IAOTSTAC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, 5 18 Civ. 2921 (JMF) V. 6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 7 COMMERCE, et al., Conference 8 Defendants. 9 10 11 NEW YORK IMMIGRATION COALITION, et al., 12 Plaintiffs, 13 V. 18 Civ. 5025 (JMF) 14 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 15 COMMERCE, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 New York, N.Y. October 24, 2018 20 2:35 p.m. 21 Before: 22 HON. JESSE M. FURMAN, 23 District Judge 24 25

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(Case called)

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Sorry we're getting off to a couple minutes late start. Just a reminder, I think we're on Call Court, so please make sure you speak into the microphone to make sure everybody, including all those in the courtroom, can hear us.

I think the first order of business is probably the government's application for a stay of trial and further pretrial proceedings. I had a couple of thoughts or questions that I wanted to pose on that front. The government's application is based primarily on the Supreme Court's order of the other night, but it seems to seek the precise relief that the court rejected, that is to say, a stay of discovery, including the Gore deposition.

I'm obviously mindful of Justice Gorsuch's words and take those words seriously, but my obligation is to follow the majority ruling, and I can't decline to do so because of what is stated in a dissent on behalf of two justices. That is to say, the Court lifted its stay on extra record discovery in the Gore deposition, yet the government seems to be seeking and asking me to grant that precise relief that they failed to get from the Supreme Court.

So how is your request consistent with the Supreme Court's order?

MS. BAILEY: Thank you for the opportunity to clarify,

your Honor. Our stay application reiterated our position that we think extra record discovery was not warranted, but the relief we sought was just a stay of the pretrial and trial proceedings until the Supreme Court rules on the ultimate forthcoming petition. So the deposition of John Gore is scheduled for, and he will be produced on Friday, as well as the other fact witnesses, so what we initially sought was the pretrial and trial proceedings.

THE COURT: I don't understand what you mean by pretrial proceedings. You mean the pretrial submissions, the filings that are due on Friday?

MS. BAILEY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand there's a fair amount of work that would go into that, but I think that 97 percent of that work has been completed since they're due in two days.

MS. BAILEY: We have certainly been working diligently on those submissions. We think those submissions could change dramatically depending on what the Court actually does. The government will be filing a petition for mandamus that seeks further review of all three orders as invited by the Supreme Court, and so if the Court upholds —

THE COURT: I know you keep saying the word "invited,"

I think it's used about seven times in your letter. I don't

actually think it's an invitation. They said you're not

precluded from making arguments with respect to those two other

orders. That's very different than an invitation. I just want to point that out.

But be that as it may, what's the harm in filing your pretrial submissions — on top of which you have never made the argument or you didn't make the argument, you didn't file a summary judgment motion, you elected not to do so — to make the argument that my review should be limited to the administrative record? That is to say you have effectively agreed to, or at least implicitly conceded that a trial is necessary to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. And on top of that, I don't think you have given up the argument that my decision should be based solely on the administrative record.

In other words, why not have a trial, you can make the argument that I should consider only this portion of the record and should ignore the rest, preserve that argument for appeal, let the Supreme Court, if it ultimately decides to review the case after a final judgment, consider that on appeal, but make the record and have a ruling. I don't understand the harm in letting the case proceed in the normal course.

MS. BAILEY: Two points, your Honor. Respectfully I think that we did argue strongly in our letter submission after the September 17 status conference that review should be resolved in summary judgment on the administrative record, and it is correct —

THE COURT: No, you made an argument for why I should

entertain a summary judgment motion, and I explicitly granted you permission to make a summary judgment motion, albeit noting my skepticism of it. You said at the conference last week that you were not filing a summary judgment motion. I have not precluded you from making that argument. You had every right in the world to make a motion saying that there is no need for a trial in this case and that my decision should be based solely on the administrative record, and I could have considered that before trial and made a decision on that basis. It is extraordinary to me that you would go running to a higher court to make that argument when you have literally never presented it to me.

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, that is correct, that you granted us the opportunity to file summary judgment. However, we read the signals in your Honor's order that the summary judgment — that your Honor was very skeptical of a summary judgment motion being capable of resolving this case.

THE COURT: But you didn't make one. So you're right, I was skeptical of it, but I have been persuaded of things that I have been skeptical of before, and you didn't make it. So I don't know, given that, why you should run to a higher court and say — I don't even take you to be arguing that trial is unnecessary in this case, it's just the scope of what I can consider in any trial.

MS. BAILEY: We do believe that trial is unnecessary

in this case, but we, perhaps mistakenly, but we read your Honor's order to suggest that your Honor viewed trial as necessary notwithstanding a summary judgment motion filed shortly before the trial was set to begin.

THE COURT: All right. Lastly, I have been operating since the beginning of this case on two assumptions, first, that time is of the essence. And indeed, I think your stay application underscores and reiterates that. You state explicitly that there's an urgent need for final decision in order to allow the Commerce Department adequate time to prepare for the census.

Second, I have assumed, as I said I think at the initial conference, and I think it's been more or less confirmed this week that I'm unlikely to have the last word here, and that whatever I decide is likely to be appealed to the Second Circuit if not to the Supreme Court.

Those two considerations, to me, mean that a trial should happen sooner rather than later because whatever decision I make -- and I want to stress, I haven't made any decision -- there needs to be adequate time for whoever loses here to appeal and ultimately potentially appeal to the Supreme Court. I don't think I have ever been told a drop dead date by which a final decision has to be made, but I know that the acting director of the census bureau has said that a decision should be made this fall, and that if it's not made by the

spring it would be very difficult and very expensive to deal with it.

I assume that you would need a decision certainly by next summer. That's a tall order even if we go to trial in a week and a half. I need time to make my decision, whoever loses needs time to appeal to the Second Circuit, and in theory whoever loses there needs time to seek cert before the Supreme Court. In the normal case that doesn't happen in a matter of months.

So I don't understand -- I mean, again, it seems to me that why not go to trial and preserve all your arguments concerning the scope of whatever I can consider in making a decision. If I make a wrong decision on that score, you can make that argument on appeal and you preserve whatever arguments you want and there's a comprehensive record from which everybody can make whatever arguments they want.

I don't get it.

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, the stay that we request wouldn't prejudice the ability to resolve this matter on the timeline that you laid out.

As to your point about when --

THE COURT: How is that? Do you know when the Supreme Court is going to make a decision? It took them 13 days to make a decision on your stay application. If you file a cert petition on Monday, presumably the plaintiffs will have an

opportunity to respond to that. I don't know when it would be conferenced. I don't know when it would be decided upon if they grant. I don't know if they're going to have oral argument. I don't know if they decide this case before next June. I don't know how you can say that.

MS. BAILEY: I can represent that we intend to file our mandamus petition quickly.

THE COURT: I assume you're filing it by Monday at 4:00 p.m., because if you don't then the stay is lifted and we can agreed with the Ross deposition, but --

MS. BAILEY: Certainly by then. But the stay that we're requesting would preserve judicial resource as well as those of parties. On the pretrial submission, while you're correct that we have been work diligently on that, it is an extraordinary lift to prepare all that. And if the Supreme Court were to grant relief and say that your Honor should not have expanded the record beyond the administrative record and should not have permitted discovery, that would dramatically change what the parties are submitting.

So it's a very large waste of effort to brief all of that when it is directly going to be pending before the Supreme Court, the scope of this Court's review. It seems prudent to wait and see what they determine as far as the scope of review.

THE COURT: And why are you not able to make that argument after a final judgment, which is the normal course in

litigation in federal court, that is to say, every time a party makes an argument that fails to persuade a trial court that would have obviated the need for a trial, if a higher court agrees with that argument it means that the trial was a waste of resources, judicial and otherwise. That's just inherent in the final judgment rule, but there are powerful reasons for the final judgment rule.

MS. BAILEY: Certainly, your Honor, but what is unusual is having a trial in an APA case at all. In this case in particular, as laid out in our stay motion, the number of attorney hours, paralegal hours, and the resources of the Department of Justice and Department of Commerce, there's a very large expenditure here for a trial. We think if the Supreme Court were to grant relief and hold that the decision should be made on the administrative record without extra record discovery, then that would negate the need for a trial at all because the case would be properly resolved on summary judgment.

THE COURT: All right. And once again, I think if there were no press for time I might agree with you, that it would make sense in what I think are slightly unusual circumstances to hit the pause button and see if the Supreme Court provides any guidance on that score. But I'm concerned that hitting the pause button for what may be an indefinite or at least lengthy period of time will then put us into jeopardy

in terms of your getting a final resolution of the plaintiffs' claims in this case.

So explain to me why that risk is not paramount here and calls for erring on the side of caution, which is to go to trial, create a comprehensive record that allows both sides to make whatever arguments they want to me and to any higher court thereafter, and we go from there.

Given the press for time, why is that not the way to proceed?

MS. BAILEY: While we agree that there is a need for the case to proceed somewhat expeditiously, we don't think the press for time is quite so dire. I'm not aware of any need for a decision to be this fall. The census bureau intends to print the forms next June, and there may be some flexibility in that, but to print the forms next June.

So we anticipate that while we don't know exactly how quickly the Supreme Court would rule, we anticipate that this would be briefed quickly. And we don't think that a short delay of trial proceedings, given the resource expenditure should trial proceed, would harm the ability to have final resolution of the case in time for the census bureau to print the forms next year.

In other words, should a stay be granted such that the trial were postponed while a petition for certiorari were brought to Supreme Court, we don't think that will stretch out

to such a length that it would prejudice the ability to have a final decision by June.

THE COURT: Well, except that you need to build into that timeline the time it takes the Supreme Court to resolve your petition, right, which may be a week, it may be six months. You need to then build in time for me to render a decision based on whatever I'm permitted to consider, whether it's the administrative record or a record of trial. You need to build in time for an appeal to the Second Circuit by whichever side loses in that proceeding, and then you need to build in time for whichever side loses there to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari, and you're telling me that you have confidence that all of that could occur before June.

It seems to me that the more sensible way to proceed is to have a trial, let both sides make whatever arguments they want to make and preserve all arguments for me, for the Second Circuit, and, if necessary, for the Supreme Court, that there is no harm that comes from that other than the attorney hours that are spent on trial. That is inherent in any case that goes to trial where the losing party preserves an argument for appeal.

MS. BAILEY: That's correct, your Honor, but not every case involves trial on an APA claim against an executive branch agency. That's what is unique here. Yes, there's an expenditure of attorney time in any case that proceeds to

trial, but it is remarkable for a trial to proceed on an APA case against --

THE COURT: So then the harm you're relying on is not actually the attorney time, it's somehow the scrutiny that is being brought to bear on an executive branch agency. Is that what you're saying?

MS. BAILEY: The time and resources wasted by both the attorneys at the Department of Justice and counsel and officials at the Department of Commerce, not just the scrutiny applied.

THE COURT: But that is true with any case that goes to trial involving the Department of Justice. If you preserve an argument for appeal, you lose in the trial court and you win on appeal, the trial was a waste of time. Full stop. That's just inherent in the final judgment rule.

So why is this case any different? I understand that there are sensitivities involved in scrutiny of the executive branch decision making, but you can preserve those arguments for appeal and make them on appeal.

MS. BAILEY: I think because it's highly remarkable and unusual to have a trial in a case brought under the Administrative Procedure Act. That's what is so unusual here. And the time required to hold a trial, the attorney time and the time of the counsel and officials at the Department of Commerce is remarkable.

In fact, plaintiffs now have pending a motion seeking to redepose or present live trial testimony from three very high ranking Department of Commerce officials. Plaintiffs continue to bring more and more discovery disputes, although we have turned over well over a hundred thousand pages of documents. The resource, time, and time here, between the high ranking Commerce officials and individuals with the census bureau, who should be focused on other non-litigation related matters, really is extraordinary. And we think, were the Supreme Court to agree with us that that case should be resolved based on the administrative record, then thousands of attorney and official hours over the next month or so would be for waste.

THE COURT: And am I wrong there are other cases that have gone to trial on review of APA claims, correct? There were several of those cited in the plaintiffs' letter concerning whether summary judgment should proceed or not.

MS. BAILEY: I believe there are some.

THE COURT: Did the government seek mandamus in those cases when the court put those down for trial?

MS. BAILEY: I'm not aware of any mandamus being sought in any cases brought by plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Thank you. You can have a seat.

Can I hear from anyone at the front table who wishes to be heard on this?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.

Plaintiffs agree that time is of the essence in this case, and we are concerned, as the Court is, that a speculative delay of an uncertain period of time would compromise plaintiff's ability to obtain relief that could ultimately be effectuated in this case, namely the removal of the citizenship question from the census.

As the Court has noted, trial in this case is necessary in any event. The parties dispute standing. The parties have technical experts regarding census procedures, Carey v. Klutznick, Baldridge, the City of New York cases. As we discussed before, these are trial cases that arose in this jurisdiction, APA claims involving census decision making.

Now with respect to defendant's arguments about irreparable harm involving resources, involving staying at hotels. Setting aside that those matters do not rise to the level of irreparable harm, with respect to hotel stays, docket 227 in which the local U.S. Attorney's Office withdrew from this case, local counsel who would not need to stay at hotels, presumably, they represented that there would be no undue disruption. Now that is not just disruption, that is irreparable harm packaged in defendants' application.

But to the extent that defendants are concerned that the ultimate presentation of trial testimony with respect to extra record discovery is excessive or wasteful or will confuse

the matter, plaintiffs can parse out in their post-trial briefing what findings of fact and conclusions of law stem from the extra record discovery and what stems simply from what we understand to be the complete administrative record, so that to the extent in the intervening time period a decision comes down with respect to that matter, the Court can make that determination based on the relevant record.

THE COURT: Can I interrupt? I think, assuming we proceed, and obviously that is the question, I think that the parties should proceed along those lines regardless. I mean whether we get guidance from the Supreme Court in the next week or two, I think it would make abundant sense for the parties to parse their arguments and say to the extent the Court's review is limited to the administrative record, here are the reasons we should win, X, Y and Z, and to the extent that the Court can consider the extra record discovery, here are the reasons and so forth.

I think the preeminent concern here should be, A, getting a decision sooner rather than later, and B, not having to do this again. It strikes me that the worst case scenario is for me make a decision based on material that a later court determines I'm not allowed to consider, and a remand to figure out what the outcome should be here.

I think having a comprehensive record, arguments made comprehensively and me being able to consider all of those and

make a record for whatever later court to review, is probably sensible no matter what, if we proceed.

Go ahead.

MR. HO:

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes, your Honor.

I am hard pressed to understand why defendants, in their seventh application for a stay on the same grounds that now 14 judges have rejected, who offer no new grounds for this stay, should be permitted to disrupt our trial proceedings on the eve of trial. As the Court has noted, time is of the essence and we should proceed to trial.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Bailey, I will give you a brief last word, and then --

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. HO: Your Honor, may I make one point briefly?

THE COURT: I will give you a brief intermediate word.

I think, from our perspective, trial is inevitable in this case, regardless of what the Supreme Court ultimately rules about the appropriateness of considering extra record discovery materials with respect to the merits of the claim.

Because one of principal issues in dispute between the parties is the standing of the plaintiffs.

Now that requires a consideration of extra record materials with respect to the effect of the citizenship question on plaintiff jurisdictions and on plaintiff non-governmental organizations. That's not something that can

be discerned from the administrative record. The defendants have never taken the position that discovery with respect to standing is inappropriate in this case. There were definitely factual disputes between the parties about that that could not be resolved on summary judgment. In fact, the bulk of the evidence that the plaintiffs seek to adduce at trial goes to the effect of this question on the organizations, on their resources, on their members, on the distribution of federal resources and apportionment of political power. These are things that are going to be disputed amongst the parties regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on the propriety of considering extra record discovery materials.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Bailey?

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, just two quick points, if I may. I'm able to represent that the government would seek expedition of any petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, so we would seek to have that move as quickly as possible.

And second, when plaintiffs talk about how many times defendants have requested a stay and how many judges have denied that, I think that is somewhat missing the point because we're not seeking a stay of discovery, which we previously had sought. We are just pointing out that if the Supreme Court were to grant relief as far as the record, then that would negate the need for a trial on some the issues that your Honor indicated you want a trial on. So this isn't a repetition of

the same stay we requested previously.

THE COURT: Thank you for clarifying that.

I'm going to reserve decision, as potentially unsatisfying as that may be at the moment. I think these are important issues and it's important to get them right. And for that reason, while I recognize that there is some urgency to decide the stay application, particularly with respect to the pretrial submissions, which are obviously due imminently, I'm going to reserve judgment and rule on the matter by way of written order.

I will do that as quickly as I can, but in the meantime, of course, there is no stay, except the Supreme Court's potentially temporary but potentially permanent stay of the Ross deposition. So everything will continue as previously ordered. So that is to say, unless and until I say otherwise, or if some other court says otherwise, your pretrial submissions will remain due on Friday.

Per my order of October 18, fact discovery is currently set to close tomorrow. I'm going to keep that deadline in place but will grant a limited extension until Sunday to permit the depositions of Mr. Gore, Mr. Langdon and Mr. Neuman to proceed, as I understand they have been scheduled by your status letters of this morning.

I think there are a couple of pending disputes or motions, one of when which is fully submitted, namely the

plaintiff's motion to call as live witnesses or present live direct testimony of several witnesses. That's docket number 386. Recognizing that if I grant the stay of trial there's no need to resolve this right now, I will nonetheless do so just to keep things moving in the meantime. Both sides effectively concede, I think, that the matter is entirely within my discretion. In that regard, I think that my decision on this front should be driven by what would be most helpful to me in making a decision and understanding the issues in this case.

Applying that standard, I'm going to and do deny the plaintiffs' application with respect to the two pure fact witnesses, as I understand it, I think the organizational witnesses. I don't see any reason to think that hearing their direct testimony live would be particularly helpful, given the nature of their testimony, given that they will be presumably cross-examined live and subject to redirect examination live as well.

I will, however, grant the application with respect to plaintiffs' expert witnesses and defendants' corresponding request to allow Dr. Abowd to testify as a live witness on direct examination, too. I think, given the technical nature of the subject matter, I think it might be potentially helpful for me to hear their direct testimony live. So there's no need to submit written affidavits with respect to those witnesses' direct testimonies, but there is with respect to the others, as

previously ordered. So that motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to take the de bene esse depositions of several witnesses. That motion will be fully submitted tomorrow, and I will try to decide it promptly thereafter unless it's mooted by my ruling on the stay application.

And then there's the motion to limit the testimony of Dr. Abowd, docket number 387. Per my order of October 22nd, defendants have until Friday to file any opposition to that motion, and plaintiffs have until Monday at 5:00 p.m. to file any reply, again barring any stay being granted.

From your status letters I have identified I think four potentially open issues or disputes. Let me go through those and then we can talk about whether they are in fact issues and disputes, and if so, how to proceed.

First I think is a remaining dispute with respect to defendants' response to interrogatory number one, namely those with whom Secretary Ross I think consulted or spoke with after taking office about the issues in this case. Second is whether the October 16 production should be deemed part of the administrative record. That certainly seems like an important thing to resolve given the issues that we have been discussing. Third is the apparent dispute regarding two documents on the government's privilege log with respect to the October 3rd

production. And fourth is the issue pertaining to the transcripts of the focus groups that were convened as part of the Census Barriers, Attitudes and Motivators study.

Let me say a word on that particular issue since it may have some bearing on how we proceed. Plaintiffs I think suggest that I previously ruled that those transcripts had to be produced, and that's true to a point, but I think somewhat misleading. At the September 14 conference I overruled the defendants' responsiveness objections but I specifically said that defendants couldn't assert more specific objections, which would presumably include privilege or privacy-type claims and claims of redactions of the sort that they're I think now making.

My understanding is that in the wake of that ruling on September 20, defendants notified plaintiffs that they would be producing summaries only, given the privacy interest of the focus group participants. And I don't think plaintiffs have disputed that, but for reasons that I don't quite understand, plaintiffs didn't raise it with defendants until October 12, and didn't raise it with me until this morning. The delay obviously between the 12th and now could conceivably be related to Justice Ginsberg's stay order, but I don't recall the plaintiffs even flagged this issue at our last conference, and regardless, it doesn't explain their delay between September 20 and the date of Justice Ginsberg's order.

So given the delay, given what I think is the marginal value of the transcripts relative to the summaries that plaintiffs do have, and given the focus group participants' privacy interests and confidentiality interests that may or may not be protected by law, but in either cases I think would require consideration, to put it mildly, I am quite skeptical the plaintiffs' requests for the unredacted transcripts. In light of that, it's not clear to me that it is worth briefing the transcript issue, although, as I said to Ms. Bailey a few minutes ago, sometimes people can overcome my skepticism. But I think unless the plaintiffs think that they have compelling arguments that I haven't considered that could overcome my skepticism, I suspect that their resources may be better spent elsewhere. So that's number one.

Number two, it's not clear to me that it's necessary to brief the second and third issues that I mentioned, the administrative record and log issues. I would like to think that the parties could resolve their disagreements on that, and maybe they already have, so I would like to hear from you on that. And if there is a need to brief it, I would think that we should, again barring stay, set a relatively quick briefing schedule so that we have those issues resolved along with the open issues remaining with respect to interrogatory number one.

So folks at the front table, do you want to take those on?

MR. HO: Sure, your Honor. It's still not clear to us why the documents that were produced were not produced as part of the administrative record when they were part --

THE COURT: Which documents are we talking about?

MR. HO: Sorry, the pre-December 2017 documents which your Honor referenced as point two of the four issues to discuss.

THE COURT: This is the October 16 production?

MR. HO: Yes, your Honor. Sorry.

So it's still not clear to us why those documents were not produced as part of the supplement to the administrative record but were instead produced as extra record materials. They are within the possession of the Commerce Department, they relate to the consideration of the — or the decision to add the citizenship question to the census. We tried to meet and confer with the defendants on this. We're happy to continue to talk with them about this, but from our perspective we're not clear as for the basis why they were not designated as part of the AR.

THE COURT: Let's take the issues one at a time, Ms. Bailey, on that one.

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, I think that the assertion that it's unclear why these materials weren't part of the original record supplementation in response to Court's orders is disingenuous.

THE COURT: Slow down, please.

MS. BAILEY: We think that's disingenuous. The search terms that we negotiated and agreed upon with plaintiffs in order to resolve their fifth motion to compel included terms that would never have been within any agency's construction of an administrative record. For instance, we negotiated with plaintiffs and we included as search terms terms that plaintiffs thought might produce evidence of discriminatory animus.

I don't believe they did, but we ended up using search terms such as "illegals" and "immigrants" that would never have been in an administrative record. We also included as search terms individuals who had come up in our previous productions. So we included searches for terms such as "Steve Bannon," for several DOJ officials, for a Department of Homeland Security official. There's no way that the Department of Commerce would have included those individuals' names as a search terms in compiling an administrative record. That would not have been a part of the original record or the record supplementation ordered by your Honor. We went back and included search terms that plaintiffs came up with after they had seen the materials that we produced in response to your July 3rd order.

THE COURT: That seems a little bit non-responsive to me. And I hear your point, and it may be that if something was -- if there's a hit with respect to a search term that

would not normally be within the scope of the administrative record -- Steve Bannon, let's say -- fine, but presumably -- I mean the mere fact that you found documents by running certain searches doesn't necessarily mean that the documents that you then produced should not have been part of the administrative record in the first instance. I think that's a separate determination from how you found them.

In other words, conducting searches using search terms is just a shorthand convenient way of trying to identify documents that are responsive and should have been perhaps part of the record in the first place. I would think that whether they are or aren't is not a function of how they're found.

Am I missing something?

MS. BAILEY: So the documents that were produced on October 16 were -- not all, but a lot of it was cumulative material that had already been collected. So a lot of the particular documents had been produced from multiple custodians. So it's not clear to me exactly how much of that was genuinely new material, but the way we went about producing the material on October 16 was from negotiating with plaintiffs on particular search terms. So we treated that like a discovery endeavor. That's why I'm referencing search terms.

We negotiated with them on what we would search and from whom.

So we added to the universe of terms. And so there were documents that came up that had already been produced,

documents that had not been produced. But it's not clear to me why those materials would be part of the record. So I can't represent that there might not be individual documents that perhaps — in other words, that our record supplementation was completely flawless, but we think it was diligent. And we think that the October 16 material, a lot of what was there came up under search terms that never would have been part of record and wouldn't have been included as part of the record.

THE COURT: All right. So back to you, Mr. Ho, and let me ask you this: Is this something that we need to resolve before a trial if we are proceeding to a trial?

Obviously if either I or the Supreme Court were to decide that I could only consider administrative review records, we need to nail this down. But assuming that we proceed to trial -- and along the lines of what I said, everybody preserves every argument that they could possibly want to make under the sun -- doesn't it make sense to basically -- number one, you can confer and hopefully reach agreement perhaps with respect to specific documents, if you think that some should have been included in the record and are important, given the potential importance of that distinction; and number two, if you can't agree in the course of your briefing in connection with my decision, you can make arguments as to why certain documents should be deemed part of the administrative record.

Does that not make more sense?

MR. HO: I think you're right, your Honor, that this isn't something that needs to be decided en masse before trial. Provisionally I think we can agreed agree that the best way to handle this is on a document-by-document basis. If there's a dispute over something that the defendants believe was not the record but was produced in discovery, we could argue that it should have been made part of the administrative record. If that proves to be a voluminous number of documents, perhaps it makes sense at some point to brief that issue, but it doesn't seem to be something that necessarily needs to be resolved in the next few days.

THE COURT: Great. Let's not resolve it in the next few days. Barring a stay, you have plenty of other work to be doing, and so do I.

Ms. Bailey?

MS. BAILEY: May I seek clarification on that? I think as far as plaintiffs were to identify any documents from the October 16 production that they think should have been excluded in the AR and they would like to rely on them, I think we should meet and confer on those documents. But what I don't think should happen is for plaintiffs go back to all the materials produced in discovery and try to pick and choose documents that they think should have been part of the record and try to classify them differently at this stage. So I think

the conferring process on materials that they think should be included in the record should be limited to the October 16 production.

THE COURT: I thought that's what we were talking about.

MS. BAILEY: I just wanted to be clear because Mr. Ho said if there are documents in discovery that defendants thought should be discovery, not record, I just want to be clear that we're talking only about the October 16 and not discovery generally.

THE COURT: Well, listen, I mean if the plaintiffs identify a document that they got on some other date other than October 16 that they think legitimately should have been part of the administrative record and was unjustifiably excluded from the record, I don't think see why they shouldn't have an opportunity to raise that with you, and barring agreement, bring it to my attention. I certainly hope there wouldn't be anything if only because you conducted a diligent if not flawless search, but I don't see why I should bar them from making that argument if they come across something that they think was improperly excluded.

Am I missing something?

MS. BAILEY: I take your point, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. So why don't you all keep this in mind as you proceed, and that is to say I think the burden

should be on plaintiffs if you come across a document that is not currently part of the administrative record that you have reason to believe should be part of the administrative record, I think in the first instance you should confer with defendants. And barring agreement, if you think it's important, recognizing, again, that this may ultimately be a critical distinction, then you should raise it with me and we can discuss at that point when and how the best way to do that is; if that should be done as part of any post-trial briefing, that we proceed, or if should be done separately.

MR. HO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I will assume there's no issues on that front unless you tell me otherwise.

Next let's talk about the October 3rd privilege log disputes. I understand there are only two documents at issue there. Is that a remaining dispute?

MR. HO: That's right, your Honor. There are two documents on the October 3rd privilege log from the Department of Justice's production. These are documents that which were shared with Mr. Gore. They are being withheld on the basis of, among other things, attorney-client privilege.

And that I think is confusing to us, your Honor, given that Mr. Gore is not a party in the lawsuit, he's not counsel in the lawsuit, he's being treated like a third party. All the discovery related to Mr. Gor has been conducted under Rule 45.

This is not a document that appears to have been either created or shared with Mr. Gore after litigation commenced, it seems like it was a document that was shared with him earlier. And there doesn't seem to be a basis for withholding it on the basis of attorney-client privilege. And this is obviously an important matter given Mr. Gore's deposition on Friday.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Bailey.

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, the document to which Mr. Ho refers is that Uthmeier memo, it's a legal memo that your Honor already upheld our claim of privilege on. It's a legal memo written within the Department of Commerce, it was shared with Mr. Gore, and we don't think it's unusual or remarkable that legal analysis was shared between agencies. We view this as working on a joint defense agreement and regard it as attorney-client. It's a document you have already seen and ruled on, and a note at attached to it, which I believe was handwritten, but I'm not a hundred percent sure on that.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. BAILEY: I think it was a Post-it note attached to it as the second document.

THE COURT: I certainly did review the memo. I recall that. I don't recall the precise issue of it being shared with Mr. Gore being raised in connection with that. So I guess it seems like that's the critical issue here and whether that makes any difference in the analysis.

Yes, Ms. Bailey.

MS. BAILEY: That wasn't part of the previous briefing. It turned up in the search of DOJ documents and was logged appropriately as a document that was provided to Mr. Gore. So that wasn't part of the previous briefing, but we think that the analysis and the privilege claim still applies the same.

THE COURT: All right. So that seems to be the heart of the matter.

Mr. Ho, do you have any authority for the proposition that sharing it with a lawyer at a different agency would waive the privilege?

MR. HO: Well, we didn't have an opportunity to brief this yet, your Honor, but it seems like the defendants want to have it both ways here by treating Mr. Gore as a non-party, as someone who is obviously not a defendant in this lawsuit, he's not counsel. He's never been represented or held out as counsel or consultant for counsel. He's not a DOJ lawyer in the way that Ms. Bailey is who is representing the Department of Commerce and Secretary Ross, he's just another person in the Department of Justice. And it doesn't seem like sharing that document with him would be within the umbrella of attorney-client privilege, but we would be happy to brief that, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's give you an

opportunity to do that, but mindful that you don't have a lot of time, since my understanding is that the deposition is proceeding on Friday.

MR. HO: That's right, your Honor.

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, I emphasize that we asserted not only attorney-client but also deliberate process privilege over that memo, and that would certainly qualify as well, and there is no issue of waiver between the two departments.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ho, your response to that?

MR. HO: My understanding is that Mr. Gore was not a

decision within the Department of Commerce who is involved in

the decision to add a citizenship question to the census, and

doesn't seem like the deliberate process privilege would apply

to him.

Your Honor has granted our motion to compel his testimony on the grounds that his participation in drafting the Gary letter to request the citizenship question be added to the census was a proper topic for discovery. So to the extent that Mr. Gore has any information about the process that led to the decision to request a citizenship question from — or be included in the census to the census bureau, I think that's implicit in your Honor's order granting the motion to compel that Mr. Gore's knowledge of that is a proper subject of discovery.

THE COURT: Well, I think the issue isn't -- I don't

think the memo here was written by him, and I don't know whether the handwritten note was or not, but I think the issue is whether sharing it with him somehow vitiates the deliberative process privilege that I do think at least applies in the first instance to the document. Again, I think that's the critical question for both privileges. So the fact that he's not a decision maker within the Commerce Department is neither here nor there in that regard, it's just a question of what the consequence of sharing it with him, if any, is.

So how do you guys propose we proceed? I recognize you need a swift ruling here. I mean you could submit simultaneous letters, plaintiffs could submit a letter and if I think a response is necessary, because I'm skeptical the plaintiff's argument here — again, skepticism doesn't mean a ruling — you could submit a letter tomorrow with the understanding that if I did direct a response it would be within a couple of hours.

How would you propose to proceed?

MR. HO: Why don't I confer with my co-counsel on that, your Honor, but tentatively perhaps we could submit -- if we decide to move forward on this issue, noting your Honor's skepticism about it, we could tentatively commit to submitting something at noon tomorrow.

THE COURT: Why don't you tentatively commit to submitting something by 10:00 a.m. tomorrow. And assuming that

a reply is necessary, I will have it filed by 4:00 p.m. tomorrow, and then I will decide it at some point later tomorrow.

MR. HO: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Interrogatory number one.

MR. GERSCH: Yes, your Honor. So interrogatory number one is a matter we raised in our October 15 status report to the Court. We were unable to move with respect to that because of the stay that had been issued. But just to review, this was an interrogatory we served trying to understand who the various federal officials were who were identified in the supplemental memorandum.

THE COURT: I recall it well. What has changed at the September conference, if I recall, defendants made a representation that they had exhausted their efforts to determine the identities of those people. I commented something along the lines of you can't draw blood from a stone, and I recognized that thereafter defendants did disclose some additional information that someone happened to remember, but what remains to be done? I would think that we're still in the same stone not drawing blood territory.

MR. GERSCH: Yes, your Honor. I think the fact that the secretary was able to remember that had in fact spoken to Mr. Bannon after the lawyers represented that there was nothing

more available suggests that there is more available.

And by way of background, we learned in discovery that the supplemental memorandum was in fact drafted by the Department of Justice. It drafted by the Department of Justice, they sent it to the Department of Commerce and they advised the secretary to sign it. That was the testimony. Earl Comstock. He said he edited the memo, that Mr. Rothmayer edited the memo, but it came from the Department of Justice.

When we were last in court, in going over the transcript I note Ms. Bailey said very clearly we looked throughout Commerce. What we would like to have happen now, and we think they should look at Commerce again to see if there's more information, but we think they should identify who in the Department of Justice actually drafted this, who is responsible for the reference to the senior administration officials who had raised this matter previous to the secretary considering it, and find out what the basis was for them putting that in the memo. And I think all those facts should be disclosed.

And your Honor, given the timing of this, we don't think it would be too much to ask that the person who drafted that language appear in court and be able to answer questions about it rather than us continuing to go back and forth trying to draw blood from a stone.

THE COURT: All right. Well, this is part of why I

think the deposition of Secretary Ross would have been nice, but it remains to be seen whether that will happen.

Ms. Bailey.

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, first of all, this is the first time we have ever heard that plaintiffs would like defendants to disclose who among individuals in the Department of Justice participated in drafting a supplemental memo. That is core attorney-client material, and we have had no warning that they were seeking the names of individuals within the Department of Justice who participated in that, and we don't think there would be any basis to disclose that.

However, the fact that we supplemented our response to interrogatory one shows that we have been diligent in providing all information that we reasonably can obtain from the Department of Commerce. So when we filed — when we supplemented the response to interrogatory number one the first time we provided all information that we were able to obtain after a reasonable search. And when additional information came to light through this process, we provided that very promptly to plaintiffs. We have simply have done all that we can do. There's no additional information that we can obtain within the Department of Commerce, and there's no ground to inquire as to who among the Department of Justice participated in drafting that memo.

THE COURT: Mr. Gersch?

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MR. GERSCH: Yes, your Honor. I don't believe the identity of the lawyers is attorney-client privilege, and I don't believe that you can make facts disappear under the attorney-client privilege by telling them to a lawyer. I think it's fairly evident someone drafted this. The idea that senior administration officials raised this before the secretary considered it is not some trivial detail. The notion that that might have been accidently dropped into the memorandum -- which no one claims, by the way -- I think would not be credible at all.

Someone drafted this, they drafted it because they were told by someone that senior administration officials raised this, and all we want, your Honor, since there's no other way to find out, is to have the persons who are responsible for that language identified and to have them identify or disclose the basis for saying that. It's clear they were told that by someone.

MS. BAILEY: Your Honor, it is correct that you can't obscure facts by telling them to an attorney, but that's not what we are seeking to do. We have provided all facts known at the Department of Justice on this matter, period.

THE COURT: I think on the basis of those representations, I don't think there's anything further that I can or should order. I agree that the identity of the person who drafted it is not necessarily privileged information, but

nor do I think it's relevant information. What is relevant is the substance. The government has supplemented its disclosures when it has come across additional information, for which I credit them. I have no basis to doubt the government's representation that it has exhausted its efforts on that front, it is, to repeat, another reason that I think a deposition of the secretary would be appropriate here, but that is not for me to decide at this point.

All right. And then the last item that I identified is the transcript issue. In light of my comments, I don't know if plaintiffs want to proceed with that or give that issue up, but what's your pleasure?

MR. HO: In light of your comments, your Honor, I think we'll confer internally and notify the Court very quickly if we decide that we think that some sort of motion on that is appropriate before trial.

THE COURT: All right. Fine. So unless I hear from you, I will assume that that issue is resolved.

MR. HO: I think that's fair, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Are there other issues that I overlooked in the letters? I know that plaintiffs noted that they may seek leave to supplement — again, assuming that I deny the motion for a stay or don't rule on it before Friday, that they may seek leave to supplement the exhibit list. In light of the production of 92,000 new documents yesterday, I

would say in principal that sounds reasonable to me. I don't entirely understand why that many documents were produced only yesterday, but that's neither here nor there.

Plaintiff should do their best to present a comprehensive exhibit list, but if there's good cause to supplement it, and the need to review 92,000 documents may well provide it, then you should seek appropriate relief. I think the first step will be conferring with defense counsel, and perhaps they would agree, and I assume they would be reasonable on this front, but if they don't, then you could seek relief from me.

Anything else that was raised or not raised, as the case may be?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes, your Honor. With respect to plaintiffs' motion for live testimony, one of the expert witnesses identified by plaintiffs is Dr. Joseph Salvo. Dr. Salvo is prepared to offer both expert testimony as well as fact testimony. Would the Court prefer unified live testimony or should we prepare one fact declaration or affidavit and then have him testify solely as to matters within his expert purview?

THE COURT: Can you estimate what percentage of his testimony would be fact based and what percent would be expert based? My instinct was to include him among the live witnesses on the theory that it would be sort of artificial and silly to

sort of bifurcate it, have part written, part oral, but maybe I --

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Plaintiffs agree, your Honor. We estimate his fact testimony would be ten percent of his testimony, at most.

THE COURT: So you can proceed live.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Bailey?

MS. BAILEY: Two quick matters, your Honor. As far as the production yesterday, I wanted to make clear that of the 92,000 that were served, the very vast majority of that were materials from within the Department of Justice that aren't directly relevant to this case. It was a very broad subpoena. So it's very little remaining material from the Department of Commerce, although there were some.

But more importantly, yesterday, last evening, the parties exchanged their preliminary exhibit lists, so we thank plaintiffs for providing that, but they provided us the draft exhibit list of 523 proposed exhibits, and it would be very difficult for us to prepare our objections to those in just a few days' time. So we have not yet had an opportunity to raise this with plaintiffs since we got it about 7:00 p.m. last night, but we would like some additional time to launch objections or prepare an objection list for the 523 proposed exhibits.

THE COURT: Do you want to submit them by noon on Monday?

MS. BAILEY: Yes, your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: Both sides could submit objections to exhibits by noon on Monday.

Anything else?

MR. HO: Yes, your Honor. If I could follow up on the issue of live testimony. One of the witnesses that you identified as that you would be granting a motion to present live testimony from was Dr. Abowd, the defense witness. We haven't obviously produced our witness lists yet, but Dr. Abowd was also a witness we had intended on calling. And with the Court's permission, given that Dr. Abowd will be appearing live, we would seek to adduce our testimony from him live as well.

THE COURT: I think that would make abundant sense.

He's a representative of one of the defendants, so I think that probably would have been appropriate regardless, but sounds good to me.

MR. HO: Okay, thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, there are a few questions that we have seeking clarification as to the pretrial filings due on Friday. Very briefly, and I apologize if I was dense in reading your Honor's pretrial order, but some questions with respect to the deposition designation. We know those are due on Friday, but

it was, to our eyes anyway, unclear whether or not objections and counter designations were also due on Friday, whether the transcripts of those depositions were also due to the Court on Friday, or simply the pages and line numbers, and whether or not if the transcripts are in fact due to the Court — or whenever they're due, if the Court prefers to get full copies of those transcripts with the designated portions highlighted or simply excerpts.

THE COURT: So in the normal course the pretrial order would contain the designations and any relevant objections and any relevant counter designations. I don't know if you are all prepared to do that on Friday. I'm seeing Ms. Bailey shaking her head no, and I infer from what you just said you might not be. So perhaps we can modify that schedule.

In answer to your last question, it certainly I think would be most helpful to me if you submitted full transcripts with highlighted portions indicating designations, counter designations and objections, and differentiating which side was objecting to what, and ideally even annotating in the margins of those what the basis for the objection is, even if that is contained in some corresponding chart of some sort as well.

But let's go back to the first point, which is sounds like you're all not prepared to designate and have objections in the pretrial order on Friday.

MR. HO: Well, it's not clear to us if the defendants

are actually designating any depositions. We had set an informal deadline yesterday of exchanging pretrial material.

We sent our designations over to them but we haven't received any from them, so we may not have anything to counter designate or object to. But I will let Ms. Bailey speak for the department on that and whether will they will be ready on Friday to object and counter designate.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. BAILEY: We intend to file counter objections, but we aren't designating from the deposition for our case in chief, so we didn't provide any to plaintiffs yesterday, but we intend to counter designate from what they shared with us.

THE COURT: When do you plan to do that?

MS. BAILEY: We could do that by Friday, but it would be quite a big lift and we would prefer additional time.

THE COURT: Why don't you guys talk amongst yourselves about this, and I'm okay — this is not a jury trial, assuming that there is any trial. And in that regard, I don't think there's as much urgency in including this in a pretrial order as there might be, that is to say I don't need to resolve most of these issues before trial, I could take them under advisement.

On that score, I note, both with respect to exhibits and with respect to designations, and frankly with respect to testimony in court, I would keep your relevance-type objections

to a minimum, because if evidence is relevant I will consider it, if it's not relevant I won't consider it. In that score, you're better off finding about other things.

But why don't you talk and figure out if there's a sensible timeline and procedure with respect to these designations and counter designations. I frankly don't anticipate looking at them until close to the end of next week at the earliest, so in that regard it's fine with me if you want to take another few days, again assuming that this is not all mooted by my ruling on the stay application.

MR. HO: Thank you, your Honor. If I may, one other question about depositions and then one other question about witnesses.

Obviously there's some depositions that are still ongoing, and we will not by able to designate, if we choose to designate from those depositions, by Friday. Is there a date by which the depositions that will be happening this week and this weekend your Honor would like us to have our designations in for?

THE COURT: Why don't you include that in the same conversation, and I think as long as you come up with something reasonable and present it to me I probably will bless it, but see if you can agree first.

MR. HO: Thank you, your Honor. One final question with respect to witness declarations. The pretrial order says

we are to serve those on Friday. Our interpretation of that was that we had to share those with the opposing party by Friday, but we were unclear as to when affirmative witness declarations should be submitted to the Court and in what format.

THE COURT: I think my rules say they are to be submitted but not filed on Friday, meaning you should email to the chamber's email address and serve them on defense counsel. If it's not clear, I will revisit that, but that is what you should to.

MR. HO: Thank you, your Honor, I appreciate your guidance.

THE COURT: Any other questions, issues? Anything?
MS. BAILEY: Not for defendants, your Honor.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Not for the governmental plaintiffs, your Honor.

MR. HO: Not from us, your Honor.

THE COURT: I did have one housekeeping note in case anybody needs to plan accordingly. I think I noted in my order of some recent date that assuming trial proceeds that it will be held in Courtroom 110. My inclination is to think, given that's a sizable courtroom, there's no need for an overflow courtroom. But if you guys have any reason to think otherwise, you have a better sense than I whether there are going to be a lot of people coming for any portion of the proceedings, you

should let me know. The sooner you can let me know, the better; certainly no later than the final pretrial conference, if we proceed with that, on November 1st.

And the answer doesn't have to be yes as to the whole trial. If you think there is some portions of it that for some reason that you know that I don't that are likely to be of greater public interest and an overflow would be appropriate, you can let me know. I can't promise that I can find one.

Because of renovations going on in the courthouse, space is a little bit at a premium, but the bottom line is we can't do anything unless we have the relevant information. So right now I'm not going arrange for an overflow courtroom. I have the oversized courtroom instead, but if you think I should do otherwise, please let me know as soon as possible.

Second and relatedly, so folks can plan accordingly if they want to, I do not use Court Call for trials. I am prepared to use it for the final pretrial conference if we proceed with that on November 1st, but assuming that the case does go to trial, it will not be carried live on Court Call. So anyone who wishes to listen to it will have to be present in the courtroom, or if there's an overflow, in the overflow, but I wanted to make sure everybody was aware of that.

That's it. All right. Thank you very much. I will reserve decision on the stay application. In the meantime, everything will proceed, and we are adjourned. Thank you.