(92.56%)	2,884(3.14%)	1,791(1.95%)	712(0.77%)	85(0.09%)	1,323(1.44%)	3,584(3.9%)	71,563	66,340(92.7%)	2,347(3.28%)	1,300(1.82%)	441(0.62%)	50(0.07%)	947(1.32%)	2,368(3.31%)
	101	District 101	91,612	1,699 (1.85%)	93,311	85,248(91.36%)	2,179(2.34%)	2,279(2.44%)	747(0.8%)	109(0.12%)	1,401(1.5%)	5,462(5.85%)	72,787	67,047(92.11%)	1,438(1.98%)	1,681(2.31%)	481(0.66%)	63(0.09%)	1,048(1.44%)	3,688(5.07%)
	102	District 102	91,612	2,255 (2.46%)	93,867	84,295(89.8%)	1,795(1.91%)	2,913(3.1%)	679(0.72%)	83(0.09%)	1,385(1.48%)	6,824(7.27%)	74,579	68,194(91.44%)	1,156(1.55%)	2,141(2.87%)	449(0.6%)	44(0.06%)	1,040(1.39%)	4,226(5.67%)
	103	District 103	91,612	-2,146 (-2.34%)	89,466	85,215(95.25%)	780(0.87%)	2,769(3.1%)	754(0.84%)	128(0.14%)	1,310(1.46%)	2,307(2.58%)	71,871	68,963(95.95%)	442(0.61%)	2,012(2.8%)	518(0.72%)	78(0.11%)	949(1.32%)	1,406(1.96%)
	104	District 104	91,612	1,814 (1.98%)	93,426	87,474(93.63%)	1,121(1.2%)	2,810(3.01%)	1,224(1.31%)	127(0.14%)	1,450(1.55%)	3,141(3.36%)	76,458	72,316(94.58%)	639(0.84%)	2,018(2.64%)	794(1.04%)	58(0.08%)	1,082(1.42%)	2,057(2.69%)
	105	District 105	91,612	-2,071 (-2.26%)	89,541	86,341(96.43%)	743(0.83%)	2,290(2.56%)	591(0.66%)	89(0.1%)	1,203(1.34%)	1,899(2.12%)	72,736	70,590(97.05%)	387(0.53%)	1,711(2.35%)	377(0.52%)	53(0.07%)	944(1.3%)	1,135(1.56%)
	106	District 106	91,612	-737 (-0.8%)	90,875	87,815(96.63%)	782(0.86%)	3,103(3.41%)	572(0.63%)	86(0.09%)	1,177(1.3%)	1,218(1.34%)	75,466	73,255(97.07%)	402(0.53%)	2,315(3.07%)	395(0.52%)	63(0.08%)	905(1.2%)	796(1.05%)
	107	District 107	91,612	1,089 (1.19%)	92,701	82,472(88.97%)	1,659(1.79%)	10,443(11.27%)	785(0.85%)	138(0.15%)	1,119(1.21%)	1,644(1.77%)	75,875	68,262(89.97%)	1,309(1.73%)	7,411(9.77%)	554(0.73%)	122(0.16%)	870(1.15%)	1,081(1.42%)
	108	District 108	91,612	-2,246 (-2.45%)	89,366	80,445(90.02%)	2,404(2.69%)	8,128(9.1%)	624(0.7%)	90(0.1%)	872(0.98%)	1,510(1.69%)	72,443	65,888(90.95%)	2,072(2.86%)	5,392(7.44%)	434(0.6%)	65(0.09%)	700(0.97%)	904(1.25%)
	109	District 109	91,612	-2,202 (-2.4%)	89,410	82,523(92.3%)	2,516(2.81%)	5,327(5.96%)	842(0.94%)	75(0.08%)	1,075(1.2%)	1,648(1.84%)	73,187	67,639(92.42%)	2,102(2.87%)	3,767(5.15%)	615(0.84%)	34(0.05%)	774(1.06%)	1,191(1.63%)
	110	District 110	91,612	-824 (-0.9%)	90,788	86,453(95.23%)	918(1.01%)	2,608(2.87%)	1,490(1.64%)	108(0.12%)	1,163(1.28%)	1,545(1.7%)	74,036	70,842(95.69%)	573(0.77%)	1,837(2.48%)	1,192(1.61%)	62(0.08%)	834(1.13%)	1,045(1.41%)

Draft State House Map 183  
9-28-21 v1 HD  
271a

Color	#	Name	VAP NH Black (Combo)
	0	Unassign	0(0%)
	1	District 1	18,591(28.62%)
	2	District 2	39,295(55.85%)
	3	District 3	3,501(5.31%)
	4	District 4	32,085(42.74%)
	5	District 5	5,702(7.8%)
	6	District 6	46,908(65.66%)
	7	District 7	7,617(11.48%)
	8	District 8	39,776(54.09%)
	9	District 9	2,707(3.68%)
	10	District 10	27,723(38.33%)
	11	District 11	30,845(43.74%)
	12	District 12	32,130(46.94%)
	13	District 13	8,618(11.78%)
	14	District 14	51,618(74.7%)
	15	District 15	41,231(63.28%)
	16	District 16	12,068(16.34%)
	17	District 17	47,655(69.29%)
	18	District 18	55,214(79.04%)



































	19	District 19	2,634(3.6%)
	20	District 20	11,400(15.65%)
	21	District 21	39,830(55.92%)
	22	District 22	29,467(39.66%)
	23	District 23	4,204(5.43%)
	24	District 24	13,980(17.91%)
	25	District 25	7,894(10.82%)
	26	District 26	3,058(4.16%)
	27	District 27	26,453(36.91%)
	28	District 28	27,167(38.64%)
	29	District 29	26,181(37.88%)
	30	District 30	5,652(7.68%)
	31	District 31	23,182(33.59%)
	32	District 32	1,017(1.4%)
	33	District 33	15,109(20.47%)
	34	District 34	1,207(1.62%)
	35	District 35	2,893(3.78%)
	36	District 36	3,525(5.06%)
	37	District 37	5,026(6.98%)
	38	District 38	2,881(4.01%)

	39	District 39	24,184(35.31%)
	40	District 40	2,622(3.55%)
	41	District 41	4,337(5.92%)
	42	District 42	7,295(9.71%)
	43	District 43	5,543(7.8%)
	44	District 44	7,419(10.6%)
	45	District 45	2,097(2.93%)
	46	District 46	758(1.03%)
	47	District 47	1,244(1.73%)
	48	District 48	2,022(2.76%)
	49	District 49	3,095(4.24%)
	50	District 50	344(0.48%)
	51	District 51	4,311(5.83%)
	52	District 52	5,056(6.87%)
	53	District 53	1,632(2.33%)
	54	District 54	2,209(3.07%)
	55	District 55	495(0.69%)
	56	District 56	2,042(2.73%)
	57	District 57	1,888(2.59%)
	58	District 58	1,305(1.72%)



	59	District 59	612(0.86%)
	60	District 60	433(0.6%)
	61	District 61	3,730(5.27%)
	62	District 62	1,139(1.56%)
	63	District 63	2,505(3.48%)
	64	District 64	1,404(2.02%)
	65	District 65	2,484(3.51%)
	66	District 66	13,470(18.71%)
	67	District 67	1,441(1.98%)
	68	District 68	20,852(28.8%)
	69	District 69	7,883(10.82%)
	70	District 70	4,976(6.33%)
	71	District 71	10,243(13.93%)
	72	District 72	2,710(3.76%)
	73	District 73	2,413(3.38%)
	74	District 74	16,318(21.72%)
	75	District 75	9,702(14.19%)
	76	District 76	5,735(8.06%)
	77	District 77	5,639(7.82%)
	78	District 78	941(1.44%)

	79	District 79	18,553(27.74%)
	80	District 80	5,788(8.19%)
	81	District 81	5,411(7.76%)
	82	District 82	5,063(6.96%)
	83	District 83	2,107(3%)
	84	District 84	1,297(1.83%)
	85	District 85	17,221(23.75%)
	86	District 86	1,837(2.61%)
	87	District 87	8,145(11.67%)
	88	District 88	12,405(17.53%)
	89	District 89	2,489(3.53%)
	90	District 90	7,496(9.53%)
	91	District 91	13,599(19.36%)
	92	District 92	13,378(18.69%)
	93	District 93	1,834(2.56%)
	94	District 94	1,052(1.47%)
	95	District 95	1,212(1.67%)
	96	District 96	823(1.21%)
	97	District 97	3,725(5.48%)
	98	District 98	3,485(4.74%)

	99	District 99	1,354(2.07%)
	100	District 100	2,347(3.28%)
	101	District 101	1,438(1.98%)
	102	District 102	1,156(1.55%)
	103	District 103	442(0.61%)
	104	District 104	639(0.84%)
	105	District 105	387(0.53%)
	106	District 106	402(0.53%)
	107	District 107	1,309(1.73%)
	108	District 108	2,072(2.86%)
	109	District 109	2,102(2.87%)
	110	District 110	573(0.77%)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONALD AGEE, JR., an individual, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOCELYN BENSON, in her official capacity  
as the Secretary of State of Michigan, *et al.*;

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00272


**Three-Judge Panel Appointed Pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)**

**Expert Report of Sean P. Trende**

January 18, 2023


Figures 5, 6

Detroit Area House Districts, Benchmark Plan, by BVAP



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Detroit Area House Districts, Hickory Plan, by BVAP




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
The net effect of this is to reduce the Black voting percentage multiple districts. These data are presented both in tabular and map form. The color shading in the following two maps displays the aggregate BVAP at the district level. The reduction in the BVAP in the Detroit area districts is evident from the lightened shade of the districts.

Figure 7

Detroit Area House Districts, Benchmark Plan, by BVAP



Detroit Area House Districts, Hickory Plan, by BVAP



The following table summarizes this, showing the districts under the various plans with the highest percent BVAP. Under the Benchmark Map, eleven districts are majority Black, ten of which are in the Detroit area. An additional district, District 4, is 47.65% Black. Under the reconstituted lines, however, only seven districts have a BVAP in excess of 46.2%, six of which are in the Detroit area.

Table 1


BVAP in 20 Most Heavily Black Michigan Districts			
Benchmark Plan		Hickory Plan	
District	BVAP	District	BVAP
7	92.0%	4	55.6%
8	90.1%	5	55.3%
3	88.6%	6	54.9%
9	72.2%	16	54.9%
10	65.4%	18	52.2%
1	63.2%	9	51.7%
35	60.5%	70	50.1%
34	58.5%	7	44.3%
2	56.0%	8	43.7%
5	52.3%	11	42.8%
6	50.9%	17	42.4%
4	45.6%	14	41.1%
29	34.3%	12	41.0%
95	33.7%	10	38.8%
49	27.8%	13	38.4%
54	26.3%	1	38.0%
12	25.4%	26	35.8%
11	25.1%	3	32.8%
92	24.0%	53	32.6%
27	23.0%	94	31.9%

The Senate tells a similar story. Under the Benchmark Plan, seven districts are contained wholly within Wayne County. Under the Linden Plan, however, these districts are drawn out into the suburbs as well, with eight districts crossing over the Wayne County line into either Oakland or Macomb counties.




Figures 9, 10

Detroit Area Senate Districts, Benchmark Plan, by BVAP



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Detroit Area Senate Districts, Linden Plan, by BVAP




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The end result of these changes is the same as with the House. Consistent with the exchanges reported in the Szetela Report, the BVAPs in the districts are decreased substantially. The Benchmark Plan had two districts drawn in excess of 50% BVAP and three more in excess of 45% BVAP. The Linden Plan, however, has just one district drawn in excess of 45% BVAP: A single district at 47.05% BVAP.

Figure 11

Detroit Area Senate Districts, Benchmark Plan, by BVAP



Detroit Area Senate Districts, Linden Plan, by BVAP




Table 2

BVAP in 10 Most Heavily Black Michigan Senate Districts			
Benchmark Plan		Linden Plan	
District	BVAP	District	BVAP
5	52.5%	7	44.8%
2	49.3%	3	42.1%
3	46.7%	10	40.4%
4	45.4%	8	40.2%
1	43.1%	6	39.1%
11	34.0%	1	35.0%
27	28.8%	27	27.3%
9	21.7%	2	24.5%
6	19.9%	11	19.2%
12	13.9%	5	18.3%

The result of this is a shift of political power away from Wayne County’s Black population and into the suburbs. Under the Benchmark Plan, seven districts contain a majority of their population in Wayne County, five of which are districts with substantial Black populations. Under the Linden Plan, that number falls to six (districts 1-6). Of those six districts, only three are even arguably districts that would likely elect the Black candidate of choice in a polarized primary.

**VI. Analysis of Michigan House of Representatives Hickory Plan**

**A. Gingles factors**

**1. Numerosity/compactness**

First, I was asked to draw a map that would include reasonably configured districts in the Wayne County area with Black majority VAPs, while reducing township, county and city splits. I was able to draw 10 such districts, though it is possible that an 11<sup>th</sup> could be drawn with more aggressive county splitting. For purposes of this map, I only changed districts 1-34 and 46-72. It is possible that a less disruptive map could be drawn by sacrificing compactness or splitting more township, county and city lines. A map of the altered districts follows, along with a summary of the relevant data from them. Individual maps of the districts follow in Appendix C.

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*IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION*

DONALD AGEE, JR., et al,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. 1:22-cv-272

JOCELYN BENSON, et al,

Defendants.

VOLUME IV

\_\_\_\_\_ /

*TRIAL*

*HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JANET T. NEFF, PAUL L MALONEY, and  
RAYMOND L. KETHLEDGE*

*Kalamazoo, Michigan  
November 6, 2023*

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28 110 Michigan Avenue NW.  
29 Grand Rapids, MI 49503

1 that was had completely later and I'm just forgetting, but I  
2 did summarize my findings from the primaries, and I believe I  
3 gave them at some point the racial black voting summary  
4 tables.

5 Q. And did anything in your analysis of the Democratic  
6 primaries in the Detroit area legislative districts alter the  
7 counsel or advice you had given the Commission in your  
8 September 2nd report and presentation?

9 A. No. I believe that I let the counsel know that I didn't  
10 find the primaries particularly relevant to the mapmaking task  
11 for a number of reasons.

12 Number one, we only had one statewide primary and you  
13 a need a statewide primary in order to do what's called  
14 recompile the election results. That's sort of the second  
15 part determining if you have an effective district and the  
16 more accurate part.

17 Second of all, half of these contests were not  
18 polarized.

19 Third, the black preferred candidate was winning in  
20 the contest -- many of the contests that were polarized so I  
21 didn't know how it could be used to direct the map drawing.

22 Let me add another factor. When the -- when I found  
23 that the black preferred candidate lost, I would say that  
24 there wasn't a clear relationship between the percentage BVAP  
25 of the district that they lost in and the loss of the

1 candidate. What I found was often other things explained it  
2 more exactly. It was the number of candidates who ran and the  
3 fact that black voters were not necessarily cohesive behind  
4 one of those candidates in, say, a five candidate contest, and  
5 that's not something you can draw a district to correct for.

6 Q. So by the time the commissioners were drawing the Detroit  
7 maps in later October, had you informed them directly or  
8 through their counsel of the preliminary results on the  
9 analysis in general and primary elections in Detroit?

10 A. Yes, I believe so.

11 Q. Now, I notice in your report, your expert report, you  
12 analyzed contests that Mr. Trende analyzed, additional ones,  
13 including additional 2014 Senate contests and 2014 and 2016  
14 House contests; is that right?

15 A. No, I didn't analyze those contests. I didn't have the  
16 data. I simply borrowed his estimates to include in my expert  
17 report to get more estimates of voter patterns in primaries.  
18 I reviewed his estimates and I accepted them as useful for  
19 including in my report without actually redoing the analysis.

20 Q. Okay. And so accepting Mr. Trende's analysis of those  
21 elections as correct for the purposes of this case, did  
22 anything in that analysis change your conclusions in your  
23 expert report?

24 A. No. It simply added more data points.

25 Q. And because I focused that question on your expert report,